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INTRODUCTION 
Ohio attorney Columbus Delano envisioned a bleak future if the state supreme 
court upheld a new voting law. The innovative 1863 statute allowed absent Civil War 
soldiers to vote in Ohio elections, just  as   if   they  were  home.  Delano’s  client,  Democrat  
John McBride, would have won his election bid for Wayne County probate judge based 
exclusively on the votes cast within the county, but he lost the race when canvassers 
added the votes of absent soldiers to  the  home  vote.     Before  the  law’s  enactment,   there  
was no such thing as absentee voting in Ohio, and Delano argued that the legislature 
lacked authority to invent it.  The law giving absent soldiers an opportunity to vote was 
not only unconstitutional, Delano  insisted,  but  also  “subversive  to  the  very  foundation  of  
the  state  government.”    It  would  transform  the  elective  franchise  intolerably,  making  it  “a  
mere transitory or migratory thing, to be exercised not at any stated or prescribed 
election precincts,  but  anywhere,  and  in  any  part  of  the  world.”1   
To the modern American ear, this protest may sound puzzling. Twenty-first 
century Americans take absentee voting for granted as a convenience that facilitates 
participatory democracy by allowing citizens to cast ballots  “anywhere, and in any part of 
the  world.”  But such voting was completely unfamiliar to Ohioans in 1863. The statute 
created something altogether different from what they had come to understand about 
elections and voting. There was no precedent before 1863 for Ohioans to cast ballots 
                                                 
1. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573, 582 (1863), italics in the original. Delano did not share his 
client’s  Democratic  political  views.    A  Whig  turned  Republican,  Delano  served  in  the  state  assembly  when  
he   argued  McBride’s   case.  Earlier   he   had   served   a   term   in   congress and had narrowly lost to Benjamin 
Wade in the 1862 contest to represent Ohio in the U.S. Senate. Rossiter Johnson, ed., The Biographical 
Dictionary of America (Boston: American Biographical Society, 1906), 3:227. 
 
2  
 
anywhere other than in their own Ohio communities, in the company of neighbors and 
under   the   watchful   eyes   of   community   leaders.   Now   a   subset   of   the   state’s   qualified  
voters – soldiers – could vote in distant locations, not only away from their home 
communities but altogether outside the state. Delano lost his constitutional argument – 
the court upheld the new law – but even the court agreed that this was something new, 
something  the  framers  of  Ohio’s  constitution  had never contemplated.2 
During the Civil War, twenty northern states did what Ohio did by creating novel 
opportunities for absent Civil War soldiers to vote.  Though mindful of what was going 
on in other states, states acted individually in doing so, and the stories of how it happened 
vary.  For the newest state of Nevada, which became a territory during the war and 
achieved statehood barely a week before Election Day in 1864, absentee voting 
represented no jolting departure from earlier electoral practices, since Nevada was too 
young to have developed its own traditions of voting. Most states, however, entered the 
war with firmly established election habits, some tracing their legal origins back nearly 
two centuries. For them absentee voting departed dramatically from familiar election 
norms.  Before enactment of these precursors to modern absentee voting laws, state laws 
had   tightly   tethered   balloting   to   the   voter’s   community,   requiring   strict   supervision   by  
local elites and in-person participation by voters.  One scholar aptly describes antebellum 
elections   as   “masculine,   communal”   events.3  Under the new laws, elections remained 
decidedly masculine, but hardly communal in the prewar sense of that word. Now 
                                                 
2. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 612. 
3. Adam I.P. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 15. 
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eligible voters – as long as they were soldiers – could cast their ballots in distant places 
where they served as warriors, far from the watchful eyes of their neighbors and 
community leaders.  In the absentee voting process that the new laws created, the absent 
party was as much the soldier’s  civilian  community as it was the soldier himself.   
With the subordination of the home community’s  role  came  the  subordination  of  
previously  paramount   legal  values.  Preserving  “the  purity”  of  elections,  so  evident  as  a  
value in the antifraud provisions of nearly all earlier election laws, suddenly gave way to 
the higher value of keeping absent soldiers within the community of voters.  Dating from 
their earliest existence as political polities, most states had become progressively sterner 
in   their   laws’   attempts   to  discourage fraud.  The anti-fraud provisions all depended for 
enforcement on the tight oversight of the voting process by election supervisors, men 
chosen  from  the  social  and  political  elites  of  each  community.     And  while  many  states’  
soldier-voting laws mimicked the oversight mechanisms of pre-war laws – including 
election judges and clerks selected from among the soldiers gathered in the field to vote, 
opportunities for challenging the qualification of soldiers to vote, sworn oaths for election 
officials and voters, the keeping of poll books, etc. – in operational reality such 
mechanisms were relatively toothless when implemented away from the states in military 
settings.  Predictions of that toothlessness by opponents of enactment did not deter 
proponents, to many of whom it simply did not matter.  For them, it was the  legislature’s  
responsibility, and within   the   legislature’s   constitutional   authority, to subordinate the 
value  of  election  “purity”   to   the  more   important  wartime   imperative  of  allowing  absent  
soldiers to vote, no matter the far greater risk of fraud. 
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State by state, legislators, lawyers, and judges would disagree about whether the 
novelty of these new voting arrangements created constitutional problems, as Columbus 
Delano argued unsuccessfully that they did in the Ohio case. Constitutional or not, 
however, all could agree that the new laws created an entirely new form of political 
participation, upending settled views about what an election was.  
The phenomenon was, in other words, legally radical. Chapters 1 and 2 undertake 
an examination of the contours of that radicalism.  Chapter  1  is  a  case  study  of  one  state’s  
experience with the invention of absentee voting. It constructs a history of election law in 
Ohio, comparing the prewar sense of what an election was, as revealed over six decades 
in statutes and constitutions, with the very different kind of election contemplated by the 
state’s  1863   soldier-voting law.  Voting had always been tethered firmly to local Ohio 
communities; that connection was   integral   to   the   very   idea   of   an   election.   The   state’s  
1863 soldier-voting law severed the link, albeit temporarily – the  law  expired  at  the  war’s  
end – and only for soldiers. All five Supreme Court justices who   listened   to  Delano’s  
arguments agreed that the law broke new ground by creating a mode of voting that 
constitutional framers had never contemplated. Over one strenuous dissent, however, the 
court majority ruled that the state constitution did not stand in the way and that the 
legislature had authority to invent something altogether new – a voting opportunity 
divorced from Ohio communities and correspondingly more vulnerable to fraud.  
Chapter 1 stands for several propositions, some of them at odds with what other 
historians have said: that  Ohio’s  new law departed radically and suddenly from a long 
tradition rooting elections in local communities in the state; that the departure did not 
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consist of a change in residency qualification (or any qualification) for suffrage, but that 
it was radical nonetheless; and that the context in which absentee voting took place under 
the new law – the soldier’s  military “community”  far  from  Ohio’s  borders  – was utterly 
unsuited for the operation of antifraud mechanisms grafted onto the new law pro forma 
from  the  state’s prewar election law. 
Chapter 2 broadens the examination to describe the unfolding innovation of 
soldier-voting legislation in the other 19 states where it happened. Focusing on formal 
law, that examination demonstrates that Ohio typified the national experience in its 
struggle to find constitutional footing for a radical, albeit temporary, departure from legal 
antecedents, though not from antecedent residency (or other) suffrage qualifications. The 
struggle played out in various ways, each demonstrating the intensity of the collision with 
prewar law. Sometimes it played out in court, sometimes through constitutional 
amendment, and sometimes by limiting the new voting right to federal elections as a half-
loaf way of avoiding the strictures of the state constitution. More than half the states 
acted late in the war, after the potency of the issue in the competition for civilian votes 
became evident in late 1863. The tardy start for these states created a time crunch that 
sparked procedural innovations designed to leap constitutional hurdles in time for the 
1864  elections.  It  was  another  measure  of  the  laws’  radicalism. 
Supreme court decisions in Ohio and eight other states help demonstrate how 
legally problematic the new idea was, even in states where the courts concluded that it 
was constitutionally permissible. Four of the nine court opinions (California, 
Connecticut, Michigan, and Pennsylvania) struck down the laws altogether. Two other 
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state courts (New Hampshire and Vermont) struck down portions of the laws, permitting 
the legislation to stand as to federal but not state elections. The other three (Iowa, Ohio, 
and Wisconsin) upheld the laws.  In all nine cases, justices tried to divine whether 
constitutional framers had intended, on the one hand, to fix the place of voting in local 
communities   as   a   part   of   the   state’s   foundational   law   or,   on   the   other   hand,   to   permit  
legislatures   to   set   the   “where”   of   voting   as   lawmakers   thought   best.   The   outcomes 
generally hinged on the court  majority’s  approach  to  the challenge of teasing meaning out 
of constitutional text drafted by men who, as justices on both sides of the debate 
repeatedly recognized, had never dreamt of absentee voting. Judges who looked to state 
history  for  the  meaning  of  a  constitution’s  undefined  words – words  such  as  “election”  or  
“vote”   – tended to vote for overturning the laws. The historical examination by these 
jurists invariably concluded that constitutional framers incorporated traditional 
understanding when they used these words, and those understandings always attached the 
act of voting to a community setting within the state. In contrast, judges limiting their 
examination to the plain meaning of constitutional text tended to uphold the laws. These 
justices deferred to legislators unless they could find explicit and unambiguous 
prohibitions against absentee voting in constitutional texts. Judges adopting both 
approaches agreed that the laws departed from earlier understandings about elections, but 
those looking to history for interpretative assistance attached constitutional consequences 
to the departure, while those looking only to the plain meaning of constitutional text did 
not.  
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Chapter 2 also demonstrates two other ways that Ohio typified the national 
experience legally. At first blush, both invite the view that the legal innovation, 
characterized throughout this dissertation as radical, was nothing of the sort. First, neither 
Ohio nor any other state that invented this new way of voting for absent soldiers 
expanded its prewar suffrage qualifications, even for soldiers.  None, for example, 
granted absent soldiers the right to vote if they were too young to vote under the prewar 
constitution or if their race or citizenship disqualified them. Even states that found it 
necessary to amend their constitutions to accommodate absentee voting limited the scope 
of the amendments to soldiers already enfranchised under prewar constitutions, generally 
white male citizens at least 21 years old.  
A second feature of the legal innovation, common to Ohio and the rest of the 
country, follows from the first, but bears emphasis. In neither Ohio nor any other state did 
the soldier-voting law result from, or result in, a relaxation in the residency qualification 
for voting. In fact, contrary to the treatment of this subject by other historians, soldier-
voting laws left prewar residency requirements completely undisturbed.  
 Viewed from a rights-conscious perspective, which looks above all to who 
belongs to the community of eligible voters, those two attributes strip the soldier-voting 
laws of any claim to radicalism. The radicalism of the laws becomes evident, however, 
when viewing voting rights through a contemporary lens as a communal, public right, 
belonging not to individuals as autonomous actors, but to the local community where 
individuals participated as members.  Soldier-voting laws stripped elections of that 
communal quality. That was a radical change measured against the antebellum sense of 
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what elections were and how voters participated in them.  In the court cases surveyed in 
Chapter 2, as in the Ohio case highlighted in Chapter 1, lawyers and judges disagreed 
about whether that change breached constitutional requirements, but all treated the 
change as a major departure.  By demonstrating the legal radicalism of soldier-voting 
laws, Chapter 2 disputes and seeks to correct the scholarly theory that these laws 
culminated a long and gradual process of loosening residency restrictions associated with 
antebellum migration. In fact, the change was abrupt, and it did nothing to loosen 
residency requirements. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 offer an explanatory theory for the change.  Politics was the 
clearest driving force, of course, given the absence of so many electors whose votes both 
parties coveted. Historians correctly treat soldier-voting legislation as a vote-maximizing 
response to the temporary absence of a big slice of the electorate.4  To treat the soldier-
voting phenomenon as nothing more than an effort to garner  soldiers’  votes, however, is 
to overlook a larger and more complex political picture.  The creation of absentee voting 
for military servicemen was part of a temporary political phenomenon that assigned an 
important role to soldiers in the contest for civilian votes. Unique circumstances set the 
stage for political combat in 1863-1864, and those circumstances made it indispensable to 
both parties for soldiers to participate as political actors in unprecedented ways. They 
participated not  only  as  voters,  but  also  as  spokesmen  for  the  parties’  major  messages  and 
endorsers of party candidates. The dissertation coins   the   term   “politics   of   soldiers”   to  
describe the political messaging of   these   years.   In   the   politics   of   soldiers,   the   parties’  
                                                 
4. The Ohio Supreme Court put the figure at one-quarter to one-third. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 607.  
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support   of   soldiers,   and   each   party’s   enlistment of the voice of soldiers in its political 
messaging, became essential to securing civilian votes. Both parties needed the 
conspicuous support of soldiers for credibility in communicating their campaign themes. 
Friction over soldier-voting laws was part of this larger partisan tug of war over the 
political kinship of servicemen. 
Chapter 3 examines the unfolding of these dynamics in 1863 Pennsylvania 
politics,  treating  that  state’s  experience  as  a  proving  ground  for  the  political  themes  that  
characterized the national contest that unfolded the following year in the Lincoln – 
McClellan contest. At the start of the war, only Pennsylvania had a law allowing absentee 
voting by soldiers.  In 1861 a losing candidate in a local election challenged the law. That 
contested election culminated in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in 1862 striking 
down the law as unconstitutional.  The   court’s   decision, and the state elections the 
following year, served to politicize soldier voting and sparked a national surge in soldier-
voting legislation.  Before the case, states were just awakening to the concept of granting 
special voting accommodations to absent soldiers. Partisan alignment over the issue, with 
Republicans favoring the idea and Democrats opposing it, had not yet crystallized. That 
changed after the author of Pennsylvania’s   high   court’s   decision,   George  Woodward,  
won  the  Democratic  Party’s  nomination  for governor in 1863. His opponent, Republican 
incumbent Andrew Curtin, used the court decision to portray Woodward as anti-soldier 
voting and therefore anti-soldier,  while  positioning  himself  as  “the  soldiers’  friend.”    
The Woodward-Curtin contest field-tested the competing campaign themes that 
the national parties embraced in 1864 – treason v. loyalty, military competence v. 
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ineptitude, and solicitude for (white) soldiers v. neglect of the troops. And just as in the 
national contest of 1864, Pennsylvania Democrats and Republicans in 1863 enlisted the 
voice of soldiers in their political messaging to civilian voters. Republicans used the 
soldier-voting issue to gain an edge in the home vote in  that  year’s  version  of  the  politics  
of soldiers.  Curtin  beat  Woodward  on  the  strength  of  the  “soldiers’  friend”  meme,  central  
to which was the soldier-voting issue. 
Chapter 4 describes the politics of soldiers in the national competition between 
Lincoln and McClellan. By this time, largely because of what had happened in the 
Curtin-Woodward race, and also because by then it was clear that Republican candidates 
would win the soldier vote, a partisan divide over soldier voting had solidified.  
Republicans’   conspicuous   support   for   the   new   form   of   voting,   and   the   party’s   success  
tarring Democrats as anti-soldier for opposing soldier-voting laws, became a major 
advantage in winning civilian votes. Riding the soldier-voting horse in the politics of 
soldiers, Republicans secured the status as the friend of the soldier, giving them 
correspondingly greater credibility in electoral messaging wars.  
As with the 1863 Pennsylvania gubernatorial contest, both parties in 1864 needed, 
and therefore enlisted, the voice of soldiers in their political messaging. Republicans did 
so to portray McClellan as disloyal, cowardly, and militarily incompetent. Democrats did 
so to portray Lincoln a bungling commander-in-chief and as neglectful of the troops, 
particularly white troops whose wellbeing Lincoln purportedly subordinated to the 
interest of slaves and armed African-Americans.  Soldiers spoke more credibly than any 
other citizens on all these subjects. So, in making and rebutting these charges, 
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Republicans and Democrats respectively relied on the voice of soldiers in appeals for 
civilian votes.  Both  parties  brought  the  soldiers’  voice  to  bear  in  letters  from  soldiers  to  
partisan newspapers, straw polls in the same newspapers purporting to show that soldiers 
favored one party or the other, the selection of soldiers to speak at campaign rallies, the 
gathering of endorsements for one candidate or the other by prominent military figures, 
and the use of the lexicon of soldiering to praise or attack candidates.  
Chapter 5 describes the predicament the soldier-voting issue created for 
Democrats. Starting with the experience of the Curtin-Woodward contest in 
Pennsylvania, they understood the political hazards of opposing soldier-voting laws, 
much as Republicans had learned the same lesson in 1862 when they opposed a soldier-
voting bill in Ohio.5  Democrats naturally wanted to demonstrate their support of the 
troops   and   the   troops’   reciprocal   support   of  Democrats,   just   as  Republicans  wanted   to 
demonstrate the opposite.  One way to do that was to endorse soldier-voting legislation. 
But Democrats could not easily do that. Unlike Republicans, many Democrats harbored 
deep misgivings about the laws.  Their misgivings were both ideological and practical.  
Ideologically, Democratic Party purists believed that soldiering was incompatible with 
voting.6  Voters needed to exercise independent judgment, while soldiers had to accept 
subordination to the judgment of others.  A related fear was that a standing army, always 
                                                 
5. As discussed more fully in Chapter 5, Republicans early in the war doubted that their candidates 
would get fair treatment in the army, given a command structure then dominated by officers of Democratic 
Party pedigree. It was the mirror image of the conviction Democrats would come to embrace starting in 
1863, by which time the Lincoln administration had asserted its control over the military command 
structure. 
6.  This  attitude  was  of  a  piece  with  Democrats’  antipathy  to  war  generally,  and  civil  war  in  particular,  as  
incompatible with liberty and an invitation to despotism. See, e.g., Jean H. Baker, Affairs of Party: The 
Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1998), 148-158. 
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a bugaboo of Democratic orthodoxy, would corrupt and overwhelm democracy if armed 
with political power.   
Practically, Democrats feared that Republican military leaders would cheat in 
administering the soldier vote. By 1863, the Lincoln administration held a strong grip on 
the military command structure. Democrats believed that Republicans would use that 
control corruptly to tilt the playing field of soldier voting in favor of Republican 
candidates. As evidence, they pointed not only to episodes of bullying and intimidation 
against Democratic soldiers by their military superiors, but also to cases of military 
interference in civilian elections, especially in Border States and always to the 
disadvantage of Democratic candidates.  
Democrats coped with this predicament uneasily. Reluctant to oppose soldier-
voting laws too loudly, they muted their opposition to the legislation and trumpeted 
evidence of Republican bullying and interference in implementing the laws when they 
passed. In keeping with the politics of soldiers, they enlisted the voice of soldiers to make 
their case that Republicans, if allowed by passage of soldier-voting legislation, would 
abuse their power to steal the soldier vote. 
An appendix describes the operational features of each state’s soldier-voting 
system and describes the legal frictions that arose in most states. As an organizing 
framework for that state-by-state  discussion,  the  appendix  distinguishes  between  “senior”  
states, defined as those entering the Union before 1800, and  “junior”  states   that  entered  
thereafter. That demarcation, concededly somewhat arbitrary, serves to demonstrate that 
the innovation of absentee voting was much more likely to clear constitutional hurdles in 
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the younger states, where the grip of the communal tradition of elections was not as tight 
as in the senior states. 
To the extent that scholars have paid attention to these laws at all, they have 
focused on the direct effect of soldier voting on election outcomes and the partisan divide 
over the issue.  The only full-length book on the subject of soldier-voting laws, entitled 
Voting in the Field, is a monograph by Josiah Benton, published in 1915.7  It is an 
encyclopedic examination of the legislative history of every military suffrage law. Benton 
painstakingly scoured state house and senate journals and legislative committee reports to 
construct a timeline of statutory enactment, state by state. His book also compiles the 
results   of   soldier   voting,  where   those   data  were   available.     Benton’s  work,   though not 
free of substantive errors, is an indispensable source of raw data about how the laws came 
into existence. James McPherson in 1988 cited it as one of the two best sources on 
soldier-voting laws.8  
The other source McPherson salutes is an article by Oscar  Osburn  Winther,  “The  
Soldier Vote in the Election of 1864.”9 Winther discusses all the laws, though more 
sketchily   than   Benton,   and   not   always   accurately.   Winther   focuses   less   on   the   laws’  
legislative history than on the partisan friction they engendered and on the direct effect of 
soldiers’  votes on election outcomes. Winther also assembles good evidence of military 
                                                 
7. Josiah H. Benton, Voting in the Field; a Forgotten Chapter of the Civil War (Boston: Priv. Print, 
1915). 
8. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University 
Press,   1988),   805n69.   Examples   of   Benton’s   errors   are   his   omission   of   a   California   soldier-voting law 
enacted in 1863 from his  account  of  that  state’s  experience  and  his  statement  that  three  Michigan  high  court  
justices  rendered  opinions  in  the  case  striking  down  that  state’s  soldier-voting law. (Four Michigan justices 
wrote opinions in the 1865 case of People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127.) 
9.   Oscar   Osburn  Winther,   “The   Soldier   Vote   in   the   Election   of   1864,”   New York History 25, no. 4 
(October 1944). 
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interference with civilian elections, particularly in Indiana, which had no soldier-voting 
law. Neither Benton nor Winther attempts a contrast between the new laws and their 
prewar antecedents, beyond the obvious distinction that prewar laws did not permit 
absentee voting while the new statutes of course did. And neither Benton nor Winther 
probes the court cases arising out of the soldier-voting laws for a sense of the 
constitutional upheaval the laws created.        
There are fine state-by-state studies of the subject. A leading scholar of the field is 
Jonathan W. White, who has examined both the Pennsylvania and New York laws, in 
separate articles  in  2004.    His  article  on  Pennsylvania’s  experience  focuses  on  the  shifting  
partisan positions on soldier voting. White documents the early bipartisanship in both the 
support for and the opposition to soldier-voting laws in the Keystone State, noting that 
the sharp partisan divide took shape only in 1863 and 1864.10  White’s   second   article  
describes the organizing efforts both parties launched, at the national level, to get ballots 
and partisan information to troops – a   “get   out   the   vote”   drive   aimed at soldiers. For 
Republicans, the Lincoln administration provided the organizing oomph, while New 
Yorkers associated with Governor Horatio Seymour provided it for Democrats. New 
York’s  national  role  emerged  at  the  same  time  the  state  was  grappling  with  passage and 
implementation of its own soldier voting law, all of which White describes lucidly.11 
A handful of other state-specific articles are similarly valuable. The best treatment 
of  Ohio’s  experience  with  soldier  voting,  by  Arnold  Shankman,  discusses  the impact of 
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the military vote on the 1863 Ohio gubernatorial election.  Shankman shows for Ohio 
what White shows for Pennsylvania: that Republicans and Democrats were ambivalent 
about soldier-voting laws until 1863, when Republican support and Democratic 
opposition jelled. Shankman also documents the abuse of soldier voting by the politicized 
army command, up to and including Edwin Stanton. It is a story of sharp elbows and foul 
play, including discriminatory furloughs, destruction of Democratic ballots sent to army 
camps, and the physical abuse of soldiers who had the temerity to speak out as or for 
Democrats.12   
Frank Klement offers perhaps the most cynical appraisal among scholars in the 
field in his article about Wisconsin. Klement characterizes Wisconsin’s   legislation  as  a  
raw power play by Republicans, who constructed the soldier-voting system to maximize 
opportunities for Republican officers in the army to control voting by their subordinates.  
And  during  the  pendency  of  a  court  challenge  to  the  law’s  constitutionality, Republicans 
amended the law to permit soldiers to vote in elections for state Supreme Court justices. 
According   to   Klement,   this   had   the   desired   effect   of   securing   the   chief   justice’s   vote  
upholding the law, since he needed support from voting troops to secure his own 
reelection.13 
Another scholar writing in the World War II period (during which soldier voting 
again became a subject of national interest) offers a far more positive assessment than 
Klement’s,   this   one  with   respect   to   the  Minnesota statute.  According to Lynwood G. 
                                                 
12.  Arnold  Shankman,   “Soldier  Votes  and Clement L. Vallandigham in the 1863 Ohio Gubernatorial 
Election,”  Ohio History 82 (Spring 1973).  
13.  Frank  L.  Klement,  “The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  during  the  Civil  War,” The Wisconsin Magazine 
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Downs,  the  absentee  voting  system  created  by  that  state’s  1862  law  should  be  a  source  of  
pride for Minnesotans because of the pains both parties took to assure evenhandedness in 
the balloting. The law fell short of full success, according to Downs, because the state 
lacked  resources  to  implement  the  law  for  all  of  Minnesota’s  far-flung soldiers.14 
Samuel  T.  McSeveney,  in  an  article  about  Connecticut’s  experience  with  soldier  
voting, underscores the disadvantages Democrats suffered in securing a level playing 
field in the soldier vote. Furloughs played an unusually large role in voting by 
Connecticut soldiers, and (as all scholars of the subject have noted) these were far harder 
to come by for Democrats than for Republicans.      Connecticut’s   law   applied   only   to  
soldiers stationed outside the state, meaning that members of the provost guard and those 
convalescing in Connecticut hospitals had to travel back to their home towns on furlough 
in order to vote. Similarly, because the law gave absentee voting rights only to registered 
voters, and Connecticut required in-person voter registration, servicemen who came of 
age during the war had to return home on furlough to register before they could vote. The 
Lincoln   administration’s willingness and ability to manipulate furloughs worked to the 
disadvantage of Democrats in Connecticut even more than it did in other states. 
McSeveney also documents a phenomenon that sheds light on the driving force behind 
the laws. In the absence of soldier-voting laws, soldiers had reason to expect, or at least 
hope for, furloughs to return home for elections. Cherishing furloughs, many soldiers felt 
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ambivalent about laws allowing them to stay in their encampments to vote. Although the 
laws ostensibly benefitted them, soldiers themselves did not clamor for their enactment.15  
This dissertation attempts to advance understanding of the subject beyond the 
scope that these scholars explore. Each of their works illuminates the subject importantly. 
Each describes  the  parties’  efforts  to  secure  soldier  votes,  the  parties’  differences  over the 
issue in   the   legislative   process,   partisan   conflict   about   the   fairness   of   the   laws’  
implementation, and the direct effects of soldier voting on election outcomes. But none 
situates soldier-voting laws in the legal and constitutional history of suffrage or elections. 
None, for example, mines pre-war election laws as a basis for comparison to the soldier 
voting law, with respect to either the mechanics of voting or the prewar intensity of anti-
fraud values reflected in election law, for example.16  Nor do they attempt to place 
soldier-voting legislation in a larger context of soldiers as players and props in the 
political messaging necessitated by the structural features of 1863-1864 politics.  
Civil War historians James McPherson, Phillip Shaw Paludan, Gary Gallagher, 
William C. Davis, and Allen Guelzo touch on soldier voting as part of their overall 
treatment of the war, but only briefly, focusing mainly on the strong preference soldiers 
expressed for Lincoln over Democrat George McClellan in the presidential election of 
1864.17 Attention to soldier voting is equally light among most scholars of nineteenth 
                                                 
15.  Samuel  T.  McSeveney,  “Re-electing Lincoln: The Union Party Campaign and the Military Vote in 
Connecticut,”  Civil War History 32, no. 2 (June 1986). 
16. The overarching antifraud objective of residency requirement becomes starkly clear from several of 
the high court decisions about the constitutionality of soldier-voting laws surveyed in Chapter 2, and the 
history  of  Ohio’s  prewar  election  laws  discussed  in Chapter 1. 
17. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 803-806; Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011). (Gallagher limits his treatment of the subject to a reprint from Frank 
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century political culture.  Jean Baker (Affairs of Party), Joel Silby (The American 
Political Nation: 1838-1893), and Glenn Altschuler and Stuart Blumin (Rude Republic: 
Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century) hardly mention soldier voting or 
soldier-voting laws at all, intimating when they do that soldiers were outside the 
mainstream political community. 18  An exception with particular significance for this 
dissertation is Kenneth Winkle, author of The Politics of Community: Migration and 
Politics in Antebellum Ohio.19 While Winkle sees Ohio’s 1863 law as part of a decades-
long loosening of residence restrictions in voting rights, this dissertation argues in 
Chapter 1 that the law departed with legal antecedents abruptly and did not change 
residency requirements.  
The dissertation draws on the very rich historiography on Civil War politics, 
particularly in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. A prominent scholar on that subject is Mark Neely Jr. 
His The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (1992), The Union 
Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North (2002), and The Boundaries of American 
Political Culture in the Civil War Era (2005) serve as essential sources. William Frank 
Zornow’s  Lincoln and the Party Divided (1957),  John  C.  Waugh’s  1997  book,  Reelecting 
                                                                                                                                                 
an election in 1864.); William C. Davis, Lincoln’s  Men  (New York: Touchstone, 1999), 211-213; Allen C. 
Guelzo, Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 464. For the preference of union soldiers for Lincoln, see also Jennifer L. Weber, 
Copperheads:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Lincoln’s  Opponents  in  the  North  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 194-199. 
 
18. Baker, Affairs of Party.  (In  her  sparse  treatment  of  soldier  voting,  Baker  characterizes  the  laws  as  “a  
suspension of the residency requirements that made out-of-district   voting   illegal.”   Id. In contrast, this 
dissertation demonstrates in Chapter 2 that all soldier-voting laws left residency requirements intact.); Joel 
Silbey, The American Political Nation, 1838-1893 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); Glenn 
C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth 
Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
19 . Kenneth J. Winkle, The Politics of Community: Migration and Politics in Antebellum Ohio 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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Lincoln: The Battle for the 1864 Presidency and Doris Kearns  Goodwin’s  Team of Rivals 
are  all  excellent   treatments  of   the  1864  election  and  Lincoln’s  political  skills.  But  none  
situates the voice of soldiers generally, or soldier-voting laws in particular, in the political 
messaging wars of 1863 and 1864, as this dissertation attempts to do. 
Joseph   Allan   Frank’s   1998   book,   With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political 
Socialization of American Civil War Soldiers is particularly important to this project.  
Frank suggests that Civil War soldiers were less the agents of political parties than the 
other way around. Passionate pro-war feelings within the army intensified the Republican 
prosecution of the war, Frank argues.  His book documents the ways that a   “core”   of  
highly politicized Union soldiers influenced the terms of the national debate, pushing the 
North’s   war   effort   in   radical   directions.   Frank’s   work   shows   the   pervasiveness   of  
bullying and intimidation by radical Republican soldiers of their Democratic-leaning 
fellows. In a 2007 essay about the political activism of Pennsylvania soldiers, Timothy 
Orr describes a similarly bottom-up   phenomenon.   Focusing   on   soldiers’   letters   to  
newspapers  and  political  “resolutions”  adopted  by  pro-administration military units, Orr 
describes   the   army   as   “an   organized   political   body”   that sought to eliminate the 
legitimacy of partisan conflict, sometimes with threats or acts of violence against 
Democrats.20  
In contrast to Frank and Orr, who describe a bottom-up direction – from soldiers 
in the field to civilian political operatives back home – in the formulation of party 
ideologies, this dissertation identifies a top-down  character   in   the  parties’  enlistment  of  
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“the   voice   of   soldiers”   to   communicate   campaign   themes,   most   demonstrably in the 
branding of Republican candidates like Andrew Curtin  as  “the  soldiers’  friend.”     Taken  
together,   Frank   and  Orr’s   arguments   and   this   dissertation   suggest   that   perhaps   soldiers  
and political parties used each other.21   
Adam   I.P.   Smith’s   2006  book,  No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 
buttresses Frank and Orr and is helpful for its insights about the dilemma Democrats 
faced, the subject of Chapter 5, below.  Wartime makes partisanship at least marginally 
illegitimate, Smith argues, thereby complicating the challenge of the party operating as a 
loyal opposition. In a wartime environment, it is easy to paint politicians opposing an 
incumbent president as treasonous, and Smith demonstrates how effectively Republicans 
applied that paint to antiwar Democrats in the Civil War, effectively delegitimizing 
Democrats’  objections  to  the  Lincoln  administration’s  war  policies.22 
Smith documents ways that politicized soldiers participated in, and lent moral 
authority   to,   the  Republicans’  project  of  delegitimizing  partisan  opposition  and   thereby  
marginalizing Democrats.  Smith  calls  the  Republican  project  the  “doctrine  of  patriotism.”  
In agreement with Frank and Orr, Smith describes the politically aware volunteer army 
(though not regulars) as a forum for political action that pitched into partisan combat 
enthusiastically, often heavy-handedly, in support of that doctrine.23 To this extent, these 
three scholars capture one element of the multi-faceted phenomenon referred to in this 
dissertation  as  the  politics  of  soldiers.  “No-partyism”  as  a  pro-war partisan ideology was 
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a variant of the Republican campaign theme disparaging anti-war politicians as disloyal, 
and Smith shows that soldiers were instrumental in communicating that theme.  
Frank, Orr, and Smith describe a pervasive climate of enforced one-partyism, with 
soldiers serving the role as its moral legitimizers and, sometimes thuggishly, as enforcers 
of the pro-war orthodoxy. In this telling, with respect to loyalty, soldiers shaped a 
political phenomenon broader than the political messaging of election seasons. Instead, 
soldiers put their considerable and muscular imprimatur on a wartime culture of 
ubiquitous loyalty that included but extended beyond election campaign themes. This 
dissertation focuses on the narrower role of loyalty and disloyalty as political campaign 
messages, with soldiers serving on both sides of the messaging wars. And unlike their 
scholarship, this dissertation identifies loyalty and disloyalty as just one of the contested 
themes in the partisan messaging for which soldiers were enlisted, the others being 
military incompetence, cowardice, and solicitude for white troops. The politics of soldiers 
drew servicemen into the partisan point and counterpoint on each of these subjects in 
ways that Frank, Orr, and Smith do not address, although their work certainly helps in the 
thematic construction of this dissertation.  
The scholarly debate about whether peace Democrats like George Woodward 
were actually disloyal remains unsettled, though it matters in this dissertation only as 
historiographical background. Scholars including Eric McKitrick, Jean Baker, Joel 
Silbey, and Frank Klement argue that they were in fact loyal and even helpful to the 
Union cause. They point to evidence showing that many Democrats supported most 
aspects of the Lincoln administration’s   war   effort,   other   than   those   connected   with  
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emancipation and arming former slaves. Michael Holt has taken issue with that 
consensus. In a 1998 essay, Holt argues that proponents of the view that Democrats were 
loyal erred by looking too exclusively at the conduct of Democrats at the federal level, 
disregarding more problematic examples of Democratic opposition at the state level.  
Pennsylvania’s  George  Woodward  is  among  the  “strident  antiwar  Democrats”  Holt  cites  
as   an   “embarrassment”   to   the   party’s   claim to loyalty. (The others were Clement 
Vallandigham of Ohio and Thomas Seymour of Connecticut.)24  
Jonathan W. White mounts a careful rebuttal to Holt and a defense of Woodward. 
White  argues  that  in  Woodward’s  view  of  constitutionalism,  under  which  states  had the 
right to secede, citizens who supported the exercise of that right could not be guilty of 
treason. To Woodward and other adherents to a contractual view of constitutionalism, 
any loyal American could express approval of southern secession. And, as White makes 
clear, at no point did Woodward ever advocate taking up arms against the United States, 
which would indeed have constituted treason. He simply believed that there was no 
disloyalty in the act or advocacy of peaceable secession.25 
This dissertation   tries   to   steer   clear   of   the  merits   of   the   parties’   attack   themes,  
focusing instead on the uncontested fact that the parties deployed the themes and used 
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soldiers whenever they could to communicate them. The merits of the claims and 
counterclaims of disloyalty, for example, matter less for purposes of this dissertation than 
the undisputable fact that the claims and counterclaims were made and that soldiers 
participated in making them.  The same is true about the merits of the other themes of the 
messaging wars. Was George McClellan really a physical coward, as Republican 
propagandists asserted in 1864? His major biographer, Stephen Sears, lends credence to 
the  charge  without  using   the  word  “coward”   in  his   indictment  of  McClellan.26 Many of 
McClellan’s   contemporaries, including some who supported Lincoln, heatedly disputed 
the assertion, as Chapter 4 elaborates. This dissertation attempts agnosticism on the 
question, since all that matters for the argument here is that Republicans accused 
McClellan of cowardice, Democrats denied the accusations, and that, because of unique 
structural features of 1863-1864 politics, each side enlisted the voice of soldiers in 
advancing its side of the debate.  It is likewise with the merits of the other themes that 
drew on the voice of servicemen in the politics of soldiers.  
The soldier-voting phenomenon deserves more attention than it has received in 
the historiography of voting rights. Attorney Columbus Delano, introduced here at the 
outset, lamented the portent of voting becoming   “a  mere   transitory   thing”   if   the  Ohio  
Supreme Court upheld the 1863 soldier-voting law. Delano had his feet firmly planted in 
voting tradition in expressing that lament, and his forebodings were in a way prescient of 
a very different kind of voting in the future. Historians of the arc of American suffrage 
rights have described a bumpy trajectory. Starting with the colonial model of elections as 
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town meetings in a system of virtual representation by white male property owners voting 
viva voce and theoretically representing the interest of their disfranchised neighbors, the 
trajectory culminates in a system of individualized and portable voting by secret (and 
sometimes electronic) ballot, with each elector representing his or her own interests.27   
One terminus of the arc is rooted in republicanism, with voting as a communal right, and 
the other in liberalism, with voting as an individual and portable right. Community 
control over eligibility determinations and the process of voting became decreasingly 
important over the course of the trajectory.28   
Civil War soldier voting straddled these two worlds interestingly, but it has 
largely escaped notice by historians. George Frederick Miller includes a short section of 
one chapter about the Civil War laws in his brief 1948 book about absentee voting, noting 
that some of the laws pioneered the modern mechanism of absentee balloting and 
cursorily describing the way they functioned.29 In his 2000 book, The Right To Vote: The 
Contested History of Democracy in the United States, Alexander Keyssar surveys the 
nation’s   entire   experience   with   voting   laws,   a   prodigious   and   highly   successful  
undertaking, including the halting, off and on trajectory toward expanded participation in 
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America’s   political universe.30  But Keyssar devotes barely a paragraph to Civil War 
military suffrage and omits analysis of the soldier-voting laws from his otherwise 
extensive appendices. Moreover, Keyssar understates the extent to which residency 
requirements reflected not so much a desire to assure that prospective voters had a 
modicum   of   “attachment”   to   or   stake   in   their   community   as   a   rather   sharp-edged 
determination to prevent fraud, particularly voting by pretenders and multiple voting in 
the same election by people moving from one voting district to another on Election 
Day.31  
The radicalism of soldier-voting laws in dislodging hometown communities from 
the voting process  has  a  conservative  counterpoint  in  the  laws’  narrow  coverage,  but  the  
laws have escaped attention by scholars otherwise attentive to conservative impulses in 
suffrage law. Some scholars of the evolution of political rights point to the privilege that 
white males sustained through at least the 1920s, even in circumstances that might have 
invited political reform.  The Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon arguably supports 
their arguments.  Without reference to the conservative side of soldier-voting laws, 
Barbara Welke, for example, traces the persistence of the legal exclusion of minorities, 
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women, and various categories of immigrants in   favor   of   “able   white   manhood.” 32 
Similarly, in  her  account  of  women’s  quest  for  equality  in  public spheres (including but 
not limited to political spheres), Sandra VanBurkleo notes that women realized political 
gains from neither the Revolutionary War nor the Civil War, both of which catalyzed 
such gains for white men.33 And Rogers Smith posits  that  “multiple  traditions,” including 
a   “persistent   belief   in   white   Anglo-Saxon   Protestant   male   superiority,”   shaped   the  
formation of political rights in American law, trumping Lockean liberalism as American 
law’s  animating  force.34  
The limited scope of soldier-voting laws, which would come as no surprise to 
these  scholars,  may  obscure  the  laws’  radicalism,  since  in  rights  conscious  terms  the  laws  
broke no new ground. But in divorcing communities from elections the laws were 
something radically new. This dissertation undertakes to document that radicalism and 
identify its causes. 
 
The Machinery of Soldier Voting 
Before embarking on an examination of the legal and political frictions associated 
with enactment of soldier-voting laws, it is useful to consider how the laws designed 
absentee voting to work in practice.  
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There was a snowflake quality to the voting arrangements the laws created — no 
two were identical.  The variations, however, tended to cluster around two alternative 
models, designated here as the Iowa and Minnesota models.35  The appendix examines 
each  state’s  version  of   the  two  general  models,  but   the  models   themselves  merit  a  brief  
introductory description. 
Laws following the Iowa model called for setting up election sites in military 
encampments  where  soldiers  served.  These  voting  sites  “in  the  field”  tried  to  recreate  the  
full choreography of elections back home, complete with election judges, poll books, 
procedures for challenging qualifications, etc. Fourteen states adopted variations of this 
approach: California, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania (which used the Minnesota model as well), 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
In contrast, laws following the Minnesota model, presaging modern forms of 
absentee voting, allowed soldiers to complete their ballots individually in the field and 
forward them sealed to their voting precincts back home, to be counted with civilian 
ballots. Seven states adopted the Minnesota model: Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, New 
York, Pennsylvania (which also adopted the Iowa model), Rhode Island, and West 
Virginia.  
The details of voting under both models varied from state to state as to such 
matters as the categories of soldiers covered, the offices for which soldiers could vote, the 
mechanisms for providing advance notice of elections in the field, structures for 
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supervising balloting, oaths for voters and election supervisors, the form of ballots and 
poll books, mechanisms for challenges, the assignment of commissioners to assist with 
implementation and the duties of commissioners, etc.  The following description of the 
laws’  operation  in  the  eponymous  states  is  offered for illustrative purposes.  
 
Iowa36 
The Hawkeye State enacted its bill on September 11, 1862.37 Voting under the 
law occurred at election sites set up “at  every  place  where  a  Regiment,  Battalion,  Battery  
or Company of Iowa soldiers may be found or stationed.”38 That formulation effectively 
excluded sailors in the navy, since naval organization included none of the listed 
designations. But the law covered every  “soldier  in  the  military  service  of  this  state  or  the  
United States,” including draftees and army regulars. This coverage provision also 
specified surgeons and chaplains.39 
 Setting the template for many military suffrage laws, this one dictated that the 
provisions   of   the   general   election   law   would   apply   to   voting   in   the   field,   “so   far   as  
applicable, and  not  qualified  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act.”40 As we shall see in chapter 1 
                                                 
36. The choice of Iowa as a model for its form of absentee voting is debatable. Pennsylvania had 
enacted a soldier-voting  law  long  before  the  Civil  War,   in  1813.  It  called  for  establishing  voting  sites  “in  
the   field”   for  absent  Pennsylvania  soldiers.  So,  while   the  Pennsylvania Supreme Court set that law aside 
early in 1862 before any other state had acted, the 1813 law based on its seniority arguably deserves the 
honor of designation as a model. Missouri, too, provided for absentee voting before Iowa did, following a 
similar model, but Missouri acted non-legislatively and arguably illegitimately in doing so.  As the first 
state to adopt this model legislatively during the Civil War, Iowa gets the nod as the model for purposes of 
this study. 
37. An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this 
State in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, ch. 29, 1862 Iowa Acts 28. 
38. Id. at § 8. 
39. Id. at § 2. 
40. Id. at § 6. 
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describing the soldier-voting experience in Ohio, this language indulged a fiction. 
Unavoidably, field elections in fact resembled civilian elections only superficially, since 
the laws could not replicate in military camps the mechanisms that served to protect 
against   fraud   in   elections  back  home,   above  all   supervision  by  members  of   the  voters’  
own community. But the Iowa model tipped its hat, however synthetically, to the 
communal quality of elections that had predominated before the war in every state. The 
notable difference, of course, was that the statutes substituted the temporary community 
of  the  absent  soldier’s  military  unit  for  the  permanent  community  of  his  neighbors  back 
home.41   
 The law called for polling sites to open for each Iowa regiment. If that failed to 
make   it   “practicable   for   all   to   vote   together,”   as   when   part   of   the   regiment   was   on  
“detached  service,”  then  the  detached  unit  could  open  its  own  polling  site.42 The eligible 
Iowa soldiers at each site elected three election judges, who in turn appointed election 
clerks. The only qualification was that the judges (though not necessarily the clerks) had 
to be eligible Iowa voters.43 That meant they had to be white males, at least 21 years old, 
U.S. citizens, with at least six months of residence in Iowa and 20 days of county 
residency.44   
                                                 
41. Joseph Allen Frank asserts that in many army units, soldiers remained tied to their communities 
back  home  and  that  military  units  often  retained  “a  communal  character.”  Frank,  With Ballot and Bayonet, 
14-15.   To   the   extent   that   this   typified   military   life,   the   Iowa   model’s   attempted   replication   of   civilian 
elections  was   not   synthetic.   But   not   even  Frank   argues   that   the   “community”   in   the   field   resembled   the  
community back home on Election Day. 
42. An Act to amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 at § 9.   
43. Id. 
44. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 1. 
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As in elections back home, judges and clerks swore oaths, promising among other 
things   to   “studiously   endeavor   to  prevent   fraud,  deceit   and  abuse”   in   the  election.45 To 
assist the election judges and clerks, the law provided for commissioners to travel from 
Iowa with necessary election paraphernalia: copies of the law, forms of poll lists and 
returns, and the text of oaths to administer to judges, clerks, and challenged voters. 
Commissioners also carried the election returns back home to Iowa. 46   The 
commissioners, appointed by the state census board, each covered just one regiment, 
although the law authorized the governor to supplement that allocation with more 
commissioners if he thought it necessary. Commissioners had to swear an oath that 
included   the   promise   to   perform   their   responsibilities   “without   reference   to   political  
preferences,”   and,   like   election   judges   and   clerks,   to   “studiously endeavor to prevent 
fraud,  deceit  and  abuse.”47 
 The statute specified the information that each ballot had to include, starting with 
the  voter’s  home  county  and  followed  by  the  name  of  the  voter’s  preferred  candidate  for  
each office. The offices up for election, and the preferred candidates names, could be 
printed in advance on the ballot (assuming that the party organization found a way to 
deliver such prepared ballots to the military camps) or written by hand by the voter.48  
 Soldiers announced themselves to the judges and clerks, by name, county of 
residence, and military attachment. The clerks entered all this information in the poll 
                                                 
45. An Act to amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 at § 11. 
46. Id. at §§ 25, 26. 
47. Id. at §§ 29, 30. 
48. Id. at § 15. In two states, Minnesota and Connecticut, the soldier-voting laws expressly allowed 
commissioners  to  carry  ballots  to  the  states’  military  encampments, but only if the political parties provided 
the ballots. (See discussion of those states in the Appendix, infra.)  Iowa’s  statute  did  not  so  state.   
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books.49 If no one challenged the voter, the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box.50 If 
there was a challenge, the judges administered an oath to the soldier testing all elements 
of eligibility – U.S. citizenship, state and county residency, and age. (As to age, the oath 
read,   “Do   you   solemnly   swear  …   that   you   are   twenty   one   years   of   age,   as   you   verily  
believe?”)  If the soldier swore the oath, his vote was accepted.51   
At the close of voting, the judges tallied the votes, the clerks double-checked the 
tally, and the judges entered the final result on the return form. Then the returns, together 
with the poll books and ballots, were given to a commissioner (or if no commissioner was 
on  hand,  placed  in  the  mail  “or  other  safe  mode”)  for  delivery  to  the  Board  of  Canvassers  
in Iowa. There the results of the soldier voting were added to the civilian results to 
determine election winners. 
Minnesota 
Minnesota enacted its soldier-voting law on September 27, 1862, hardly two 
weeks  after  Iowa  had  acted.  Unlike  Iowa,  Minnesota  did  not  try  to  open  election  sites  “in  
the   field,”   opting   instead   for   a   system   that   allowed   soldiers   to send completed ballots 
from their military encampment back home to their election districts in Minnesota. It was 
the first state to do so.52  
                                                 
49. Id. at § 16. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the Military or Naval Service 
of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at the General Election to be held 
in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections, during the Continuance of the 
Present War, ch. 1, 1862 (extra session) Minn. Laws 13. [hereinafter this law will be referred to as the 
Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law] 
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The law covered military personnel comprehensively, allowing absentee voting 
by  “all  persons  …  in  the  military  or  naval  service,”  provided  they  were  eligible  electors  
“when  they  mustered  into  the  service.”53 This included volunteers, draftees, regulars, and 
sailors in the navy. The law went a step further, authorizing voting by servicemen who 
turned 21 during their military service, provided they qualified as residents before 
enrolling. The law applied comprehensively to elections, as well, authorizing absent 
soldiers   to   vote   in   “all”   annual   elections,   starting   in   1862,   but   only   “during   the  
continuance of the present war.”54  
Commissioners  were  key  to  the  law’s  functioning.  The  governor,  with  the  advice  
and consent of the state senate, appointed the commissioners. They were stretched thin, a 
total of eight commissioners being assigned for all the states where Minnesota 
servicemen were stationed.  By the terms of the law, four commissioners were Democrats 
and four Republicans.55   
The law allowed the two political parties to supply their pre-printed ballots to the 
commissioners, who then provided the ballots to the voting soldiers.   The   soldier’s  
completed ballot would get forwarded home to Minnesota only after he first swore an 
oath, which a commissioner administered in person. The oath touched on the elements of 
voting eligibility other than race and gender.  It covered age (21), residence (four months 
in Minnesota and ten days in the election district), and U.S. citizenship. Minnesota was 
unusually generous in its citizenship qualification for suffrage, enfranchising not only 
                                                 
53.  Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law at § 1. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at § 6. 
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then-current United States citizens, but also foreigners  who  had  declared  their  “intention  
to become such citizen, conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of 
naturalization.”56  The oath covered both citizenship categories.57  
The soldier would complete his ballot, place it in an envelope supplied by the 
commissioner,   “seal   the   same  with   sealing  wax”   (also   provided  by   the   commissioner),  
and swear the above oath. The commissioner then signed a form in the nature of a 
notarization on the back of the sealed envelope. It attested to the name of the soldier, the 
name   of   the   commissioner,   the   soldier’s   military   attachment,   the   fact   that   soldier   had  
taken   the  oath,   and   the   commissioner’s   assurance   that   the   soldier’s  vote  was   “free   and  
voluntary.”58  
The commissioner then mailed the envelope to the   soldier’s   voting   district   in  
Minnesota. The election judges there, after confirming that the soldier named on the 
envelope   was   on   the   district’s   voting   registry,   opened   the   envelope   and   added   the  
enclosed ballot to the civilian votes in the ballot box.59  This meant that there could be no 
separate tally of the soldier votes.  The same was true of other states adopting this 
model.60 
                                                 
56. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1. The constitutions of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Kansas 
similarly allowed prospective citizens to vote. MICH. CONST. of 1831, art. VII, § 1; WIS. CONST. of 1848, 
art. III, § 1; KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. V, § 1. The Minnesota oath did not address the two categories of 
Native Americans allowed  to  vote  under  this  section  of  the  constitution.  One  was  “Persons  of  mixed  white  
and   indian  blood  who  have  adopted   the  customs  and  habits  of  civilization.”  The  other  was   those  Indians  
found  by  a  court  to  be  “capable  of  enjoying  the  rights  of  citizenship  within  this  State.”  Minnesota’s  Soldier-
Voting Law at § 1.     
57.  Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law at § 3.  
58. Id. 
59. Id. at § 5. 
60. Benton, Voting in the Field, 312. 
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Like many soldier-voting laws, this one included an argumentative provision in 
the nature of a legal fiction. Its title pronounced that the voting system set forth in the law 
would enable absent   soldiers   “to   vote   in   the  Election  Districts  where   they   reside….”61 
The statement had a purpose. Soldiers voting under the law filled out their ballots in the 
field, far from home and arguably  in  violation  of  the  state  constitution’s  requirement that 
the   elector   must   vote   “in   the   election   district”   where   he   met   a   ten-day residency 
qualification.62 In   the   event   of   a   challenge   to   the   law’s   constitutionality,   a   court  would  
have to decide whether an absentee ballot, prepared in the field but ultimately deposited 
in the local ballot box, would satisfy the requirement. The statement in  the  law’s  title  was  
meant, in bootstrap fashion, to help cement the argument that it would. 
In one form or another, it was an argument waged across the country as states 
sought to conform the novelty of absentee voting to constitutions framed by men who had 
never contemplated such a thing. Minnesota’s   law  never  faced  a  court  challenge testing 
the fit of its soldier-voting law with its constitution. Iowa’s  law  did,  as  did  many others, 
among  them  Ohio’s. 
                                                 
61.  Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law. 
62. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV § 1. 
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CHAPTER 1 
“WORDS  BECOME  THINGS:”  THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  OHIO 
 
In the 1863 election for probate judge of Wayne County, Ohio, Republican Henry 
Lehman ran against Democrat John McBride in a tight race.  Election Day fell only six 
months  after  passage  of  Ohio’s  military   suffrage   law,  which  allowed  absent   soldiers   to  
vote.   Of   the   ballots   cast   at   the   polling   places   in   Wayne   County’s   sixteen   townships,  
McBride won by 183 votes.  But Lehman did much better than McBride among the 
county’s  absent  soldiers.  Lehman  got  380  of  those  votes  to  only  57  for  McBride.     That  
advantage  overcame  Lehman’s  deficit  among  the  civilian  voters.    So,  in  accordance  with  
the new law, the county clerk dutifully certified Lehman the winner – and Wayne 
County’s  newest  probate  judge  – by a final tally of 3369 to 3227.   
McBride challenged the election results in a lawsuit.  His court papers asked the 
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas to install him as the winner on the grounds that 
Ohio’s   military   suffrage   law   was   unconstitutional   and   that the ballots of the absent 
soldiers   therefore   should   not   count.      McBride’s   complaint   alleged   all   sorts   of  
constitutional infirmities in the law.  The new statute, said his lawyers, violated the 
proscription against class legislation, since it allowed absent electors to vote only if they 
were soldiers, thus discriminating against electors who might be absent for other reasons.  
Moreover,   McBride’s   attorneys   insisted,   the   legislators in Columbus could not 
constitutionally adopt laws having effect outside Ohio (all but two of the absent soldiers 
                                                 
 The author borrows   this   title   from  his  Masters  Thesis,   entitled,   “Words  Become  Things:  Absentee  
Soldiers  and  Ohio  Election  Law,”  (Wayne  State  University,  2003). 
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voting in the Lehman-McBride election had cast their ballots outside the state), and in 
fact the Ohio constitution, properly interpreted, allowed electors to cast their ballots only 
in  the  town  where  they  resided.    The  county  judge  agreed  with  McBride  that  the  state’s  
1851 constitution barred the legislature from allowing voting outside Ohio.  So he set 
aside the election results and declared McBride the winner.1  
Now   it  was  Lehman’s   turn.     He   appealed   to   the  Ohio  Supreme  Court,   insisting  
that the new law was indeed constitutional. His lawyers argued that the constitution left it 
for the legislature to decide where elections could be held and that the soldier-voting law, 
in creating a way for soldiers to vote away from home, was a legitimate exercise of that 
legislative authority.  In a lengthy opinion, the court majority ruled that the legislature 
was within its constitutional authority in allowing out-of-state Ohio soldiers to vote.  It 
reversed the lower court ruling and declared Henry Lehman the winner.   
Of  the  five  justices  on  the  court,  only  one  took  McBride’s  side  of  the  argument.    
In  a  dissenting  opinion  even   lengthier   than   the  majority’s, Justice Rufus Ranney traced 
the  meaning   of   the  word   “election”   and   the   nature   of   voting   through  Ohio’s   legal   and  
constitutional history.  Ranney maintained that by 1851, when the state ratified a revised 
constitution,  “election”  had  come  to  mean  a  public meeting, occurring in an Ohio election 
district and overseen by election officials who, as district residents, knew the community 
and its voters well enough to ensure that only qualified electors cast ballots. Framers 
                                                 
1. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 573, 574. The lower court disallowed only the votes cast outside of Ohio.  It 
allowed the two votes by soldiers absent from their townships but within the state, both of which went to 
Lehman.   The   court’s   distinction   between   in-state and out-of-state absentee ballots was part of the 
inspiration for an 1864 amendment to the soldier-voting law. It expressly extended the absentee voting 
right to servicemen both within and without the state. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in 
the Military Service to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, 61 Ohio Laws 88 (1864).   
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hadn’t   expressly  defined   the  word,   since   there  was  no  need   to  do   so.   “Election”  was   a  
word of common usage, understood to mean what it had always meant in Ohio law. Now, 
by allowing voting outside the state and beyond the reach of community-based 
enforcement, Ranney objected, the soldier-voting law had unconstitutionally redefined 
the very concept of an election.2 
To   the   consternation   of   Democrats   and   the   relief   of   Republicans,   Ranney’s  
opinion persuaded none of his four colleagues on the bench. The court ruled 4-1 in 
Lehman’s   favor.   So it was that Henry Lehman moved triumphantly into his new 
chambers in Wooster, Ohio, as the duly elected probate judge of Wayne County. Like it 
or not, Ohioans would live with the novelty of absentee voting for their servicemen for 
the rest of the war.   
Though McBride’s lawyers lost their argument, they were right that the 1863 
election law broke abruptly from well-settled state law that had anchored elections to 
Ohio communities and granted control of election sites to local community leaders. The 
law had long empowered those leaders (usually township trustees) to decide, for example, 
whether  a  migrant  recently  arrived  in  town  met  the  state  constitution’s  qualifications  for  
suffrage, including particularly whether he qualified as a resident.   
 This chapter examines the prewar evolution of Ohio election law to demonstrate, 
as  a  measure  of  the  1863  law’s  novelty,  the  decades-long stasis in the control that local 
elites enjoyed over legal voting rights. Community control over elections endured 
undiminished through the   state’s   growth,   maturation,   and   experience   with   heavy  
                                                 
2. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 630. 
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migration in the first half of the nineteenth century. Throughout that antebellum 
experience,   Ohio’s   election   laws   showed   a   fierce   determination   to   prevent   fraudulent  
voting – to  preserve  the  “purity”  of  elections,  as  the  statutory  language  often  put  it  – by 
entrusting oversight of the election process to community leaders who knew their 
neighbors and could presumably distinguish between qualified voters and pretenders. All 
that changed abruptly in 1863 when absent Civil War soldiers briefly gained voting rights 
away from the watchful eye of township leaders. Just as abruptly, the status quo ante 
returned  at  the  war’s  conclusion,  with  community  leaders  back  in  charge. 
 
Fitting Soldiers into an Election System Designed for Civilians 
Ohio was an early mover among states that experimented with the innovation of 
absentee voting for soldiers.  It was the fifth state to enact a soldier-voting law, passing 
its statute in early 1863.3  Partisan alignments on the issue had not yet crystalized. The 
bill in fact received bipartisan support.4  When the idea for such a law was first floated in 
1862, Republicans had opposed it, fearing that Democrats in high positions in the 
military would abuse their power in the army to cheat Republican candidates in soldier 
voting. After Republicans did poorly in the 1862 elections, they concluded that the 
absence of soldiers from in-state election sites hurt their side more than it hurt 
Democrats. They therefore joined Democrats in supporting the legislation in 1863.5  
                                                 
3. The first four were Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Benton, Voting in the Field, v. 
4. The bill passed the Ohio house of representative by a 79-2 vote.  Id.,73.  
5.  Arnold  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham”. 
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Ohio’s   law   followed   the   Iowa   model,   calling   for   election   sites   to   open   at   the  
encampments where Ohio soldiers served. Under the law, these faraway elections 
mimicked elections at home, complete with ballot boxes, election judges and clerks, 
ballot challenges, poll books, and tally sheets.6 Election officials in the field forwarded 
the vote count back to election districts back home, where the soldier results were added 
to civilian votes to determine winners and losers.   
In   its   coverage,   Ohio’s   law   was   more   comprehensive   than   most.   By   an   1864  
amendment,  it  defined  “military  service”  to  mean  more  than  just  service  as  army  soldiers.    
The law now explicitly extended the opportunity for absentee voting to men working in 
the   service   as   “teamsters,   wagoners,   quartermasters   and   their   employees,   and   those  
engaged   in   the   subsistence,   transportation   and   naval   departments   of   said   service.”7 A 
separate amendment in 1864 enlarged the types of elections in which absent servicemen 
could vote. The 1863 enactment covered county, state, congressional, or presidential 
elections. As expanded in 1864, the law also covered municipal elections.8 Neither the 
original 1863 law nor its 1864 amendments excluded draftees or army regulars, as laws in 
several other states did. Overall, no state had a soldier-voting law broader in its scope, as 
                                                 
6. An Act to Enable Qualified Voters of this State, in the Military Service of this State, or of the United 
States, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, 60 Ohio   Laws   80   (1863).   [Hereafter   cited   as   “Ohio   Soldier-
Voting  Law  of  1863”]. 
7. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in the Military Service to Exercise the Right of 
Suffrage, § 1, 61 Ohio Laws 88, 88 (1864).  The same amendment eliminated any lingering doubts about 
the geographic scope of the law, stipulating that it applied to absent soldiers whether inside the state or 
beyond  Ohio’s   borders.   Id. As we shall see, the majority in Lehman construed the 1863 act as already 
having this broader scope. In this sense, the 1864 amendment was redundant. The amendment also limited 
the  law’s  duration  to  “the  existence  of  the  present  rebellion.”  Id. 
8. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of Cities and Incorporated Villages which are Divided into 
Election Districts and Wards, of this State, who may be in the Military Service of this State, or of the 
United States, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, 61 Ohio Laws 49 (1864). 
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to   both   covered   personnel   and   applicable   election   categories,   than   Ohio’s   law   as  
amended. 
One reason soldier-voting laws have received relatively little attention among 
Civil War scholars is that absentee voting results did not alter the outcome of major 
elections.  In  his  fine  article  about  the  Ohio  soldier  vote  in  the  state’s  1863  gubernatorial  
election, for example, scholar Arnold Shankman shows the insignificance of the soldier 
vote. In that election, John Brough, the candidate of the Unionist party (an amalgam of 
Republicans and war Democrats) trounced Democrat Clement Vallandigham, a strident 
opponent  of  the  war.  Brough’s  margin  of  victory  in  the  civilian  vote (62,920) was larger 
than the total number of votes cast by absent soldiers (43,765). So, even though Brough 
won  95%  of   the  soldiers’  votes,  he  didn’t  need  any  of   them  to  win.9   Similarly, in the 
1864 elections, the soldier vote from Ohio, though more than 81% for Lincoln, had a 
marginal  effect.  Lincoln,  who  won  the  Ohio  soldiers’  vote  80%-20%, would have carried 
the  state  even  if  he  had  lost  100%  of  the  state’s  51,000  voting  soldiers,  just  as  he  would  
have won nationally even without any of the soldier votes cast.10 
But sometimes the soldier vote mattered a great deal, as it certainly did in the 
contest between Henry Lehman and John McBride in Wayne County, Ohio. The example 
illuminates the relevance of military suffrage in down-ballot elections. And because the 
election sparked a contest that went all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court, where the 
                                                 
9 .   Shankman,   “Soldier   Votes   and   Clement   L.   Vallandigham,”   104.   Brough’s   lopsided   win   among  
soldiers compares to his more modest, though still solid, margin in the civilian vote, which he won 57.3% 
to   42.7%.      Shankman   shows   that   at   least   some   of   Brough’s   oversized   win   among   soldiers   owed   to  
manipulation, coercion, and fraud by pro-administration military commanders. 
10.  Winther,  “The  Soldier  Vote,”  457;;  McPherson,  Battle Cry of Freedom, 804-805. 
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adversarial process of litigation brought sharp focus to the constitutional issues the new 
law raised, the case also helps illuminate the novelty of the statute.  
Before returning to Lehman v. McBride, it is useful to situate the new law in the 
history   of   Ohio’s   prewar   election   laws,   starting   with   a   caveat.   While   elections   are  
artifacts of law, and an understanding of what it meant to have an election begins with a 
close  look  at  Ohio’s  election  laws  before  1863,  the  similarities  and  contrasts  in  statutory  
wording   between   the   1863   law   and   its   antecedents   reveal   only   part   of   the   new   law’s  
radicalism, albeit the biggest part.11  In many of its provisions governing operational 
details, however, the military suffrage law achieved a deceptive appearance of harmony 
with  the  state’s  electoral  traditions  by  borrowing  much  of  its  wording  from  earlier  Ohio  
election laws.  Nevertheless, the core provision permitting voting elsewhere than in 
Ohio’s  cities  and  townships  was  dramatically  different  from  earlier  prewar  laws.  The  new  
law also authorized voting in the midst of war.  Earlier laws were written for peaceful, 
civilian venues, under the supervision of civilian leaders.  The new law operated in 
sometimes violent, and always martial, settings controlled by the military hierarchy.  
Close attention to the operational effects of that contextual difference helps illuminate the 
1863 soldier-voting  law’s  dissonance  with  Ohio’s  election traditions as defined by earlier 
legislation.   
In enacting election laws, the legislature of course had to operate within a 
constitutional framework.  By the time it adopted its military suffrage law in 1863, the 
                                                 
11. The 1864 law, already discussed, did not substantially alter the voting procedures of the 1863 law, 
and of course added nothing to its novelty. Because it was the 1863 law that broke with tradition and was 
the focus of the court case, that law forms the basis of the comparisons drawn in this chapter. 
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Ohio legislature had functioned under two state constitutions, the first drafted in 1802 
(the year before Ohio entered the union) and the second nearly half a century later, in 
1851.  In their treatment of elections and suffrage, the two constitutions differed only in 
minor ways, most of which had little or no bearing on the dispute in Lehman v. McBride.  
Both   required  voting  “by  ballot,”   and  both   restricted   suffrage   to   substantially   the   same  
category of people: 21-year-old white men with at least a year of residency in Ohio.12  
The 1851 constitution deleted a taxpaying qualification of the 1802 version, and while the 
1802  constitution  left  it  for  local  election  judges  to  decide  which  men  were  “residents,”  
the 1851 version authorized (but did not require) the legislature to specify durational 
local residency requirements.13 More significantly, the two constitutions differed in the 
way they addressed the matter of where election balloting was to take place.  In the 
section  that  established  voting  qualifications,  the  1802  constitution  specified,  “no  person 
shall be entitled to vote except in the county or district in which he shall actually reside at 
the   time   of   the   election.”14  The 1851 constitution omitted those words, a change that 
defenders of the 1863 soldier-voting law pointed to as evidence that the new constitution 
no longer fixed the place of voting.   
In the Lehman case, the justices would debate the significance of that omission, as 
we shall see later in this chapter.  But by 1863, when the legislature passed the soldier-
voting law, a long succession of election laws enacted under both constitutions had firmly 
                                                 
12. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, §§ 1, 2; OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, §§ 1, 2. 
13. OHIO CONST. of  1851,   art.  V,   §  1.  Ohio’s  1851  constitution  was  unusual   in   its   delegation   to   the  
legislature of authority to set the durational minimum for local the local residency qualification. Neither 
side in Lehman disputed the suffrage qualifications applicable to absent soldiers, including residency 
requirements.   
14. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1. 
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established what it meant to have an election in Ohio.  In remarkably consistent terms, 
and with subtle shifts over time, these laws described the ornate stagecraft of public 
elections, and the strict choreography that voters and election officials followed in 
casting, challenging, counting, and communicating the votes.  The 1863 soldier-voting 
law tried self-consciously to replicate these familiar steps in as many ways as possible for 
Ohio’s   far   away   troops.      War   and   geography,   however,   made   perfect   replication  
impossible.   
The  1863  law’s  starkest  departure  from  previous  law  related,  of  course,  to  the  site  
of voting.  Before 1863, Ohio law had rooted elections inseparably to locations in Ohio.  
An election had always been a community event, and election laws had consistently 
provided that voters could cast their ballots only in the community where they resided.  
Each township constituted an election district, and the law called for voters to gather at a 
specified  location  in  their  township  to  conduct   their  elections.     The  state’s  first  election  
law,  adopted  in  1803,  instructed  each  county  court  of  common  pleas  “to  name  a  certain  
house”   in   each   of   the   county’s   townships   where   voters   “shall   meet”   to   conduct   their  
election.15  By 1809, the authority to designate the election site had shifted from the 
county  court  to  each  township’s  own  trustees,  but  elections  remained  occasions  at  which  
qualified  citizens  would  “meet  and  vote”  somewhere  in  the  township.16 The 1824 election 
law  spoke  of  elections  in  the  same  terms,  as  an  occasion  to  “meet  and  vote.”17  The verb 
“meet”  appears  less  frequently  in  the  election  law  in  1831,  but  the  sense  of  an  election  as  
                                                 
15. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 2, 1 Ohio Laws 76, 76 (1803). 
16. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 3, 8 Ohio Laws 550, 551 (1809). 
17. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 3, 22 Ohio Laws 32, 32 (1824).  
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a township meeting remained evident.  The law, as it always had, still spoke of electors 
voting  “at”  elections.18   
In these years, as elections became more protracted affairs with more participants, 
they became less like traditional meetings.19  But they still constituted public gatherings. 
The 1841 election  law  omitted  the  verb  “meet,”  but  still  referred  to  elections  as  events  at  
which   voters   “assembled”   in   the   community.  As   late   as   1859,   the   legislature   spoke   of  
elections  as  events  that  people  “attended.” 20  Over the entire span of nearly six decades 
between   Ohio’s   statehood   and   the   war,   state   law   consistently   connected   elections   and  
voting to location, and the location was always at a gathering place within the 
community.  
Participation in these public election events was limited to qualified voters 
residing in the township – men known to each other, with interests and feelings tied to the 
community, and presumably well positioned to know whether other prospective electors 
actually qualified to vote.21  Tethering  elections  to  the  place  of  voters’  residence thereby 
served a policing function, which remained an integral element of election laws 
throughout the six decades leading up to the war. The 1841 law, in terms virtually 
                                                 
18. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 11, 29 Ohio Laws 44, 46 (1831). The  law  used  the  verb  “meet”  in  
describing elections to fill vacancies (§ 38) as well as elections in newly formed counties (§ 39). 
19.  An  1837  statute  hinted  at  the  shifting  nature  of  election  “meetings”  by  relieving  election  judges  of  
the duty to finish the vote tally on Election Day. Amendatory   of   ‘An   act   to   regulate   elections,’   passed  
February 18, 1831, 35 Ohio Laws 56 (1837).  For a description of how antebellum elections operated in 
practice,  see  Kenneth  Winkle,  “Ohio’s  Informal  Polling  Place:  Nineteenth-Century Suffrage in Theory and 
Practice,”   in  The Pursuit of Public Power: Political Culture in Ohio, 1787-1861, ed. Jeffrey Brown and 
Andrew Cayton (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 169-184.  
20. An Act to Preserve the Purity of Elections, § 19, 39 Ohio Laws 13, 18 (1841). An Act to Amend 
Section Seven of an Act to Regulate the Election of State and County Officers, passed May 3, 1852, § 1, 50 
Ohio Laws 311, 311 (1852).   
21. For the justification of early nineteenth century residency requirements, see Keyssar, The Right to 
Vote,  33;;  and  Kruman,  “Legislatures  and  Political  Rights,” 3:1235-1253. 
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identical to the 1831 law before it and the 1824, 1809 and 1803 laws before that, 
provided  that  “no  elector  shall  vote  except  in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he  resides.”22  
The 1841 provision to this effect remained in force up to the 1863 legislative session.  It 
clearly barred voting by anyone – soldier or civilian – away from his hometown on 
Election Day.  The whole purpose of the 1863 soldier suffrage law was to change that 
restriction for absent Civil War soldiers.  Constituting a major step away from a long 
tradition rooted in all preceding election laws, the change was radical. 
The new law allowed each Ohio soldier in the field (assuming he qualified as an 
eligible voter) to cast his ballot at one of three remote locations.  First, the law required a 
poll to open at the quarters of the commanding officer of the military company in which 
Ohio soldiers served.23   All soldiers attached to that company who were within two miles 
of that location could vote there and only there.  Second, servicemen not attached to a 
company   and   those  more   than   two  miles   from  a   company  commander’s   quarters   could 
vote  at  the  polls  of  any  company  that  might  be  “most  convenient  to  them.”    This  group  
included not only artillerymen (organized by batteries, not companies), but also infantry 
officers with command over units larger than a company, such as regimental, brigade, or 
divisional commanders.  Thus the Ohio colonel who commanded a regiment, and his 
                                                 
22.  An Act to Regulate Elections of 1803, § 13; An Act to Regulate Elections of 1809, § 10; An Act to 
Regulate Elections of 1824; Ohio enacted a second election law in 1824: An Act to Regulate Elections in 
the township of Cincinnati, § 5, 23 Ohio  Laws  14,  15  (1824).     This   law  established  each  of  Cincinnati’s  
four  wards  as  an  election  district.     The  act  states   the  residency  restriction  as   follows:  “That   the   qualified 
voters of said township or city [i.e., Cincinnati] shall vote in the respective ward in which they reside, and 
not  elsewhere.”    Throughout  the  period  covered  by  this  chapter,  references  to  “wards”  in  Ohio  election  law  
appear to apply only to Cincinnati.); An Act to Regulate Elections, § 9, 29 Ohio Laws 44, 45 (1831); An 
Act to Preserve the Purity of Elections, § 3, 39 Ohio Laws 13, 15 (1841). References to these statutes in 
subsequent   footnotes   are   abbreviated   as   “Ohio   election   law   [year],”   followed by the pertinent section 
number.  
23. Companies were organizational units in both the infantry and the cavalry, but not the artillery or 
navy.   
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staff, could drop in to vote at the quarters of any of the ten or so companies in his 
command, as could the brigadier general above him (commanding perhaps five 
regiments), the divisional general above him (typically in charge of three brigades), and 
up to the corps and army commanders above them, each with a staff of aides.  Third, if 
twenty or more Ohio servicemen found themselves in a place more than two miles from 
any   company   commander’s   quarters,   they   could   create   their   own   polling   place   on   the  
spot.24    
By 1863, Ohio infantrymen and cavalry troopers served in about 140 regiments, 
each nominally with ten companies, scattered across many states, with the heaviest 
concentrations in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia.  That meant potentially at least 
1400 polling stations outside Ohio, not counting those that might be set up as needed by 
detached units of twenty or more.  More than fifty additional infantry regiments – 500 
more companies – were added by the time of the 1864 election.25  The total number of 
potential voting sites thus created for Ohio soldiers in the field exceeded the number of 
election sites for civilians back home.26   
Having established this critical difference in the permissible voting site, the new 
law required the Ohio servicemen, gathered at the makeshift polling stations set up for 
them in the field, to follow most of the same ritualized voting procedures that election 
                                                 
24. Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), § 2.   
25.  “The  Civil  War  Archives,”  http://www.civilwararchive.com/unionoh.htm (accessed July 15, 2013). 
For information on the organization of Union forces, see McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 322-327. 
26. This conclusion is derived from the conservative assumption that Ohio had no more townships in 
1863 than it does today. According to its Secretary of State, as of 2011 Ohio had 1309 townships, a number 
probably greater than the total in the Civil War. Ohio Secretary of State, Municipal roster for 2010-2011, 
accessed July 15, 2103, 
www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/publications/election/muniroster2010_2011/Townships.csv .           
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laws had long imposed on  polling  sites  for  civilians.    As  in  Ohio’s  townships  and  wards,  
three election judges presided over the process at each voting site for soldiers, wielding 
nearly absolute power over the election.  Whereas election judges back home were 
usually township trustees, in the field they were soldiers, elected by the Ohio soldiers 
gathered at the site. As at home, two election clerks served under the election judges. 
Judges  and  clerks  alike  swore  an  oath,  including  the  promise  “to  studiously  endeavor  to  
prevent fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse”  in  conducting  the  election.27   
The  clerks’  job  included  recording  the  voters’  names,  and  the  tally  of  votes  given  
for  each  office,   in  “poll  books.”     These  were   in   the  nature  of   files  with   record-keeping 
formats that conformed to a template printed in the statutes.  The two election clerks had 
to keep duplicate copies of the poll books, recording everything identically in both.   
Soldiers  and  civilians  alike  voted  “by  ballot.”  The  election  laws  barely  addressed  
the form of the ballot, requiring  only  that  it  be  a  “single  piece  of  paper,  on  which  shall  be  
written   or   printed”   the   names   of   the   preferred   candidates.28  In most elections, voters 
could fashion their own ballots, but more typically they used pre-printed ballots provided 
to them by the political parties or published in partisan newspapers before the election.29  
A few soldier-voting laws made provision for both political parties to distribute their 
ballots  to  soldiers  through  the  agency  of  “commissioners”  who  traveled  to  army  posts to 
help  implement  the  laws,  but  Ohio’s  law  did  not.30 
                                                 
27. Ohio Soldier-Voting law (1863), § 5. 
28. Ohio election law (1803), § 13; Ohio election law (1809), §10; Ohio election law (1831), § 9.  The 
soldier-voting law said nothing about the form of the ballot. 
29. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 28; Silbey, The American Political Nation, 59.   
30. Minnesota’s  law  is  an  example. An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged 
in the Military or Naval Service of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at 
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The  1863  law’s  replication  of  earlier  election  law  provisions  about  ballots  masked  
another of many profound practical differences between the two election contexts.  By 
the mid-nineteenth century, the major political parties had achieved modern levels of 
organizational efficiency and were adept at supplying the party faithful and prospective 
voters  with  the  party’s  ballots.    Organizational  prowess  in  ballot  distribution  was  a  key  to  
electoral success, but neither party had experience distributing ballots to absent voters.  
As the war progressed, access to ballots became increasingly problematic for absent 
soldiers, especially if the soldier was a Democrat.31  
Once he had either prepared his own ballot or obtained one pre-printed, the voter 
– whether civilian or soldier – handed it to one of the election judges.  The civilian 
election   laws   had   always   insisted   that   the   voter   do   so   “openly   and   in   full   view,”   a  
requirement eliminated in the 1863 law.32   Upon receiving the ballot, and while still 
holding   it,   the  election   judge  publicly   announced   the  voter’s  name.33  At this point, the 
prospective voter was subject to challenge by any other voter present or any of the 
election judges.  When someone challenged the voter’s  eligibility,  it  became  the  election  
judges’   duty   to   conduct   an   immediate   and   formal   inquiry.      For   civilian   elections,   this  
meant administering an oath, interrogating the voter, and finally deciding whether to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the General Election to be held in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections, 
during the Continuance of the Present War, ch. 1, §6, 1862 (extra session) Minn. Laws 13, 16. 
31. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 140;;  Shankman,   “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  
99. Chapter 5 elaborates on this difficulty for Democrats. 
32. Ohio election law (1803), § 13; Ohio election law (1809), §10; Ohio election law (1824), § 10; Ohio 
election law (1831), § 9.  
33. Ohio election law (1803), § 13; Ohio election law (1809), § 10; Ohio election law (1824), § 10; 
Ohio election law (1831), § 9.  
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accept or reject the ballot.34  The soldier suffrage law did not prescribe any procedure for 
handling a challenge, stating only that before accepting the ballot, the election judge had 
to   “be   satisfied”   that   the   voter  was   qualified.35  For all practical purposes, the election 
judges’  decision  about the challenge was final.  No mechanism existed, either for soldiers 
in the field or civilians back home, for immediate appeal.  Review happened, if at all, 
only   in   an   election  “contest,”  held   in   an  Ohio  court   and  occurring  days   or   even  weeks  
later, after an election winner was declared.36   
If no one challenged the voter, or if the judges satisfied themselves that a 
challenged voter was indeed eligible, the election judges accepted the ballot.  A judge 
placed the accepted ballot in a locked ballot box, and the election clerks entered the name 
of the voter in the duplicate poll books.37  Voters, judges, and the clerks continued this 
process for the six or eight hours that the polls stayed open.38   At the close of the voting, 
with the ballot box still locked, the clerks counted the names they had entered in the 
duplicate poll books and noted the total.  The judges then signed the poll books and 
turned to the task of counting the votes.39   
                                                 
34. Ohio election law (1803), § 15; Ohio election law (1809), § 12; Ohio election law (1824), § 12; 
Ohio election (1831), § 10. 
35. Ohio Soldier-Voting law (1863), § 8. 
36. Ohio election law (1831), § 43.  Neither the 1841 election law nor the soldier-voting law changed 
this procedure. 
37. Ohio election law (1803), § 14; Ohio election law (1809), § 11; Ohio election law (1824), § 11; 
Ohio election (1831), § 10; Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), § 8.  
38. Under the 1831 law, the polls in Ohio townships opened between 8:00 AM and 10:00 AM and 
closed at 4:00 PM, except in Cincinnati, where they closed at 6:00 PM.  Ohio election law (1831), § 5.  The 
soldier-voting law opened the polls at 10:00 AM and split the difference in the civilian closing times, 
closing the polls for soldiers at 5:00 PM.  Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), § 3. 
39. Ohio election law (1803), § 16; Ohio election law (1809), § 13; Ohio election law (1824), § 13; 
Ohio election (1831), § 13; Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), §§ 8-9. 
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Vote counting followed an elaborate and labor-intensive process far better suited 
to placid civilian settings than to hectic war zones, but the election laws described them 
almost identically for both settings. One election judge opened the ballot box, began 
removing the ballots one at a time, and publicly announced the votes shown on each one.  
Then he handed the ballot to the second judge for his examination, and he in turn passed 
it to the third judge, who finally strung the ballot on a thread.40   All the while, the 
election clerks entered each vote in the duplicate poll books.  After processing all the 
ballots in this fashion, the clerks tallied the votes, entered the tallies in the poll books, 
then sealed and forwarded one of the poll books to the clerk of the county court of 
common pleas.41  The 1863 law required all these tallying and bookkeeping steps in 
terms virtually identical to the provisions of law governing elections in Ohio.  
By requiring so many of the time-honored election procedures that Ohio law had 
provided since 1803, the soldier-voting law sought to do more than just give the absent 
serviceman a way to cast his ballot.  The 1863 law tried to recreate, in each of these 1500 
or so remote locations where soldiers might find themselves on Election Day, full-blown 
Ohio elections.  In statutory text, the transplanted events resembled elections that had 
grown familiar to Ohioans for nearly six decades.  But the remote settings contemplated 
for these recreated Ohio elections, and the differences between a temporary community 
of absent soldiers and a permanent community of civilians back home, made perfect 
replication of the home-front election impossible in the field.  The constitutional issues 
                                                 
40. The threading of ballots was a consistent feature of Ohio election laws, appearing in the 1803 
election law, § 17, and the 1809 election law (§ 14). The 1831 election law preserved it (§ 14), as did the 
1863 soldier-voting law (§ 10).   
41. Ohio election law (1803), § 23; Ohio election law (1809), § 19; Ohio election law (1824), § 21; 
Ohio election (1831), § 21; Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), §§ 8-9.  
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that divided the Lehman court grew out of that impossibility; the law could not graft all 
the features of an Ohio election onto   an   election   held   far   outside   the   state’s   borders,  
sometimes in zones of active combat.        
Some differences between the elections that soldiers experienced and the election 
process for civilians would hardly have mattered to any voters.  In the townships back 
home, for example, the township clerk kept the second poll book – the one not forwarded 
to the county courthouse – “for  the  use  of  persons  who  may  choose  to  inspect  it.”42  For 
soldier voting in the field, election officials forwarded the second poll book to the 
secretary of state, where the county clerk could obtain it on demand.43   The ballots cast 
in the field were mailed to the county court along with the first poll book.44  But the state 
election laws had never directed election officials to do anything at all with ballots cast in 
Ohio. 
In other ways, however, elections in the field differed substantially from elections 
held back home.  Soldiers could experience only a pale imitation of the cultural 
phenomenon of an election among civilians.  Scholars of nineteenth century American 
politics such as Jean Baker, Joel Silbey, Glenn Altschuler, Stuart Blumin, and Richard 
Bensel have vividly described the remarkable spectacle of Election Day.  By the mid-
nineteenth century, an election was as much a social as a political event. Baker portrays 
elections  of   this  era  as  “secular  holy  days,  a   time  when  daily  routines  were  interrupted,  
                                                 
42. Ohio election law (1831), § 22. 
43. Ohio Soldier-Voting Law (1863), § 16. 
44. Id. 
52  
 
work   was   suspended,   and   communities   observed   a   public   festival.” 45   On a typical 
Election Day in civilian America, according to Silbey, 
…  there  was  intense  excitement  and  an  exuberant,  busy  atmosphere.    In  addition  to  
the voters streaming in and out, and the party workers and election officials who 
had to be there, large crowds bustled around the polling places: wives, children, and 
other family members, as well as vendors, entertainers, and simple gawkers.  
Elections were special events.  Amid the continuous electioneering and political 
arguments, picnic, drinking, and boisterous celebration went on throughout each 
polling day.46 
 
Beyond listing all the ingredients and steps to follow in the statutory recipe for 
making  an  election,  Ohio  election  law  had  never  defined  the  term  “election.”  Neither  did  
the  state’s  constitution.    It  was  a  word  that  constitutional  framers  and  legislators believed 
had a commonly understood meaning, making definition unnecessary in drafting. Of 
course no amount of care in legislative drafting could transplant to the war theater the 
familiar  features  of  the  civilians’  “secular  holy  day.”      Wives,  children, and entertainers 
could not materialize at the typical site of soldier voting in the field.  If Election Day fell 
during one of the many lulls in fighting, when armies rested or regrouped during 
interludes of peace between engagements, a degree of festivity might have crept into the 
election   process   for   servicemen;;   drinking   and   carousing  were   not   alien   to   the   soldiers’  
experience.      But   how   completely   foreign   to   civilian   sensibilities   the   soldiers’   voting  
experience must have been when Election Day fell during battle.  For fighting soldiers, an 
election was no picnic.  Consider the voting experience of a fervently Republican Ohio 
soldier whose unit found itself engaged in combat on election day in October 1864: 
                                                 
45. Baker, Affairs of Party, 271. See also, Richard Franklin Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the 
Mid-Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
46. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 143.  See also Altschuler and Blumin, Rude Republic: 
Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century, 69-79. 
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The election judges and clerks moved along our lines in ambulances.  It was a day 
of   constant   marching   and   fighting.      At   every   halt   of   a   few   minutes’   duration  
balloting progressed vigorously, votes being more than once sandwiched in 
between volleys of musketry scarcely fifteen minutes apart.  The rebels at every 
charge advanced with vociferous cheers for McClellan to which our boys reacted 
with cheers for Lincoln and solid arguments with their Enfields.  It produced a 
marked effect upon our soldiers.  What wonder that they voted almost 
unanimously for the Union ticket?  How could they fight rebels one moment, 
hazarding life and limb for the dear old government, and the next undo all they 
were  doing  by  voting  for  Treason’s  cowardly  allies  at  the  rear.47 
 
Ohioans contemplating soldier voting in 1863 – a year earlier   than   this  Ohio’s  
soldier’s   1864   experience   – had already developed a well-informed understanding that 
voting soldiers would experience an election environment starkly different from what 
civilians back home had come to expect on Election Day.  By April 1863 when the Ohio 
legislature enacted the soldier-voting law, the country had seen photographs of the 
grotesque scenes of battlefield carnage at Antietam.  They had read newspaper accounts 
of Bull Run, Shiloh, Fredericksburg, and Murfreesboro, and countless smaller 
engagements.  They had read first hand accounts in letters from servicemen at the front 
and heard the stories in person from returning soldiers.  They surely knew that for many 
soldiers, elections would not resemble the familiar home front spectacle.  If it troubled 
lawmakers  that  they  were  inventing  something  radically  different  from  the  “secular  holy  
day,”  they  obviously  did  not  let  their  misgivings  stand  in  the  way  legislatively.     
The soldier-voting law of 1863, however, did create election novelties with more 
obviously legal significance.  For example, the Ohio soldiers who assembled to vote at 
the  makeshift  polling  stations  in  the  field  were  from  any  number  of  Ohio’s  eighty-seven 
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counties.  Even on peaceful days, this meant coping with daunting logistical challenges 
unknown to voters and election officials at civilian polling stations.  The soldier-voting 
law required the election clerks and judges to keep separate sets of poll books, in 
duplicate, for the voters of each Ohio county and to separately thread the ballots for each 
county.   Back home, where only electors from the township could vote, only one pair of 
poll books and one thread of ballots were needed.48   Even that could pose logistical 
challenges. An historian of Ohio elections describes the difficulties civilian election 
clerks   had   working,   “sometimes   feverishly,”   to   keep   up   with   the   pace   of   voting   and  
maintaining accuracy in the two poll books.49  When voting occurred for soldiers at the 
battle front, any unit of which could include men from several counties, one wonders 
how, in the heat of combat, election officials jostling about in rolling wagons could have 
managed to keep accurate records in the different duplicate sets of poll books, 
segregating ballots from different counties on different threads, all the while dodging 
bullets.   
Then there was the problem of notice.  How did absent soldiers know when and 
where to vote?  For elections in Ohio, the law required the county sheriff, fifteen days in 
advance,  to  publish  a  “proclamation”  announcing  the  date  of  the  election  and  the  offices  
at stake.  He also had to post a copy of the proclamation at the election site in each 
                                                 
48. Ohio Soldier-Voting Law (1863), § 7; Ohio election law (1831), § 10.   
49.  Winkle,  “Ohio’s  Informal  Polling  Place,”  169-184, 173.  
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township and publish a copy of it in a county newspaper, if the county had a newspaper.50  
The soldier-voting law made no provision at all for advance notice.   
The 1863 law also departed from the procedures civilian election judges followed 
when deciding the eligibility of a challenged voter.  Ohio law had always vested election 
judges with wide discretion in resolving   challenges   to   a   voter’s   eligibility.      The   1803  
election  law  granted  election  judges  “power  to  examine  [the  prospective  voter]  on  oath  or  
affirmation,   touching   his   qualification   as   an   elector,”   and   authorized   him   to   accept   the  
ballot   if   he  was   “satisfied   that   the   elector   is   legally   entitled   to  vote.”51   The 1809 law 
expanded   the   election   judges’   authority   by   allowing   them   to   swear   in   and   interrogate  
“disinterested  witnesses”  during  the  challenge  process.52  The 1824 and 1831 laws made 
no substantial changes   in   the   election   judges’   duties   or   responsibilities   in   resolving  
challenges.53   
The election law of 1841 left almost all provisions of the 1831 law intact, but it 
overhauled the procedures governing challenges and added stiff new penalties for 
violating election rules.  The new law equipped township officials with powerful tools for 
disciplining the voting process, and more insistently than ever before it required those 
officials  to  use  the  tools.  Entitled  “An  Act  to  preserve  the  purity  of  elections,”  this  anti-
fraud statute particularly targeted voters who cast ballots in the wrong township or in 
more than one township.  Legislators designed the law to impose greater uniformity and 
                                                 
50. Ohio election law (1831), § 4.  Before 1831, the laws required only the proclamation; there was no 
mention of newspaper notice. Ohio election law (1803), § 5; Ohio election law (1809), § 5; Ohio election 
law (1824), § 5. 
51. Ohio election law (1803), §§ 14, 15. 
52. Ohio election law (1809), § 12. 
53. Ohio election law (1824), § 12; Ohio election law (1831), § 12. 
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tighter discipline on the enforcement of the residency qualification for suffrage.  While 
all   earlier   election   laws   had   straightforwardly   required   electors   to   vote   “only   in   the  
township,  or  ward,  in  which  he  resides,”  statutory  penalties  for  voting  in  more  than  one  
township had not existed in the early Ohio election laws. 54    The 1803 law imposed up to 
$500   in   penalties   on   candidates   who   gave   or   promised   “any  meat,   drink   or   any   other  
reward”  in  exchange  for  votes  and  punished  voters  who  accepted  such  inducements  with  
up to a $100 penalty, but it imposed no penalty for violating the residency restrictions.55  
The 1824 law preserved the penalty for giving inducements, deleted the penalty for 
accepting them, and added a $100 fine for tricking an illiterate voter into casting a pre-
printed  ballot  “contrary  to  his  inclination.”56  It imposed no penalty for voting outside the 
township of residence.   
The  1831  law  was  the  first  to  penalize  “voting  in  more  than  one  township  or  ward  
at   the   same   election,”   imposing   a   $50   penalty. 57   This   coincided   with   Ohio’s   first  
statutory accommodation   of   absent   electors.      If   a   voter’s   “actual   employment   in   the  
business  of  his  trade,  occupation  or  profession”  took  him  temporarily  to  another  township  
in the same county, he could vote there.58  But the 1841 law, in its assault on voter fraud, 
ended this modest  experiment  in  voting  outside  one’s  own  township  and  added  a  flurry  of  
new strictures and far harsher penalties focused mostly residency fraud.  It started by 
tightening   the  familiar  provision  of  all  earlier   laws   that  “no  elector  shall  vote  except   in  
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the   township   in  which  he  resides.”59 It then painstakingly defined residency, addressing 
nine different scenarios that had made residency debatable before 1841, including a 
voter’s  temporary  absence  from  the  township  (he  retained  his  residency),  his   temporary 
presence in a township (it did not count as residency), and his conducting business in one 
town  while  keeping  his  family  in  another  (his  family’s  place  of  residence  controlled).   
Among  the  1841  law’s  innovations  for  “preserving  the  purity  of  elections”  were 
precise, step-by-step instructions for election judges to follow when interrogating a 
challenged voter.  The new law scripted the oath to administer when swearing the voter 
before interrogation.  It prescribed exact questions to ask for each category of challenge – 
citizenship, residency, and age.  It listed two questions to pose when someone challenged 
the  prospective  voter’s  U.S.  citizenship  (and  follow-up questions when the voter claimed 
to be a naturalized citizen, including a demand that he produce a certificate of 
naturalization), five questions to test Ohio residency, four for challenges to his county 
residency,  and  so  forth.     For  a  challenge   to   the  prospective  voter’s  age,  election   judges  
had   to   ask   the   young   soldier,   “are   you   twenty   one   years   of age to the best of your 
knowledge  and  belief?”    Only  for  challenges  based  on  the  voter’s  race  was  the  1841  law  
silent on the form of questioning.60   
In one sense, these tightly drawn interrogation requirements diminished election 
judges’  discretion  as  gatekeepers – a rare thing in prewar election law – by dictating the 
precise questions to ask challenged voters. But it did so not in a way that protected 
                                                 
59. Conforming that wording more precisely to the language of the 1802 constitution, the 1841 law 
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migrants whose ballots the election judges had unjustly rejected in the past or diminished 
the power of local officials to block unwelcome voters.  The purpose was the opposite: to 
impose discipline on election judges who, the legislature believed, had neglected their 
duties in the past by allowing unqualified migrants to vote.  The statute, then, was an 
anti-migrant election law meant to discourage careless or corrupt election judges from 
exercising their gatekeeping obligation to bar unqualified migrants from voting.61 
The law still vested all power in the election judges, who still had the final word 
on challenged votes. They could reject a ballot even after the prospective elector 
personally   swore   that   he   met   the   eligibility   criterion   under   challenge,   “if   they   [the  
election  judges]  shall  be  satisfied,”  from  the  evidence  they  chose  to  hear,   that   the  voter  
was unqualified.62 
It was a tough law, meting out stiff penalties against fraud, especially residency 
fraud. Four of the penalty provisions specifically targeted non-residents: six months in 
the  penitentiary  for  voting  in  a  township  “in  which  [the  voter]  does  not  actually  reside;;”  
three  years  of  “hard  labor”  for  voting  in  a  county  and  “not  being  a  resident  thereof;;”  five  
years  at  hard  labor  for  voting  by  “a  resident  of  another  state;;”  and  five  years,  also  at  hard  
                                                 
61. Not surprisingly, this anti-migrant tilt arose in a political context. Whigs had won the elections of 
1840 and dominated the Ohio legislature the following year.  As a rule, Whigs before 1850 looked with a 
jaundiced eye on suffrage expansion, even for white males.  Democrats, in contrast, favored easier suffrage 
for immigrants and other lower class white men, among whom Democrats outpolled Whigs in most 
elections.  The 1841 election law bears all the hallmarks of Whig skepticism about enlarging the electorate 
and Whig belief that Democrats corrupted the election process. Rush Welter, The Mind of America, 1820-
1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 42; Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from 
Property to Democracy 1760-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 261; Winkle, The 
Politics of Community, 77. 
62.  Ohio election law (1841), § 16. 
59  
 
labor,  for  voting  more  than  once  “at   the  same  election.”  63  Persons aiding or abetting a 
non-resident’s  voting  also   faced  up   to   five  years  at  hard   labor.64  Justice Rufus Ranney 
did not exaggerate when he described the law, in his dissenting opinion in the Lehman 
case,   as   “perhaps   one   of   the  most   perfect and stringent for the prevention of fraud at 
elections  to  be  found  in  any  state.”65  It certainly imposed far harsher maximum penalties 
than any earlier Ohio election law ever had.66  
Moreover the penalties tilted the balance of power away from aspiring voters. No 
provision of the statute punished election judges for rejecting the ballot of a voter they 
knew  to  be  qualified,  but   the  law  subjected  them  to  punishment  for  up  to  five  years  “at  
hard   labor”   for   accepting   the   ballot   of   a   voter   they   knew   to   be   unqualified.67  This 
imbalance would encourage an election judge in a close case to play it safe by rejecting 
the   voter’s   claim   of   residency.   And   the   law   imposed   an   affirmative   duty   on   election  
judges  to  challenge  voters  they  knew  “or  suspect[ed]”  to  be  unqualified, again on penalty 
of up to five years at hard labor.68 The law directed its muscle disproportionately at 
voting by unqualified migrants.  In contrast to the severe penalties a non-resident faced, 
                                                 
63. Id. at §§ 4, 5, 6, and 7.  The stated terms of confinement were, in each case, maximum penalties for 
the offense described. 
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65. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 627.  Ranney believed the 1841 law shed light on the intent of the framers of 
Ohio’s   1851   constitution,   since   none of those framers (and Ranney had been one of them) expressed 
dissatisfaction   with   it.   Neither   the   majority   opinion   nor   Lehman’s   attorneys   disputed   Ranney’s  
characterization of the 1841 law as having been intended to target fraud. 
66. For a differing view, arguing that the 1841 law was part of a trend toward relaxed residency 
qualifications and was in fact more lenient than its antecedents, see Winkle, The Politics of Community, 62. 
Winkle’s  theory  of  “volitional  residence”  posits  that  migrants  in  the  decades before the Civil War gained 
ever greater autonomy in determining their own residence, and to that extent their eligibility to vote.   It is a 
theory at odds with the arguments and supporting evidence set forth in this chapter. 
67. An Act to Preserve the Purity of Elections, § 24, 39 Ohio Laws 13, 18 (1841). 
68. Id. at §§ 18, 24. 
60  
 
the maximum punishment for underage voting or voting by a convicted felon was six 
months in the penitentiary.69   
In 1857, the legislature amended some provisions of the 1841 act without altering 
its decidedly anti-fraud spirit or diminishing the authority of election judges to 
superintend the process.  The 1857   law   imposed   Ohio’s   first   specific   durational  
requirements both for county and township residency, requiring 30 days of residency in 
the county and 20 days in the township. It also made corresponding adjustments in the 
oaths  for  testing  challenged  voters’ residency and imposed the same penalties as the 1841 
act for violations of the now precisely stated residency rules.70   Election judges enjoyed 
as tight a grip over the proceedings as under the 1841 law, and they still functioned under 
a mandate to enforce suffrage qualifications strictly, under risk of harsh penalty for 
waiving them. Fraud prevention remained their paramount legal responsibility. 
In contrast, the 1863 soldier voting law gave virtually no guidance to election 
judges faced with a challenge.  In much the same terms as earlier election laws, it 
provided  merely  that  the  election  judges  in  the  field  should  accept  the  soldier’s  ballot  if  
“the   judge   be   satisfied”   that   the   voter   met   the   state’s   eligibility   requirements,   but   it  
provided no instruction about how the election judge might pursue his doubts.71   The 
1863 law left intact the anti-fraud provisions of the 1857 law for voting within Ohio, 
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explicitly stating that in elections set up for soldiers away from their home townships but 
still within the  borders  of  Ohio,  “all  the  provisions  of  the  general  law  in  relation  to  fraud  
at  elections  and  the  punishment  thereof”  applied.72  It did not say this about elections set 
up for Ohio soldiers in other states.  This created the anomaly of tight statutory discipline 
in resolving election challenges in Ohio, but relative laxity over challenges in the field. 
As the 1841 and 1857 statutes made clear, the system relied heavily on election 
judges  to  preserve  the  “purity  of  elections.”    Who  were  these  critically  important people?  
For  elections  in  Ohio,  the  law  assigned  the  posts  to  the  “township  trustees,”  or  in  the  case  
of Cincinnati to city councilmen.  Every April, each Ohio township elected local officers, 
including   appraisers,   a   treasurer,   two   “fence   viewers,”   two   overseers   of   the   poor,   a  
township clerk, and three township trustees. 73   The trustees stood atop the local 
governmental hierarchy with authority to designate how many constables and highway 
supervisors the township would have and power to impose taxes on local property.74  
They were generally older and richer than average voters and more likely to be merchants 
and   professionals   instead   of   farmers   and   laborers.   As   the   town’s   most   prestigious  
politicians, they knew and were known by the local voters. 75   Who better to safeguard 
the  “purity”  of  elections  by  identifying  the  town’s  legitimate  voters  and  weeding  out  the  
pretenders?  From 1809 to the Civil War, election laws always assigned the role of 
election judges to these trustees. The township clerk – also elected annually – was 
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automatically assigned as one of the two election clerks, and the three election judges 
selected the other.76 
The election laws recognized that the township trustees and the township clerk 
could not always perform their election duties.  They might be absent or they might 
themselves run for an office.  When that happened, the law provided for replacements.  
The voters on hand when the polls opened would elect from among themselves, vive 
voce, the necessary substitutes.  Upon their selection, and before the rest of the election 
process proceeded, these substitute election judges or clerks took an oath – a step not 
required of the township trustees or the township clerk – to perform their election duties 
as  best  they  could  and  to  “  studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse.”77  But 
because   voters   chose   the   substitutes   from   among   the   community’s   eligible   voters,   the  
policing function remained in local hands.  Whether the election judge was a town trustee 
or a substitute, he shared his township residency with the qualified electors and brought 
the advantage of familiarity with his neighbors to the task of refereeing challenged 
ballots. 
The 1863 soldier-voting law could not replicate this critical feature of civilian 
elections.   The polling sites in the field could never draw on the services of township 
trustees or clerks, who of course performed their duties back home.  More fundamentally, 
the military polling stations did not draw Ohioans from just one township.  Although 
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Union infantry companies typically consisted of men from the same town, or at least the 
same county,78 the identity between a company and a single township was never perfect. 
The Conscription Act of 1863 permitted a drafted man to hire a substitute to fill his place. 
While  conscripts   represented  a   relatively  small  percentage  of   the  Union’s  overall   force,  
they often took advantage of the substitution opportunity.79  These substitutes, according 
to James McPherson, were likely to be eighteen and nineteen year olds and immigrants.80  
Neither category was eligible to vote in Ohio, but even if the draftee found a substitute 
from Ohio who did qualify as an elector, there was no telling what part of Ohio he might 
come from.  Moreover, Ohio soldiers unattached to the company could still vote at the 
company’s   polling   station,   no  matter  where   they   resided   in  Ohio,   if   they  were   officers  
above the rank of company commander, or if they were artillerymen, or if election day 
found them more than two miles away from their own company’s  headquarters.    In  each  
of these situations, Ohioans from multiple townships, and probably multiple counties, 
would  mix  at  the  same  polling  place.    And  the  law’s  allowance  for  any  group  of  twenty  
Ohioans to set up their own election site when no Ohio company was within two miles 
further  assured  that  residential  homogeneity  among  Ohio’s  voting  soldiers  would  be  a  hit  
or miss proposition.   
So, not only did the 1863 law permit Ohioans to cast ballots out-of-state, and to 
do so in the company of men from different Ohio communities, without oversight by 
civilian leaders, but now for the first time the voters and election judges might not have 
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common residential ties.  Here surely was a paradigmatic shift in what it meant for 
Ohioans to have an election.     
To accommodate the unavailability of township trustees and clerks for service as 
election officers, and the inevitable mix of soldiers from different communities at the 
polling sites, the 1863 law provided for choosing the three election judges by a vive voce 
vote among the soldiers on hand when the makeshift military polling place opened, as 
long as the judges were qualified Ohio voters.  The three election judges then appointed 
the two election clerks.81  Like substitute election judges and clerks in the townships back 
home, the soldiers chosen to serve these functions had to swear to perform their duties 
diligently  and  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse.”82   
But beyond borrowing from the text of statutes that applied to civilian elections, 
the law could not replicate for military elections an officiating system resembling the 
system back home.  Consider first the handicaps imposed by military hierarchy.  Soldiers 
could hardly overlook the command structure when choosing their election judges.  Some 
might think it foolhardy to run or vote against a superior officer seeking that position, or 
against another soldier whom the superior openly preferred. Joseph Allen Frank has 
documented the sometimes heavy-handed way that officers in the Union army monitored 
the political preferences of soldiers under their command and punished subordinates who 
espoused views deemed anti-administration. Soldiers were mindful of the risks of 
offending the political sensibilities of their superiors.83 The known political preferences 
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of the officer serving as election judge might deter ballot challenges by his subordinates, 
and  many   soldiers  would   find   it   reckless   to   challenge   their   superior’s   ballot   no  matter  
who  was  election  judge.    When  a  superior  officer’s  proffered vote drew a challenge from 
some bold trooper, would a subordinate soldier serving as election judge have the 
temerity  to  reject  the  ballot?    Or  would  he  dare  overrule  the  officer’s  challenge  of  another  
voter?  Might not the election judge in that position imagine that an officer displeased by 
his decision would express that displeasure by assigning the offending election judge to 
hazardous or tedious duties or withholding his furloughs?84  
Apart from problems the military hierarchy imposed, military culture itself defied 
the logic of the policing devices designed for civilian elections. Devotion to the purity of 
elections could not rank as high on the scale of virtues for soldiers working as election 
judges as it did for their civilian counterparts, their identical oaths notwithstanding.  If the 
election judge and a challenged voter were messmates who had marched and fought 
within the same small band of warriors, the duties of election judge would collide with 
the  far  more  powerful  forces  of  “group  cohesion,”  which  tied  soldiers  in  a  fighting  unit  
together  with  unbreakable  bonds  of  loyalty.  In  his  study  of  Civil  War  soldiers’  experience  
with combat, Gerald Linderman quotes a soldier as describing the ties that bound 
messmates.  “He  learns  to  look  upon  them as brothers; there is no sacrifice that he will not 
make  for  them….  Fellowship  becomes  almost  a  religion.”85  An Ohio artilleryman wrote 
in  a  letter  home,  “You  would  not  believe  that  men  could  be  so  attached  to  each  other  – 
                                                 
84. Both Frank and Shankman document the ubiquity of officers wielding their power over subordinates 
for harboring or expressing disfavored political views. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 120, 133, 137; 
Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  99-100. 
85. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War 
(New York: The Free Press, 1987), 235.  
66  
 
we  are  all   like  brothers.”86  An Ohio infantryman wrote in 1862 that he and his combat 
buddies  “were  hooped  …  with  bonds  stronger  than  steel.”87   
The unique group dynamics of combat units invites reflection on the relationship 
between soldier and community. On the one hand soldiers saw themselves as belonging 
to cohesive communities in the army, distinctive from their civilian communities back 
home.  On the other hand, they remained products of those home communities, with 
enduring political habits and civilian identities formed there. They straddled the two 
worlds, one foot in each kind of community.  
Their absentee voting under the new law had an active communal aspect in the 
context of their intense belonging to a tightknit military unit. One can think of that unit as 
their new residence, not fixed geographically, but coherent nevertheless. Soldiers clearly 
felt attachments to it, perhaps more powerfully than the attachments they felt to their 
permanent hometowns in Ohio. And they certainly had a stake in the health of these 
communities similar to or bigger than their stake in the township they came from; the 
soldier’s  very  survival  might  depend  on  his  military  unit’s  smooth  functioning.     
In their role as members of these communities, soldiers surely saw themselves as 
at least partially removed from the communities they had left behind, and in some ways 
better than citizens who remained in those communities. Rogers Smith argues that 
lawmakers through most of American history crafted citizenship laws to encourage 
groups receiving privileged  status  under  new  law  to  think  of  themselves  “as  a  distinctive  
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and  especially  ‘worthy’  people.”  They  were  generally  white,  Protestant  males,  in  Smith’s  
thesis.88  Although Smith does not discuss them, soldier-voting laws treated soldiers – at 
least most of those who were white and 21 – as specially privileged voters.  
Evidence indeed suggests that some soldiers saw themselves as distinctively 
worthy of special treatment compared to their civilian counterparts, whom they 
sometimes scorned. In the 1863 elections, for example, the Eighth Ohio regiment elected 
an eighteen-year old soldier to serve as an election judge, in defiance of the Ohio soldier-
voting   statute’s   requirement   that  military   election   judges  meet   the   qualifications   of   an  
Ohio elector.  His fellow soldiers, the under-aged election judge wrote proudly to his 
wife,  had  insisted  that  “a  man  who  is  old  enough  to  fight  for  his  country  and  to  risk  his  
life for it is better qualified to vote than are stay-at-home   patriots.” 89  The episode 
suggests an attitude among soldiers of belonging to a distinctive community. Indeed, as 
James McPherson has documented, soldiers felt the attachment to their community away 
from   home   very   intensely.   “All   other   groups,”   writes   McPherson,   “were   secondary:  
regiment, brigade, army, country, even community and family so long as he remained in 
the  army.”90 
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In other ways, soldiers remained linked to the communities they left behind.  One 
scholar argues that the communal character of militia units that became building blocks 
of the  volunteer  army’s  organization  kept  alive  a  sense  among  soldiers  that  they  remained  
a part of their home communities, especially compared to army regulars. In their politics, 
according   to   Joseph  Allen  Frank   referring   to  volunteers,   “the  men   remained  civilians,”  
whose   ties   to   their   home   communities   “prevented   the   total   absorption   of   the   citizen-
soldier  into  the  military  culture.”91  In this sense soldiers never left home; they remained 
products  of  the  political  culture  of  their  home  communities.  “These  men  were politicians 
and  voters  in  their  civilian  life,”  writes  one  scholar  of  soldier  voting,  and  as  soldiers  they  
“remained   politicians   and   voters.”92 Even when they voted in the field, soldiers saw 
themselves as participating in the kind of political ritual that had engaged them in their 
civilian   lives.   Voting   in   their   military   camps,   one   historian   has   written,   “affirmed  
republican  government”  for  absent  citizen-soldiers.93  
The two communities clashed in soldier-voting statutes. Legislatures enacted 
soldier-voting laws in acknowledgment that white citizen-soldiers, by virtue of their 
noble   participation   in   the   distinctive   community   of   servicemen,  were   “worthy   people,”  
deserving of the special privilege the laws bestowed. But legislatures crafted the 
operational details of the laws as if soldiers in the field lived in communities no different 
from the civilian communities they had left behind in Ohio.  The same rules of inclusion 
and exclusion applied. As members of tight knit communities in the field, soldiers could 
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respect distinctions among themselves based on military rank. But notwithstanding the 
terms of the law, they were far less likely than civilians to respect distinctions based on 
residence, citizenship, or age, as the experience of the 18-year old election judge from the 
Eight Ohio Regiment demonstrates.  
When a soldier election judge, of any age, pondered a ballot challenge involving 
his comrade in this new community, the merits of the challenge might matter little 
compared   to   the  “bonds  stronger   than   steel”   that  attached  him   to  his  comrade.  And   the  
strength of those bonds might trump misgivings a soldier could entertain about the 
qualifications of a comrade to vote under Ohio law. That would facilitate improper voting 
in ways that the new law technically disallowed.  These voters related to each other in 
ways very different from the relationship between township trustees and prospective 
civilian voters in Ohio, confounding the anti-fraud machinery built into antebellum laws 
governing civilian elections. Legal historian Christopher Tomlins expansively defines 
“law”   to   include   not   just   law’s   formalities   – written constitutions, statutes, and court 
decisions – but also what  he   terms   “legalities,”  meaning   the effects and adaptations of 
those formalities in people’s   lives. 94  To   borrow   Tomlins’   parlance,   servicemen’s  
adaptation of soldier-voting statutes to the realities of their lives in military communities 
produced legalities, or effects conforming logically to those realities while departing from 
the letter of  the  statutes.      The  statutes’  critics  back  home  would  call  such  legalities  fraud,  
and according to formal law they were indeed fraud, but servicemen themselves might 
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understandably regard them as sensible adaptations fully   justified   by   soldiers’  
circumstances.  
This was just one of several discordant features of elections contemplated for 
soldiers by the 1863 statute and elections familiar to Ohio civilians.  As we have seen, 
much else was also different.  The number of election sites for Ohio voters potentially 
doubled with the addition of the soldier polling places.  Elections for soldiers lacked the 
holiday atmosphere that characterized many civilian elections. The politicization of the 
military command deprived many soldiers of equal access to ballots.95  Soldiers had less 
advance notice of elections than civilians enjoyed. Record keeping duties for election 
officials in the field created frightful logistical challenges unknown to civilian officials. 
And ballot challenges were subject to different procedures for resolutions, controlled by 
men  in  a  hierarchical  structure  unlike  the  civilian  hierarchy  contemplated  by  all  the  law’s  
antecedents.   
The source of most of these operational differences, and by itself the biggest 
difference of all, was the new law’s   core   feature:   for   the   soldiers   it   covered,   the   law  
removed   the   venue   of   elections   away   from   Ohio’s   townships.   That   difference   alone  
profoundly altered the meanings that Ohio law and custom had previously attached to the 
word   “election.”      The   operational differences flowing from the change of venue, and 
particularly the change from civilian communities at peace to remote military 
communities  at  war,  bring  the  law’s  radicalism  into  even  sharper  relief. 
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The Constitutionality of the 1863 Soldier-Voting Law  
Could a law creating all these differences be constitutional?  That was the issue 
the five justices of the Ohio Supreme Court faced in Lehman v. McBride.  The case came 
before them as a legal problem calling for dispassionate judicial resolution. But these five 
men   were   themselves   creatures   of   politics   and   society.   In   1863,   Ohio’s   justices   were  
popularly elected, and they well understood the politics of the soldier-voting issue.96   
They knew, first, the numbers involved.  In Ohio, about one quarter of eligible voters 
served as Civil War soldiers.97  No politician could safely ignore such a huge bloc of 
voters.98  And by the time the Ohio court took up the case, it was clear how those soldiers 
were likely to vote.  Especially in Ohio, absent soldiers voting under the 1863 law 
overwhelmingly favored Republicans.  In the 1863 Ohio gubernatorial race, decided a 
month before the high court ruled in Lehman, Democrat Clement Vallandigham, a 
strident opponent of the war, had lost in a landslide to Republican John Brough.  
Vallandigham won 42% of the votes cast in Ohio, but only 5% of the soldier vote.99  
John   Brinkerhoff,   a   Republican,   led   the   court’s   majority.      He   had   represented  
Ohio in Congress for two terms in the 1840s and after the war served as an alternate 
delegate to the Republican National Convention. To the extent that politics colored his 
approach to the Lehman case, he seemed a safe bet to favor upholding the soldier-voting 
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law.  The other three justices who joined with Brinkerhoff as the majority in the Lehman 
v. McBride opinion were also Republicans.100  
Rufus  Ranney,  the  court’s  lone  dissenter  in  Lehman, brought the opposite political 
perspective to the case.  Ranney was an active Democrat.  Less than a year after the 
Lehman decision, he served as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention that 
nominated George McClellan to run for president against Abraham Lincoln.101  Earlier in 
his career, he had served as a delegate to the convention that drafted the 1851 
constitution.  There he exhibited strong misgivings about legislative power: at one point 
in the proceedings he offered this assessment of how effectively the legislature 
supervised  state  finances:  “About  as  a  dog  would  a  man’s  dinner.”102  He had specifically 
opposed giving the legislature authority to set durational residency requirements, 
believing  that  doing  so  could  result   in  frequent  changes  in  voting  eligibility  “to  suit   the  
caprices  and  changes  of  opinion  of  the  General  Assembly.”103  
Democratic party orthodoxy, to which Ranney likely subscribed, held that while 
any war threatened republicanism by spawning standing armies and a tyrannical central 
government,  civil  war  in  particular  was  “the  worst  of  all  society’s  disorders.”104  Ranney 
may   also   have   shared   his   party’s   indignation   about   military   interference in civilian 
elections and its skepticism about the chances that soldier voting could be fair under a 
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military command structure dominated by Republicans.  If Republican political biases 
inclined Brinkerhoff and his Republican colleagues to favor the soldier-voting law, 
Democratic political biases seemed just as likely to incline Ranney against it.  It was with 
these prejudices, subordinated, one would hope, to the higher calling of the law and their 
oaths of office, that the five justices approached the constitutional issues raised by the 
Lehman case.105 
Both Lehman and McBride brought powerhouse lawyers to the high court battle, 
befitting the importance of the showdown to both sides.  The legal teams reflected the 
partisan alignments that by this time had formed about the pros and cons of absentee 
soldier voting.  Democrats saw that their man McBride, who won more than 51% of the 
civilian votes, had secured barely 13% of the soldier vote.  This was better than 
Vallandigham’s  5%  performance  among  soldiers, but it clearly foretold major problems 
for Democrats in the upcoming elections in 1864.  Republicans, of course, liked the 
soldier-voting results as much as Democrats disliked them. For both sides, the high stakes 
justified bringing the best legal talent  to  bear  in  the  fight  over  the  law’s  validity. 
Lehman’s   lead   lawyer  was  Columbus  Delano,   a   prominent  Republican.  He  had  
served one term in the House of Representatives as a Whig from 1845-47 and would 
serve again from 1865-67. He had been a state delegate to the 1860 Republican 
convention in Chicago.  Later in life his career would suffer a setback when scandals in 
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the Indian Bureau forced his resignation as Secretary of the Interior under President 
Grant, but his star shone brightly in 1863.106 
Martin Welker   assisted  Delano   as   Lehman’s   co-counsel.  Like Delano, Welker 
had   been   a   Whig   before   joining   the   Republican   Party.   He   had   served   as   Ohio’s   Lt.  
Governor from 1858 to 1860 under Salmon Chase. Earlier in the war, he was Judge 
Advocate General of Ohio. After the war he would serve three terms in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.107 
McBride’s   lawyers  brought   even  more   lustrous   credentials   to   the   fight.  Thomas  
W.  Bartley  was  lead  counsel.    A  loyal  Democrat  and  a  “strong  Van  Buren  man,”  he  had  
served briefly as Ohio’s  governor  in  1844  upon  the  resignation  of  the  incumbent.  (He  did  
not  win  his  party’s  nomination  for  the  office  that  year,  and  maybe  he  was  grateful  to  have  
lost. If he had won, he would have found himself in the extraordinary position of running 
against his own father, the Whig politician Mordecai Bartley. Mordecai won that 
election.) Bartley had served as Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court for three years. 
Two of his fellow justices, fellow Democrat Ranney and Republican Brinkerhoff, still sat 
on the high court and would hear the arguments.108 
 John  McSweeney  assisted  Bartley  as  McBride’s  co-counsel. Another prominent 
Democrat, McSweeney had served a term in the Ohio senate and several terms as the 
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prosecuting attorney for Wayne County. On his death in 1890, his obituary referred to 
him  unqualifiedly  as  “the  greatest  criminal  lawyer  the  State  of  Ohio  ever  produced.”  (It  
also   spoke  highly  of  his   rhetorical   skills:   “His   language  was   the  purest  Saxon,  adorned  
with  poetic  flowers  and  jolly  Irish  wit.”)109  
That was the rich mix of political savvy and legal experience, both on the bench 
and  on   the   legal   teams,   that  grappled  with   the   legal   issues   raised  by  Lehman’s   appeal.    
McBride lawyers argued, first, that the 1863 law unconstitutionally discriminated in favor 
of   a   single   class   of   eligible   voters,   i.e.,   soldiers.  But   it  was   clear   that  McBride’s   team  
would have objected even if the statute gave absentee voting rights to all voters. The 
main thrust of their attack on the law was that the constitution did not give the legislature 
power   to  separate  voting  from  the  voter’s  place  of   residence.  “The   right  of   the  elective  
franchise,”   they   insisted,   “is,   by   the   terms  of   the   constitution,  not  made   incident   to   the  
locality  of  the  elector’s  residence  in  a  local  election  district,  but  inseparable  from  it.”110 
Allowing   voting   outside   the   voter’s   place   of   residence   would   “make   the   elective  
franchise a mere transitory or migratory thing, to be exercised not in any stated or 
prescribed election precincts or districts, but anywhere, and in any part of the world 
where  an   elector  may  happen   to  be  on   the  day  of   the   election.”111 And to allow voting 
under the exclusive control of military authorities, beyond the reach of civilian oversight, 
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was   “subversive   of   the   very   foundation   of   the   state   government,”   and   therefore   surely  
unconstitutional.112  
The main difficulty facing the McBride team was that their challenge required the 
court to infer constitutional limitations on legislative authority that the constitution itself 
did not expressly state.  The inference – that voting was constitutionally inseparable from 
the   voter’s   residence   – was reasonable but not inescapable. The constitution had been 
adopted  in  1851.  As  in  the  state’s  1802  constitution,  the  1851  instrument  both  fixed  the  
qualifications of voters and granted the legislature some authority over the conduct of 
elections.  That authority had limits, and the court in Lehman v. McBride had to decide 
whether it fell within those limits for the legislature to let soldiers vote away from  “the  
township   or  ward   of   their   residence,”  where   all   other  Ohio   electors   had   to   vote.      The  
language of the 1851 constitution made this question debatable.   
It would not have been debatable under the 1802 constitution.  In defining who 
among  Ohio’s  citizens  enjoyed  suffrage  rights,  that  instrument  stated,  “no  person  shall  be  
entitled to vote except in the county or district in which he shall actually reside at the 
time  of   the   election.”113  That left no room for absentee voting.  The 1851 constitution 
had omitted  this  wording,  a  point  Lehman’s  lawyers  emphasized.    But  other  provisions  in  
the 1851 instrument made the issue uncertain enough for the justices to need more than 
seventy pages to set out their competing opinions. 
Some provisions about voting eligibility were clear enough.  To qualify as a voter, 
an Ohioan had to be white, male, and at least twenty-one years old.  He also had to be a 
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citizen of the United States.114  None of those qualifications mattered in Lehman, but the 
constitution required more.  The voter had to meet a two-pronged residency test, one 
covering Ohio residency and the other covering local residency. He must have been a 
resident  of  Ohio  for  “one  year  next  preceding  the  election,”  and  of  “the  county,  township,  
or  ward”  for  “such  time  as  may  be  provided  by  law.”115  
The legislature waited until 1857 to exercise its constitutional authority to impose 
durational requirements for county and township residency, settling on modest 
requirements of 30 and 20 days, respectively. Soldiers who met that qualification when 
they entered the service ran no risk of losing it during their temporary absence, even 
without the soldier-voting law. The 1841 election law provided that protection by stating, 
“a  person  shall  not  be  held  to  have  lost  his  residence, who shall leave his home and go 
into  another  state  …  for  temporary  purposes  only,  with  an  intention  of  returning.”116  The 
1851 constitution left this provision undisturbed, and Civil War soldiers surely fit within 
its terms.  The soldier-voting law made no change in residence (or any other) 
qualifications for soldiers. By its terms, it applied only to soldiers who were already 
qualified electors, neither adding to nor subtracting from prewar eligibility requirements. 
The change the law wrought, in other words, related not to who was eligible to 
vote, but to where an   election   could   be   held.      In   observing   that   “qualifications   which  
confer the right to vote, and the place at which that right may be exercised, are things 
quite  distinct  from  each  other,”  the  Supreme Court majority framed the issue as whether 
                                                 
114. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 1.     
115. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 1.      
116. Ohio election law (1841), § 2, second paragraph. 
78  
 
the   1851   constitution   on   the   one   hand   fixed   “the   place   at  which”   eligible   voters   could  
vote, or on the other hand allowed the legislature to set up elections in places of its 
choosing, including places outside Ohio for absent soldiers. 117   
Most  of  the  debate  centered  on  the  last  three  words  of  the  constitution’s  definition  
of voter eligibility.  Article V, section 1 said that a person meeting all the qualifications 
of an elector – citizenship, race, gender, age, and residency – could   vote   “at   all  
elections.”118  At all elections?     McBride’s   lawyers,   arguing   to   have   the   law   set   aside,  
pointed  out  that  the  constitution  could  not  have  intended  to  permit  “holding  an  election  in  
Louisiana,  or  in  England,  or  in  China,”  since Ohio had no way to enforce its election laws 
extra-territorially.119  To  avoid  that  absurdity,  McBride’s  lawyers  argued,  the  terms  “at  all  
elections”  must  be   read  with   an   implicit   qualification.     As  qualified  by   the   implication  
they urged the court to accept,   the   clause  meant   “at   all   elections   at such place of his 
residence.”120  
This   asked  more   than   the   court’s   majority   was   willing   to   grant.   Justice   Josiah  
Scott  wrote   the  majority’s  opinion.  Scott  was   a  Republican  with   a  Whig  heritage,  who  
had served in the state legislature.121 His admiration for the law became clear from his 
characterization  of  its  purpose:  to  assure  that  soldiers  “shall  not  be  disfranchised  through  
their   devotion   to   the   vital   interests   of   their   country.”122  Scott denounced the effort to 
strike down such a virtuous law, or indeed any law, absent clear language in the 
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constitution prohibiting the enactment. He could find no such language in this case, and 
to  him  that  was  decisive.  He  declared,     “Had  it  been  the  intention  of  the  framers  of  our 
present  constitution  to  fix  or  limit  …  the  place  at  which  the  elective  franchise  should  be  
exercised by the voters respectively, it is quite remarkable that no attempt should have 
been  made  to  do  so  in  express  terms.”123 Scott  agreed  that  “at  all  elections”  did  not  really  
mean all elections, but he was not inclined to read into the 1851 constitution words that 
McBride’s  lawyers  urged  on  the  court,  which  would  have  the  effect  of  striking  down  the  
law. In his opinion for the court, Justice Scott found in the constitution no implied 
limitation as to the place of voting.  Instead, he saw an implied limitation on the elected 
positions   for   which   the   constitution   allowed   electors   to   cast   ballots.   A   man’s  
constitutional  right  to  vote  in  “all  elections”  meant,  wrote  Scott, that he could vote at the 
elections of all officers – state, county, and municipal – whose jurisdiction extended over 
him and over the township where he resided.  And the constitution placed no limits on 
where the legislature could decide to situate those elections.  If they chose to situate 
elections outside the state, they were constitutionally free to do so.124  
Justice   Scott   brushed   aside   McBride’s   arguments   that   the   soldier-voting   law’s  
extra-territorial effects rendered the statute unconstitutional.  The election involved office 
holders  “whose  sphere  of  official  action  lies  wholly  within  the  state  and  who  are  creatures  
of  its  sovereign  will.”125  There was ample precedent for Ohio laws having effect outside 
of Ohio, such as laws permitting depositions to be conducted, and wills and deeds 
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executed, outside the state.126 Moreover, said Scott, those who violated the law could be 
punished  when   they   returned   to  Ohio.     Besides,   as   an   “independent   sovereignty”  Ohio  
was free to make any arrangement it chose for the selection of its officers unless the 
constitution  specifically  said  otherwise.    Scott  insisted  that  even  if  Ohio  should  “see  fit  to  
declare that all her officers should be appointed and commissioned by the Dey of Algiers, 
in so far as the result would affect herself, or her citizens or subjects alone, I do not 
readily  perceive  how,  or  by  whom,  her  right  to  do  so  could  be  questioned.”127  It might be 
a poor policy choice for the legislature to do so, Scott conceded, but that did not make it 
unconstitutional.   
Scott   made   short   shrift   of   McBride’s   argument   that   the   law   unconstitutionally  
discriminated in favor of a single class of voters.  The constitutional requirement of 
uniformity, he ruled, meant only that the law had to apply uniformly to all parts of Ohio, 
which this law did. There was ample precedent for laws that apply to just one group of 
Ohioans, including laws regulating lawyers and brokers, for example.128 In short, Scott 
concluded, the legislature acted within its constitutional authority in allowing soldiers to 
vote outside the state.  
All  of  this  appalled  Rufus  Ranney,  the  court’s  sole  Democrat.  He  identified  four  
constitutional defects in the 1863 statute.  First, it effectively nullified the protection 
afforded to voters by a constitutional provision   that   voters,   “during   their   attendance   at  
elections   and   in   going   to   and   returning   therefrom,   shall   be   privileged   from   arrest.”129   
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Ranney observed that Ohio had no way to confer that protection outside its borders.130  
The soldier-voting law also violated  the  constitution’s  requirement  that  county  officers  be  
elected   “in   such  manner  …   as  may   be   provided   by   law.”131  To  Ranney,   “law”  meant  
rules backed by enforceable sanctions, and the criminal sanctions that Ohio had designed 
to punish violations of its election rules could not reach outside the state.  Ranney 
contended   it   was   an   “absurdity”   to   imagine   that   the   framers   of   Ohio’s   constitution  
contemplated extra-territorial legislative sanctions for election violations.132   
Third, Ranney argued that absentee voting eviscerated the constitutional suffrage 
qualifications, including particularly the requirement that electors reside in their township 
for  a  period  “next  preceding   the  election.”  By  stripping  away   the  mechanism  by  which  
those requirements could be policed, Ranney asserted, the law effectively gutted the 
qualifications.133  In terms of local residency, while it was for the legislature to decide 
what the required period should be, the soldier-voting law, by allowing voting away from 
the  township,  “completely annihilates the means, and the only means, [the framers] relied 
upon   to   make   this   provision   practically   operative.” 134  The   “evil”   targeted   by   the  
constitution’s  residency  requirement,  Ranney  maintained,  was  multiple  voting  by  people  
falsely claiming to be actual residents of the township.  Local voters knew who was 
entitled   to   vote,   and   the   residency   requirement   permitted   them   to   “protect   themselves  
from   fraud.”      Removing   the   election   from   the   community   defeated   that   protection,  
                                                 
130. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 647.  Complaints about the politicization of the military made this more 
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rendering  it  “not  worth  the  parchment  upon  which  it  is  written.”    Assigning  oversight  for  
one   county’s   election   to   officials   from   another   county,   as   the   1863   law   permitted,  
similarly   undercut   the   protection   intended   by   the   constitution’s   residency   requirement,  
according to Ranney.  Those  election  officials  would  have  no  “interest  …   to  guard   the  
election  of  officers  whose  official  acts  can  never  concern  them.”135   
Ranney’s  fourth  and  overarching  constitutional  concern  related  to  the  meaning  of  
“election”  as  he  believed  the  1851  framers used that term.  While Scott limited his search 
for constitutional meaning to the black letter of the text, Ranney in contrast searched 
history   for   evidence   of   the   framers’   understanding   of   the   words   they   used.      The  
constitution itself provided no express definition, but Ranney believed that the framers 
had  a  clear  and  discernible  meaning  in  mind  when  they  used  the  word.  “Words  become  
things,”  Ranney  maintained,  “and  are  to  have  the  effect  intended  by  those  who  employed  
them.”136 By 1851, Ranney claimed, the  word  “election”  in  Ohio  had  taken  on  a  meaning  
and had become a thing constitutionally incompatible with the concept of absentee 
balloting.  The 1863 law violated the constitution, then, by departing from the 1851 
definition  of    “election.”     
Ranney maintained that an election in the constitutional sense had four 
“indispensable  elements.”  It  was,  first,  a  public  meeting.    Second,  it  was  held  within  the  
election district. Third, qualified electors could vote at the meeting.  And fourth, those 
same electors had the right “to   guard   the   ballot   box   from   illegal   voting   or   other  
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frauds.”137  By cutting elections loose from their mooring in Ohio townships, the soldier-
voting law violated the second and fourth of these elements.  In reaching his conclusion, 
Ranney drew heavily from the 1841 election law – the   one   intended   to   “preserve   the  
purity  of   elections.”     The  1851   framers  had  expressed  no  disagreement  with   that   law’s  
concern   about   election   fraud,   particularly   cheating   by   voters   “falsely”   presenting  
themselves at a   township’s  polling  place.     As  Ranney  saw  it,   the  1851  framers  brought  
this sense of vigilance for the purity of elections to their notion of what a constitutional 
election   was.      “Nobody   [in   1851]   had   ever   heard   of   any   other   sort   of   election,”   he  
insisted.138  Removing an election from its proper setting in a township stripped it of the 
safeguards that the framers thought essential. 
Henry  Lehman’s  lawyers  had  argued,  in  defense  of  the  law,  that  the  constitution  
guarded voting as a personal right, which the 1863 law properly protected by permitting 
the soldier, in effect, to carry it with him.139  While it ruled for Lehman, the majority 
ignored this argument.  Rufus Ranney did not.  The right to vote, he insisted, derived 
from the constitution and was therefore a   “public   franchise,   belonging   to   the   whole  
community,”  although   it  was  conferred  on  only   some  citizens.     The  community  had  an  
interest   in   safeguarding   this   public   belonging   “against   abuse   and   perversions.”    
Dislodging the act of voting from a location within the community deprived the 
community   of   its   ability   to   protect   itself   “from   the   unlawful   intrusions   of   those   not  
qualified  [to  vote]”  and  was  therefore  a  public  wrong.140  Ranney saw the importance of 
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the   majority’s   error   as   “impossible   to   overstate”   because   it   “undermines   the   very  
foundation-principles upon which the constitution has founded the exercise of the 
elective  franchise.”141 
Ranney’s   lament   about   the   “abuse   and   perversions”   that   would   result   from  
allowing soldiers to vote at locations remote from their home communities seem well 
founded. The results of the 1863 gubernatorial elections point powerfully to gross 
irregularities   in   the  soldier  vote.  The  vote   in  some  counties  virtually  screamed  “fraud”!    
In Trumbull County, Brough won handily in the home vote, 74% to 26% for 
Vallandigham.  But   Brough  won   99%  of   the   votes   from  Trumbull’s   absent   soldiers.   In  
Williams County, Brough won the home vote, 60% - 40%, while winning better than 
99% of the 365 votes cast by absent soldiers.  The home vote in Mahoning County went 
to   Brough,   57%   to   43%,   while   99.8%   of   the   county’s   370   absent   soldiers   voted   for  
Brough.  In Lake and Paulding counties, Vallandigham won a grand total of zero votes 
out of  the combined 396 soldiers absent from those counties.142  
 Ranney’s  differences with Scott about the overarching values of the constitution 
and relevance of history in divining the meaning of constitutional text found echoes in 
judicial   disagreements   in   cases   challenging   other   states’   military   suffrage   laws,   as   we  
shall see in more detail in Chapter 2.  Decisions supporting the constitutionality of such 
laws did so based on one or more of the values that Scott extolled – the right to vote, the 
injustice   of   “disfranchising”   soldiers,   and   a   state’s   sovereign   right   to   respond   to 
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exigencies legislatively.  Like Ranney, other justices voting to strike down the laws 
looked   to   history   for   guidance   about   the   framers’   intentions   and   extolled   the   values  
anchoring  Ranney’s  dissent  – the  “purity”  of  elections,  the  community’s  right  to  oversee 
voting, and the constitutional status of time-honored election practices.  
A gulf of disagreement about constitutionalism separated Ranney from his four 
colleagues, but all five justices substantially agreed that the 1863 soldier-voting statute 
law broke   new   ground   for   Ohio’s   election   system.      Whether   Ohio’s   constitution  
permitted the innovation of absentee voting or not, all five justices concurred that it was 
an   innovation.  None  of  Rufus  Ranney’s  colleagues  could  have  disputed  his   speculation  
about the  1851  constitutional  framers.    “I  cannot  bring  myself  to  the  belief  that  a  single  
individual [among the framers] supposed it possible that the officer of one county could 
be elected by the votes given in another, much less by votes given out of the state.”143  
Ranney drew conclusions of unconstitutionality from that dissonance with the past. His 
colleagues did not, though they too recognized the dissonance. Either way, the legislature 
in 1863 had created something radically different.  
The law was radical, first, in its unprecedented elevation of the individual voter 
over the community as the central player in an Ohio election, and second in its 
subordination   of   overall   election   “purity”   to   the   expanded   suffrage   rights   of   a   class   of  
voters.  Henry  Lehman’s  attorneys argued correctly that the 1863 law protected suffrage 
as  a  personal  right  and  was  intended  “to  guard  this  right  wherever  the  person may  be.”144  
And Justice Ranney was correct in observing that this inverted the historical relationship 
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among elections, communities, and individual voters.  Before 1863, voters participated in 
elections only in their capacities as members of an Ohio community, as attendees at 
gatherings of townspeople.  An election untethered to the community was no more 
imaginable than a meeting without people.  In 1863, Ohioans for the first time 
conceptualized voting as an activity divorced from the community, and suffrage as a 
private right. 
It  was  equally  radical  to  expand  voting  rights  at  the  expense  of  election  “purity.”    
From 1803 through 1857, Ohio election laws successively tightened strictures against 
fraud and strengthened the hand of community leaders in enforcing them.  We have seen 
that the 1863 law fit incongruously with those antecedents, and most of the incongruities 
related  to  the  system’s  capacity  to  assure  accuracy  and  prevent  fraud.    Severed  from  their  
moorings in civilian communities, elections under the 1863 blueprint opened 
opportunities for voting irregularities that Ohio would not have tolerated before the war.  
The new law weakened one time-honored protection after another.  Prior notice of an 
election,  a  voter’s  familiarity  to  fellow  voters  and  to  election  judges  (and  vice  versa),  an  
atmosphere conducive to ballot challenges and their resolution, the primacy of allegiance 
to the community, a setting for orderly management of logistical necessities like tallying 
and recording, enforceable sanctions for cheating, bribery, or intimidation – all these 
attributes of civilian elections were diluted or altogether missing in the 1863 military 
elections.   
In   light  of   the  state’s   longstanding  aversion   to   risks  of  voting   irregularities,   this  
amounted to an expensive tribute to soldiers.  The statute Ohio passed in 1863 addressed 
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the problem of suffrage rights for distant soldiers at the expense of a value that had 
always been paramount in the statutory structure: preserving electoral purity, largely 
through community supervision of the voting process.  In the novel elections that the law 
created that year, the absent party was not the distant soldier, but the Ohio community he 
left behind.   
The novelty was short lived. By the terms of an 1864 act amending the 1863 law, 
the   opportunity   for   absent   soldiers   lasted   only   as   long   as   “the   existence   of   the   present  
rebellion.”145 When Ohio’s  soldiers  returned  from  the  service,  they  returned  as  voters  to  
the form of elections they knew from their prewar experience. Voting was restricted to 
locations in their Ohio townships, under the watchful eyes of the township trustees 
charged, as always,   with   guarding   the   “purity”   of   the   ballot   box   by   keeping   out  
pretenders. 
What caused this profound change in law? While this dissertation focuses on 
political forces underlying the invention of absentee voting opportunities for soldiers, a 
potential cause apart from politics deserves mention. Specifically, the ubiquity and scale 
of migration in antebellum America in general and Ohio in particular may have played a 
role. According to Kenneth Winkle, a scholar of the intersection of migration and politics 
in Ohio, as many as half of all Americans moved every decade over the first half of the 
nineteenth century, more of them to Ohio than to any other state. Intrastate migration was 
also heavy.146  The scholarship of Joel Silbey and Alexander Keyssar support Winkle in 
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positing that the rapid movement of populations naturally weakened the attachment many 
people felt toward individual communities.147  
 It is entirely possible that residential volatility attendant to nineteenth century 
migration, together with the general weakening of individual ties to particular 
communities, helped  create  an  environment  conducive  to  1863’s  election  law  reform  by  
softening up attitudinal resistance to absentee voting. For example, a man leaving his 
longtime home in Warren Ohio for Florence Township, then departing Florence for 
Henrietta Township two years later, might end up residing in Toledo and regarding 
himself as a bird of passage more than as a man of any Ohio township. He and voters like 
him might find little objectionable in a law diminishing the role of township trustees in 
certain elections.  
These long running societal forces by themselves could not account for the 
electoral innovation of absentee voting. Otherwise we would expect the innovation to 
have begun earlier and to have taken root more gradually than it did, and we would 
expect it to have endured. Instead it emerged abruptly in the context of the Civil War, and 
it ended just as abruptly when the war ended.  But in conjunction with more immediate 
causes associated with   the  war,   the   impact  of   this   societal  phenomenon  as  a  “softening  
up”  agent  is  entirely  plausible.148 
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For the primary cause one must look to politics, mainly the natural appetite of 
politicians to recapture the votes of electors absent in large numbers while in military 
service.  When Ohio acted, that appetite produced bipartisan support for the law. As the 
war progressed and states, including Ohio, gained experience with actual voting by 
absent soldiers, bipartisanship gave way to sharp partisan divisions.  The unique political 
circumstances of late 1863 and 1864 would heighten those differences and put soldier-
voting laws on center stage, as elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4. 
First,   however,   it   helps   to   understand   how   Ohio’s   law   fit   into   soldier-voting 
reforms as a national phenomenon.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DISLOCATED SUFFRAGE: THE RADICALISM OF SOLDIER-VOTING 
LAWS NATIONALLY 
 
Laws allowing absent soldiers to vote swept the Union states from 1862 to 1865, 
departing from legal antecedents almost everywhere. In many ways, the national 
experience was Ohio writ large.  In all states but one, laws untethering voters from their 
civilian communities jarred the prewar legal order, as it did in Ohio.1  The centrality of 
communities to the election process, not only as fixed venues for casting ballots but also 
as oversight mechanisms to prevent fraud, abruptly gave way – if only for soldiers – to a 
notion of voting as an individualized and portable right, dislocated from communities.  
That transition upended previous assumptions about the nature of voting and of elections.  
This chapter begins by surveying the national phenomenon with attention to the 
laws’  common  features  and  major  differences.  The  broad  categories  of  commonality  and  
variation among the laws shed light on what the laws accomplished, what they failed 
even to attempt, what they changed, and what they left alone. By one measure, the 
phenomenon was profoundly conservative. In particular, the laws did nothing to enlarge 
the community of qualified voters. Instead, they granted a new procedural privilege to a 
slice of the electorate that already enjoyed the substantive benefits of suffrage. The 
chapter   then   turns   to   an   examination   of   the   laws’   radicalism   as  measured   not   by   their  
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effect on the boundaries of political belonging, but rather by contemporary 
understandings  of  what  elections  and  voting  were  as  a  process.  Prewar,  the  community’s  
role   in   that   process   imparted   to   the   “right   to   vote”   a   public,   collective   quality.  As   the  
1863 law did in Ohio, similar laws in other states altered that communal quality and 
thereby challenged earlier understandings, rooted in law, about the essential nature of that 
process.   
Compounding   the   laws’   substantive   radicalism   was   the   legal   creativity   many  
states   exhibited   in   the   states’   rush   to   implement soldier voting in time for the 1864 
elections. Only in late 1863 did it become clear nationally that the issue of soldier voting 
would become politically potent in the pursuit of civilian votes. The majority of states 
awakened to that reality tardily, often with too little time remaining on the election 
calendar for the orderly process of constitutional amendment followed by legislation. 
They coped with the time crunch inventively. The same political urgency that prompted 
states to abandon long-held substantive notions about the nature of elections also inspired 
them to invent aggressive ways to accelerate the usual pace of constitutional change.   
 
Voting  Qualifications:  “Justice”  and  the  “Disfranchised”  Soldier   
Like  Ohio’s  1863  law,  the  laws  in  every state left intact prewar qualifications for 
suffrage. The statutes expressed this in various ways, always making it clear that the only 
soldiers  whom   the   laws   covered  were   servicemen   already   eligible   to   vote.  Ohio’s   law  
applied  only  to  “the  qualified voters  of  this  state  …  in  the  actual  military  service  of  this  
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state,   or   of   the   United   States.” 2  The statutes of Kentucky, Maine, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin used virtually the same limiting language.3 California’s   law   applied   to   “all  
electors, resident of the State   of   California   …   in   the   military   service   of   the   United  
States.”4 West  Virginia’s  statute  similarly  limited  its  coverage  to  soldiers  “entitled  to  vote  
in   the  township,  who  [are]  necessarily  absent  therefrom  on  the  day  of  any  election….”5 
Iowa and Michigan incorporated the limitation not only in the operational text of the laws 
but  also   into   their   titles,  but  also   in   the   laws’   title,  describing   the   respective  statutes  as  
allowing  “qualified  electors  of  this  State  in  the  military  service  to  vote….”6  
So it was, in one form or another, with every soldier-voting law. None extended 
the voting franchise to a previously excluded category of citizen, even if the citizen in 
that category served as a soldier. That left out a great many soldiers. For example, most 
African-American soldiers, disfranchised by state constitutions by virtue of their 
blackness, gained no voting opportunities under the new laws.7 Neither did white soldiers 
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who were not citizens or who were younger than twenty-one years old.8  And neither did 
women, including the many women who supported the war effort away from home as 
nurses or the few women who actually fought in battle.9  The soldiers whom the new 
laws privileged – always male, always at least twenty-one years old, and almost always 
white citizens – suddenly enjoyed brand new procedural opportunities to vote away from 
home. But back home they already enjoyed voting privileges as previously qualified 
electors.   
Even the eight states that amended their constitutions to authorize soldier voting 
did so without creating suffrage rights for soldiers previously excluded from voting.10 In 
amending their constitutions, none went beyond the objective of allowing absent 
qualified soldiers to vote. Only one state even attempted to expand prewar suffrage 
qualifications   by   constitutional   amendment,   and   that   attempt   failed.   Rhode   Island’s  
antebellum rules had a property qualification that applied more onerously to naturalized 
U.S. citizens than to native-born citizens.11 Viewing this discrimination as unfair to its 
foreign-born veterans, Rhode Island legislators who favored absentee voting for soldiers 
tried to eliminate the inequity by constitutional amendment.12  The proposed amendment 
failed to win ratification; only the absentee voting amendment secured popular 
                                                                                                                                                 
Island, and Vermont). In addition, New York granted African-Americans voting rights qualified by a 
discriminatory property qualification. Keyssar, The Right To Vote, 57, Appendix A9. 
8. All state constitutions limited voting rights to 21-year old males. 
9. For an account of women serving in Civil War combat, see Deanne Blanton and Lauren M. Cook, 
They Fought Like Demons: Women Soldiers in the Civil War (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing 
Group, 2003). 
10. The eight states that amended their constitutions to authorize absentee voting for soldiers were 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.  
11. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, §§ 1, 2.  Among the distinctions was that by paying a small tax or 
serving in the militia for a year, native-born citizens could avoid an otherwise universal property 
qualification for suffrage, while naturalized citizens had no way around the property requirement.  
12.  Benton, Voting in the Field, 182-188. 
94  
 
approval.13  The effort distinguished Rhode Island from the other nineteen states that 
enacted absentee voting rights for soldiers, but the outcome aligned Rhode Island with its 
sister states in preserving all prewar categories of disfranchisement even as they granted 
absent soldiers a new way to vote. 
The failure of the laws to extend suffrage rights to previously excluded groups 
buttresses the theories of several scholars who have observed in the evolution of 
American citizenship rights a recurrent pattern of privilege and exclusion, i.e., privilege 
for able-bodied, non-alien, white males – exactly the group privileged by soldier-voting 
laws – and exclusion for everyone else. Alexander Keyssar, Eric Foner, Barbara Welke, 
and Rogers Smith, to name some who have noted this stubborn pattern, would find 
nothing surprising in the privileges and exclusions that characterized all twenty of these 
laws.14 This feature of the laws qualifies them all as conservative in modern, rights-
                                                 
13. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors a Certain Proposition of Amendment to 
the Constitution of the State, ch. 529, 1864 R.I. Acts & Resolves 3. Had Rhode Island’s  effort  succeeded,  it  
would have extended suffrage equality only to a slightly larger group of white males than already enjoyed 
full  belonging  in  the  state’s  political  community,  since  the  naturalized  citizens  it  targeted  were  white,  male,  
and at least 21-years old. But even that baby step failed. According to Benton, no record remains of the 
tally of the popular votes for and against the amendments.  Benton, Voting in the Field, 186. 
14. Keyssar and Foner both dispute the whiggish notion of progressively more expansive political rights 
for women, minorities, and immigrants through the march of American history. They note, for example, the 
tortured trajectory of suffrage rights for African-Americans from exclusion starting in the early 19th 
century, to inclusion following the Civil War, to exclusion again after Reconstruction and into the Gilded 
Age. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 54-61; Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1998), 79-116; Welke argues that the development of political rights in American law 
from  the  founding  through  the  “long  nineteenth  century”  was  marked  by  the  recurrent  privileging  of  white,  
able-bodied   men   and   the   exclusion   of   everyone   else.   “[W]hite   men   alone   were   fully   embodied   legal  
persons,”   Welke asserts,   “they   were   America’s   ‘first   citizens,’   they   were   the   nation.”   Barbara   Young  
Welke,  “Law  Personhood,  and  Citizenship  in  the  Long  Nineteenth  Century:  The  Borders  of  Belonging,”  in  
The Cambridge History of Law in America, ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2: 345; Smith, too, describes repeated resurgences of inegalitarianism 
and dominion by white male elites in the development of American citizenship. For most of U.S. history, 
Smith asserts, most peoples of world were legally excluded from American citizenship by their race, 
nationality, or gender. The egalitarianism within the community of white male citizens, such as it was, has 
been  “surrounded  by  an  array  of  fixed,  ascriptive  hierarchies”  built into the law, always to the advantage of 
white males. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History, 17.   
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conscious terms. Their contemporary radicalism consisted not in disturbing prewar 
definitions  of  who  qualified  for  the  voting  franchise,  but  in  severing  soldiers’  voting  from  
hometown communities.  
That  the  laws’  new  privilege  applied  only  to  already  qualified  electors  sheds  light  
on  claims,  made  ubiquitously  by  proponents  of  the  laws,  that  “justice”  demanded  giving  
absent   soldiers   the   vote.   Soldiers  would   suffer   “disfranchisement”   unfairly  without   the  
right to vote in the field, they insisted. In state after state, a rallying cry for enactment was 
that justice required it. Republican Governor Edward Salomon of Wisconsin, for 
example,   in   a  message   to   the   legislature   urging   passage   of   that   state’s   law,  wrote   that  
“justice  seems  to  demand  that  [soldiers]  should  be  rewarded  …  for  their  patriotism”  with  
an opportunity to vote in the field. Vermont Governor Frederick Holbrook urged passage 
of a soldier-voting   law  “as  an  act  of   justice   to   the  brave  sons  and   freemen  of  Vermont  
who  are  so  nobly  doing  battle  in  the  cause  of  the  country….”  Illinois Governor Richard 
Yates   urged   passage   in   the   same   terms   (“[L]et   this   General   Assembly   signalize   its  
patriotism by this [soldier-voting bill] of prompt and necessary justice to the gallant 
citizen   soldier   of   the   State”)   as   did  Maine’s   Governor   Samuel   Cony   (“The   justice   of  
extending to our citizen soldiers in the field an opportunity for exercising the right of 
suffrage   in  our   elections  has  been  considerably   discussed  and  generally   conceded.”)   In  
New York, a minority report of the Senate Judiciary Committee   proclaimed   “the  
overruling  justice”  of  a  soldier-voting law.15 The purported justice of the cause also found 
                                                 
15. 1862 (extra session) Wisconsin Assembly Journal, 11; 1863 Journal of the Vermont House of 
Representatives, 44-46; 1865 Illinois Senate Journal, 33; 1864 Documents printed by order of the 
Legislature of the State of Maine, 22-23;;  1863  New  York  Senate  Journal,  740;;  all  as  quoted   in  Benton’s  
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judicial expression. Justice James Campbell, apparently discomfited by the implications 
of  his  own  opinion   that  Michigan’s  soldier-voting law violated   that  state’s  constitution,  
suggested   almost   apologetically   “the   only   remedy   is   to   invoke   the   people   to   amend   a  
restriction  which  has  become   too  narrow   for   complete   justice.”16 The Republican press 
similarly deployed the rhetoric of justice in advocating passage of such laws. A New York 
Times editorial spoke indignantly of stay-at-home opponents of proposed soldier-voting 
legislation in New York:  
We cannot comprehend either the mind or the heart of any really loyal man who 
interposes wretched quibbles and cavils to prevent his neighbor, who has 
answered   his   country’s   call,   from   exercising   the   same   civil   rights   he   himself  
enjoys, though he has not answered it. We should suppose the mere thought 
would overwhelm him with shame.17 
 
Given that the laws applied only to soldiers already qualified to vote, this rhetoric 
reveals a distinctive notion of justice, different from the justice repeatedly invoked by 
disfranchised  groups  demanding  suffrage   in   reciprocity   for   fighting   the   country’s  wars.  
German historian Otto Hintze succinctly stated the now familiar formulation linking 
suffrage  to  military  service  as  a  matter  of  justice.  “Whoever  puts  himself  in  the  service  of  
the   state,”   Hintze   wrote,   “must   logically   and   fairly   be   granted   the   regular   rights   of  
citizenship.” 18  That is not what advocates of soldier-voting laws meant when they 
                                                                                                                                                 
Voting in the Field, at 53, 80, 264, 120, and 142.  Benton gathers these and similar quotations from 
politicians in assembling the legislative history of each of the laws.  
16. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 148. 
17. New York Times, April 1, 1863. 
18. As quoted in Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 17. African-Americans and women have asserted the fairness 
principle of reciprocity as the strategy underlying their efforts to secure an equal place in the military for 
their  respective  groups.  “Once  let  the  black  man  get  upon  his  person  the  brass  letters,  US,”  wrote  Frederick  
Douglass with his eye on citizenship rights for African-American   enlistees,   “let   him  get   an   eagle  on   his  
button, and a musket on his shoulder and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on earth which can 
deny   that   he   has   earned   the   right   to   citizenship   in   the   United   States.”   [Frederick   Douglass,   Douglass’  
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demanded  “justice”   for   absent  Civil  War  servicemen.  Even  when   they  explicitly   linked  
arms bearing to voting rights, their meaning was narrower than the literal meaning of the 
words they spoke.   In  advocating  enactment  of  Wisconsin’s   law,   for  example,  Governor  
Solomon  said  at  one  point,  “who  bears  arms  should  not  be  disfranchised,  but  permitted  to  
vote,  should  be  the  policy  of  the  country.”19 But the bill Solomon proposed applied only 
to already enfranchised soldiers. It left all other soldiers disfranchised, notwithstanding 
their arms bearing.  
By their invocations of justice, Salomon, Holbrook, Coburn and Yates meant only 
that it would be unjust for fully enfranchised men (generally white, twenty-one year old 
male citizens) to lose the opportunity to vote when they left home in answer to their 
country’s  call   for  service.  That  was  a   far  cry  from  the  notion   that   their  military  service  
rendered unjust the disfranchisement of African-Americans, aliens, and men younger 
than twenty-one. If governors or legislators really believed during the war that justice 
required   enfranchising  all  men  who  bore   arms   in   their   country’s   service,   the   laws   they  
advocated  when  decrying  soldiers’  disfranchisement  did  not say so.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Monthly 5, (August 1863), 852, as quoted in James M. McPherson, The  Negro’s  Civil  War (New York:  
Ballantine Books, 1965), 163]. For   women’s   use   of   the   principle,   see   Linda   Kerber,   No Constitutional 
Right to Be A Lady (New York: Holland Wang, 1998). Ronald Krebs documents the ubiquity in American 
history   of   group   claims   that   suffrage   is   “the   just   reward   for   their   people’s   sacrifice”   in wartime. Krebs, 
Fighting for Rights, 3. So does Alexander Keyssar, who documents both the general phenomenon of 
suffrage expansion during wartime and the use of the soldiering-voting nexus as an argument against 
woman suffrage. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 169,  191.  See  also  Kruman,  “Legislature  and  Political  rights,”  
1235, 1238. Linda Kerber examines the converse of the same proposition, observing in the context of 
women’s  rights  that  political  inequality  flows  from  disparities  in  citizens’  obligations  to the state, such that 
exclusion of women from military service has served to justify their unequal enjoyment of political rights. 
Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 221-303. Chapter 6 of this dissertation elaborates 
on the way the Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon fits in the pattern linking suffrage rights to military 
service in American history. 
19. 1862 (extra session) Wisconsin Assembly Journal, 11, as quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, 53. 
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 A variant of this narrow definition of justice found expression in partisan 
arguments about whether soldier-voting   laws   were   needed   to   “enfranchise”   absent  
soldiers. In the political realm, described in the following three chapters, proponents of 
the laws branded opponents as anti-soldier   for   favoring   “disfranchisement”   of  
servicemen, a term that spoke for itself as an injustice in the political context. By 1863, 
opponents were mostly Democrats, and they challenged the accusations as illogical, if not 
mendacious.  Even without a soldier-voting law, qualified absent soldiers remained 
enfranchised, Democrats insisted. The obstacle to voting by absent soldiers who met their 
states’   suffrage qualifications, they asserted, was not their disfranchisement as voters – 
they remained franchised – but their absence from home on Election Day. Thousands of 
soldiers proved this by returning home on furlough to vote, either in states that never 
passed a soldier-voting law (e.g., New Jersey and Indiana) or for elections in 1863 and 
1864 in states that enacted such laws only late in the war. Democrats believed that it 
strengthened their side of the debate to point out that soldiers themselves were not 
clamoring for absentee voting rights.20 Indeed, there is evidence that many soldiers quite 
sensibly disliked soldier-voting laws, since the laws diminished their chances of securing 
cherished furloughs to return home to vote.21 These were logical arguments that generally 
failed to resonate in the world of politics. 
Republicans’  counterarguments  about  enfranchisement  had  logical  merit  as  well,  
and they resonated far better politically. Because soldiers could not return home for 
                                                 
20.  Klement,  “The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  During  the  Civil  War,”  40. 
21 .   McSeveney,   “Re-electing Lincoln: The Union Party Campaign and the Military Vote in 
Connecticut,”   147.   McSeveney   himself   characterizes   soldiers   as   “disfranchised”   without   soldier-voting 
laws. Id. at 143. 
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elections on their own volition, their status as a practical matter differed little from those 
back home whom state constitutions formally excluded from the suffrage. Soldiers could 
not come and go as they pleased from their out-of-state military stations, and the 
exigencies of war sometimes made furloughs impossible. One could plausibly argue that 
this was tantamount to disfranchisement. Republican Governor Ramsey of Minnesota, 
urging passage of a soldier-voting  law,  captured  his  party’s  view.  Without  the  new  law,  
the   governor   argued,   “volunteer   soldiers   remain   disfranchised.”22  Or as a Republican-
dominated   legislative   committee   in  New  York   put   it,   absent   soldiers  were   “practically  
disfranchised”   unless   they   had   access   to   absentee   voting.23  These Republicans had a 
point, and to that extent it was fair to characterize a law giving soldiers a way to vote in 
the   field   as   “enfranchising”   them.   By   the   same   logic,   it   was   fair   to   characterize   the  
absence  of  such  a  law  as  “disfranchising”  them.   
Fair or not, as chapters 3, 4, and 5 describe, Republicans used the debate to good 
effect in the political combat of 1863-1864. They leveraged partisan divisions over 
soldier-voting  laws  to  seize  the  mantel  for  Republican  candidates  as  “the  soldiers’  friend”  
and used that argument to secure votes of both soldiers and civilians. It was somewhat 
different in the legal realm. The same rhetorical debate surfaced in judicial decisions 
about   the   laws’   constitutionality,   but   in   a   more   bi-partisan way, with Democratic and 
Republican justices sometimes departing from the script of their legislative counterparts. 
In upholding Pennsylvania’s   soldier-voting law against a challenge to its 
                                                 
22. As quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, 67. 
23. Report of the Judiciary Committee of the New York Senate, Senate Journal, 1863, p. 1799, as 
quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, at 140. 
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constitutionality, for example, trial court judge John Nesbitt Conyngham, a Democrat, 
observed  that   the  challenge,   if  successful,  would  “disfranchise  thousands  of  our  fellow-
citizens, who have been drawn from their homes in obedience to the Constitution and for 
their   country’s   defence,   and  whose   disfranchisement  will   arise”  when   they   answer   the  
call.24 Byron  Paine,  a  Republican  justice  on  Wisconsin’s  high  court  disagreed.  “So  long  
as electors are at liberty   to   vote   at   their   places   of   residence,”   he   wrote   reviewing  
Wisconsin’s  soldier-voting  law,  “they  cannot  be  said  to  be  disfranchised.”25  
Political   and   legal   arguments   about   “justice”   and   “disfranchisement”   aside,   a  
common feature of all soldier-voting statutes was that they privileged only soldiers who 
already qualified as electors.  
 
Soldier-Voting Laws and Residency Requirements 
A second noteworthy feature common to all the laws follows from the first.  All 
soldier-voting laws left the residence requirements of prewar election laws entirely intact. 
We have just seen that no soldier-voting laws changed any prewar suffrage qualifications.  
The unchanged eligibility requirements differed from state to state, but usually included 
race (white) and U.S. citizenship, and always included age (21 years and older), gender 
                                                 
24 .   John   Nesbitt   Conyngham,   “In   the   Matter   of   the   Contested   Election   of   District   Attorney,”  
Philadelphia Inquirer, January   16,   1862.   In   the   decision   overturning   Conyngham’s   ruling,   the   Supreme  
Court  took  him  to  task  for  his  use  of  the  term  “disfranchise”  in  this  context.  “It  strikes  us,”  wrote  Justice  
George Woodward for the majority in Chase v. Miller, “that  this  is  an  inaccurate  use  of  language.”  Striking  
down the soldier-voting  law  “would  disfranchise  no  qualified  voter,”  he  ruled.  Chase  v.  Miller,  41  Pa.  403,  
427 (1862).  
25. State ex rel. Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 398, 418-419 (1863).      For   Paine’s   party   affiliation,   see  
Joseph  Ranney,   “Concepts  of  Freedom:  The  Life   of   Justice  Byron  Paine,”  Wisconsin Lawyer 75, no. 11 
(November 2002), accessed June 22, 2014, 
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=75&Issue=11&Artic
leID=231.  
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(male),  and  a  minimum  period  as  a  “resident.”  To  be  enfranchised,  a  person  had  to  meet  
all the tests.  While the enforcement of voter eligibility rules became more difficult with 
absentee voting, no soldier-voting law expressly altered any of the tests of voter 
eligibility, including residency. The laws changed only the place where the soldier – 
having met exactly the same eligibility requirements as civilian voters back home – could 
cast his ballot. 
This point about residency merits elaboration, since it is a source of easy 
confusion about the laws.26  In defining suffrage rights, all states by the beginning of the 
war required a minimum period of residence in the state.  Illinois, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin required nothing more by way of residence, but most states required in 
addition that the voter have resided a minimum time in the relevant subdivision (or 
subdivisions) of the state, such as county, township, ward, or election district.27  The 
constitutions and statutes measured the residency periods by counting back in time from 
the  date  of  the  election,  always  some  specific  number  of  months  or  days  “next  preceding  
the  election,”  meaning  immediately  before  the  election.   
Most Civil War soldiers were absent from their homes far longer than the 
residency durations required in any of the laws. Many were gone for years. Prewar state 
                                                 
26. One historian characterizes soldier-voting  laws  as  “a  suspension  of  the  residence  requirements  that 
made out-of-district   voting   illegal….”   (Baker,   Affairs of Party, at 291.) Another asserts that the Ohio 
soldier-voting law and the Supreme Court decision upholding it culminated a gradual relaxation of 
residence requirements occurring over the antebellum decades. (Winkle, The Politics of Community, 48-
70). The latter argument is grounded on the assertion that relaxed residency rules for voting grew out of a 
gradual  loosening  of  residence  rules  in  Ohio  poor  law,  which  then  spilled  over  into  the  state’s  election law. 
While the two bodies of law both dealt with the rights of residents, residence qualification for voting 
differed   definitionally   and   conceptually   from   the   settlement   rules   for   pauper   relief.   The   theory’s   more  
fundamental problem, however, is in treating  Ohio’s  soldier-voting legislation as a law about the residence 
qualification for voting. It was not.  
27. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 1; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. 
III, § 1. 
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law everywhere, however, made it clear that any citizen, having achieved status as a 
resident, retained that status while temporarily away from home.  The source of this rule 
was variously constitutional, statutory, common law, or some combination of the three, 
but the rule applied everywhere. Under this legal principle, well established long before 
the war, any resident away from home temporarily, who intended to return home, 
retained his residency qualification during his absence. There was no novelty in the 
application of this rule to absent Civil War soldiers. Servicemen needed no loosening of 
residency rules to retain their voting qualification while temporarily away from home, 
and soldier-voting laws provided none. 
In Ohio, for example, we have seen in Chapter 1 that statutory law provided this 
protection   of   an   absent   voter’s   residency  qualification   long  before   the  war.   The   state’s  
1841  election   law  provided,   “A  person   shall   not  be   considered  or  held   to  have   lost  his  
residence, who shall leave his home and go into another state, or county of this state, for 
temporary  purposes  merely,  with  an  intention  of  returning.”28  Kansas’s  prewar  election  
law had a similar provision.29  The  election  law  in  New  Hampshire  provided  an  elector’s  
residence  in  town  “shall  not  be  interrupted  or  lost  by  a  temporary  absence  therefrom  with  
the   intention  of   returning   thereto.”30 Pennsylvania had no such statute, but its Supreme 
Court   ruled   that   common   law   achieved   the   same   result   under  principles  of   “domicile,”  
                                                 
28. Ohio Election Law (1841) § 2. 
29. An Act to Regulate Elections and to Prescribe the Qualifications of Voters, and to Prevent Illegal 
Voting, ch. 28, § 9 1861 Kan. Sess. Laws (legisl. 1st session) 133,134-135. The Kansas soldier-voting law 
of 1864, ch. 59, § 6, 1864 Kan. Sess. Laws 98, 99.  incorporated this provision by reference.  
30.  The Rights and Qualifications of Voters, ch. 25, § 7, N.H. COMP. STAT., 85, 86 (1853).  
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which   controlled   determination   of   a   voter’s   residence. 31  Vermont’s   Supreme   Court  
reached  the  same  conclusion  in  its  review  of  that  state’s  soldier-voting  law.  A  soldier’s  
absence  for  war,  the  court  said,  “like  a  absence  from  the  state  upon  a  journey,  or  business,  
is of a temporary character, and the domicil, or residence, continues within the state, 
while the person is actually without the state.”32 
The same common law rule applied in every state, including Ohio and Kansas, 
making   those  states’  statutory  provisions   legally   redundant,   though  useful  as  a  guide   to  
election judges unfamiliar with common law. In some states, the point was made in the 
state  constitution,  though  only  for  the  benefit  of  certain  categories  of  voters.  Wisconsin’s  
constitution,   for   example,   provided   that   “no   person   shall   be   deemed   to   have   lost   his  
residence in this state by reason of his absence on business of the state or the United 
States.”33 That provision covered not only soldiers, but also federal contractors and the 
state’s  federal  office  holders.  Michigan’s  constitution  had  language  virtually  identical  to  
Wisconsin’s,  as  did  New  York’s,  California’s,  and  Nevada’s.34 
                                                 
31.   The   state’s   high   court   explained   that   a   man’s   domicile,   and   therefore   his   residence   for   voting  
purposes, was the place of his permanent home, to which he intended to return when temporarily away. The 
local  residency  requirement  in  Pennsylvania’s  constitution,  according  to  the  court,  meant  “the  equivalent  of  
domicile,”  and  soldiers  met  it  notwithstanding  their  temporary  absence from Pennsylvania. Upon his return 
home   from   service,   the   court   stated,   the   soldier   “resumes   all   the   civil   rights   of   citizenship,   and,   his  
residence  being  unimpaired  by  his  temporary  absence,  he  has  a  right  to  vote  on  election  day.”  Chase, 41 Pa. 
at 421, 423. 
32.   Opinion   of   the   Judges   of   the   Supreme   Court   on   the   Constitutionality   of   “An   Act   Providing   for  
Soldier  Voting,”  37  Vt.  665,  670-671 (1864). The court did not discuss a state law predating the decision 
and stating that an absence from Vermont for more than one year extinguished voting rights in the state. 
VT. COMP LAWS Title I, ch. I, §§ 6, 7 (1851). Research for this dissertation uncovered no similar law in any 
other state. 
33. WIS. CONST. of 1848, art III, § 4. 
34. MICH. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 5; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art II, § 3. This provision extended 
beyond   service   to   the  United  States   to   cover   any  person   absent  while   “engaged   in   the   navigation  of   the  
waters  of  this  state,  or  of  the  United  States,  or  of  the  high  seas”  or  while  being  a  “student of any seminary 
of  learning”  or  “while  kept  at  any  almshouse  or  other  asylum,  at  public  expense,”  or  even  “while  confined  
in   any   public   prison.”   The   New   York   provision   not   only   protected   eligible   voters   from   losing   their  
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In no state did the residency requirements of election law demand that a voter, 
having   qualified   as   a   resident,   stay   in   town   for   the   specified   number   of   days   “next  
preceding  the  election”  in  order  to  preserve  his  voting  right.  He  was  free  to  come  and  go  
without risking his voting eligibility. He could leave town even for extended periods 
without jeopardizing his status as a resident, as long as his absence was temporary.  Iowa 
Supreme Court Justice George Wright, in his opinion upholding the constitutionality of 
that   state’s  military   suffrage   law,   stated   the   proposition   plainly:   “It   is   not   claimed,   nor  
could it well be, that soldiers in the volunteer service of the government, by their absence 
have   lost  or   changed   their   residence.”35 Or, as California Chief Justice Silas Sanderson 
put  it,  “A  man  is  just  as  much  a  qualified  elector  when  absent  from  the  place  of  voting  as  
when present. In the former case he has the right to vote, but not the opportunity. In the 
latter  he  has  both.”36 That was true everywhere. Soldier-voting laws simply equalized the 
opportunity for absent soldiers.  
 
Scope of Coverage: Which Soldiers Did the Laws Cover? 
The categories of eligible servicemen varied from law to law.37  Soldiers serving 
in the regular army presented a particular challenge and were often excluded. According 
                                                                                                                                                 
residency qualification on account of these activities, but also prevented outsiders from gaining a New 
York residency qualification by conducting any of the identified activities while in New York temporarily. 
N.Y. CONST. of  1846,  art  II,  §  3;;  California’s  1849  tracked  the  New  York  language verbatim. CAL. CONST. 
of 1849, art. II, § 4. That provision, the California Supreme Court noted, merely affirmed the common law, 
which  held  that  temporary  absence  did  not  change  a  citizen’s  domicile.  Bourland  v.  Hildreth,    26  Cal.  161,  
212 (1864); NEV. CONST. of 1864, art II, § 2. 
35. Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304, 344 (1863). 
36. Bourland, 26 Cal. at 238. 
37.  As   amended   in   1864,  Ohio’s   law  was   unusually   broad,   explicitly   extending   to  men   in   such   non-
combat   roles   as   “teamsters,   wagoners,   quartermasters and their employees, and those engaged in the 
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to republican theory, standing armies were invitations to tyranny, especially when they 
wielded political power.  Those sentiments still had vitality at the outbreak of the Civil 
War, finding expression in many prewar state constitutions and in some cases standing as 
obstacles to enfranchisement under prewar law.38 The new laws removed none of those 
obstacles. 
Of the twenty northern states that provided for absentee soldier voting, fifteen had 
constitutional provisions either flatly excluding regulars from the franchise 39  or 
complicating their enfranchisement by barring regulars from gaining residence by reason 
of being stationed in the state. 40   In addition, regulars suffered more generalized 
                                                                                                                                                 
subsistence,  transportation,  and  naval  departments….”  An  Act  to  Enable  the  Qualified  Voters  of  this  State  
in the Military Service to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, (Ohio 1864) § 1.  
38. Baker, Affairs of Party, 154; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 7, 172. For the roots of American hostility to standing armies in English political thought, see 
Lois G. Schwoerer, No Standing Armies: The Anti-army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). 
39. The constitutions of Kansas, Missouri, and Connecticut flatly excluded regulars from suffrage 
eligibility.  KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. V, § 3. [Kansas amended its constitution in 1864 to shore up the 
foundation for the soldier-voting law it had already passed that year. The amendment preserved the 1859 
exclusion of regular servicemen. Joint Resolution, to Amend Section Three of Article Five of the 
Constitution of the State of Kansas ch. 45, 1864 Kan. Sess. Laws 81 (1864)]; MO. CONST. of 1820, art III, § 
10. Connecticut amended its constitution in 1864 to authorize absentee soldier voting, specifically 
excepting   regulars   from   eligibility.   For   the   language   of   Connecticut’s   1864   amendment, see An Act 
Relating to the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, ch. 11, 1864 Conn. Pub. Acts 24. 
40. The constitutions of Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, New York, Maine, Rhode Island, Illinois, California, 
Minnesota, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wisconsin blocked regulars from gaining a residence qualification 
by reason of being stationed in the state. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 4; OHIO CONST. of 1851,  art. V, § 
5; MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 7; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 3; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. II, § 1; 
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 4; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 6; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 4; MINN. 
CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 4; NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 2; W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. I, § 6; WIS. 
CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 5. In addition, some state constitutions expressed disfavor for standing armies in 
ways   not   directly   relevant   to   voting,   such   as   by   banning   them   in   peacetime   as   “dangerous”   (e.g.,   N.H.. 
CONST. of 1792, Part First, art. XV; VT. CONST. of 1793, CH. 1, art. XVI; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 18) 
or barring the coerced quartering of troops (e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 19; ME. CONST. of 1820, 
art. I, § 19). 
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constitutional disfavor under language sometimes banning them in peacetime as 
“dangerous”  or  barring  them  from  nonconsensual  quartering  with  civilians.41   
The upshot was that eight states explicitly excluded soldiers in the regular army 
from their absentee soldier-voting laws, sometimes tellingly referring to the regulars as 
“the   standing   army.”42  The soldier-voting laws of Ohio and seven other states with 
constitutions barring in-state regulars from gaining residence qualification, remained 
silent about the eligibility of absent regulars to vote in the field; the new laws neither 
expressly included nor excluded these men.43  That left it for election judges in the field 
to   decide   the   eligibility   of   regulars’   case   by   case   as   challenges   arose.   Just   as   Ohio’s  
                                                 
41.    Standing  armies  as  “dangerous,”  see,  e.g.,  N.H. CONST. of 1792, Part First, art. XV; VT. CONST. of 
1793, CH. 1, art. XVI; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 18. Provisions barring quartering, see, e.g., CONN. 
CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 19; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 19. 
42. The eight were Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin. An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field, ch. 37, § 1, 1864 Conn. Pub. 
Acts  51,  51;;  An  Act  Supplemental   to  an  Act  Entitled  ‘An  Act   to  Regulate  Elections  and   to  Prescribe   the  
Qualifications of Electors, and  to  Prevent  Illegal  Voting.’  Approved  June  3,  1861,  ch.  59,  §  1,  1864  Kan.  
Sess. Laws 101, 101; An Act Authorizing Soldiers Absent from the State in the Military Service to Vote for 
Electors of President and Vice President (Me. 1864), § 9; Missouri Convention,  “An  ordinance  to  enable  
citizens of this state, in the military service of the United States or the State of Missouri, to vote, June 12, 
1862,”  Journal and proceedings of the Missouri State Convention: Held at Jefferson City, June, 1862, (St. 
Louis: G. Knapp & Co, 1862) 15-16; An Act to Enable the Militia and Volunteers of this State, when in the 
Military Service of the United States or of this State (Wis. 1862) § 1; An act Providing for Soldier Voting 
(Vt. 1863) § 1. Three of these eight states – Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont – had prewar 
constitutions  with  no  bar  against  regulars’  voting  or  gaining  a  residence,  though  the  constitutions  in  each  
case prohibited nonconsensual quartering or barred standing armies in peacetime. 
43. The seven states in addition to Ohio were California, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, 
and West Virginia. Ohio Soldier Voting Act (1863); An Act in Addition to an Act Entitled an Act to 
Regulate Elections (Cal, 1863); An Act to enable the Qualified Electors of this State, Absent there from in 
the Military Service of the United States, in the Army or Navy thereof, to Vote, 1865 Ill. Laws 59; An Act 
to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State in the 
Military Service (Iowa 1862); An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the 
Military or Naval Service of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at the 
General Election to be held in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections, during 
the Continuance of the Present War, ch. 1, 1862 (extra session) Minn. Laws 13; Election Ordinance of 
1864, §2, 1 Nev. Comp. Laws; Embracing Statutes of 1861 to 1873, (Bonnifield & Healy) cxxxvii, cxxxviii 
(1873); An Act to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State, Absent therefrom in the Military Service of 
the United States, in the Army or Navy thereof, to Vote, ch. 253, 1864 N.Y. Laws 549; An Act to Regulate 
Elections by the People (W. Va. 1863) § 26. 
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soldier-voting law provided no instructions for election judges facing such challenges, 
neither did any of the other five.  
Eleven laws excluded sailors in the navy, though the laws never stated the 
exclusion explicitly. Rather, statutes implied the exclusion by operation of their positive 
terms,  which  created  polling  places  where  “soldiers”  served  in  “regiments,”  “companies,”  
or  “battalions.”  These  were  organizational  units  of  armies,  cavalries,  or  artillery,  but  not  
of the navy. 44   The exclusion may have resulted from the size and demographic 
composition of naval forces. There were far fewer sailors than soldiers in the Civil War, 
particularly from western states.  More often than with army enlistees, navy recruits were 
predominantly foreign-born and African-American, men that most prewar constitutions 
disfranchised. The white contingent was largely an unsympathetic cohort: rowdy, heavy-
drinking men from the margins of respectable middle class society. Compared to their 
counterparts in the army, most were motivated not by patriotism but by the desire to 
escape the draft.  They resented service in the racially integrated shipboard environment, 
and they served grudgingly.45   These  men,  though  they  contributed  greatly  to  the  Union’s  
                                                 
44. The eleven were Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field, 
(Conn. 1864); An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of 
this State in the Military Service (Iowa 1862), § 1; An Act Regulating the Manner of Soldiers Voting for 
Electors of President and Vice President of the United States (Ky. 1863) § 1; An Act Authorizing Soldiers 
Absent from the State in the Military Service to Vote for Electors of President and Vice President, and for 
Representatives to Congress (Me. 1864) § 1; MD. CONST. of  1864,  art.  XII  (“Schedule”);;  An  Act  to  Enable  
the Qualified Electors of this State, in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, (Mich. 1864) § 1; 
Missouri  Convention,  “An  ordinance   to  enable  citizens  of   this   state,   in   the  military  service  of   the  United  
States”   15-16; An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors a Certain Proposition of 
Amendment to the Constitution of the State (R.I. 1864); An Act Providing for Soldier Voting (Vt. 1863)  § 
1; An Act to enable the militia and volunteers of this state, when in the military service of the United States 
or of this state (Wis. 1862) § 1. 
45. Michael J. Bennett, Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004). 
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military effort, may have escaped the attentions or the respect of state lawmakers with 
whom they had little in common socially or demographically. In any event, more than 
half of military suffrage laws effectively excluded them. 
 
Duration of Soldier-Voting Laws 
Civil War soldier-voting laws paved the way for similar laws in subsequent wars and 
also served as a milestone in the development of absentee voting rights generally.46 But the laws 
themselves were generally short-lived. Only five of the twenty soldier-voting arrangements that 
came into existence during the Civil War survived very long past the war.47 In one way or 
another,  most  states  followed  Ohio’s  example  in  limiting  the  laws’  duration.48  Four expired at 
war’s   end  by   their   own   terms,  with   language   limiting   the   laws’   duration   to   the   period  of   the  
“present  war” (Missouri,  Minnesota),   “during   the  present   rebellion”   (Connecticut),  or   “during  
                                                 
46. Miller, Absentee Voters and Suffrage Laws, 29-35; Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the 
Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), 197. 
47 .   The   five   were   Kansas’s,   Maine’s,   Michigan’s   and   Nevada’s   (all   of   which   endured   well   into   the  
twentieth  century)  and  New  Hampshire’s  (which  remained  in  effect  until  1897).  The  Kansas  soldier-voting 
law survived the Civil War and remained in effect until at least 1947. [Elections, KAN. STAT. ANN. Ch. 25, 
art. XII, §1201 et. seq. (1947)] Maine election law preserved the right of absent soldiers to vote through 
World War II. In 1944, the state extended absentee voting rights more generally to citizens away from their 
homes on Election Day. [Elections, ME. REV. STAT. tit. I, ch. 8, §§ 83, 84, (1930).ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 
1, ch. 8, § 83-84. (1930). ME. REV. STAT. ANN Ch.  6,  §§  1,  7  (1944)]  Michigan’s  soldier-voting law expired 
by its terms at the end of the war and was ruled unconstitutional by its state supreme court even before that.  
But  the  state  amended  its  constitution  in  1866  to  authorize  the  legislature,  during  wartime,  to  “provide  the  
manner in which, and the  time  and  place  at  which”  absent  servicemen  could  vote.  The  state  incorporated  
that  provision  in  its  revised  constitution  in  1908.  It  was  subsumed  in  the  1963  constitution’s  more  general  
grant of legislative authority for all classes of absent voters, not just soldiers. [Benton, Voting in the Field, 
at 103; MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. III, § 1, MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. III, § 4] In Nevada, the legislature 
incorporated military suffrage provisions into the general elections law in 1866. These remained a part of 
Nevada law into the twentieth century. [An Act Relating to Elections, NEV. REV. STAT. Ch. CVII, § 23 
(1866); An Act to Provide for Taking the Votes of Electors of the State of Nevada, who may be in the 
Military Service of the United States, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 1887, et seq. (1912).  See the Appendix for 
additional discussion of each state.  
48. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in the Military Service to Exercise the Right of 
Suffrage, (Ohio 1864). This amendment to the 1863 law limited the  duration  of  that  law  to  “the  existence  of  
the  present  rebellion.” 
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the  existence  of   the  present   rebellion”   (Ohio).49  The remaining states either repealed soldier-
voting statutes legislatively after the war or effectively erased them with postwar revisions to 
state constitutions or election laws omitting soldier-voting provisions.50  That five out of twenty 
                                                 
49. Missouri Ordinance, § 1; An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the 
Military or Naval Service of the United States (Minn. 1862), § 1; An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise 
to Soldiers in the Field, (Conn. 1864) § 1; An Act To Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in the 
Military Service to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, (Ohio 1864) § 1. 
50. Pennsylvania: The election law of 1868 made no reference to absentee voting for soldiers and 
included  this  provision:    “No  body  of  soldiers,  armed  or  unarmed,  shall  be  present  at  any  place  of  election  
during  the  time  of  election.”  An  act  Relating  to  the  Elections  of  this  Commonwealth, P. L. No. 192, 1839 
Pa. Laws 519; Iowa:     The  general  election  law  of  1880  stated,  “no  person  is  entitled  to  vote  at  any  other  
place  than  in  the  township  in  which  he  resides  at   the  time  he  offers  to  vote.”  There  was  no  exception  for  
absent soldiers. IOWA CODE, Ch. 32, § 492 (1880); Vermont: By 1870, the required location for voting for 
congressional  representatives  was  “any  town  in  the  congressional  district  in  which  he  [the  voter]  resides.”  
For electors for U.S. president and vice-president,   it   was   “in   any   town   in   this   state.”   There   were no 
exceptions for absent soldiers. VT. COMP LAWS Title I, § 37, (1870); Kentucky: The state repealed its 
military suffrage law in 1866, an arguably redundant exercise, since by its terms the soldier-voting law 
applied only to the election of 1864. An Act  to  Repeal  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act  Regulating  the  Manner  of  
Soldiers Voting for Electors for President and Vice President of the United States within and without this 
State,  ch. 370, 1866  Ky. Acts 25; Maryland: The state constitution of 1864, which enabled absentee voting 
for soldiers, had a very short lifespan.  A new constitution replaced it in 1867.  It deleted the 1864 soldier-
voting  provisions  and  restored   the  prewar  suffrage  rules,  once  again  entitling  each  elector  “to  vote   in   the  
ward or election  district   in  which   he   resides.”  MD. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 1; Wisconsin: The Badger 
State repealed its soldier-voting law in 1871, WIS. STAT. tit. XXIX, ch. CLXXXVIII, § 1(1871);   West 
Virginia: The state omitted military suffrage provisions from the state’s  election  law  in   the  first  post-war 
statutory codification, in 1870. Elections by the People for State, District, County, and Township Officers, 
W. Va. Code, Ch. III (1870); California:  Not  long  after  the  Supreme  Court’s  ruling  in  1864  that  absentee 
soldier voting was unconstitutional [Bourland , 26 Cal. at 161], the California legislature repealed the 
state’s  Civil  War  soldier-voting laws in 1866. CAL CODE, Para 7979, § 9 (1864 - 1871); Missouri: In July 
1865, a new constitution took effect in Missouri.      It’s   ratification   process   allowed   absent   soldiers   to  
participate,  and  its  suffrage  provision  granted  absentee  voting  rights  to  members  in  “the  volunteer  army  of  
the  United  States,  or  in  the  militia  force  of  this  state….”  MO. CONST. of 1865, art II, § XXI. On revision in 
1875, the state constitution omitted this provision; Illinois: No soldier-voting provisions appear in the 
election  law  section  of  the  state’s  1871  compilation  of  laws  then  in  effect.  Eugene  L.  Gross  and  William  L.  
Gross,  The Statutes of Illinois: An Analytical Digest of All the General Laws of the State in Force at the 
Present Time, Second Volume: Acts of 1871 and 1872 ( Springfield: E. L. & W. L. Gross, 1872), 252;  New 
York: The Empire State repealed its soldier-voting law in 1866. An  Act  to  Repeal  an  Act  Entitled  “An  Act  
to Provide the Manner in which and the Time and Place at which the Electors of this State, Absent 
therefrom in the Actual Military Service of the United States, may Vote, and for a Canvass and Return of 
their   Votes,” Passed April Twenty-Fourth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Five., ch. 524, § 1, 1866 N.Y. 
Laws 1132. 
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laws survived the war marks the phenomenon as more than ephemeral, but its status as genuine 
reform  is  diminished  by  the  laws’  quick  extinction in fifteen of twenty states.  
 
High Courts Grapple with Radicalism in Soldier-Voting Laws  
The   laws’   commonalities   and   differences   underscore   what   the   soldier-voting 
phenomenon was not.  It was not an expansion of the elective franchise to previously 
excluded   groups;;   many   laws   fell   short   of   covering   even   the   entirety   of   their   states’  
voting-eligible soldiers, and none attempted to open suffrage to soldiers left out of their 
states’  prewar  suffrage  qualifications.  The  phenomenon  was  not  about  gradually  shifting 
residency requirements, or fundamentally about the residency qualification at all. It did 
not reflect a bottom-up demand for absentee voting rights by absent soldiers themselves, 
many of whom preferred the alternative of returning home on furlough to vote alongside 
their neighbors back home. Nor was it long lasting; most absentee-voting arrangements 
expired when the war ended or shortly thereafter.   
Nevertheless, the laws were radical. Their radicalism emerges from application of 
a different yardstick, a yardstick giving primacy to process. By divorcing the process of 
voting   from   soldiers’   in-state communities, soldier-voting laws changed an attribute of 
elections that all earlier law had embedded in the constitutional order in every state. That 
shift, brief and limited though it was, marks the laws as radical and potentially 
transformative.  
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Just as it did in Ohio, the picture of radicalism emerges from court decisions 
weighing   the   laws’  constitutionality.  The  debate  between  Ohio  Supreme  Justices  Rufus 
Ranney and Josiah Scott in the Ohio case of Lehman v. McBride played out in similar 
terms in other states. Everywhere the question was the same: did the state constitution, in 
addition to identifying who could vote, fix the location of voting, or did the constitution 
leave that subject for legislatures to decide? To answer that question, justices 
approaching the question as Rufus Raney did in the Ohio case, looked to history for 
definitions   of   key   constitutional   terms,   terms   like   “election”   and   “vote.”   Their search 
revealed to them a legal tradition of exclusively in-person, community-based voting, 
which had achieved constitutional status by the time of the Civil War.  Their 
interrogation of history also revealed a paramount constitutional value of protecting 
electoral  “purity.”  These  justices  saw  fixing  the  place  of  voting  within  local  communities  
as  their  constitutions’  device  for  advancing  that  value,  such  that  divorcing  the  process  of  
voting  from  voters’  home  communities  constituted  an  unconstitutional invitation to fraud.  
 In contrast, justices approaching the constitutional question as Josiah Scott did in 
the Ohio case, while agreeing that absentee voting was a legal novelty and indeed 
conceding   that   the   concept   was   unimaginable   to   constitutions’   framers, attached no 
constitutional  significance  to  the  novelty.  For  them  the  question’s  answer  lay  in  whether  
the plain meaning of constitutional text, contemporaneously understood, unambiguously 
prohibited absentee voting. If it did not, then the legislature had a free hand.  Chief 
Justice George Martin of Michigan captured this approach vividly in his dissenting 
opinion  in  support  of  Michigan’s  statute.  “I  find  myself  unable  to  put  my  finger  upon  any  
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express  provision  of   the  constitution,”  Martin  protested,  “which  deprives   the   legislature  
of  the  right”  to  pass  such  a  law.51  These justices saw a paramount constitutional value in 
protecting the right of qualified electors to vote, and they saw absentee-voting laws as 
consistent with that value. Like their brethren taking the other side of the issue, however, 
they saw the laws as departing pronouncedly from established traditions. 
The first state to confront the question was Pennsylvania, the only state in the 
union with a soldier-voting law on the books at the outset of the war.  That law was first 
enacted in 1813.52 After the state revised its constitution in 1838, the law was retained, in 
a slightly revised form, as a brief section in a long and comprehensive election passed in 
1839.  It allowed absent soldiers  “to  exercise  the  right  of  suffrage  at  such  place  as  may  be  
appointed by the commanding officer of the troop, or company, to which they shall 
respectively  belong,  as   fully   as   if   they  were  present  at   the  usual  place  of  election.”53 A 
precursor to Civil War soldier-voting laws on the Iowa model, it called for election sites 
to open at the encampments where soldiers served, overseen by officers of each 
company.54  Before the Civil War, the law never received judicial attention, if indeed it 
was ever used at all.55  But it was used in elections in 1861, and in some of those 
elections  soldiers’  ballots  tipped  the  outcome.   
                                                 
51. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 185-186. 
     52. An ACT to enable the militia or volunteers of this state, when in the military service of the United 
States or of this state, to exercise the right of election, ch. CLXXI, 1812 Pa Laws 213. 
53. An Act Relating to the Elections of this Commonwealth, P.L. 192, 1839 Pa. Laws 519.  
54. Id. at § 44. 
55. In attacking Democrats in general, and Democrat George Woodward in particular, for opposing 
soldier voting, Republicans in 1864 charged in an election pamphlet that Pennsylvania soldiers had indeed 
voted under the law during the Mexican War. William E. Chandler, The   Soldiers’   Right   To   Vote:  Who  
Opposes It? Who Favors It? (Washington: Lemuel Towers, 1864), 8; Claims that absent Pennsylvania 
soldiers had voted in the Mexican War surfaced in a few newspapers during the Civil War. An unsigned 
letter to a Republican newspaper asserted that Pennsylvania soldiers had voted in the 1847 gubernatorial 
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The   constitutionality   of   the   law   came   before   Pennsylvania’s   high   court   in   the  
1862 case of Chase v. Miller, which struck down the law as unconstitutional.  More than 
any other court decision dealing with soldier-voting laws, this one reverberated 
nationally, both legally and politically. Legally, it drew attention as a potential precedent 
in the other eight states where high courts subsequently reviewed the constitutionality of 
similar laws, including Ohio.56  Politically, the decision took center stage when its author, 
Democrat George Woodward, ran for governor in 1863. Citing his decision in Chase, 
Republicans charged over the following two years that Woodward in particular and 
Democrats in general were anti-soldier because they opposed soldier-voting laws.  
None of those repercussions were foreseeable when the case arose in 1861. In the 
race that year for district attorney of Luzerne County, Democrat Chase won the home 
vote, but Republican Miller won the overall tally by outpolling Chase among voting 
soldiers. The return judges excluded the soldier votes and declared Chase the winner. 
Miller contested the outcome in court.57  The lower court judge, a Democrat named John 
Conyngham, agreed with Miller that the soldier vote should have counted.  Their 
                                                                                                                                                 
election, most of them for winning Democratic candidate Francis Shunk. (Wellsboro Agitator, June 4, 
1862). Another Pennsylvania paper simply stated, without elaboration, that absent soldier votes had been 
counted during the Mexican War (Chambersburg Franklin Repository, July 20, 1864). Cf. Neither Josiah 
Benton nor Jonathan White, in writing about the Pennsylvania soldier-voting law of 1864, corroborates that 
assertion. A likely reason for enactment of the 1813 version of the law was to assist in recruiting for the 
War of 1812. See Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 37, 137. For the connection between voting and suffrage 
during that war, see Williamson, American Suffrage From Property to Democracy, at 188.  
56. Justice Josiah Scott cited the Pennsylvania decision in his majority opinion, opining that differences 
between the Pennsylvania and Ohio constitutions rendered the case inapplicable. (Chase, 41 Pa. at 611.) 
Rufus Raney cited it in his dissenting opinion as support for his argument that tying elections to local 
communities  served  the  constitutional  imperative  of  protecting  the  “purity”  of  elections.  (Id. at 649.) 
57 . Chase, 41 Pa. at 414. A fair assumption is that the election officials acted based on their 
interpretation of the Pennsylvania constitution, but no record of their reasoning has survived. 
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exclusion  “disfranchised”  soldiers,  in  Conyngham’s  opinion,  and  denied  the  legislature’s  
“sovereignty.”58  Chase appealed to the state Supreme Court. 
The legal dispute hinged on the meaning of the suffrage provision of 
Pennsylvania’s  1838  constitution.     Article   III,   section  1  granted  voting   rights   to  “every  
white freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year, and in 
the election district where he offers to vote, ten days immediately preceding such 
election….”59 The central question was whether the language italicized here imposed a 
constitutional requirement that voters cast their ballots in person within their 
Pennsylvania election districts.  
Woodward approached the question as a subject for historical inquiry, just as 
Rufus Raney would the following year when he dissented in the Ohio case. Woodward 
sought   to   answer   the  question  as   the   constitution’s   framers  would  have   answered   it. In 
this he had the advantage of having been one of the framers himself, although his 
authority on questions of original intent was presumably no greater than James 
Thompson’s,   a   fellow   Democrat   on   Pennsylvania’s   high   court.   Thompson   too   was   a  
delegate to the 1838 convention that drafted the constitution. 60  He dissented from 
Woodward’s   opinion   for   the   4-1 Chase majority, although, because he did not file an 
explanatory dissenting opinion, we are left to guess at his reasons. 
                                                 
58. Philadelphia Inquirer, January 16, 1862. 
59. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1, italics added. The same section also conditioned the suffrage on the 
payment of a tax. Specifically, the prospective  voter  must  have  “within   two  years  paid  a  State  or  county  
tax,  which  shall  have  been  assessed  at  least  ten  days  before  the  election….”     
60. Woodward participated actively at the convention. On the suffrage provision of the new instrument, 
Woodward supported  the  addition  of  “white”  as  a  qualification  for  voting.  Giving  Negroes  the  vote,  he  was  
reported   to   have   said   in   a   convention   speech,   would   “offend   against   nature.”   Democratic Banner 
(Clearfield,   PA),   August   26,   1863,   2;;   For   Thompson’s   role   as   a   delegate, see “James   Thompson,”  
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, accessed November 26, 2013, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000204 . 
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We  do  know  Woodward’s  reasons. The framers, he ruled, went beyond deciding 
who could vote (white, 21-year old men meeting residency and taxpaying requirements) 
and purposely made the precise place of elections a constitutional element of suffrage, 
thereby putting the subject beyond the reach of legislation to alter.  They did this in 
Article  III,  Section  1  by  linking  the  act  of  voting  physically   to   the  election  “district”  in  
which the voter met the 10-day residency requirement. It was in that district, and only in 
that district, that the  voter  could  “offer”  his  vote  by  appearing  there  in  person  to  cast  his  
ballot. 
 In the Ohio case, Rufus Raney looked to history for a definition of the word 
“election”   in   that   state’s   1851   constitution;;   for   Woodward,   the   key   word   in   the  
Pennsylvania constitution   was   “district.”   Pennsylvania’s   constitution   provided   no  
definition, but Woodward concluded that by 1838 the word had taken on a clear meaning 
from   the   state’s   long   history   of   election   laws.  Year   after   year,   starting   long  before   the  
1838 constitution, legislation had specified the places of voting and called those places – 
always within Pennsylvania – “election  districts.”  By   law,   the  word  had  come   to  mean  
the location where voters convened in person to cast their ballots. The framers had that 
definition  in  mind  when  they  used  the  word  “district,”  according  to  Woodward.61   
The history of election law in Pennsylvania also revealed to Woodward a 
consistent record of ever-tightening guards against fraud. The purpose of requiring voting 
in election districts   in   the   1838   constitution,   he   said,   was   “to   exclude   disqualified  
                                                 
61. Chase, 41 Pa. at 421.  The  constitution  did  not  limit  the  legislature’s  authority  to  create  new  districts,  
Woodward wrote, including a district defined as a specific military encampment within the state, if 
legislators wished. But the 1839 soldier-voting  law  did  no  such  thing.  It  simply  ignored  the  constitution’s  
requirement   of   voting   in   a   district,   saying   instead   that   absent   soldiers   could   vote   “at   such   place”   as   the  
soldier’s  commanding  officer  shall  appoint.  This,  Woodward  concluded,  violated  Article III, § 1. Id. 
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pretenders   and   fraudulent   voters   of   all   kinds.”   The   soldier-voting law offered none of 
these  protections.   It   “opens  a  wide  door   for  most  odious   frauds,”  Woodward  wrote,  by  
allowing soldiers   to  vote  “where   the  evidence  of   their  qualifications   is  not  at  hand  and  
where  our  civil  police  cannot  attend  to  protect  the  legal  voter.”  All  this  collided  with  what  
Woodward   called   “the   labour   of   the   constitution,”   which   was   to   assure   that   suffrage  
rights  “be  preserved  from  abuse  and  perversion.”62  
In concluding that the soldier-voting  law  could  not  stand,  Woodward  wrote,  “We  
cannot  be  persuaded  that  the  constitution  ever  contemplated  any  such  mode  of  voting.”63 
Rufus  Raney  would  echo  Woodward’s  conclusion about the lesson of history. At the time 
Ohio’s  constitution  was  drafted,  “Nobody  had  ever  heard  of  any  other  sort  of  election”  
than  one  held  within  the  voters’  hometown,  Raney  would  say  in  his  dissent  in  the  Ohio  
case.64 The supposed inconceivability of absentee voting to framers became a common 
refrain among justices looking askance on the concept of absentee voting. 
                                                 
62. Id. at 425 - 427. Woodward treated the fraud attendant on soldier voting not as a hypothetical risk, 
but as a documented certainty. In 1861, the soldier-voting law had come before the court on procedural 
issues  not  involving  the  law’s  constitutionality. The undisputed record in that case showed rampant fraud. 
Hulseman and Brinkworth v. Rems and Siner, 41 Pa. 397 (1861). With that record apparently in mind 
(though he did not cite Hulseman in his Chase opinion),  Woodward  said,  “the  cases  of fraud that have been 
before  us”  proved  that  soldier  voting  was  subject  to  cheating  and  manipulation.  He  was  careful  to  absolve  
the soldiers themselves from culpability for the fraud, noting – again undoubtedly from the Hulseman 
record – that the actual culprits   “…   were   political   speculators,   who   prowled   about   the   military   camps  
watching for opportunities to destroy true ballots and substitute false ones, to forge and falsify returns, and 
to cheat citizen and soldier alike out of the fair and equal election provided  for  by  law.”  (Chase, 41 Pa., at 
421.) 
63. Id. at 418-419, 424-425. Woodward had to square that conclusion with the fact that the 1813 
precursor of the 1839 soldier-voting law was on the books when the 1838 constitution was drafted. He did 
so in a lengthy discussion about the legislative history of the 1839 law. In reenacting the 1813 law in a 
hasty  rush  to  adjournment,  lawmakers  had  lost  sight  of  the  new  constitution.  It  was  “careless  legislation,”  
he said, pointing as proof to a separate provision of the same 1839 law that prohibited troops from 
attending elections. Id. at 417.  
64. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 629. 
117  
 
The Chase decision sparked a successful initiative to amend the Pennsylvania 
constitution so as authorize soldier-voting legislation. Acting on that authority, the 
legislature passed a soldier-voting law in time for the 1864 elections.65 The decision also 
doomed  Woodward’s   run  for  governor   in  1863  and  marked  a  watershed  moment   in   the  
general politicization of the soldier-voting issue. 
Five other state high courts rendered decisions finding soldier-voting laws 
unconstitutional. All did so following the approach that Woodward used in striking down 
Pennsylvania’s  prewar   law  and  Ranney  used  unsuccessfully   in  urging  his  colleagues   to  
strike down Ohio’s   1863   law.  To   lend  meaning   to   otherwise   undefined  words   of   their  
state constitutions, these justices searched the history of suffrage in their states, as 
reflected in earlier constitutions and elections laws. The definitions they extracted from 
that search took on constitutional status and, in their minds, left no room for the novelty 
of absentee voting.  
Three of the cases reaching this conclusion arose in the New England states of 
Connecticut, Vermont, and New Hampshire. Unlike the Pennsylvania and Ohio cases, 
each of these court opinions was advisory, because it responded to a legislative request 
for   the   court’s   views   on   the   constitutionality   of   an   enacted   law   or   a   bill   under  
consideration.  The very fact that they made the requests showed legislative uncertainty 
about the constitutionality of the laws under consideration. In concluding that absentee 
voting was unconstitutional, the three New England court opinions validated the 
legislative doubts. 
                                                 
65. An Act to Regulate Elections by Soldiers in Actual Military Service, P.L. No. 871, 1864 Pa. Laws 
990. 
118  
 
Connecticut’s  opinion  came  first.  The  1862  law  under  consideration followed the 
Iowa model of calling for election sites to open at out-of-state encampments where 
Connecticut soldiers served.66  Justice Thomas Butler, a Whig in his earlier days in the 
state legislature, wrote the unanimous court opinion finding the law defective.67  The 
problem,  the  high  court  held,  was  that  the  state’s  constitution  quite  clearly  fixed  the  place  
for   elections   in   “electors’  meetings”  held   in   towns  within   the  state.  Like  Woodward   in  
Pennsylvania and Ranney in Ohio, Butler reached this conclusion by analyzing the 
history   of   the   state’s   election   laws.   Dating   from   its   colonial   charter,   the   Fundamental  
Orders   of   1639,   and   continuing   through   its   most   recent   amendment   to   the   state’s  
constitution   in   1836,   “elections”   were   virtually   synonymous with town meetings of 
freemen, such that an election held elsewhere than in a town meeting, let alone out of 
state, was a constitutional impossibility. The constitution repeatedly referred to elections 
as  “meetings  of  electors.”  It  called  for  electors  to  choose  state  officers  and  legislators  “at  
their  meeting”  every  April  and  for  the  casting  of  ballots  “by  each  elector  present  at  such  
meeting.”68  In language echoing George Woodward, and anticipating Rufus Ranney, 
Butler  wrote,  “there  has  never  been  an  election, by the people, of representatives or state 
officers,   in  any  other  manner  or  place”  than  by  personal  attendance  by  electors  at   town  
                                                 
66. An Act in addition to an Act entitled  “An  Act  relating  to  Electors  and  Elections,”  ch.  17,  1862  Conn.  
Pub.  Acts  15,  (hereafter  cited  as  “the  1862  Connecticut  Military  Suffrage  law”).   
67. Opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court, 30 Conn. 591   (1862).   (hereafter   cited   “Connecticut 
Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion”).   For   Butler:   “Thomas   Butler,“   Biographical Directory of the 
United States Congress. Accessed June 19, 2014, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B001191. 
68. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn. at 596-600.    Butler’s  citations  were  to  
several sections of Articles 3, 4, and 6 of the 1836 Connecticut constitution. The centrality of town 
meetings to local government in early America is well documented in a rich body of literature. See, e.g., 
David Hackett Fischer, Paul  Revere’s  Ride  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Brian P. Janiskee, 
Local Government in Early America (Lanham, MD: The Roman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 
2010). 
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meetings in Connecticut. The constitution tethered voting so tightly to township meetings 
that soldier voting would be impermissible   even   if   it   happened   in   the   soldier’s   own  
township   within   Connecticut,   unless   it   happened   in   that   township’s   annual   meeting,  
Butler added.69  
Anticipating the constitutional problem that Butler identified, the legislature had 
attempted a creative legal fiction in crafting the 1862 statute. The law declared that 
soldiers’  out-of-state  voting  under  the  law  was  to  “be  considered,  taken  and  held  to  have  
been   given   by   them   in   the   respective   towns   of   which   they   are   residents.”70 It was a 
creative provision, but it failed to carry weight with the court. Voting under the 1862 act 
clearly   meant   voting   away   from   Connecticut,   and   the   court   said   that   the   legislature’s  
effort   to   call   it   something   else   was   the   equivalent   of   “legislative   alchemy.” 71  If 
lawmakers could  get  away  with  that,  the  court  anticipated,  the  state’s  constitution  would  
count for little. Focusing just on suffrage qualifications, the court imagined where the 
slippery slope would lead if not nipped in the bud: 
They [the legislators] may authorize minors to vote, and say that their votes shall 
be considered, taken and held to be votes of electors of full age; or colored men, 
and say their votes shall be considered, taken and held to be the votes of white 
men and electors; and so may authorize the taking and counting of women and 
aliens. 
 
The Connecticut legislature responded by launching an initiative to amend the 
constitution. That project succeeded in time for legislation in 1864, allowing absent 
Connecticut soldiers to vote. For the first time in  Connecticut’s  history,  voters  could  cast  
                                                 
69 . Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn. at 597, 601 (emphasis in the 
original). 
70. The 1862 Connecticut Military Suffrage Act, § 8. 
71. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn at 602. 
120  
 
ballots without attending their township meetings, as long as they were qualified 
soldiers.72  
In   Vermont,   the   decisive   constitutional   word   was   “constable.”   In   elections   for  
executive branch offices including governor,  the  state’s  1793  constitution  directed  voters  
in each town to "bring in their votes ... to the Constable...."73 To protect the argument that 
absent  soldiers  were  “bringing   in”   their  votes  “to   the  constable,”   the  soldier-voting law 
designated the presiding  election  officials  at  the  far  away  military  voting  sites  as  “special  
constables.”      Treating   that   statutory   wording   as   legerdemain,   the   court   found   that  
absentee voting violated the constitution. Throughout Vermont history, the court noted, 
“constables”   presided   at   town  meetings,   and   they   had   no   authority   other   than   as   town  
officials. That historical meaning defined the otherwise undefined word in the 
constitution.   So,   in   requiring   voters   to   “bring   in”   their   votes   to   the   constable,   the  
constitution meant they had to present their votes in person to the constable presiding at 
the town meeting where civilian Vermonters had always held their elections. That ruled 
out absentee balloting.74  As discussed later in the chapter, the Vermont court sustained 
the legislature’s   authority   to   prescribe   absentee   voting   in   purely   federal   elections.  
Vermont’s  absent  soldiers  used  that  law  to  vote  by  absentee  ballot,  marking  a  first  in  the  
state’s  history. 
                                                 
72. An Act Relating to the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, (Conn. 1864); An Act to secure 
the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field, (Conn. 1864).  
73. VT. CONST. of 1793, CH. II, § 10.    
74. In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 670-671.  As discussed later in the chapter, the Vermont court 
sustained   the   legislature’s   authority   to   prescribe   absentee   voting   in   purely   federal   elections.   Vermont’s  
absent  soldiers  used  that  law  to  vote  by  absentee  ballot,  marking  a  first  in  the  state’s  history. 
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court made similarly short work of an 1863 
soldier-voting bill patterned on the Minnesota model, relying on history in concluding 
that absentee voting was unconstitutional. The court cited treatises and a string of cases 
establishing  the  common  law  rule  that  “every  vote  must  be  personally  given.”  The court 
determined   the  meaning  of   the   constitutional  word  “vote”  by  examining,   in   the  court’s  
words,   the   “history   of   the   origin   of   the   powers   of   towns   in   New   England,   and   of   the  
nature  and  usages  of  their  meetings.”    That  examination  persuaded  the  court  that framers 
had   the   common   law   meaning   of   voting   in   mind   and   that   “the   right   of   suffrage  
established by [the constitution] is to be exercised by the voter in person, at the meetings 
duly held for the purpose in the places of the State pointed out by the Constitution.”75 
That left no room for the absentee balloting contemplated by the proposed law. 
California’s  law  met  a  similar  fate  at  the  hands  of  its  high  court.  The  state’s  1849  
constitution conditioned suffrage on thirty days residence in   the   “county   or   district in 
which  [the  voter]  claims  his  vote….”76 In crafting the 1863 soldier-voting law, legislators 
clearly anticipated the difficulty this language presented, so, like their counterparts in 
Connecticut, they inserted a provision to finesse the problem. It provided that the absent 
                                                 
75. Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. 633, 636 (1863).  The legislature responded with a bill limiting the 
absentee voting opportunity to federal elections. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State 
Engaged in the Military Service of the Country to Vote for Electors of President and Vice President of the 
United States, and for Representatives in Congress, ch. 4030, 1864 N.H. Laws 3061. As discussed later in 
the  chapter,  the  high  court  endorsed  that  approach  for  the  same  reason  that  Vermont’s  court  had  done   so. 
Opinion  of  the  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  on  the  Constitutionality  of  the  Soldier’s  Voting  Bill, 
45 N.H 595 (1864). 
76. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 1. 
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soldiers' votes "shall be considered, taken, and held to have been given by them in the 
respective  counties  of  which  they  are  residents.”77  
The California Supreme Court showed the finessing language no more respect 
than its Connecticut counterpart had in reviewing a similar provision. The case was 
Bourland v. Hildreth.78  Justice Oscar Shafter, writing for the court majority, ridiculed the 
deeming provision. If the legislature can deem an absentee vote to have been cast locally, 
Shafter  wrote,  it  could  just  as  easily  deem  a  minor’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  an  adult,  or  
an  alien’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  a  citizen,  or  a  “colored”  man’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  
by a white man. Far from protecting the law from constitutional scrutiny, the deeming 
provision’s  effect  was  to  “efface”  the  constitution,  Shafter  said  in  a  tone  of  indignation.79 
In reaching the substance of the constitutional question, Shafter relied heavily on 
what he saw as the instruction of history. For the framers of the 1849 constitution, he 
wrote,   the   meaning   of   the   word   “vote”   was   “imparted   by   traditions   that   became  
historical”   and   by   “habits   of   thought   that   became   chronic,   and   habits   of   action   that  
became muscular almost, both in England and this country, ages before 1849.”  Under  
those traditions and habits, a vote was the physical act of casting a ballot (or giving a 
voice vote) in person.80  
                                                 
77. An Act in Addition to an Act entitled an Act to regulate Elections (Cal 1863) § 4.  As discussed in 
the Appendix, the 1863 law applied by its terms only to the 1863 elections. Two separate laws, both similar 
to the 1863 law, were enacted the following year. The 1863 law, following the Iowa model for voting in the 
field, is hereafter cited as "California's 1863 law." It included an additional deeming provision meant to 
cope with the potential constitutional problems associated with punishing violations occurring outside the 
state. It stated that the misconduct "shall be considered, taken, and held to have been committed by such 
officer within the jurisdiction of this State...." Id.   
78. Bourland,  26 Cal. 161. 
79. Id. at 201. 
80. Id. at 197. 
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Lorenzo Sawyer leaned even harder on the 
lessons of history. His concurrence echoes the 1862 opinions of Pennsylvania Justice 
George Woodward in Chase v. Miller and Justice Thomas Butler in the Connecticut 
Supreme  Court’s   advisory   opinion,   as   well   as   the   1863   dissent   of   Ohio   Justice   Rufus  
Ranney in Lehman v. McBride. Settlers from all over the country had populated 
California by the time of statehood, and they brought with them a universal 
understanding of what an election was, Sawyer reasoned. In all states,  
the personal presence of the elector was required at the place established by law 
for receiving  votes….  The  very  idea  of  an  election  embraced  the  idea  of  a  place  
appointed  within  the  district  for  the  meeting  of  the  voters  …  and  the  presence  of  
the  elector  in  person  to  offer  or  claim  his  vote….  Men  had  no  other  conception  of  
the process of voting, or of offering to vote, or of claiming their votes. This 
conception and these ideas were necessarily in the minds of the men who framed 
our constitution and the people when they adopted it.81  
 
Sawyer’s  point  was  essentially  the  same  as  Ranney’s:  “words  become  things.” 
 
Michigan’s  Supreme  Court  struck  down  that  state’s  1864  law  as  unconstitutional  
in early 1865 in a case arising out of a contested election for prosecuting attorney in 
Washtenaw County. 82   It was the last of nine state high court rulings judging the 
constitutionality of soldier-voting laws, and it echoed the first, in Pennsylvania. At issue 
was  the  1850  constitution’s  provision  that  “no  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall  be  an  elector,  or  
entitled to vote at any election, unless he has resided in the township or ward in which he 
offers   to   vote,   ten   days   next   preceding   the   election.”83 The question was whether that 
language pertained only to the qualifications of the voter – he had to be a resident of the 
                                                 
81. Id. at 216. 
82. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 127. 
83. MICH. CONST. of 1851, art. VII, § 1. 
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township where his vote is received, no matter where he casts that ballot – or whether it 
dictated where the elector casts his ballot, requiring him to be physically present in the 
township or ward when he voted. The majority concluded that an elector met the 
constitutional requirement only by personally casting his ballot in the township where he 
resides and that the soldier-voting law was therefore unconstitutional. Justice James 
Valentine  Campbell  explained  that  framer’s  intent  in  requiring  that  voters  be  personally  
present in their township or ward when  they  cast   their  ballots  was  fraud  prevention.  “If  
the   voter   is   required   to   present   himself   personally   at   his   own   place   of   abode,”   wrote  
Campbell,   “his   neighbors   will   know   his   person,   and   will   be   likely   to   know   his  
qualifications….  That  other  means  of  protection may be devised is possible; but the test 
by neighboring eyewitnesses has always been the favorite resort of the law, and it is the 
best.84 
Justice Isaac Christiancy concurred. Relying on history, he concluded that the 
term  “offers  his  vote”  in  a  township or ward, as the 1850 framers must have understood 
the   term,   meant   “personal   presentation   of   the   vote   at   that   place   to   the   inspectors   or  
officers  presiding  at  such  election.”  This  had  been  the  “uniform  mode  in  all  the  American  
states from their first   organization,”   with   the   single   exception   of   Pennsylvania’s   1813  
law, which Christiancy brushed aside, observing that Michigan had certainly known no 
other mode in her history.85   
Although Christiancy did not base his conclusion on previous opinions, he 
similarly rooted his reasoning in the lessons of history. Courts should give undefined 
                                                 
84. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 127, 144. 
85. Id. at 155. 
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words in constitutional text the meaning that the framers attached to those words. For 
Woodward  in  Pennsylvania,  the  word  was  “district.”  For  the  five  Vermont  justices  it was 
“constable,”   and   for  Ranney   in  Ohio   and  Butler   in  Connecticut,   it  was   “election.”   For  
Christiancy   in  Michigan   and   Shafter   and   Sawyer   in   California,   it   was   “vote.”   In   each  
case, the word had meant something quite specific to the framers of the respective 
constitutions. For these justices, that meaning attached to the words in the constitution 
and left no room for absentee voting laws. 
The countervailing judicial approach, typified by Josiah Scott in the opinion 
upholding  Ohio’s  law,  attached  no  constitutional significance to the novelty of absentee 
voting. Justice Byron Paine, a radical Republican, authored the opinion of the Wisconsin 
Supreme  Court   upholding   that   state’s   soldier-voting law.86  He   conceded   “the   framers  
never  contemplated  or   ‘dreamed’  of  a law authorizing a ballot to be cast outside of the 
state.”87 But  for  Paine,  this  undisputed  fact  said  nothing  about  the  legislature’s  authority  
under   the   constitution.   The   legislative   power,   Paine   wrote,   “is   sovereign   and  
uncontrollable, except as specially   restricted   in   the   constitution.”   Nowhere   did   the  
constitution   expressly   limit   the   legislature’s   power   to   fix   the   place   of   voting.      Paine  
believed the statute should stand unless constitutional text said, expressly and without 
ambiguity, that voting could occur only inside the state. No such text existed.88 For Paine, 
                                                 
86. Chandler, 16 Wis. at 433. As an attorney before the war, Paine had defended an abolitionist accused 
of  impeding  enforcement  of  the  fugitive  slave  act.    See  “Byron  Paine,”  Wisconsin  Court  System,  accessed  
May 19, 2014. http://www.wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/justices/retired/paine.htm. The enforcement 
episode that drew Paine into his role is described in H. Robert Baker, The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A 
Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and the Coming of the Civil War (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 
2006). 
87. Id. at 439. 
88. Id. 
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the   constitution’s   silence   empowered   the   legislature   to   do   as   it   pleased.   The   court’s  
opinion was unanimous.89  
There was a similar outcome in Iowa, where the high court sustained its soldier-
voting   law  with   reasoning  akin   to  Paine’s   in  Wisconsin  and  Scott’s   in  Ohio.  Under   the  
state’s  1857  constitution,  voting  eligibility  required  a  citizen  to  have  been  for  at  least  60  
days   a   resident   “of   the   county   in   which   he   claims   his   vote.”90  In an election contest 
challenging   the   law’s   constitutionality,   the   trial   judge,   Norman   Isbell,   adopted   the  
approach of Justices Woodward of Pennsylvania, Ranney of Ohio, Butler of Connecticut, 
Sawyer of California, and Christiancy of Michigan; history gave meaning to the 
constitution’s   terms,   he   said.      The   idea   of   absentee   voting   was   utterly   foreign   to   the  
experience   of   the   constitution’s   framers.   When   they   crafted   the   suffrage   provision  
requiring  60  days  of  residence  in  the  county  “of  which  he  claims  his  vote,”  the  notion that 
voters  might   cast   ballots   elsewhere   than   in   their   own   county   “would   never   enter   their  
minds,”   Isbell   wrote.   “We   cannot   believe   that   any   man,   at   the   adoption   of   the  
                                                 
89. According to the leading scholar of the Wisconsin law, the state legislature tried to tip the scales of 
justice to  influence  the  court’s  decision.  The  device  for  doing  so  was  an  amendment  to  the  soldier-voting 
law to permit soldier voting in elections for state judges. (An Act to Amend Chapter 11 of the General Law 
of  the  Extra  Session  of  1862,  entitled  “An  Act  to  Enable the Militia and Volunteers of this State, when in 
the Military Service of the United States or of this State, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, ch. 59, 1863 
Wis. Laws 77.) The intention, according to historian Frank Klement, was to pressure the justices to favor 
soldier voting so as not to antagonize soldiers whose votes they needed for their own elections. It would 
have  been  “political  suicide”  for  the  justices  to  rule  against  the  law.  Klement  argues  that  the  legislature’s  
gambit succeeded in influencing  the  outcome  of  the  court  case.  Klement,  “The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  
During the Civil War,” 37-47,  45.  It  is  a  plausible  but  not  a  provable  assertion.  Paine’s  analysis,  after  all,  
employed a respectable approach, entirely in step with the approach of justices elsewhere who voted to 
sustain soldier-voting laws based on judicial restraint and deference to legislatures.  
90. IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 1. 
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Constitution,   regarded   its  meaning   in   the   light   claimed   [by   the   law’s   defenders],  much 
less  any  of  its  framers.”91  
Without  disputing  Isbell’s  statement  of  how  the  framers  envisioned  elections,  the  
Iowa Supreme Court reversed his decision, holding that the soldier-voting law was 
constitutional. George Wright, a Republican, wrote the court’s  unanimous  opinion.92 He 
ruled that the disputed constitutional language defined who could not, but did not fix 
where he   could   vote.   The   legislature  was   free   to   set   the   “time,   place,   and  manner”   of  
voting, including out-of-state locations, Wright concluded.      He   cited   Justice   Paine’s  
reasoning in upholding the Wisconsin law, agreeing with Paine that it was 
constitutionally   irrelevant   that   the   framers   “never   contemplated   or   ‘dreamed’”   of  
absenting voting. Only if the constitution restricted the legislature in   “clear,   palpable,  
plain”  text  could  a  court  invalidate  a  statute,  and  no  such  prohibition  appeared  in  the  text  
of  Iowa’s  constitution.93  
In each of the nine court decisions, justices observed that constitutional framers 
had never contemplated the possibility of absentee voting. The very notion was foreign to 
their experience and to their idea of what it meant to vote. They disagreed about the 
                                                 
91. Morrison, 15 Iowa  309. 
92. For  Wright’s  political  leanings,  see  “George  Grover  Wright,”  Biographical Directory of the United 
States Congress, accessed May 29, 2013,  
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000759.   
93. Morrison, 15 Iowa at 347-349.  Two  other  states’  high  courts,   in  reviewing  the  constitutionality  of  
soldier-voting   laws,   commented   negatively   on   the   Iowa   Supreme   Court   decision.   Vermont’s   Supreme  
Court, concluding that the constitution of that state barred absentee voting laws covering state  (but not 
federal)  elections,  expressly  declined  to  adopt  the  Iowa  court’s  reasoning,  declaring  “we  are  not  prepared  to  
say  it  is  sound.”  [Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 674.] California’s  high  court,  in  striking  down  that  state’s  
law,  said   in  somewhat  harsher   language   that  adopting   the  reasoning  of   their   Iowa  brethren  would  “throw  
the  whole   law  relating   to   the  construction  of  written   instruments   into  hopeless  confusion.”   [Bourland, 26 
Cal. at 206.] 
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consequences of the change. To some, it had constitutional effect by violating prewar 
election norms that defined the language of state constitutions.  For others, it did not, 
leaving legislators free to invent something that departed from tradition. Either way, all 
recognized that they were dealing with something altogether new. 
 
Seven States Take Creative Legal Steps to Meet Political Deadlines 
Compounding the radical impact that the new laws had on the substance of 
prewar law was a variety of inventive steps some states took in their haste to implement 
voting in the field in time for the 1864 elections. As chapters 3 and 4 describe, by 1864 
the political potency of the issue had become clear, particularly from the 1863 election 
experiences in Ohio and Pennsylvania. From the Ohio experience, the country learned 
that absent soldiers would vote overwhelmingly for Republicans. Even more importantly, 
Pennsylvania in 1863 proved that Republicans could win civilian votes by blaming 
Democrats for the absence of a soldier-voting law.  With 1864 elections on the horizon, 
states that had done little or nothing on the issue before November 1863 suddenly swung 
into action.94 
Seven of these late-acting states – Vermont, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Rhode 
Island, Maryland, Maine, and Kansas – faced constitutional obstacles to absentee voting.  
By the time they awakened to the political rewards of enacting voting rights for their 
absent soldiers, with the 1864 election season fast approaching, time was running short 
                                                 
94. For detail on the timing of enactments, see the text accompanying notes 84-87 in Chapter 3. 
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for the often-cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. 95  The time squeeze 
inspired inventive legal measures in all seven states.  
Three states solved the time shortage by enacting soldier-voting arrangements 
limited to federal elections. This half-loaf solution was not the preferred approach 
anywhere, since it left absent soldiers unable to participate in elections for state offices. It 
was better than nothing, however, and unlike amending a constitution, it could be done 
quickly. Vermont, New Hampshire, and Kentucky, each having concluded that its state 
constitution barred absentee voting in elections for state officers, seized on the approach 
as a quick way around their constitutional obstacles. Their soldier-voting laws 
accordingly applied only to representatives to Congress and electors for President and 
Vice President.  
Vermont’s  Supreme  Court  produced  the  legal  analysis that achieved this outcome, 
and the other states followed the Green Mountain State’s  lead.  Vermont’s  high  court,  in  
an advisory opinion requested by the state legislature, concluded that the state 
constitution barred out-of-state voting.96 But the court added that the constitutional bar 
was irrelevant to elections for congressmen and presidential electors, since the federal 
constitution alone controlled that subject.  Language in Articles I and II of U.S. 
Constitution, the court concluded, delegates to state legislatures the power to determine 
                                                 
95. Vermont, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Maryland faced this 
problem.  
96. The state constitutional provision   that   created   the   difficulty   stated   that   the   “freemen”   of   each  
Vermont  town  must  “hold  elections  therein”  for  their  representatives  in  the  state  House  of  Representatives.  
(VT. CONST. of 1793, Ch. II, § 7.) 
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where to hold elections for federal offices. Absentee voting legislation was within that 
delegated authority, the court concluded.97  
That interpretation gave the Vermont legislature a free hand to allow absent 
soldiers to vote away from home in federal elections, no matter what the state 
constitution said about elections. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in an advisory 
opinion   shortly   afterwards,   seized   on   the   Vermont   court’s   logic   to   reach   the   same  
conclusion.98  Kentucky’s  legislature,  which  had  taken  no  action  before  1864,  recognized  
state   constitutional   obstacles   similar   to   Vermont’s   and   New   Hampshire’s,   but   did   not  
bother asking its high court for advice. It simply enacted a soldier-voting law limited to 
federal elections. 99  Maine did as well, though that state simultaneously launched an 
initiative, which ultimately succeeded, to amend its constitution to permit the application 
                                                 
97. For congressional elections, Article I requires  that  voters  meet  the  same  qualifications  as  voters  “for  
the  most  numerous  branch  of  the  state  legislature,”  but  that  speaks  only  to  who can vote for congressional 
representatives. It says nothing about where they can vote. Elsewhere in Article I, the court pointed out, the 
Constitution   authorizes   state   legislatures   to  determine   “the  place   and  manner”   for   electing   congressmen;;  
“the   Times,   Places   and  Manner   of   holding   Elections   for   Senators   and   Representatives,”   reads   the   U.S.  
Constitution,  “shall  be  prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  Legislature  thereof.”  (In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 
Vt. at 677, quoting section 4 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution.) For presidential electors, the 
Constitution’s  delegation  of  power  to  state  legislatures  is  similarly broad. Article II provides that each state 
shall  appoint  its  presidential  electors  “in  such  Manner  as  the  Legislature  thereof  may  direct….”  (Id.) 
98. An Act to enable the qualified voters of this State engaged in the military service of the country to 
vote for electors of President and Vice President of the United States, (N.H. 1864). In an earlier advisory 
opinion issued in 1863, the New Hampshire court concluded that a bill authorizing soldier voting for state 
elections would be unconstitutional under the state’s   1792   constitution.   In   reaching   that   conclusion,   the  
court pointed to a provision of the constitution stating that, in choosing state representatives and senators, 
eligible  voters  “shall  be  entitled  to  vote  within  the  district  wherein  they  dwell.”    Elections for other offices, 
including  governor,  were   to  be   “in   the   same  manner”   as   elections   for   state   representatives.     Overall,   the  
court  opined,  the  “provisions  of  our  Constitution  …  require  that  the  right  of  voting  shall  be  exercised  by  the  
voter in person at the meetings duly held for the purpose in the places of the State pointed out by the 
Constitution.”  That  left  no  room  for  absentee  balloting  for  state  offices.  Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. at 636. 
The legislature took no action in 1863 to initiate a constitutional amendment to solve the problem, leaving 
insufficient time to do in 1864. When the legislature that year enacted a bill limited to elections for federal 
offices, the court rendered a second advisory opinion finding the second bill constitutional. In so doing, it 
endorsed  the  Vermont  court’s  approach.  [Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H at 606 ].  
99. An act regulating the manner of soldiers voting for Electors of President and Vice President of the 
United States (Ky. 1863).  The act did not extend to the election of congressmen. (Id. at § 1.) 
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of  soldier  voting  to  state  officers,  as  well.  (More  on  Maine’s  approach  in  a  moment.)  In  
short, the Vermont gambit succeeded everywhere it was tried.100 
As discussed earlier, Rhode Island amended its constitution to overcome the 
prewar   provision   confining   voting   to   “town   or   ward  meetings.”  While   the   amendment  
granted  the  legislature  “full  power  to  provide  by  law  for  carrying  this  article  into  effect,”  
ratification would come too late for the legislature to act on its new authority before the 
election.101  The amendment itself solved that problem by authorizing absentee voting for 
soldiers, and describing  how  that  voting  would  work,  “until  such  provision  shall  be  made  
by   law.”102 The  description   provided   far   less   detail   than   any   state’s   soldier-voting law, 
but  more  detail  than  other  states’  constitutional  provisions  enabling  such  laws.  It  was,  in  
effect, legislation masquerading as constitution. But it worked. For the elections in 1864, 
                                                 
100. The logic of the Vermont decision, and of the decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that 
followed  it,  was  not  inescapable.  Neither  decision  arose  out  of  a  contested  election,  and  neither  was  a  “case  
or controversy”   of   the   sort   that   federal   courts   have   authority   to   review   under   art.   III,   §   2   of   the   U.S.  
Constitution. Instead, they were advisory opinions provided at the request of the state legislatures. Neither 
the Vermont nor the New Hampshire court had the advantage of a factual record or arguments for and 
against, as they would in a case arising out of a dispute between two parties represented by counsel.  The 
countervailing logic, which did not surface in either advisory opinion, did find expression in a contested 
federal  election  for  the  seat  representing  Michigan’s  5th  congressional  district  in  1864.  Lawyers  briefed  and  
argued both sides of that contest, albeit to a congressional committee and not to a court. Republican 
Rowland Trowbridge had defeated Democrat Augustus Baldwin, with absent soldiers providing 
Trowbridge’s  margin  of  victory.  Baldwin  challenged  the  outcome,  arguing  that  the  soldier  vote  should  not  
have  counted.  By  then  the  Michigan  Supreme  Court  had  ruled  that  Michigan’s  1864  soldier-voting law was 
unconstitutional (Twitchell,  13  Mich.  at  127)  and  Baldwin  maintained  that  the  statute’s  unconstitutionality  
should have disqualified the soldier votes that had given Trowbridge his putative victory. The committee 
ruled against Baldwin, applying the   logic   of  Vermont’s   high   court.   The   committee’s  minority   issued   its  
own   report,   arguing   that   the   “legislature”   to   which   the   U.S.   Constitution   refers   can   act   only   in  
subordination to the state constitution. The minority cited a case [Shiel v. Thayer, 2 Cong. Elect Cas. 319 
(1861); Asher Crosby Hinds, Hinds’  Precedents  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States, Vol. 
II, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), 3-4] arising out of an 1860 election in Oregon for that 
state’s   seat   in   the  House of Representatives. The state legislature had set the election on a date different 
from the date fixed for such elections in the state constitution. One candidate won the most votes on the 
election date set by the constitution, but another won the most votes on the date the legislature had set. 
Congress  resolved  the  dispute  by  rejecting  the  legislature’s  power  to  ignore  the  state  constitution  in  setting  
the election date.   
101. Benton puts the ratification date as September 10, 1864. Benton, Voting in the Field, 186. 
102. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors  (R.I 1864). 
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the state enacted no military suffrage legislation, and this creative constitutional language 
sufficed to support voting by absent Rhode Island soldiers.  
As in Rhode Island, military suffrage in Maryland depended on a creative solution 
to   the   combined  challenge  of   a   constitutional   obstacle   and  dwindling   time.  Maryland’s  
prewar  constitution  said  that  a  qualified  elector  “shall  be  entitled  to  vote  in   the  ward  or  
election district   in   which   he   resides.”103  To eliminate that obstacle, a constitutional 
convention  in  1864  crafted  an  amendment  authorizing  the  legislature  to  “provide  by  law  
for  taking  the  votes  of  soldiers  in   the  army  of  the  United  States  serving  in  the  field.”104 
Recognizing that ratification would not happen in time for legislative action before 
November,   the   convention   proposed   a   shortcut  much   like  Rhode   Island’s.   In   an   article  
entitled   “Schedule,”   it   permitted   absent   soldiers   to   participate   both   in   the   ratification 
process and, while they were at it, to vote in elections for state and federal offices, with 
the proviso that their election votes would count only if ratification succeeded.105 It did 
succeed, and like   Rhode   Island’s   men   in   blue,   Maryland   servicemen   voted   in   1864’s  
elections without the benefit of legislation.106 
Kansas, too, showed legal ingenuity in coping with a time crunch in 1864. The 
suffrage  provision  of  its  prewar  constitution  included  a  problematic  proviso  stating,  “nor  
                                                 
103. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 1. 
104. In addition, the amendment achieved an array of even more radical reforms, including the abolition 
of slavery and the disfranchisement of former confederates. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, §§ 1, 2. 
105. MD. CONST. of  1864,  art.  XII  (“Schedule”),  §  11. 
106.  Maryland’s  legislature  did  act  on  its  new  constitutional  authority  in  its  January  session,  1865.  An  
Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State, in the Military Service of the United States or this State to 
Exercise the Right of Suffrage, and to add the following Sections providing therefor to the Thirty-Fifth 
Article of the Code of Public General Laws, ch. 124, 1865 Md. Laws 187. Enacted on March 23, 1865, this 
was the last of the Civil War soldier-voting laws.  
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shall any soldier, seaman, or marine  have   the  right   to  vote.”107  Without conceding that 
the proviso applied to Kansas volunteers, lawmakers acted as if it might and proposed for 
ratification a constitutional amendment to get around the potential problem.108 It stated, 
“the  legislature  may make provision for taking the votes of electors who may be absent 
from their townships or wards, in the volunteer military service of the United States, or 
the  militia   service   of   this   state.”109  Lawmakers did not wait for ratification, however, 
before enacting a soldier-voting law, passing its statute in June.110  Absent soldiers used 
that law to vote in the 1864 elections.  Because it was enacted before the amendment took 
effect,   the   statute’s   constitutionality   was   debatable. The gambit succeeded, however. 
Soldier  voting  under   the  new   law  occurred  after   the   amendment’s  ultimate   ratification,  
and the statute never faced judicial review. 
It  took  a  force  more  powerful  than  the  abstraction  of  “justice”  to  account  for  legal  
changes this abrupt and this radical. Comparing  the  laws’  supposed  foundation  on  justice  
with their relatively short life span, one might wonder if justice had very much to do with 
it all. Future soldiers in future wars would surely experience the same injustice unless 
they, too, enjoyed absentee voting opportunities. Indeed, in a few states the laws endured. 
                                                 
107. KAN. CONST. of 1859,  art. V, § 3. 
108. One can read the proviso cited in the previous footnote either as excluding all servicemen from 
voting or as applying only to the those servicemen identified in a preceding clause of the same section: 
soldiers and sailors in the army or navy of the United States – presumably regulars – and stationed in 
Kansas.  Read the latter way, the final clause stood not as a flat prohibition of a military suffrage statute, 
but as a bar to voting by career servicemen stationed in Kansas. The attorney general, Republican Warren 
Guthrie, provided the state senate with a written opinion to exactly this effect, stating that before 1861 (the 
state constitution  was  drafted  in  1859),  the  term  “soldier”  never  applied  to  volunteers  and  militiamen,  but  
only   to   “that   branch   of   the   national   military   service   known   as   ‘regulars.’”   Kansas   Senate   Journal,   4th  
Cong., reg. sess., February 25, 1864, 413-414. 
109. Joint Resolution, to Amend Section Three of Article Five of the Constitution of the State of 
Kansas,   (Kan.   1864).   The   amendment   explicitly   excluded   from   suffrage   rights   “any   soldier,   seaman   or  
marine  in  the  regular  army  or  navy  of  the  United  States.”  Id. 
110. An Act Supplemental  to  an  Act  Entitled  ‘An  Act  to  Regulate  Elections,’  (Kan  1864). 
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Moreover, the Civil War era laws set precedents for soldier-voting laws enacted during 
subsequent wars and for more inclusive absentee voting opportunities created in the 
twentieth century.111  In the short term, however, the innovation did not endure in most 
states. It fizzled out with the end of hostilities, when states restored the primacy of 
communities in their voting laws, notwithstanding the potential injustice to soldiers 
absent in future wars.  
One   can   credit   the   sincerity   of   advocates’   invocation   of   justice   and   still  
acknowledge that baser political motives certainly played a part in inspiring enactment of 
the laws. Early in the war, the political motive was simply to garner the votes of the 
absent soldiers themselves, and both parties saw reasons to do it. Until 1863, as the 
scholarship of both Jonathan White and Arnold Shankman documents, partisan divisions 
on the issue had not fully formed. In Ohio and other early-acting states, both parties 
supported or opposed soldier-voting bills, and challenged the validity of the laws in 
election contests, depending on their calculation of electoral benefit and harm from the 
votes of soldiers.112  That calculation shifted late in 1863 as it became apparent not only 
that Republicans would win the soldier vote, but also that the issue would have an even 
larger impact on civilian votes. A surge in legislative activity resulted from the late 
dawning of that awareness.  
The following chapters elaborate on that broader political reality, ascribing the 
late-blossoming political attraction of soldier-voting legislation to the unique 
                                                 
111. Miller, Absentee Voter and Suffrage Laws, 35. 
112.  White,  “Citizens  and  Soldiers,”  5:2;;  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham.” 
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circumstances of 1863-1864 politics. It was the politics of soldiers, in which soldiers 
became the most authoritative spokesmen for   both   parties’  major   campaign   themes.   In  
the politics of soldiers, soldier-voting laws took on their greatest significance in the quest 
for civilian votes. After 1865, the politics of soldiers having ended, the appetite for 
soldier-voting laws ended, too. As soldiers returned home, considerations of justice for 
absent soldiers in future wars undoubtedly waned, as well.   
It  speaks  to  the  enduring  power  of  prewar  election  norms  that  at  war’s  end  most  
states reverted to them and to a legal system in which absentee voting once again had no 
place. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1863 PENNSYLVANIA: PROVING GROUND FOR 1864 POLITICAL 
MESSAGING 
Starting in 1863, soldier-voting laws played an increasingly important role in the 
messaging war of Civil War politics.  We shall see in Chapters 4 and 5 how powerful that 
role had become in national politics by 1864. Republicans that year harnessed the soldier-
voting  issue  to  fortify  their  status  as  the  “soldiers’  friends”  and  to  portray  Democrats  as  
“enemies   of   soldiers.”   That   status   underlay the more specific themes that Republicans 
used to attack Democrats and their standard-bearer, George McClellan: that Democrats 
including McClellan were disloyal, and that McClellan was both a coward and an 
incompetent field commander. Soldiers enjoyed unmatched credibility as messengers of 
those themes, so Republicans deployed the voice of soldiers in attacking Democrats and 
McClellan.   The   “soldiers’   friend”   meme   undergirded   the   party’s   strategy   by  
communicating the broad affinity between Republicans and the soldiers who were so 
indispensable   to   their   messaging.   Republicans’   support   for   soldier-voting laws helped 
cement that affinity. 
Democrats   in   1864   needed   soldiers’   voices   as   well,   not   only   to   refute   the  
Republican attacks but also to carry their own attacks themes: that Lincoln was an inept 
commander-in-chief, that he neglected his own troops, and that he subordinated their 
wellbeing to the interests of blacks. Soldiers spoke authoritatively on these subjects, so 
Democrats harnessed the voice of soldiers  in  attacking  Lincoln.  Democrats’  opposition  to  
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soldier-voting   laws  complicated   the  party’s  claim  to   the  status  of  “soldiers’   friend”  and  
correspondingly  impeded  the  party’s  messaging.   
Most of these 1864 partisan political attack themes had been developed and 
perfected   a   year   earlier   in   the   context   of   Pennsylvania’s   gubernatorial   contest.   Unlike  
most states, the calendar for statewide elections in Pennsylvania (like Ohio) was out of 
phase with the schedule for nationwide elections held in even numbered years.  That 
unique  electoral  calendar  heightened  the  national  visibility  of  the  state’s  contests,  making  
it,   in   the  words  of  Mark  Neely,  a  “bellwether”  for  national  politics.1 So the antennae of 
political operatives around the country were up as Democrats and Republicans faced off 
in  the  Keystone  State’s  1863  contest  for  Pennsylvania’s  governor.  The  lessons  learned  in  
that contest would inform the strategies of contestants elsewhere when they faced off in 
1864 elections. After the dust kicked up by Pennsylvania’s  political  storm  in  1863  finally  
settled down, the political potency of the soldier-voting issue became perhaps the most 
important lesson of all. 
The 1863 race for Pennsylvania governor pitted Republican incumbent Andrew 
Curtin against Democratic challenger George Woodward.  Curtin positioned himself as 
the  “soldiers’  friend,”  in  juxtaposition  to  Woodward,  whom  Republicans  assailed  as  anti-
soldier. Democrats resisted this labeling as energetically as Republicans advanced it.  
Both parties in Pennsylvania  needed  the  imprimatur  of  “soldiers’  friend”  in  1863  as  much  
as the national parties would need it in 1864, because the voice of soldiers was central to 
the political combat in both contexts. The differences between Curtin and Woodward 
                                                 
1.   Mark   E.   Neely   Jr.,   “Civil   War   Issues   in   Pennsylvania,”   Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography 135, no. 4 (October 2011): 389-417.   
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over   the   state’s soldier-voting   law   became   a   linchpin   in   their   competition   for   soldiers’  
friend status. 
Andrew Curtin grew up in Pennsylvania politics as a Whig, switching his 
allegiance to Republican in 1860.  He won the governorship in 1860 as the candidate of 
the People’s  Party,  an  amalgam  of  Pennsylvania  factions  – mostly Republicans, but also 
Know-Nothings, and Anti-Masons – united mainly by their opposition to Democrats. He 
became   an   enthusiastic   ally   of   Lincoln   and   a   strong   supporter   of   the   president’s   war  
policies.2  His   constitutional   powers   as   governor   included   “commander-in-chief of the 
army and navy of this Commonwealth, and of the militia, except when they shall be 
called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States.”3  While his military authority operated 
at a   level   removed   from   the   direction   of   Pennsylvania’s   troops   in   the  war,   he   ran   for  
reelection in 1863 as the incumbent commander-in-chief, just as Lincoln would in 1864. 
And just as Democrats in 1864 attacked Lincoln as a bungling commander, so Democrats 
in Pennsylvania assailed Curtin in 1863 as an inept commander-in-chief of the 
commonwealth’s  forces.   
Curtin  would  cultivate  the  “soldiers’  friend”  brand  as  a  reelection  device  in  1863,  
and his early service as governor in support of the war effort made the later branding 
credible.  Even before the fall of Fort Sumter, Curtin pushed through legislation 
improving the organization of the state militia. When Lincoln called for 75,000 
                                                 
2 . Erwin Stanly Bradley, The Triumph of Militant Republicanism: A Study of Pennsylvania and 
Presidential Politics 1860-1872 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 49-50, 89-90, 127-
129. 
3. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. II, § 7. 
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volunteers  following  Sumter,  Curtin’s  zealous  response  generated  troops  far  in excess of 
the  state’s  quota,  more  in  fact  than  the  Department  of  War  could  absorb.4  
Evidence indicates that Curtin indeed genuinely cared about the welfare of 
Pennsylvania’s  troops.     He  pushed  the  legislature  to  address  arrearages  in  soldiers’  pay.  
He secured   pensions   for   soldiers’   widows   and   orphans.   He   or   his   representatives  
frequently visited Pennsylvania troops in their field camps and hospitals. He answered 
every letter sent to him by soldiers. Soldiers of even the lowest ranks were the first 
visitors   ushered   into   the   governor’s   chambers.   He   pushed   for   legislation   to   fund   the  
return  of  bodies  of  deceased  soldiers  for  burial  at  home.    The  memoirs  of  one  of  Curtin’s  
closest  advisors,  attorney  Alexander  McClure,  attest  to  the  sincerity  of  Curtin’s  solicitude 
for soldiers. McClure, a practicing lawyer, former state legislator, and one-time chairman 
of  the  state  Republican  committee,  wrote,  “Curtin’s  affection  for  his  soldiers  was  that  of  
the  most  loving  father  for  his  own  children.”5  
If   Curtin’s   claim   to   the   status   as   “soldier’s   friend”   was   grounded   on   his  
behavior toward actual servicemen, the branding of George Woodward as the enemy of 
soldiers was a political construct. It lay somewhere between, on the one hand, a cruel 
caricature that stood truth on its head, and, on the other hand, a defensible inference 
drawn  from  Woodward’s  political   ideology  and  his   jurisprudence.   In  either  case,   it  had  
nothing  to  do  with  Woodward’s  personal  behavior  or  attitude  toward  soldiers.  In  fact,  in  
his private life, Woodward demonstrated decidedly pro-soldier inclinations. Two of his 
                                                 
4. Bradley, The Triumph of Militant Republicanism, 130-132. The surplus became the Pennsylvania 
Reserve Corps, which served as ready reinforcements later in the year following the federal defeat at Bull 
Run. Id. 
5. Id. at176; Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: The John C. Wilson 
Company, 1905), 1:497-498. 
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own sons served in the Union army, and Woodward himself paid the expenses of raising 
a company of volunteers for the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves.6   
We can get some feel for Woodward the private man   from   Curtin’s   ally  
Alexander McClure.  Notwithstanding their political differences, McClure had come to 
know   and   respect   Woodward   within   Pennsylvania’s   tight-knit legal community.  
McClure   admired   Woodward   as   a   “sincere”   and   “courteous”   man.   In   his   memoirs, 
written decades after the war, McClure praised him not just as a capable lawyer and 
jurist, but also as being sincerely devoted to servicemen.  McClure described an 
encounter he had with Woodward on a train ride from Philadelphia to Allentown during 
the 1863 gubernatorial campaign. Sitting together, the two men candidly exchanged their 
differing   views   about   the   war   and   politics,   “with   entire   freedom,   and   of   course,   with  
utmost   courtesy.”   The   subject   of   supporting   the   “cause   of   the   soldiers”   came   up.  
Recalling the conversation, McClure wrote in his memoir,  
I reminded him that he had two sons in the army who had won distinction and 
stood among the heroic soldiers of the state, and asked him whether he or I in the 
opposing positions with the soldiers was best supporting the cause of the soldiers 
in the field. He answered with visible pride that his sons were soldiers, and as 
soldiers they would do their duty.7 
   
Personally, then, each man – Woodward and Curtin (through his surrogate McClure) – 
reasonably and   sincerely   saw   himself   as   the   soldiers’   friend.   Politically,   however,  
Republicans saw to it that the label stuck only to Curtin. 
                                                 
6. Erie (PA) Observer, October 3, 1863, 2; White, Washington Woodward and Black,  “A  Pennsylvania  
Judge  Views  the  Rebellion,”  201-202.   
7. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2:55-61.  
141  
 
Woodward was born in March 1809, a month after Lincoln. By 1861, he had a 
long track record as a Democrat and as a jurist.  He served as a delegate to the 1837 
Pennsylvania constitutional convention, where he advocated successfully for 
disfranchising free African-Americans and pushed unsuccessfully for restrictions on the 
right of immigrants to vote and hold office, a position that Republicans would use against 
him in 1863.8  He first became a judge in 1841, serving for eleven years on the Fourth 
Judicial District where he had both trial and appellate duties. While still in that judicial 
post, Simon Cameron defeated Woodward in a race for the US senate in 1845.  The next 
year, James Polk nominated Woodward to the United States Supreme Court, but the 
president failed to push the nomination forcefully enough to overcome energetic 
opposition led by Cameron, who bore grudges from the previous  year’s  senate  race.  The  
senate rejected Woodward, 29-20.9   
Woodward did not slip quietly into obscurity after that setback, but resumed his 
state court duties and remained an active figure in Pennsylvania politics even while 
serving on the bench. He was elected associate justice to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in 1852 and ran against Curtin for governor in 1863 while still occupying this post on the 
state’s  high  court.  By  then,  he  had  earned  notoriety  as  author  of  the  court’s  1862  decision  
in Chase v. Miller,   striking   down   the   state’s   prewar   soldier-voting law. That decision 
became  the  centerpiece  of  the  Republicans’  argument  the  following  year  that  Woodward  
                                                 
8 .   Daniel   J.   Curran,   “Polk,   Politics,   and   Patronage:   The   Rejection   of   George   W.   Woodward’s  
Nomination  to  the  Supreme  Court,”  The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 121, no. 3 (July 
1997): 163, 166. 
9. Id. at 163; McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2:62. Curtin, too, would come to suffer 
Cameron’s   political   enmity   after   supporting   Lincoln   over   Cameron   for   the   Republican   presidential 
nomination in 1860. 
142  
 
was anti-soldier. And the year after that, 1864, Republicans would use it against George 
McClellan  based  on  McClellan’s  endorsement  of  Woodward’s  candidacy  in  1863. 
Woodward’s  role  in  striking  down  the  soldier-voting law was not the only count 
in  the  Republicans’  indictment  of  him  as  anti-soldier. The others were his membership in 
the peace wing of the Democratic Party and specific statements he made against the war 
in 1861. Woodward was avowedly a peace Democrat, but not an extremist within that 
group. Like others who regarded themselves as good Americans but who opposed the 
Lincoln administration’s   approach   to   the   war,   Woodward’s   loyalty   was   to   “the  
Constitution  as  it  is,  the  Union  as  it  was.”    By  that  standard,  Woodward  was  no  more  a  
traitor than countless other northern Democrats, all believing themselves to be stalwart 
patriots.10  
Still, his prominence as a Democrat and the reservations he expressed about the 
Lincoln  administration’s  policies  made  him  an  easy  mark   for  opposition  propagandists.  
Like many conservative Democrats, Woodward thought civil war invited dangerous 
growth of centralized   power.   A   “centralized   despotism,”   he  wrote   to   a   friend   in   1863  
about  his  fears  that  the  country  was  headed  in  the  wrong  direction,  “would  be  the  death  
knell   of   popular   liberty.” 11  Here   is   McClure’s   distillation   of   Woodward’s   ideology:    
Woodward   “was   a   Democrat of the old school, a strict constructionist and sincerely 
convinced that there was no safety to popular government in the revolutionary 
                                                 
10.  For  Woodward’s  comfortable  fit  within  the  mainstream  of  Pennsylvania’s  substantial  anti-war (and 
anti-African-American) sentiment, see Arnold M. Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 1861-
1865 (Rutherford, N.J: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 40, 54-55, 126.   
11. Letter from Woodward to Lewis Coryell, June 1, 1863, as quoted in Shankman, The Pennsylvania 
Antiwar Movement, 1861-1865, 126. 
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innovations   which   are   ever   precipitated   by   civil   war.”12  He   subscribed   to   Calhoun’s  
“compact   theory,”   under   which states formed the Union in a contractual relationship. 
Though he opposed secession, he supported the right of states to secede if they concluded 
that the national government had violated the terms of the contract.  Southern apologists 
for secession pointed to contract violations as their justification, and Woodward saw their 
point. He sympathized with southern slaveholders; in an 1860 speech in Philadelphia, he 
characterized   slavery   as   an   “incalculable   blessing”   to   the   North.      He   agreed   that  
Republicans were  trying  to  install  a  “negro  despotism,”  as  he  said  in  a  letter  to  a  former  
colleague   on   the   state’s   high   court.   He   did   not   think   that   the   electoral   success   of  
Republicans, misguided though he believed them to be, justified secession by southern 
states, and he did not believe that states having seceded had the right to attack the United 
States, as South Carolina had done at Fort Sumter. He did believe, however, that each 
state had a right to secede peacefully if it chose to. He thought it pointless for the North 
to resist southern independence forcibly. Better to let the southern states depart the union 
than   to   coerce   them   to   stay.   “We  hear   it   said,   let   the  South  go  peaceably,”  Woodward  
said  in  speech  in  1861.  “I  say  LET  HER  go  peaceably.”13   
That kind of rhetoric played into the hands of Republicans eager to tar not just 
Woodward, but the whole Democratic Party as disloyal. To many Republicans and their 
allies in the pro-war wing of the Democratic Party, anything short of full-throated support 
for the Lincoln’s   administration’s   prosecution   of   the   war   constituted   disloyalty.   There  
                                                 
12. Id. at 61. 
13. George Woodward, letter to Rufus E. Shapley, The Press (Philadelphia, PA), October 12, 1863; 
White,   Woodward   and   Black,   “A   Pennsylvania   Judge   Views   the   Rebellion,”195-225; Speech by 
Woodward in 1861, Huntingdon (PA) Globe, September 9, 1863. 
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was no room in the community of loyal Americans for opposition, they sincerely 
believed,   especially   organized,   partisan   opposition.      Only   “no-partyism”   sufficed.14 By 
that standard, Woodward was indeed disloyal. He not only opposed the Lincoln 
administration’s   war   policy,   but   he   opposed   it   as   an   active   partisan,   a   prominent  
Democrat  and,  by  1863,  the  party’s  standard-bearer for governor.   
So, even without the 1862 court decision striking down the prewar soldier-voting 
law,  Woodward’s  sympathy  with  the  right  of  secession  and  his  outspoken  opposition  to  
Lincoln’s  war  policy  provided  his  detractors  with  ample  ammunition   for  characterizing  
him as disloyal.  But those attitudes by themselves did not distinguish Woodward from 
untold numbers of peace Democrats holding the same view and do not by themselves 
account  for  Woodward’s  place  at  the  head  of  the  Republicans’  rogue  gallery  of  traitors.  It  
was the court case of Chase v. Miller, together with  Woodward’s   run   for   governor   in  
1863, which earned him that distinction.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Chase v. Miller was the first of nine state supreme 
court decisions addressing the constitutionality of a soldier-voting law. Authoring the 
court’s   opinion striking down the law, Woodward concluded that the framers of 
Pennsylvania’s  1838  constitution  went  beyond  deciding  who could vote (white, 21-year 
old men meeting the residency and taxpaying requirements) and purposely made the 
precise place of elections a constitutional element of suffrage, thereby putting the subject 
beyond   the   reach   of   legislation   to   alter.   Woodward’s   decision   striking   down  
                                                 
14. Smith, No Party Now:  Politics in the Civil War North, 160-162.  
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Pennsylvania’s  prewar  military  suffrage  law  typified  the  approach  that  looked  to  history  
for the meaning of relevant constitutional text. (In Chase, Woodward drew on history to 
establish  the  meaning  of  the  word  “district.”)  As  elaborated  in  Chapter  2,  that  approach  
predominated in the six high court decisions rejecting the laws. The court majorities in 
Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, California, and Michigan all applied reasoning 
similar  to  Woodward’s  in  striking  down  soldier-voting laws, as did the dissenting opinion 
by  Rufus  Ranney  in  Ohio,  where  the  court  majority  upheld  that  state’s  law.    The  majority  
opinion   in   each   case   cited   Woodward’s   conclusion   approvingly.15  Majority opinions 
upholding  the  laws  in  Iowa,  Wisconsin,  and  Ohio  distinguished  Pennsylvania’s  case  from  
their  own,  but  none  criticized  Woodward’s  opinion  as  wrongly  decided.16 
From this we can conclude   that   Woodward’s   opinion   was   well   within   the  
mainstream of respectable jurisprudence. Nor did partisanship mark the Pennsylvania 
court’s  approach  to  the  issue  of  absentee  voting  by  soldiers  in  any  noticeable  way.    Of  the  
five justices on Pennsylvania’s   high   court,   three   were   Democrats   (Woodward,  Walter  
Lowrie, and James Thompson) and two were Republicans (John Read and William 
Strong).17   In the Chase decision,  both  of  the  court’s  two  Republicans  joined  Democrats  
                                                 
15.  In   the   California   case,   for   example,   Justice   Shafter   wrote   that   Woodward’s   opinion   “must   be  
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16.      Justice  Christiancy  of   the  Michigan  high  court   tempered  his  approval  of  Woodward’s  conclusion  
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Woodward and Lowrie in the majority opinion striking down the soldier-voting law, 
while one of the three Democrats, Thompson, was the sole vote to uphold the law.  A 
Democratic judge (John Nesbitt Conyngham) also authored the lower court opinion 
upholding the law.18  In the final Chase tally, then, the political pedigree of the judges in 
no way predicted the partisan alignment that would crystalize over the soldier-voting 
issue by 1863. Of the six judges who considered the case, the four Democratic jurists 
split 2-2 on whether to sustain the law, while the two Republicans both voted to strike 
down the law. That distribution of votes hardly seemed a promising foundation for a 
political attack against Democrats as anti-soldier.  And the year before deciding Chase, 
the high court had voted unanimously against overturning an election in which the soldier 
vote was both decisive and manifestly fraudulent. That case was Hulseman and 
Brinkworth v. Rems and Siner, and both Republican jurists joined their three Democratic 
colleagues in lamenting the fraud while declining, on procedural grounds, to set aside the 
election.19  
Judicial nonpartisanship about the prewar soldier-voting law corresponded to a 
broader nonpartisanship among Pennsylvanians on the issue in 1861 and 1862. By the 
end of the war, the laws had become a sharply partisan issue within elective politics, with 
Republicans favoring the laws and Democrats opposed. As we shall see, the Chase 
decision itself would hasten the process of coalescence, after Woodward threw his hat in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Last modified February 33, 2006, http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-
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www.nndb.com/people/902/000180362  
18.  For  Coyningham’s  party  affiliation,  see  “John  Nesbitt  Coyningham,”  Find a grave.com, October 8, 
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the political ring as  Democratic   candidate   for  Pennsylvania’s   governor   in  1863.  But   in  
May   1862,   when   Pennsylvania’s   high   court   decided   Chase v. Miller, there was still 
bipartisan uncertainty over the political effect of soldier-voting laws, and partisanship 
around the issue had not yet coalesced.20  Voting  by  soldiers  in  several  of  Pennsylvania’s  
1861   elections,   as   permitted   by   the   state’s   prewar   soldier-voting law, sparked several 
election contests.21 Losing candidates in races for the state House of Representatives, 
municipal offices in Philadelphia, and at least one county position, challenged the soldier 
vote. Some challengers were Republicans and others Democrats. As historian Jonathan 
H. White documents in his study of party competition for the soldier vote in 
Pennsylvania, both parties at this early stage of the war viewed the matter the same way. 
They favored soldier voting when it helped their candidates win and opposed it when it 
contributed   to   their   candidates’   defeat.   Similarly,   the   partisan  press   viewed   the   subject  
ambivalently, with newspapers of both political stripes coming down for and against 
soldier voting.22  
                                                 
20.  Williams,  “Voters   in  Blue:  The  Citizen  Soldiers  of   the  Civil  War,”  187,  189-90; Jonathan White, 
“Citizens   and  Soldiers,”   47.     Both  Williams   and  White   point   to  Republican electoral losses in the 1862 
elections as catalyzing partisanship on the soldier-voting issue, while Williams also gives weight to the 
shifting suspicions of the parties about the dangers to their candidates from abuse of soldier suffrage by 
military commanders.  
21. There is scant evidence that any absent soldiers voted under the 1813 law in the War of 1812 or 
under  its  1839  progeny  in  the  Mexican  War.     A  plausible  explanation  for  the  prewar  law’s  origins  is  that  
the legislature calculated that it would help wartime recruitment. Alexander Keyssar has identified military 
security as a reason for expanding male suffrage beyond property and taxpaying qualifications, on the logic 
that disfranchised men might be reluctant to serve in state militias on the same terms as enfranchised men. 
This law might have grown out of a similar calculation. (Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 15.) No published 
court decisions address the laws before the Civil War. When the soldier-voting issue became politicized 
following   Woodward’s decision in Chase, some Republican attacks on Woodward asserted that 
Pennsylvania soldiers did in fact vote under the 1839 law during the Mexican War.  For example, New 
Hampshire Republican William Chandler said so in his 1864 pamphlet, The  Soldiers’  Right to Vote. Who 
Opposes It? Who Favors It? (Washington, DC: Lemuel Towers, 1864), 8.  Chandler did not claim that any 
soldiers voted under the 1813 law during the War of 1812.   
22. White, Citizens and Soldiers, 50-51. 
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Neither   the  widespread   judicial   respect   for  Woodward’s  Chase decision nor the 
support  it  garnered  from  Woodward’s  Republican  brethren  on  the  bench  would  spare the 
decision from becoming a centerpiece in the political wars that took shape starting in 
1863. As Republicans (pro) and Democrats (con) staked out their respective positions 
about soldier voting, the Chase decision became synonymous with Democratic 
opposition.   And   after   its   author   won   his   party’s   nomination   for   governor   in   1863,  
Republicans saw to it that he became the face of that opposition.    
The Democratic nominating convention chose Woodward in June 1863 as Robert 
E. Lee mounted a northward offensive that would culminate in the Battle of Gettysburg 
in   early   July.   Lee’s   campaign   and   its   denouement   on   Cemetery   Ridge   shaped   the  
Woodward-Curtin political campaign profoundly.23 With the benefit of hindsight, the 
contemporary political operative Alexander McClure believed that the best candidate for 
the Democrats would have been General William Franklin, a career soldier with a solid 
record of service in the first two years of the war. Choosing Franklin would have avoided 
“the  crushing  millstone  of  actual or apparent disloyalty that always more or less hindered 
Democratic   success,”  McClure   speculated   in   his   1905  memoirs.   But   peace  Democrats  
dominated the convention, and Woodward was a comfortable choice for them. He was a 
familiar and respected stalwart of the party, well liked by the delegates and best qualified, 
they   believed,   to   help   Pennsylvania   address   “the   gravest   constitutional   and   legal  
questions  that  would  be  presented”  at  the  close  of  the  war.24  
                                                 
23. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2: 53. 
24. Id. at 54. 
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For   Republicans,   the   absence   of   Pennsylvania’s   75,000 soldiers presented the 
biggest challenge in the 1863 election season. The party believed most of them to be 
reliable  Curtin  votes,  but  now,  thanks  to  the  high  court’s  decision  in  Chase v. Miller, they 
could vote only by returning home on furlough. Many would do so, but in a state where 
Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 75,000, the absence from the polls of tens of 
thousands of likely Republican votes loomed as a potentially insurmountable obstacle. 
The solution, devised by the Republican State Committee,   was   Curtin’s   “Soldiers’  
Friend”   strategy.   The   idea  was   to   harness   the   political   power   of   the   absent   soldiers   as  
advocates for Curtin in letters to their families and friends back home.   
Republicans laid the groundwork for the Soldier Friend strategy at the nominating 
convention.  The  convention  adopted  a   resolution  saluting  Curtin’s  “vigilant  care  of  our  
soldiers   alike   in   the   field,   in   the   camp,   and   in   the   hospitals”   and   offering   him   to   the  
electorate   as   the   candidate  who   “is   alike   the   friend  of   the   soldier and a favorite of the 
people.” 25  Public   meetings   called   after   the   convention   to   ratify   Curtin’s   nomination  
picked  up   the   theme.  The  newspaper  notice  of  one   such  meeting   invited   “all  who   love  
their  country”  to  attend  an 8 pm gathering at Penn Square for ratifying the nomination of 
“Andrew  G.  Curtin,  The  Soldiers’  Friend.”26  
The Republican State Committee then organized the machinery for converting the 
“soldiers’   friend”   brand   into   actual   votes.   Because   the   target   voters   were   civilian  
Democrats, the Republican organization identified Democratic families with soldiers in 
the field and then organized pro-Curtin letter-writing campaigns by those soldiers.  It 
                                                 
25. North American and United States Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), August 6, 1863. 
26. Id., August 21, 1863. 
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worked.  “The  army  is  known  to  be  devoted  to  Curtin,”  wrote  one  Republican  newspaper  
as the strategy unfolded,   “and   its   home   influence   can   hardly   be   overstated.”   
A  flood  of  letters  from  absent  soldiers  praising  Curtin  as  “the  soldiers’  friend”  persuaded  
enough Democrats back home to give Curtin a 15,000 majority. Alexander McClure, who 
worked   in   Curtin’s campaign,   later   estimated   that   three   quarters   of   the   state’s   absent  
soldiers participated in this letter-writing campaign. Looking back on the campaign as a 
memoirist in the early twentieth century, McClure marveled at the efficient 
implementation of this strategy.  It  “was  systematically  undertaken  and  carried  out  with  a  
degree  of  perfection  that  has  never  been  surpassed  in  political  management,”  he  recalled  
effusively.27  
 Even allowing for the likelihood that McClure overestimated the level of 
participation  by  soldiers,  evidence  of  the  troops’  widespread  embrace  of  the  branding  of  
Curtin   as   soldiers’   friend   certainly   abounds,   as   does   evidence   that   the   project   was   a  
decidedly top-down affair, with soldiers responding to and embracing political themes 
crafted for their consumption by political operatives back home. 28  One Republican 
newspaper, for example, published a pro-Curtin letter purportedly speaking for 364 
Pennsylvania soldiers, each identified by name.  The soldiers were all convalescing in an 
unidentified   hospital,   according   to   the   letter,   and   each   one   of   them  had   told   the   “ward  
master”   in   person   that   he   favored   Curtin.      The   letter   explicitly   addressed   itself   to   the  
                                                 
27. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2: 56-58; Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 10, 1863. 
28. There is ample scholarship supporting the proposition that soldiers, in a bottom-up process, often 
inspired political themes, particularly radical themes, and successfully advocated them to party leaders back 
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newspaper’s  civilian  readership.  “Reader,”  it  asked,  “have  you  a  son,  brother,  or  friend in 
the army? If so, that one can tell you how it would grieve him if you cast your vote 
against   Gov.   Curtin.”   It   praised   commander-in-chief   Curtin   as   a   “protector   of  
Pennsylvania”  against  southern  invaders  and  as  “a  friend  of  its  defenders.  We  know  him  
to  be  a  friend  of  the  soldier,”  a  man  who  “feels  for  us,”  the  letter  assured  readers.29 
The same letter assailed Woodward as a pro-Confederacy traitor. Not only had he, 
like   other   peace   Democrats,   embraced   as   a   motto   that   “slavery   must   live,   though   the  
Union should  perish,”  but  he  had  also   “decided  against  giving  us,  who  are   fighting   for  
your  liberties,  a  right  to  vote.”  Woodward’s  purpose  in  doing  so,  the  letter  accused,  was  
“to  aid  the  rebels  in  achieving  their  hellish  ends.”  The  letter  concluded  with  an  emotional 
and pointed appeal: 
We ask you in the names of our comrades who have fallen victims to this infernal 
rebellion; we ask it in the names of such us [sic] are still suffering in the hospitals; 
we ask it in the names of those who are wasting their lives in rebel prisons; we 
ask it in the name of liberty, the Constitution, and the Union, to go to the polls and 
vote for A.G. Curtin, the man who never failed us. We leave the matter with you, 
reminding you that on your shoulders rest the responsibilities for which posterity 
will hold you responsible.30  
 
In another letter purporting to speak for entire units of soldiers, the commander of 
the 13th Pennsylvania cavalry forwarded pro-Curtin   “resolutions”   his   troopers   adopted.    
One expressed gratitude to Curtin for  his  “constant  and  successful  exertions”  on  behalf  of  
soldiers,  proving  Curtin  to  be  “the  Soldiers’  Friend.”  Another,  taking  aim  at  Woodward,  
lamented  that  soldiers  had  been  “deprived  of  some  rights  of  citizens  by  a  decision  of  the  
                                                 
29. North American and United States Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), September 16, 1863.  
30. Id. 
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Supreme Court, in which the candidate opposing Governor Curtin has rendered himself 
conspicuous.”31  
A soldier speaking only for himself wrote from a Philadelphia hospital to assure 
readers  of  a  Republican  paper  that  Curtin  was  “emphatically  the  friend  of  the  soldier….  
We all want  to  vote  for  him,  if  the  copperheads  will  grant  us  the  glorious  privilege.”    In  
contrast   to   the   soldiers’   friend   Curtin,   he   added,   Woodward   was   “the   copperhead  
candidate   [who]   robbed   the   boys   of   their   right   to   vote.”32 A Republican newspaper in 
Wellsboro collected pro-Curtin testimonials from individual soldiers. One, a member of 
the 6th Pennsylvania  Reserves,  wrote,  “If  the  soldiers  could  vote,  I  know  Curtin  would  be  
elected.   If   you   wish   to   do   your   country   good,   vote   for   Curtin,   the   soldiers’   friend.”33 
Another  wrote   beseechingly,   “Are   you,   citizens   of   Penna,   going   to   allow   the   soldiers’  
friend to be defeated? If he be defeated, the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac will lose 
their  dearest  friend  on  earth.”34 Referring  to  these  servicemen  as  “the  brave  Tioga Soldier 
Boys,”  the  paper  challenged  peace  Democrats  to  listen  to  their  message.  “Do  you  hear  it,  
ye  Coppers?  Is  this  thunder?”35  
A different soldier made the same point in a letter to another Republican 
newspaper. Captain Harry Forster wrote to the Central Press (Bellefonte, PA) describing 
himself as a Democrat. Forster claimed that his admiration for Woodward had given way 
to  the  conviction  that  Woodward  held  “extreme  Southern  views”  and  “would  give  aid  and  
comfort   to   traitors.”   In   contrast,   said   Forster,   Curtin   “is   the   soldier’s   friend”   and   will  
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“give  the  National  government  all  proper  aid  and  assistance.”36 Moving up the chain of 
command, General George Meade added his voice to the pro-Curtin branding effort. 
Meade, a Pennsylvanian himself, had become a hero in his home state as commander of 
the triumphant Union troops at Gettysburg. When a unit of the Pennsylvania Reserves 
presented  him  with  a  sword,  he  responded  with  a  speech  endorsing  Curtin  as  “the  friend  
of the soldier and the friend of the Government.”37 
The theme found its way into partisan song. A pro-Curtin newspaper in 
Harrisburg  published  a  song  implicitly  indicting  Woodward  for  opposing  soldiers’  voting  
rights  while  praising  Curtin  as  the  soldiers’  friend.  Entitled  simply,  “Campaign  Song  for  
Curtin,”  it  followed  the  tune  of  “Battle  Cry  of  Freedom”: 
He’s  the  champion  of  our  rights,  boys,’   
The  soldiers’  faithful  friend, 
Standing firm for Liberty and Union. 
He’s  been  faithful  in  the  past,  boys,   
We’ll  trust  him  to  the  end. 
Standing firm for Liberty and Union.38 
 
Straw polls purporting to show the pro-Curtin preferences of absent soldiers 
fortified the message that Curtin was the friend of soldiers. One, reported by the pro-
Republican Chicago Tribune, showed Curtin beating Woodward 93-15 among Union 
soldiers held captive at Libby Prison in Virginia.39 Another, from a Republican paper in 
Harrisburg, described the apparently viva voce polling of two Pennsylvania units at Camp 
                                                 
36. Central Press (Belafonte, PA), September 18, 1863. 
37. The Press (Philadelphia, PA), October 3, 1863. 
38. Evening Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October 2, 1863. 
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Tyler in Baltimore. Both units purportedly favored Curtin overwhelmingly, one by 357 to 
1, and the other by 323 to 10.40  
The   soldiers’   friend   label   served   as   the   backdrop   for   Republicans’   contrasting  
characterizations of Woodward as anti-soldier and disloyal. Among the 1863 attack 
themes that presaged attacks Republicans would mount against McClellan in 1864 was 
the proposition of a symbiotic alliance between Confederate armies and northern peace 
Democrats like Woodward. The southern rebels, in common with northern peace 
Democrats, hoped for the defeat of Republican politicians bent on subduing the 
Confederacy. The alignment of their interests, according to the Republican argument, 
proved the disloyalty of peace men like Woodward. Woodward, argued a Republican 
paper  in  Huntingdon,  is  “the  candidate  the  rebels  wanted  elected.”41 Reciprocally, another 
Republican  paper  claimed,  peace  Democrats  “rejoice  at   the  success  of   the  rebels.  Loyal  
Democrats   remember,”   the   paper   exhorted,   “Woodward   is   one   of   them.   Remember   he  
disfranchised   the   soldiers.” 42  In a pro-Curtin speech in Philadelphia, retired Union 
general   Richard   Busteed   told   his   audience,   “News   of  Woodward’s   election   would   be  
hailed   in   the   rebel   capital   (sic).”   Curtin,   in   contrast,   is   “the   soldier’s   friend,”   Busteed  
added.43 
In what may be the most vituperative of all expressions of hostility for pro-
Woodward voters back home, a member of the 42nd Pennsylvania volunteers lashed out at 
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peace  Democrats  in  his  hometown  of  Nelson.  “I  cannot  help  sending  my  compliments  to  
the  copperheads  of  Nelson,”  wrote  the  soldier,  A.  Miles,  “by  hoping  that   the grass may 
refuse  to  grow  upon  their  graves  after  they  are  dead….  Their  backbones  ought  to  be  used  
to whip sheep-killing  dogs  about  the  streets.”44  
Such was the commonality of interests between peace Democrats and southern 
rebels, claimed Republicans extravagantly, that the Curtin-Woodward contest took on an 
importance as great as the recent military clash at Gettysburg. Pennsylvania Democrats, 
observed a Republican newspaper in Connecticut,  
…   are   fighting   Jeff   Davis’s   battles   on   the   hustings   and   at   the   polls, and their 
selection of [Woodward] as their candidate for governor was an act scarcely less 
significant of their spirit than would have been the display of the Confederate flag 
over the convention hall. Mr. Woodward is a disunionist, pure and simple. His 
secessionist opinions have been as openly and positively expressed as those of 
Jeff.   Davis   himself….      [Beating   Woodward]   will   be   a   union   victory   scarcely  
inferior in importance to that achieved at Gettysburg.45 
  
Prominent Union general Benjamin Butler made a similar argument to an 
audience in Harrisburg. Citing Richmond newspapers, Butler claimed that the 
Confederacy was hatching a plot to invade Pennsylvania again, not to gather supplies for 
Lee’s   army,   but   “to   give   aid   and   encouragement   to   the   Democratic Party in 
Pennsylvania….  You  want  the  soil  of  Pennsylvania  to  be  free  from  the  invader,”  Butler  
proposed,   then   “vote   for   Curtin.”   A   Republican   state   senator,   T.J.   Bigham,   made   the  
same point at a political rally in Pittsburg. Lee would invade Pennsylvania again in the 
fall, Bigham predicted, for the purpose of helping elect George Woodward.46  According 
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to a Harrisburg newspaper, Democrats feared that Union military success would hurt 
their candidates at the polls by liberating pro-Curtin soldiers to come home in time for the 
election.  “The  Copperheads  are  opposed  to  enlisting  or  reinforcing  the  army,”  the  paper  
claimed,  “for  fear  the  war  will  be  brought  to  a  close  and  the  soldiers  come  home  to  vote.”  
It was because Woodward knew that soldiers opposed him, the paper claimed, that he 
struck down the soldier-voting   law.   “The   soldiers   in   the   field   support   the  Government,  
and  for  this  they  were  disfranchised  by  the  action  of  a  Democratic  Supreme  Court.”47  
Democrats fought back. A Democratic newspaper in Erie attributed   Curtin’s  
“soldiers’  friend”  image  not  to  the  heartfelt  sentiments  of  soldiers  but  to  the  conniving  of  
Republican   politicians.   It   claimed,   “prominent   politicians   are   constantly   visiting   the  
army, and by speeches and the circulation of lying documents, attempting to convince 
them that Gov. Curtin has been their special friend, while Judge Woodward is their bitter 
enemy.”  Democrats  operated  at  a  big  disadvantage  in  securing  the  support  of  soldiers,  the  
paper  complained,  since  “Democratic  papers  are  not permitted to be sold in most of the 
camps,  while  Republican   journals   are   flooded   into   the   army   by  wholesale.”  The   paper  
encouraged   its   readers   to   reach   out   to   absent   soldiers   by   sending   them   “sound,  
conservative  newspapers.”48  
Notwithstanding the difficulties Democrats purported to face in communicating 
with  absent  soldiers,  the  party  managed  to  enlist  the  voice  of  soldiers  to  undercut  Curtin’s  
claim  to  be  the  soldiers’  friend  and  to  make  the  case  for  Woodward’s  popularity  among  
the troops. Sergeant U.R. Burkert of the 6th Pennsylvania reserves wrote a letter to a 
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Democratic   paper   in   his   hometown  mocking   Curtin’s   claim   to   be   the   soldiers’   friend.    
Woodward had at least as many friends as Curtin in his unit, claimed Burkert, and they 
would vote for Woodward if they could.49  
A Democratic paper in Erie published a letter from a Democratic soldier to his 
mother  similarly  claiming,  “All  our  boys  would  vote  for  Woodward   if   they  could  get  a  
chance.”  The  letter,  signed  only  “Your  dutiful  son,”  provides  vivid  evidence of the top-
down  nature  of  the  Republican  project  to  secure  soldiers’  support  for  Curtin’s  candidacy.   
The  other  day  an  Abolition   tract  man  brought  Curtin’s  pictures   to   the  camp  and  
gave   copies   out   for   nothing.  Most   of   the  men  wouldn’t   have   them   even   at   that 
price, but some of us took them just for fun. Somebody stuck one up on a tree, 
and  wrote  “The  Soldiers’  Friend”  over   it.  …  The  boys   then  amused   themselves  
throwing  quids  of  tobacco  at  the  picture,  and,  before  we  were  done,  Andy’s  face  
was changed into the more popular color of his favorite niggers.50 
 
A soldier from the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves wrote from his camp in Culpepper, 
Virginia, disputing   Curtin’s   claim   to   lopsided   support   in   the   army.   Signing   his   letter  
“Musket,”  he  claimed  that  straw  polls  purporting  to  show  that  Curtin  was  “the  soldiers’  
friend”  were  false.51  Another serviceman, who signed his letter to the same Democratic 
paper  in  Harrisburg  “A  Private  in   the  Army  of  the  Potomac,”  made  the  same  point.      In  
another indication of the top-down nature  of   the   effort   to  brand  Curtin   as   the   soldiers’  
friend,  he  wrote,  “’the  powers  that  be’  are  making  a  political  machine  of  the  Army  of  the  
Potomac   for   the   advancement   of   Andy   Curtin”   by   orchestrating   meaningless   votes   of  
soldiers in the camps to give the appearance of support for Curtin among soldiers. 
Soldiers   like   himself   who   preferred  Woodward   were   told   they   “can   never   expect   any  
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favor   from   those   who   wear   shoulder   straps   [i.e.,   officers]….   Let   a   man   vote   for  
Woodward and he is given to understand that his life in the army will be anything but 
pleasant.  O  ain’t  this  a  manly  game?”52  
A  particularly  bitter  Democratic  soldier  identifying  himself  only  as  “W.C.”  wrote  
of mistreatment he had suffered for expressing anti-Curtin sentiments. While his pro-
Curtin comrades received furloughs to return home to vote, he drew a grubby assignment 
in a military prison in Baltimore formerly used to incarcerate slave criminals. Now, he 
reported indignantly, most of its staff was Negro soldiers, some of whom he and other 
white  servicemen  were  under  orders  to  salute.    He  wrote  derisively  of  Curtin’s  claim  to  
be   the   soldiers’   friend:   “Yes,  my  Democratic   friends,  we   are   all   here   together,   niggers  
and whites, deserters and conscripts, criminals and convalescents, all used alike. All alike 
are  the  subjects  of  Abe  and  Andy,  the  ‘soldiers’  friend.’”53 
One line of defense that Democrats tried to construct for Woodward was that his 
decision in Chase was actually pro-soldier.  By striking down the soldier-voting law, 
some Democrats claimed, Woodward vindicated the very constitution that Pennsylvania 
soldiers  were  fighting  to  preserve.  “Abolitionists  [complaining  about  the  decision]  would  
violate   the   constitution   the   soldier   is   fighting   to   defend,”   wrote   the   editors   of   a  
Democratic newspaper in Harrisburg.54  Another Democratic paper reminded readers that 
Woodward’s   Republican   colleagues   on   the   high   court,   Justices   Reed   and   Strong,   had  
agreed with his decision in Chase. Moreover, the same paper pointed out that in the case 
                                                 
52. Id. 
53. Democratic Banner (Clearfield, PA), October 12, 1863. 
54. The Patriot and Union (Harrisburg, PA), August 17, 1863. 
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of Ewing v. Thompson, it was a Republican judge on the court of common pleas who 
ruled that the prewar soldier-voting law was unconstitutional. That decision had the effect 
of excluding soldier votes from an election for sheriff of Philadelphia.  The Democratic 
candidate would have won if the soldier vote had counted.  By excluding those votes, the 
Republican judge effectively handed the election to the Republican candidate, the paper 
correctly pointed out. Viewed in that light, Democrats argued, Woodward was no guiltier 
of enmity to soldiers for his ruling in Chase than were the several Republican judges who 
reached   the   same   conclusion.   “If   you  want   to   elect   the   real   ‘soldiers’   friend,’   vote   for  
Woodward,”  urged  the  paper. 55 
Democratic newspapers also complained that Republicans’  branding  of  Curtin  as  
the   soldiers’   friend   masked   the   Lincoln   administration’s   widespread   abuse   of   the  
furlough  process.  A   soldier   identified   only   as   “Member   of   the  Third  Regiment”   of   the  
Pennsylvania Reserves wrote to a Democratic paper in Gettysburg claiming that 
Republican  officers  convened  a  “secret  meeting”  to  learn  the  politics  of  the  regiment  and  
then granted furloughs only to the pro-Curtin   men.   “In   this   way   are   the   Democratic  
soldiers cheated out of those rights to which every American citizen   is   entitled,”   he  
protested.56 Knowing that officers granted furloughs selectively to soldiers thought to be 
safely pro-Curtin, soldiers of course expressed themselves as pro-Curtin in straw polls 
conducted by the same officers, claimed Democrats.57  Lopsided pro-Curtin straw polls 
among   soldiers,  which  Republican   papers   hailed   as   proof   that  Curtin  was   the   soldiers’  
                                                 
55. Democratic Watchman (Bellefonte, PA), September 18, 1863.  The paper correctly summarized the 
case of Ewing v. Thompson, 43 Pa. 372 (1862). 
56. Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), November 2, 1863. 
57. The Patriot and Union (Harrisburg, PA), October 6, 1863; Democratic Banner (Clearfield, PA), 
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friend, to Democrats confirmed that corrupt officers dangled the promise of furloughs 
only to soldiers willing to commit publicly for Curtin. 
Claims and counterclaims in the 1863 contest between Curtin and Woodward 
about  who  was  or  wasn’t  the  soldiers’  friend,  about  the  purported  treason  of  Democrats,  
and about the relevance of support for soldier-voting laws to those issues, all found 
Woodward and his supporters playing defense, just as those same issues would put 
George McClellan and his supporters on defense the following year. But, again presaging 
1864, Pennsylvania Democrats in 1863 forced Republicans to play defense by asserting 
that the incumbent was an incompetent commander-in-chief and that he neglected the 
troops under his command, especially white troops. In their claims and counterclaims on 
these issues, too, both parties relied on soldiers as their most credible spokesmen, just as 
they would again in 1864.  
By Election Day in October 1863, Pennsylvanians, like the rest of the Union, 
regarded the repulse of Lee at Gettysburg much the way modern Americans regard it – as 
a   great   triumph.   Curtin,   Pennsylvania’s   constitutional   commander-in-chief, reaped 
corresponding political rewards, much as Lincoln would benefit politically from 
Sherman’s  capture  of  Atlanta  in  1864.  Looking  back  more  than  forty  years  later,  Curtin’s  
close political advisor Alexander McClure saw the Union’s   Gettysburg   victory as 
politically  decisive  in  1863.  “The  issue  of  the  memorable  gubernatorial  contest  of  1863,”  
McClure  wrote  in  his  1905  memoirs,  “was  irrevocably  decided  by  the  repulse  of  Pickett’s  
charge  and  the  retreat  of  Lee’s  army  from  the  battlefield  of  Gettysburg.”  McClure  added  
that   while   this   became   clear   in   hindsight,   it   “was   not   fully   understood   at   the   time,   or  
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indeed at any period during the [Curtin-Woodward]   contest.” 58  For contemporaries, 
especially   in   Pennsylvania,   the   panic   and   ignominy   occasioned   by   Lee’s invasion 
considerably offset the glory in repulsing the invasion. As far as Democrats were 
concerned, Curtin deserved as much blame for the former as credit for the latter. They 
trained   their   sights   on   Curtin’s   perceived   vulnerability   for   having   allowed   Lee to 
encroach so deeply and destructively into their state. 
As Lee pressed his offensive push into the north, the Union’s   Army   of   the  
Potomac frantically pursued him from the south. North of Lee, there was no organized 
force in Pennsylvania prepared to meet   the   oncoming   confederates.  As   Pennsylvania’s  
commander-in-chief, that became a major concern for Governor Curtin. In May and June, 
Curtin and his representatives met with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to develop a 
plan to mobilize a force of Pennsylvanians to resist Lee. They worked through issues that 
might hamper the recruitment effort: assuring men they would be paid, guaranteeing a 
limited term of service, and assuring the recruits that their service would be limited to the 
soil of Pennsylvania. The forces they finally assembled provided a limited but valuable 
service. They lacked the strength to impede Lee, but they gathered information about his 
movements, which helped the Army of the Potomac plot its ultimately successful 
moves.59   
In other words, Curtin and the makeshift troops he helped assemble operated at 
the margin of the real military action. By constitutional title, he was commander-in-chief 
                                                 
58. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2:52. 
59. Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s  Sons,  1979),  134-140.  Among the subjects discussed during these deliberations was the choice 
of a commander for the new military organization. Coddington asserts that one name,  suggested  by  Curtin’s  
close confidant and advisor Alexander McClure, was George McClellan.  Stanton rejected the idea. Id.  
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of the forces of Pennsylvania, but he had no operational control over any of the Union 
forces that engaged Lee in the battle of Gettysburg.  His role at the fringe of the military 
action, however, did not deter political polemicists on both sides from treating him as a 
central  player.  Republicans  painted  him  as  an  architect  of  the  union’s  victory.  Democrats 
treated him as the goat – the failed commander-in-chief who let Lee invade and wreak 
havoc in Pennsylvania. Lincoln would face similar treatment the following year, when 
Democrats tarred him as a bungling commander-in-chief. 
Lee could not have gotten as far as Gettysburg had it not been for the 
“inefficiency  of  Gov.  Curtin,”  claimed  at   least   two  Democratic  newspapers.60   Another 
asserted  that  the  invasion,  and  the  resultant  “robbery”  of  Pennsylvania’s  farmers  by  Lee’s  
foragers,  happened  “because  Governor Curtin had not the manliness and the ability to do 
his  sworn  duty.”61  James F. Shunk, a lowly private in the Pennsylvania home guard but a 
prominent attorney admitted to practice at the US Supreme Court, lashed out at Curtin in 
a speech before a mass rally for Woodward in Philadelphia a month before the election. 
He   faulted  Curtin   for   letting   rebel   armies   enter   the   state,   and  he   characterized  Curtin’s  
collaboration with Stanton as the dithering of a feeble leader. Shunk praised the direct 
response of Democratic governors in New York and New Jersey, who quickly sent troops 
to   help   defend   Pennsylvania.  Curtin,   in   contrast,  went   “begging   and   pleading  with   the  
powers  at  Washington  for  leave  to  call  out  his  own  militia,”  and  as  Pennsylvania’s  peril  
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61. Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), September 21, 1863. 
163  
 
grew, Curtin “was   trembling  on  his  marrow  bones  before   the   throne  at  Washington.”62 
One Democratic paper claimed that the very act of running for office showed that Curtin 
shirked  his  military  duties.  When  he  stumped,  the  paper  claimed,  Curtin  “abandoned  his  
duties at Harrisburg  …  when  a  hand  is  needed  at  the  helm.”63 
A  facet  of  Curtin’s  inadequacy  as  a  commander-in-chief, and belying his claim to 
be  “the  soldiers’  friend,”  according  to  Democrats,  was  his  neglect  of  Pennsylvania  troops.  
These attacks, too, presaged claims that Democrats would make against Lincoln the 
following year. One Democratic paper quoted a Pennsylvania soldier complaining in a 
letter   home   that   he   hadn’t   “walked   right   since   I   got   the   rheumatism   under   one   of   his  
[Curtin’s]  rotten  blankets.”  The  same  soldier told of a friend who complained mockingly 
“of  shoes  with  paste-board soles which he had got from [Curtin,] ‘the  soldiers’  friend.’”64 
A soldier in the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves complained in a letter to a Democratic paper 
that men in his camp lacked clothing and shoes and that their pay was in arrears, all 
thanks  to  the  governor  posing  as  the  soldiers’  friend.65  
Another pro-Woodward paper claimed that it was Democrats, not Republicans, 
who   championed   “opposition   to   contractor   frauds   and   to   supplying   soldiers with 
unwholesome   food   and   shoddy   clothing.” 66  In contrast, another paper said, Curtin 
received kickbacks from suppliers of shoddy uniforms, worthless shoes, and defective 
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blankets.67 In sum, Democrats claimed, Curtin, far from being the true soldiers’   friend,  
was  simply  “the  shoddy  candidate  for  Governor.”68 
Republicans, of course, trotted out the voice of soldiers to dispute these attacks. A 
soldier in the 6th Pennsylvania Reserves called accusations about shoddy equipment a lie. 
“The  clothes  we  got  from  the  State,”  he  claimed,  “were  fifty  percent  better  than  any  we  
received   from   the   United   States.”   For   that   reason,   he   added,   and   because   Curtin   was  
indeed   the   soldiers’   friend,   almost   all   his   comrades   supported   Curtin.   To   be   sure,   he  
conceded, some favored  Woodward,  “but   there   are  mighty   few  of   them,  and   [they]  are  
even  despised  by  their  boon  companions.”69 
In   the  Democrats’   rogue   gallery   of  Curtin   supporters,   shoddy   contractors   stood  
side  by  side  with  detested  abolitionists.  Democrats’  attacks  on  Curtin  routinely associated 
him  with  both.     His  support  of  Lincoln’s  “Negro  war,”  as   they  characterized   it,  was  an  
implicit  affront  to  white  soldiers  and  an  additional  facet  of  Curtin’s  mistreatment  of  white  
troops.  Lincoln  in  1864  would  face  the  same  Democrats’  attacks for purported hostility to 
white troops rooted in the emancipatory direction of the Union war effort starting in 
1863.  
A democratic paper in Erie claimed that Curtin and his Republican allies were 
making the war into a fight for abolition, thereby elevating   “the   colored   man   to   an  
equality   in   the   ranks   and   at   the   ballot   box   with   the   white   man….”70 The same paper 
printed  a  letter  from  a  soldier  to  his  mother,  in  which  the  son  ridiculed  Curtin’s  claim  to  
                                                 
67. Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), November 2, 1863. 
68. Democratic Watchman (Bellefonte, PA), September 18, 1863.   
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be  the  soldiers’  friend,  then  added,  “We  are  sick and tired  of  hearing  about  ‘the  nigger,’  
and we want to see the abolitionists put down to his level instead of having him put up to 
ours.”71  
A Democratic paper in Lancaster accused Lincoln and Curtin of being anti-soldier 
because they subjected white soldiers to hazards on behalf of blacks. The paper 
categorized the voters who the editors claimed favored each candidate. Pro-Curtin 
categories  included  “Everyone  who  thinks  that  the  nation  can  only  be  saved  by  the  help  
of  negro  soldiers”  and  “Everyone  who  believes  the  negro  race  is  superior  to  the  white.”  
The pro-Woodward  group,  in  contrast,  included  “Everyone  who  believes  this  government  
was  made  by  white  men   for  white  men,”   and  “Everyone  who  condemns   the  negro  war  
policy   of   the   President   and   his   advisors.”72 By   his   support   of   Lincoln’s   war   policies,  
including enlisting African-American soldiers into the Union army, another paper 
claimed,  Curtin  had  proved  that  his  goals  were  “negro  suffrage  and  negro  equality.”73 
 
The attack themes that Republican and Democrats deployed against each other in 
the 1863 gubernatorial race between Andrew Curtin and George Woodward 
foreshadowed attacks that partisans would hurl at the presidential candidates in the 1864 
race. The parallel was imperfect, since Pennsylvania Democrats in 1863 nominated a 
member  of   the  party’s  peace  wing  with   a   civilian   resume,  while   the  next   year  national  
Democrats ran with a pro-war candidate with a military resume. Part of the Republican 
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attack   strategy   in   1864  was   to   tear   down  McClellan’s   stature   as   a soldier by accusing 
him, for example, of physical cowardice. Woodward, never offered to the electorate as a 
soldier,  avoided  that  line  of  attacks.  But  in  both  cases,  Democrats’  division  over  the  war  
opened  the  party’s  candidate  to  accusations  of  disloyalty,  either  because  (in  Woodward’s  
case) he was himself a peace Democrat or because  (in  McClellan’s  case) he allied himself 
with peace Democrats. 
The other attacks that Lincoln and McClellan would face in 1864 were also 
familiar to Curtin and Woodward in 1863: that the challenger was a traitor, that the 
incumbent was an incompetent war leader, and that the incumbent neglected and 
dishonored his white troops. For all these themes, soldiers spoke with special authority, 
so both parties enlisted soldiers as messengers of the themes. In both races, for both 
parties, the political voice of soldiers was ubiquitous. Underlying the effort to 
demonstrate   affinity   with   soldiers   was   the   parties’   struggle   to   achieve   status   as   “the  
soldiers’  friend.”  Republicans  won  that  struggle both years, in no small measure because 
they succeeded in painting Democrats as anti-soldier by virtue their real (in 1864) or 
purported (in 1863) opposition to soldier-voting laws. 
 
Woodward’s  Judicial  Activism  in  Chase 
We close this chapter with a look back at the Chase opinion and an intriguing 
aspect of it suggesting that Woodward went out of his way to strike down the prewar 
soldier-voting law and may even have flirted with impropriety in the process. Research 
has uncovered no scholarship examining this aspect of the Chase decision for the light it 
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might   shed   on  Woodward’s   role   in   the   case.   Indeed,   that   light   may   be   quite   dim,   as  
evidence remains murky and ambiguous. Still, such evidence as does exist points to the 
irony that Woodward could have reached a sound result and avoided the political penalty 
he eventually (and perhaps unfairly) paid for his decision in Chase had he approached the 
case with his characteristic conservatism. He did not.  
We have seen that Ezra Chase prevailed in the case because of the exclusion of 
the soldier votes cast for Jerome Miller, an exclusion that the high court ratified when it 
found that the prewar soldier-voting law was unconstitutional. But it is evident from a 
close   reading   of   Woodward’s   decision,   and   particularly   its   discussion   of   the   case’s  
procedural   history,   that   the   court   could   have   preserved   Ezra   Chase’s   election   victory  
without reaching the constitutional issue.  Most judges, and certainly most judges as 
conservative as Woodward, generally prefer to avoid making unnecessary findings and to 
decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds. It is worth pondering why Woodward 
and the rest of the court majority chose not to do so in Chase. 
The   court’s   opportunity   to   escape   the   broad   constitutional   issues   arose from a 
defect   in   Jerome   Miller’s   original   petition   for   review   of   the   election   results.   As  
Woodward  explains  in  his  description  of  the  case’s  history,  Miller’s  petition  challenging  
Chase’s   win   lacked   essential   statements   of   facts.   Specifically,   it   did   not provide the 
names of the soldiers whose pro-Miller votes the election judges excluded, or the places 
where the soldiers cast their ballots.  Nor did the petition show that the soldiers who 
voted were constitutionally qualified electors, or that they cast their ballots the statutorily 
requisite distance from their usual voting place (not less than ten miles under the 1839 
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law).  Absent  those  facts,  Miller’s  petition  provided  no  foundation  for  a  court  to  find  that  
the election judges rejected any votes that the 1839 law would have permitted, assuming 
it was constitutional.74    
The  inadequacy  of  Miller’s  petition  would  have  ended  the  case  in  Chase’s  favor  at  
the lower court level, except that a remarkable thing happened. While the case was 
pending at the inferior   court,   the   two   parties   solved   Miller’s   evidentiary   problem   by  
entering into a written agreement – in  legal  parlance  a  “stipulation”  – about the excluded 
votes. It essentially said that if the excluded votes were included in the vote count, Miller 
would win the election, and that Chase would be the proper winner only if the votes 
remained excluded. The lower court concluded that this stipulation was tantamount to 
filling   in   the   pieces   missing   from   Miller’s   petition.   The   stipulation   did   so   not   by  
providing any of the missing details – the names of the soldiers, the place where they 
voted, their eligibility to vote, etc. – but by presupposing that all the excluded votes 
indeed met the requirements of the 1839 law.75   The lower court concluded that if the 
two parties had no disagreement about the factual details of the excluded votes, then there 
was nothing on that subject for the court to decide; courts exist to referee disagreements, 
and the stipulation reduced the disagreement between Miller and Chase to the question of 
the  law’s  constitutionality. 
In  addressing   the   lower  court’s  acceptance  of   the  stipulation,  Woodward  at   first  
seemed inclined to disagree. He found fault with the substance of the stipulation for its 
lack of detail about the who and where of the soldier votes; on all the discrete elements of 
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eligibility  to  vote  under  the  1839  law,  Woodward  noted,  “the  agreement  is  dumb.”76  “If  
we  limit  ourselves  strictly  to  the  agreement,”  Woodward  wrote,  “we  should  be  obliged  to  
say it was wholly insufficient to  support  the  [lower  court’s]  decree….”77  
Woodward   might   have   stopped   there,   found   Miller’s   challenge   defective,   and  
reversed the lower court on this procedural basis without venturing into the constitutional 
questions. But Woodward passed up that easy chance by giving the stipulation an assist. 
“[T]o  help  out   the   record,”  Woodward  wrote   after  observing  all   the  deficiencies  of   the  
stipulation,   “we   choose   to   read   the   agreement   in   connection  with   [Miller’s]   petition   of  
complaint, and we have already seen that  it  [Miller’s  petition]  did  set  forth,  not  as  fully  as  
it ought, but with tolerable precision, the qualified character of the volunteers who cast 
the  votes  in  question.”78  
In other words, while the stipulation left something to be desired, it was good 
enough  when  read  in  conjunction  with  Miller’s  petition  challenging  the  election  results.  
The two documents together, though they left some holes, made it unnecessary for the 
court  to  concern  itself  about  the  “who  and  where”  of  the  excluded  soldier  vote.    On   this 
basis, Woodward proceeded to address the constitutional issues.  
This remarkable approach raises two questions that are unanswerable without 
speculation, but reasonable speculation points to interesting possibilities. The biggest 
question is why a conservative   justice   like  Woodward   would   choose   to   “help   out   the  
record”   in   order   to   reach   an   avoidable   constitutional   issue?   The   answer,   one   may  
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reasonably surmise, is that he wanted to reach the constitutional issue. Perhaps he and his 
colleagues recognized that they could not avoid the constitutional issue indefinitely. It 
would certainly arise in a subsequent case if they failed to address it in Chase, so why not 
get on with it sooner rather than later? They undoubtedly harbored lingering convictions 
about the  1839’s  law’s  invitation  to  fraud,  which  they  had recognized unanimously and 
lamented in the Hulseman and Brinkworth case only six months earlier. One way or 
another, however, they showed eagerness in the Chase case to grapple with a 
constitutional question they might have ducked. 
A second question is why Ezra Chase and his attorneys agreed with Miller and his 
lawyers to enter into the factual stipulation. It is easy to see why Miller agreed. He 
needed the stipulation to fill factual gaps in his challenge. Miller carried the burden of 
overturning the decision of the election judges, and the stipulation would help him meet 
that burden. But why would Chase agree? Why would Chase lift a finger to help Miller 
improve the factual record in his challenge to an election that Chase had won? Again, we 
are left to speculate.    
An unremarked detail in the case points to a possible, though conjectural, solution 
to  the  riddle.  It  hinges  on  the  identity  of  one  of  Ezra  Chase’s  attorneys.  The  report  of  the  
case identifies   two   lawyers  arguing   for  Ezra  Chase.  One  was  “L.  Hakes”  and   the  other  
“Stanly  Woodward.”79 Hakes was undoubtedly Lyman Hakes, a prominent trial attorney 
of  the  era.  He  practiced  mostly  in  Scranton,  a  city  adjacent   to  Luzerne  County.  “Stanly  
Woodward,”  was also a trial lawyer of prominence. He practiced mostly in Wilkes-Barre, 
                                                 
79. Id. at 405. 
171  
 
the   biggest   city   in   Luzerne   County.   Remarkably,   he   was   George   Woodward’s   oldest  
son.80 This means that Justice George Woodward decided the case of Chase v. Miller in 
favor  of  his  son’s client, Ezra Chase. Leaving aside  the  question  of  whether  his  son’s  role 
may   have   affected   Justice  Woodward’s   impartiality   in   the   case,81 the possibility arises 
that Justice Woodward, in ex parte communications with his son or through winks and 
nods that are   commonplace   between   judges   and   lawyers,   signaled   his   and   the   court’s  
desire to address the constitutional issue, which it could do only if the parties entered into 
a stipulation of the sort that Chase and Miller in fact agreed to.  More specifically, if 
Chase’s   attorneys   were   confident   that   the   high   court   would,   if   it   could,   decide   the  
constitutional issue in favor of Chase, then they would have nothing to fear from a 
                                                 
80.   The   spelling   of   Stanly   Woodward’s   first   name   sometimes   appears   as   “Stanly,”   as   it   did   in   the  
Supreme   Court’s   report   of   the   Chase decision and also in a 1875 New York Times obituary following 
George  Woodward’s  death.  (“Obituary:  Chief  Justice  Woodward,”  New York Times, May 11, 1875.) More 
frequently   it   appears   as   “Stanley,”   as   it   did   when   he   spoke   at   a   bar   association   event   honoring   Lyman  
Hakes  after  the  latter’s  death  in  1873  (“Death  of  Lyman  Hakes,”  Scranton Law Times, December 12, 1873) 
and also in his own obituaries [Yale University, Obituary Record of Graduates of Yale University 
Deceased From June, 1900 to June, 1910 (New Haven: The Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, Co., 1910), 563; 
Rev. Horace Edwin Hayden, ed., Proceedings and Collections of the Wyoming Historical and Geological 
Society For the Years 1908-1909 (Wilkes-Barre: E.B. Yordy Co., 1909),10:228]. In a published roster of 
Pennsylvania   attorneys   practicing   during   this   era,   the   first   name   appears   as   “Stanley”   [Frank Marshall 
Eastman, Courts and Lawyers of Pennsylvania in History (New York: The American Historical Society, 
1922), 3:666.], as it does in published genealogical records [Horace Edwin Hayden, Genealogical and 
Family History of the Wyoming and Lackawanna Valleys, Pennsylvania (New York: The Lewis Publ. 
Comp, 1906) 1:17; William Richard Cutter, ed., New England Families: Genealogical and Memorial (New 
York:   Lewis   Historical   Publishing   Company,   1913),   2:604].      Whether   as   “Stanly”   or   “Stanley,”   most  
references  to  him  identified  him  as  George  Woodward’s  eldest  son.  Research  uncovered  no  record  of  any  
other attorney named Stanly or Stanley Woodward practicing law in Pennsylvania during this era. It 
appears  incontrovertible  that  “Stanly  Woodward”  and  “Stanley  Woodward”  was  one  and  the  same  attorney,  
the son of Justice George Woodward. 
81.  While  modern  norms  governing  judicial  conduct  would  require  a  judge  in  Woodward’s  position  to  
recuse himself, no such rules applied until later in the nineteenth century. (Charles  Gardner  Geyh,  “Why  
Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again," The Review of Litigation 30, no. 4 (2011), 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/826/; Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias – 
Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience 48 OR. L. REV. 311 [1969]). The 
docket   materials   of   the   case   have   not   survived,   so   we   cannot   determine   whether   Justice   Woodward’s  
relationship   to  Chase’s   lawyer  was   addressed   before   the   court   rendered   its   substantive   decision.     Of   the  
countless  political  attacks  on  Woodward  for  the  “anti-soldier”  outcome  of  the  Chase case, research for this 
project found none that raised the father-son relationship in the case.  
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stipulation that allowed the court to reach the issue. They may have gained that 
confidence  based  on  the  son’s  access  to  his  father  and  the  insights  this  may  have  provided  
about the inclinations of the father and his colleagues. Having learned which way the 
court   was   leaning,   Chase’s   legal   team   may   have   concluded   that   there   was   no   risk   in  
entering into the stipulation that Miller needed. Instead of winning the case by refusing to 
stipulate and thereby leaving Miller with a factually deficient challenge, Chase would 
win on a court finding that the soldier-voting law was unconstitutional. 
This hypothesis rests partly on facts not in evidence, as any critical observer 
would correctly note. It might very well be wrong. It seems worth offering as a 
possibility, however, because it has the virtue of knitting together and making sense of 
three important facts that are very much in evidence. First, the court majority, we know 
from the Hulseman and Brinkworth case, looked askance on the 1839 soldier-voting law 
before the Chase case arrived on its docket.  Their eagerness for an opportunity to kill the 
law is easy to infer from that fact. Second, Chase entered into a factual stipulation that, 
but for the scenario hypothesized above, was clearly against his interests. Third, one of 
Chase’s  lawyers  was  Justice  Woodward’s  son,  a  man well positioned to know firsthand 
of   the   court’s   inclination   to   strike   down   the   law.      The   hypothesis   connects   those   dots,  
albeit conjecturally. 
What we can say without conjecture is that Justice George Woodward did reach 
the constitutional issue and decided it by striking down the 1839 soldier-voting law as a 
violation   of  Pennsylvania’s   1838   constitution.     He   could   have   rendered   justice   to  Ezra  
Chase without striking down that law; his opinion in the case as much as says so. Instead, 
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he made an avoidable finding of unconstitutionality.  Michigan Supreme Court Justice 
Isaac   Christiancy,   in   reviewing   that   state’s   soldier-voting   law,   faulted   Woodward’s  
opinion   (with   which   Christiancy   otherwise   agreed)   for   evincing   “hostility”   to  
Pennsylvania’s  soldier-voting law.82 Christiancy saw the hostility  in  Woodward’s  having  
attached   constitutional   relevance   to   the   law’s   susceptibility   to   fraud,   a   matter   of  mere  
“inexpediency”   – constitutionally irrelevant – as far as Christiancy was concerned. 
Perhaps Christiancy had a point, but even greater hostility is arguably evident from 
Woodward’s  gratuitous  consideration  of  the  law’s  constitutionality.   
Mark  Neely  has  characterized  this  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  as  “aggressive,”  
having in mind the results not only in Chase, but also in the Kneedler case temporarily 
striking down the federal Conscription Act of 1863.83 The most noteworthy aggression in 
Woodward’s   Chase decision, however, was less in the outcome than in reaching an 
avoidable outcome. While Woodward could not have anticipated it at the time, his 
uncharacteristic indulgence in judicial activism doomed his later political ambitions by 
saddling  him,  however  unfairly,  with  the  label  of  the  “soldiers’  enemy.”  Had  he  avoided  
the constitutional issue in Chase, the notoriety of having authored the country’s  first  court  
decision striking down a popular soldier-voting law probably would have fallen to a 
justice in some other state. As it happened, it fell to George Woodward, and it fell hard. 
Woodward’s   defeat   taught   politicians   nationwide   a   political   lesson, and they 
applied that lesson in state legislative sessions in 1864. The timing of enactments of 
                                                 
82. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 161. 
83.  Mark  E.  Neely,  Jr.,  “Civil  War  Issues  in  Pennsylvania:  A  Review  Essay,”  The Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography, 135:4 (October 2011), 414. As to the result in Chase, Neely praises Woodward 
for  having  “made  a  good  case  that  the  old  [soldier-voting]  law  was  unconstitutional.”  Id. 
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soldier-voting laws demonstrates that a turning point occurred at the end of 1863. Twelve 
of the twenty states that invented ways for absent soldiers to vote did so after January 1, 
1864, often reversing positions taken in 1863.  The Michigan and New Hampshire 
legislatures, for example, failed to pass soldier-voting bills in 1863. In early 1864, laws 
passed in both states.84 The Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, and Maine legislatures failed 
in 1863 to launch the process of amending their state constitutions to authorize soldier-
voting legislation. The necessary legislation passed in all four states in early 1864, all 
without intervening elections.85 New  York’s  Governor Horatio Seymour vetoed a soldier-
voting bill in 1863, partly for constitutional reasons but mostly on policy grounds. He 
signed the bill passed in 1864, though the features objectionable on policy grounds in 
1863 persisted in the 1864 bill.86  The legislatures in Rhode Island and California ignored 
the soldier-voting issue in 1863. Early in 1864, the former took steps to amend its 
constitution, and the latter passed a law, in both cases to permit absent soldiers to vote, 
and in both cases without an intervening election.87 
Concededly, the post hoc character of the 1864 activities in these states does not 
decisively establish the Pennsylvania gubernatorial race of 1863 as the propter hoc. 
Ohio’s   1863   election   results,   with   soldiers   voting   overwhelmingly   for pro-war John 
Brough, surely played a part in sparking this national surge in enthusiasm (by 
Republicans) and muted opposition (by Democrats) for soldier-voting laws. But one 
                                                 
84. Benton, Voting in the Field, 95-100, 206. In the Michigan senate, more Republicans (15) than 
Democrats (14) voted to kill the bill in March 1863. Less than a year later, with no intervening elections, 
senate Republicans all voted for the bill over the unanimous opposition of Democrats. Id. at 95, 100. 
85. Id. at 177-178 (Connecticut), 109 (Kansas), 234 (Maryland), and 119 (Maine).  
86. Id. at  151.  (Benton  says  of  the  1864  bill,  “It  was  open  to  the  same  objections  as  the  Act  of  1863  and  
yet  Seymour  signed  it.”) 
87. Id. at 182 (Rhode Island), and 128 (California).  
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cannot dismiss the likelihood that the unwitting hand of George Woodward played a big 
part.   His   judicial   exertions   against   Pennsylvania’s   law,   and   Republicans’   masterful  
cultivation  of  Curtin’s  status  of  “the  soldiers’  friend”  based  largely  on  what  Woodward  
had done on the bench, opened political eyes everywhere to the potency of soldier-voting 
laws in the political messaging wars taking shape in 1864.  
Ironically, then, champions of absentee soldier voting had George Woodward to 
thank for advancing their cause, however unintentionally he performed that role. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INDISPENSABLE VOICE OF SOLDIERS IN THE MESSAGING   
WARS OF 1864 
Andrew Dickson White led a life of impressive accomplishment. Before the Civil 
War, he taught history and English at the University of Michigan, where among other 
things he organized a student project to   plant   elms   on   the   campus   “Diag,”  which  was  
barren when White first saw it and became handsomely tree lined thanks to him.1 Shortly 
after the war, he co-founded Cornell University with his wealthy friend and fellow New 
York state senator, Ezra Cornell. White  became  Cornell’s  first  president,  serving  in  that  
post from 1866 till 1885.   He was popular with students there, as he has been at 
Michigan.   In   a   tradition   that   long   outlasted   Dickson’s   tenure   as   president,   all   Cornell  
students with the last name White, no matter what their given name, earned the nickname 
“Andy.”      Post-Cornell, he added to the luster of his curriculum vitae. In 1884, White 
became the first president of the American Historical Association.  He served as president 
of the U.S. delegation to The Hague Peace Conference (1889), minister to Russia (1892-
94), and twice as US ambassador to Germany (1879-81 and 1897-1902).2   
Having  led  such  a  distinguished  life,  perhaps  it  should  not  surprise  us  that  White’s  
exertions as a Republican partisan in 1864 barely register in his lengthy 1904 
autobiography, or that the pro-Lincoln pamphlet he wrote about soldier-voting laws fails 
to register at all. Was the pamphlet simply too trivial to merit mention in the memoirs of 
                                                 
1 .Margaret   Buranen,   “Tree’s   Company,”   Michigan Today, September 17, 2013, 
http://michigantoday.umich.edu/a8696/ . 
2 .   “Legacy   of   Leadership:   Cornell’s   Presidents”   Cornell, accessed October 19, 2013, 
http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/presidents/view_item.php?sec=3&sub=8;;   “In   the   Founders   Footsteps:  
Builders of the Cornell University   Library,”   Cornell, accessed October 19, 2013, 
http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/footsteps/exhibition/buildingcollections/buildingcollections_8.html. 
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such an accomplished man? Or instead could the omission owe to sheepishness White 
may have felt in 1904 about his writings as a youthful political operative forty years 
earlier? His anti-McClellan pamphlet was a work of political propaganda, full of 
distortions and smears. To be sure, distortions and smears did not violate prevailing 
norms of political combat, which accepted a degree of mendacity as an inevitable part of 
partisan polemics. 3   But they hardly comported with the norms of a distinguished 
historian and man of letters, and they fell short of the dignity and integrity a man of 
White’s  distinction  would  want  associated  with  his  name  as  he  looked  back  on  his   life.  
That might explain his preference to sweep his 1864 project under the rug, or perhaps 
somehow to purge the pamphlet from his own recollections.  But whether or not the 
pamphlet  secured  a  place  in  White’s  memory,  it  deserves  a  place  in  ours.4   
White entitled his pamphlet Political Dialogues: Soldiers on Their Right to Vote, 
and the Men They Should Support.5  He wrote it at age 32 while serving in the New York 
state senate. It is a fictional play, set in an encampment of Pennsylvania soldiers serving 
near Atlanta in 1864.  The play has no action, just conversation. The cast members are all 
nameless soldiers, identified only by their rank and home state.  Some are Republicans, 
some  Democrats,  but  they  all  agree  on  the  pamphlet’s  central  message:  traitorous  “peace  
men”  have  captured   the   formerly  honorable  Democratic  party,  and   their  1864  standard-
                                                 
3. See generally, Martin Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics (Charlottesville: University 
of Virginia Press, 2010). 
4 . Andrew Dickson White, Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White, (New York: The Century 
Company, 1904), 1:122. Of his  role  in  the  1864  campaign,  White  wrote  only  that  he  “tried  to  do  my  duty  in  
speaking through my own and adjacent [state senate] districts, but there was little need of speeches; the 
American people had made up their minds, and they reelected Mr. Lincoln   handily.”   Id. He makes no 
mention of his pamphlet. 
5. Andrew Dickson White, Political Dialogues: Soldiers on Their Right to Vote, and the Men They 
Should Support, (1864; The Cornell University Library Digital Collections) 
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?c=mayantislavery;idno=39923010;view=image;seq=1  (Hereafter cited as Political Dialogues.) 
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bearer George McClellan is now guilty of treason by his association with them.  They 
have proved their treason by opposing soldier-voting   laws.   To   the   soldiers   in  White’s  
play, that makes them ipso facto anti-soldier and pro-rebellion. 
Over   the  course  of  White’s  play,  soldiers   from  other states drift by and join the 
Pennsylvanians   in   their   “dialogues.”      Ohioans   arrive   first,   followed   by   Michiganders,  
Wisconsinites, Minnesotans, Illini, Hoosiers, and New Yorkers.  One at a time, each 
group  adds   its   own  account  of   the  Democratic  Party’s  perfidious opposition to soldier-
voting laws.  All concur with the Pennsylvanians that by opposing military suffrage, 
Democrats in each state had revealed their hostility to soldiers and their affinity to the 
Confederacy. And they all agree that McClellan had thrown in with the traitors. 
The   Pennsylvanians   are   alone   in   the   play’s   first   scene,   talking   about   soldier-
voting rights in that state.  Here White introduces George Woodward of the Keystone 
State’s  Supreme  Court. Woodward is the key villain and the linchpin  of  White’s  thesis  of  
Democratic sedition.  A captain of the Pennsylvania regiment, leading the discussion, 
explains to the small gathering that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had struck down the 
state’s   prewar   soldier-voting   law,   ruling   that   soldiers   “had   no   right   to   vote.”   An  
incredulous private asks the captain who could possibly have rendered such an opinion. 
“It  couldn’t  have  been  any  soldier’s  friend,”  observes  the  inquiring  private.  “It  must  have  
been  some  rebel   sympathizer.”     The  captain   responds,  “You  are  correct.   It  was  George  
Woodward.”6  
George  Woodward   had   indeed   authored   the   Pennsylvania   high   court’s   decision  
striking down the only extant soldier-voting  law  in  the  country  in  1862.  White’s  play  tars  
all  “peace  Democrats”  as  proven  enemies  of  Union soldiers, but it gives Woodward top 
                                                 
6. White, Political Dialogues, 2. 
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billing  as  the  prime  saboteur  of  soldiers’  voting  rights.  Woodward  was  the  perfect  foil  for  
such polemics, tailor-made for the caricature of Democrats as anti-soldier traitors.  
Republican polemicists and newspaper editors had a field day portraying him as an 
enemy of Union soldiers and the Union cause.  
Like much political polemics, it stood on a weak substantive foundation.  As we 
saw in Chapter 3, Woodward was an outspoken peace Democrat, but he was hardly anti-
soldier in any personal sense. Two of his sons served in the Union army, and Woodward 
himself paid the expenses of raising a company of volunteers for the 2nd Pennsylvania 
Reserves.7  His   hostility   to   the   administration’s  war   effort  was  well  within  mainstream 
Democratic thought. Though he opposed secession, his opposition rested on standard, 
conservative Democratic orthodoxy.8   
Other   jurists  who  shared  Woodward’s  political  views  and  who,   like  Woodward,  
had found constitutional flaws in soldier-voting statutes, did not become whipping boys 
for Republican attacks quite the way Woodward did. Rufus Ranney of the Ohio Supreme 
Court   and   Chief   Justice   Joel   Hinman   of   Connecticut’s   high   court,   for   example,   were  
Democrats who found constitutional infirmities in their respective  state’s  soldier-voting 
laws. Both came under some fire from Republicans for doing so, but not on the national 
scale or with the vituperation that Woodward experienced. 9  What made Woodward 
                                                 
7. Erie (PA) Observer, October 3, 1863, 2. 
8. Letter from Woodward to Rufus E. Shapley, Philadelphia Press, October 12, 1863; Speech by 
Woodward   in   1861,   saying   inter   alia,   “We   hear   it   said,   let   the   South   go   peaceably.   I   say   LET  HER  go 
peaceably.”   Globe (Huntingdon, PA), September 9, 1863. Jonathan White offers the best analysis of 
Woodward’s  political  thought.  White,  Woodward  and  Black,  “A  Pennsylvania  Judge  Views  the  Rebellion,”  
195-225.  
9. A Connecticut newspaper slammed Hinman for concurring   in   the   court’s   ruling   that   the   soldier-
voting  law  was  unconstitutional,  noting  that  Hinman  was  “a  member  of  the  Copperhead  McClellan  party.”  
Daily Palladium (New Haven, Conn.), October 5, 1864. But even that paper devoted more space to 
attacking Woodward than Hinman.  
180  
 
special? Why did Andrew Dickson White make Woodward the first of the villains 
assailed as a traitor in his play about soldier-voting laws? 
There are four elements to the answer, adding up to a perfect storm of political 
vulnerability for Woodward. First was his priority in time.  Pennsylvania had the only 
soldier-voting law on the books at the outbreak of the war, so its law was the first to 
come under judicial scrutiny. In Chase v. Miller, Woodward authored the Supreme Court 
opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional. This brought national attention to him 
(though not to the two Republican justices who joined his opinion).10 Second, while 
many jurists came to the bench from backgrounds in elective politics, Woodward entered 
the political fray while still on the bench by running as the Democratic candidate for 
governor of Pennsylvania in 1863, at a time when his opinion in the soldier-voting case 
was still fresh. That move brought Woodward national attention, particularly because 
Pennsylvania’s   statewide   elections   occurred   in   what   was   an   “off   year”   in   most   other 
states. In the election, Republicans used his decision against the soldier-voting law as 
“proof”   that   he   was   “anti-soldier,”   in   contrast   to   the   Republican   incumbent,   Andrew  
Curtin,   who   branded   himself   successfully   as   “the   soldier’s   friend.”   After   the   1863 
election,  Republicans   attributed  Woodward’s  views,  or  more   accurately   their   caricature  
of his views, to the entire Democratic Party, because now Woodward was as conspicuous 
in Democratic politics as he was on the judiciary. Democrats became saddled with 
Woodward’s  opinion   in   the   soldier-voting case, making them traitorous enemies of the 
soldier, according to Republican rhetoric. 
Third, shortly after the gubernatorial election, Woodward became entangled in an 
additional hot potato case about soldiers and the war. In an eagerly awaited opinion, not 
                                                 
10. Chase, 41 Pa.at 418. 
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issued until after the election, he joined a 3-2 court majority in striking down the federal 
Conscription  Act   of   1863   as   unconstitutional.  The   draft   exceeded  Congress’s   authority  
under Article I, the state court ruled. The opinion was short-lived, as a reconstituted court 
reconsidered and reversed itself before issues of federal supremacy boiled over. But 
Woodward remained on the court and stuck to his original view of the matter.11  This 
gave Republicans in 1864 even more ammunition for attacking him and Democrats as 
hostile   to   the   Union   cause   and   “anti-soldier,”   on   the   logic   that   the   union   cause   and  
incumbent soldiers needed the reinforcements that the Conscription Act promised.   
Finally, Woodward unwittingly offered Republicans in 1864 an easy avenue for 
attacking their real target, George McClellan.  In October 1863, in a blunder that haunted 
McClellan for the following twelve months, the politically ambitious general wrote a 
letter   endorsing   Woodward’s   candidacy for governor. The Philadelphia press had 
erroneously reported that McClellan supported the Republican candidate, Andrew Curtin. 
Knowing that the rumor would hurt his political aspirations as a Democrat, McClellan 
wrote to the chairman of the Democratic Party’s  State  Central  Committee  in  Philadelphia,  
Charles Biddle, to set the record straight.  His letter first denied the rumor. Then it went 
the additional step of affirmatively supporting Woodward with the following regrettable 
passage:  “I  desire  to  state clearly and distinctly that, having some few days ago had a full 
                                                 
11. The case was Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863).  It was brought on behalf of Henry Kneedler and 
two other Pennsylvania men who had been drafted under the authority of the 1863 Conscription Act. The 
court’s  majority  concluded  that   in  fighting  the  Confederacy,  Congress  could  act  only   in  the  way  the  U.S. 
Constitution  specifically  authorized  to  “suppress  Insurrections.”    That  was  by  “calling  forth  the  Militia”  of  
one or more states. (Article I, section 8). The  Conscription  Act  did  not  “call  forth”  state  militias,  but  instead  
drafted civilians directly into US military service.  The case never got to the U.S. Supreme Court because 
the Pennsylvania court reversed itself in early 1864 after Chief Justice Lowry, who voted with Woodward 
to strike down the draft, lost his bid for re-election. Daniel Agnew, an avid Unionist, replaced Lowry, 
giving a 3-2  majority   in   favor  of   the  Conscription  Act’s  constitutionality.  The  second  Kneedler decision, 
over  Woodward’s  dissent,  reasoned  that  Congress  had  unlimited  power  under  section  8  of  Article  I  “to  raise  
and  support  Armies.”  For  an  analysis  of  the  two  Kneedler opinions, see J.L. Bernstein, Conscription and 
the Constitution: The Amazing Case of Kneedler v. Lane, 53 A.B.A. J. 708 (1967). 
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conversation with Judge Woodward, I find that our views agree, and I regard his election 
as  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  called  for  in  the  interests  of  the  Nation.”12  
Republicans pounced and never let up. They claimed that by agreeing with 
Woodward’s   views   after   a   “full   conversation,”  McClellan   had   confessed   to   holding   all  
the traitorous, anti-soldier positions that Woodward (supposedly) held. Never mind that 
elsewhere in the letter McClellan asserted that he and Woodward were of the same mind 
in wanting to restore the Union and preserve the constitution, or that in context his 
statement  that  “our  views  agree”  meant  that  they  agreed  on  those  points.    Starting  in  1863  
and continuing through the 1864 election season, Republican newspapers and polemicists 
quoted only the damning passage, which taken alone was unqualified in its endorsement 
of  Woodward’s   “views.”  His   detractors   said   it   proved   that  McClellan,   like  Woodward  
and other peace Democrats, was hostile to soldier voting, and hence to soldiers, and 
hence   was   disloyal.   Democrats’   purported   scruples   about   constitutionalism  were   mere  
“cover”   for   their   antipathy   toward   soldiers   and   overall   perfidy,   according   to   the  
Republican line of attack.13  
That was  exactly  how  Andrew  Dickson  White  used  McClellan’s  endorsement  in  
his  play.    Let’s  return  to  the  scene  of  White’s  Pennsylvania  soldiers  talking  politics.  The  
private asks if it was true that McClellan had endorsed Woodward. The corporal answers 
by reciting  the  fateful  passage  of  McClellan’s  letter,  word  for  word.  If  McClellan  said  his  
“views   agree”   with   Woodward’s,   argues   the   captain,   “I   can’t   see   how   to   avoid   the  
conclusion   that  what   one   has   said   the   other   approved,   and   that’s  what   I   can’t   do.”   “It  
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comes  to  this,”  the  sergeant  concludes,  “Little  Mac  [i.e.,  McClellan]  has  given  us  up  and  
gone  over,   either   in  whole  or   in  part,   and   it   don’t  make  much  difference  which,   to   the  
Chicago  peace  party….  When  he  was  fighting  with  us  for   the  Union  and  the  old  flag, I 
was   for   him.   But   I   ain’t   for   any   man   who   would   give   ‘his   voice   and   vote   to  
Woodward.’”14  
And   what   specifically   were   the   “views”   of   Woodward   with   which   McClellan  
agreed,   according   to   the   soldiers   in   White’s   play?      The   purported   agreement   was  
complete, extending  even  to  Woodward’s  supposed  view  that  soldiers  were  unworthy  of  
the  vote.  The  captain   cites   language   in  Woodward’s  opinion   in  Miller v. Chase stating 
that the soldier-voting  law  “opens  a  wide  door  for  the  most  odious  fraud.”    In  fact,  as  we  
saw in Chapter 2, Woodward made that point (which he premised on a judicial finding of 
such fraud in an earlier case) to support his conclusion that the law violated the anti-fraud 
spirit   of   the   constitution’s   suffrage   provision.   But  White’s   play   omits   that   context. In 
complaining about the risk of fraud, says the captain in the dialog, Woodward reveals a 
belief that soldiers are prone to committing fraud.  The captain paraphrases Woodward: 
“We   can’t   act   as   upright   citizens,   because   we   are   soldiers!”   The   captain   then cites 
Woodward’s   reasoning   that   the   constitutional   requirement   to   vote   in   person   in   the  
election   district   was   designed   “to   secure   the   purity   of   elections.”   So,   continues   the  
captain,  Woodward  must  believe  “we  are  not  as  pure  as  those  at  home  – can’t  be trusted 
to  do  right  abroad!  Now  my  lads,  I  tell  you  that  is  infamous.”15 
By  embracing  Woodward’s  “views,”  in  other  words,  McClellan  had  proved  both  
his hostility to soldier-voting laws and to soldiers generally, and hence his disloyalty to 
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the Union. White expands on these themes as he brings soldiers from other states to join 
the Pennsylvanians. A lieutenant colonel from Michigan describes Democratic opposition 
to the soldier-voting  bill  in  that  state,  including  one  legislator’s  view  that  soldier  voting  
represented  a  “corrupting  process.”  The  Pennsylvania  captain  responds,  “Why  all  that  is  
Woodward  over  again.”  And  because  McClellan  agrees  with  Woodward,  McClellan  must  
agree   with   the   Michigan   Democrats,   too.   McClellan   can’t   duck   or   straddle   the   issue.  
“There is no half-way  house  for  him  or  any  man  to  stop  at,”  says  the  captain.  In  the  same  
vein,   an   adjutant   from   Wisconsin   relates   Democratic   opposition   to   that   state’s   law,  
describing  the  party’s  concern  about  the  dangers  and  mischief  attendant  to  soldier  voting 
as  nothing  more  than  “the  Woodward-McClellan  objection  over  again.”16 
Woodward  wasn’t  the  only  Democratic  traitor  whom  McClellan  cozied  up  to,  in  
White’s   telling.   Clement   Vallandigham   of   Ohio,   Horatio   Seymour   of   New   York,   and  
George Pendleton of Ohio (McClellan’s   running   mate)   all   qualified   as   rebel-loving, 
soldier-hating  Copperheads   in   the   eyes   of   the   soldiers   populating  White’s   play.  By  his  
association with them, as with Woodward, McClellan had become guilty of those sins 
himself, as had the entire Democratic Party.  The Pennsylvania captain lamented the 
Democracy’s  decline   into  sedition.  “The  old  party  was  one  of  principle,”  he  said.  “The  
thing that takes its name is a humbug – worse,   a   nest   of   treason.”      And  McClellan,  
“defiled   by   association”   with   so   many   Copperheads,   “got   an   appetite   for   the   food   of  
traitors.”17  
Like  Woodward,  each  of  the  other  villains  in  White’s  play  opposed  soldier  voting  
and  therefore,  in  the  words  of  the  play’s  unnamed  private  from  Pennsylvania,  each,  like  
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Woodward,   “couldn’t   have   been   any   soldier’s   friend.”18  In the Civil War, even more 
than   in  other  wars,   it  behooved  every  politician   to  be  seen  as   the  soldiers’   friend,  or  at  
least not as their enemy.  Soldiers were central not only to the core activity of the war – 
fighting – but also to the political combat that the war stirred.  Their centrality went far 
beyond their potency as a voting bloc, although it certainly included that. More 
importantly,  soldiers  had  expertise  on  the  subjects  at  the  heart  of  the  parties’  main  attacks  
on each other – treason, cowardice, military incompetence, and indifference to the troops.  
It  was   essential   for   the   parties   to   enlist   soldiers’   support   for   these   themes.  But   a   party  
could not plausibly enlist soldiers to endorse these messages without first gaining 
credibility  as  the  soldiers’  friend.    Likewise,  if  the  party  and  its  candidates  could  secure  
the  mantle  of  the  soldier’s  friends,  the  opposing  party’s  attacks  lost  much  of  their  steam.  
So if, as White argued in his pamphlet, only supporters of soldier voting qualified as the 
friend of soldiers, then Republicans had Democrats at a big disadvantage.  
Democrats  had   learned   the  power  of   the  “soldiers’   friend”  meme  in  1863   in   the  
Pennsylvania gubernatorial race.  Republicans cast incumbent Andrew Curtin, who 
supported soldier-voting  legislation,  as  the  soldier’s  friend  and  Woodward  as  traitorously  
anti-soldier   for   striking   down   Pennsylvania’s   prewar   soldier-voting statute and ruling 
against the draft.  The main purpose of this messaging was not to secure the votes of 
Pennsylvanian soldiers; the Chase v. Miller ruling meant that few soldiers could vote in 
the 1863 elections. The real purpose was to mobilize civilian indignation against 
Woodward  as  “anti-soldier”  and  civilian votes for Curtin.   Alexander McClure, chairman 
of   Pennsylvania’s   Republican   state   committee,   marveled   at   the   effectiveness   of   the  
Pennsylvania   Republicans’   “soldiers’   friend”   strategy.   It   was,   he   said,   “systematically  
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undertaken and carried out with a degree of perfection that has never been surpassed in 
political  management.”     A   key   element   of   the   strategy  was   to   organize   soldiers   in   the  
field to write home to voting friends and relatives expressing support for Curtin as the 
“friend  of  the  soldier.”  It  worked  brilliantly.  Curtin  won  in a predominantly Democratic 
state, and according to McClure the Republican effort to harness soldiers as pro-Curtin 
political  messengers  “turned  the  scales”  of  the  election.19 
Republicans repeated the successful 1863 Pennsylvania strategy on a national 
scale   in   1864.   They   cast   Lincoln   as   the   soldier’s   friend   and   savaged   Democrats   who  
opposed soldier-voting  laws  (and  McClellan  by  association  with  them)  as  “enemies  of  the  
soldiers.”    This  was  the  thrust  of  White’s  pamphlet.  Another  1864  pamphlet,  prepared  for 
the  Union  Congressional  Committee,  made  the  same  point,  but  without  White’s  fictional  
soldiers serving as the spokesmen. Written by a New Hampshire Republican, William E. 
Chandler, it carried the title The  Soldiers’  Right   to  Vote.  Who  Opposes  It?  Who  Favors 
It?  Much   as  White   had   done,   Chandler   reviewed   each   state’s   political   struggles   over  
soldier-voting bills, scornfully highlighting the pattern of Democratic Party opposition 
and  praising  Republican  support.  He  treated  the  parties’  position  on  soldier-voting laws 
as a proxy for their position about soldiers themselves, and hence as a test of loyalty. The 
pamphlet’s  two  concluding  sections  are  entitled  “Abraham  Lincoln  and  Andrew  Johnson  
Are  Friends  of   the  Soldiers’  Right   to  Vote”   and  “George  B.  McClellan   and George H. 
Pendleton  Are  Enemies  of  the  Soldiers’  Right  to  Vote.”20     
The  accusation  of  both  White’s  pamphlet  and  Chandler’s  was  that  Democrats   in  
general and McClellan in particular opposed soldier-voting laws because they were 
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traitors.  This was part of a larger attack by Republicans on their rivals as disloyal.  Other 
Republican attack themes, as we shall see, were that McClellan was inept as a military 
leader, and that he was a coward, both morally and physically.  On each of these partisan 
themes, soldiers enjoyed unparalleled credibility as spokesmen.  As paradigmatic 
patriots, soldiers spoke with unique authority on matters of treason and loyalty. Soldiers 
understood military competence better than civilians, so who better than soldiers to assail 
McClellan as an inept battlefield leader?  And as the embodiment of courage, soldiers 
presumably knew a coward when they saw one, so Republicans enlisted the testimonials 
of soldiers to condemn McClellan on that score, too. 
By the same token, Democrats enlisted the voice of soldiers in rebutting 
Republican  claims  of  McClellan’s  treason,  incompetence,  and  cowardice.    Democrats  had  
attack themes of their own, and soldiers were uniquely qualified as messengers of these, 
as well. Lincoln was a blundering commander-in-chief, they claimed. The war would 
have been over and won but for his incompetence. The voice of soldiers – expert as they 
were on military competence – obviously added special heft to that critique.  Moreover, 
Democrats insisted, Lincoln neglected the troops, especially white troops. Their 
equipment  was  “shoddy”  and  their  medical  care  poor.    After  Lincoln  sacked  McClellan,  
less skilled leaders than Little Mac subjected soldiers to butchery on the battlefield. 
Lincoln sacrificed them in a cause – emancipation – that they never signed up for and that 
subordinated them to the interest of black men.  These were matters that soldiers could 
speak to with authority, and Democrats made sure they did.  For the same reason, 
Republicans enlisted the voice of soldiers   in   defending   Lincoln   from   the   Democrats’  
charges.  
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Each of these Republican and Democratic attack themes was an inevitable 
outgrowth of the structure of the political contest of 1864 – of the way the political stage 
was set.  As always in politics, each party suffered political vulnerabilities that the other 
party attacked. The main Republican vulnerability was that war had dragged on too long.  
The effort to put down the rebellion had not yet succeeded and, as the parties organized 
for the elections in 1864, the war was going poorly for the North. This set up the 
Democrats’  charge  that  Lincoln  was  a  blundering  war  leader.   (That   theme  lost  much  of  
its punch late in the election season, when Union forces enjoyed a string of victories, 
highlighted by Sherman’s  capture  of  Atlanta   in  early  September.     But  Democrats  never  
abandoned  the  argument.)  Lincoln’s  supposed  indifference  to  the  troops  was  an  egregious  
facet  of  his  overall  incompetence,  in  the  Democrats’  messaging. 
Democrats’   vulnerabilities   grew   out of their intra-party division about the war.  
American wars always inspire at least some dissent, and the dissent is always met with at 
least some accusations of disloyalty.  Federalists who opposed the War of 1812 faced 
accusations of disloyalty, as did Whigs who opposed the Mexican War. During World 
War I universities now thought of as bastions of liberalism fired faculty members for 
voicing opposition to that war.21  So the Civil War was hardly unique in sparking dissent 
and countercharges of disloyalty. When wartime dissent splits a major political party 
during  an  incumbent  president’s  reelection  campaign,  as  it  did  in  1864  (and  also  in  1972  
and 2004), accusations of disloyalty inevitably become a campaign problem that the 
challenging party must manage.  The party supporting the war predictably brands the 
entire opposition as disloyal. Democrats in 1864 tried to solve the disloyalty problem by 
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choosing a pro-war standard bearer with a biography of military service, George B. 
McClellan. That choice prompted   Republicans   to   seek   ways   to   diminish   McClellan’s  
stature as a soldier. They did so by attacking him as a coward and as an incompetent 
commander. The voice of soldiers played a big role in carrying all these political attacks 
against McClellan. 
So it was that the politics of 1864 became the politics of soldiers. Soldiers of all 
ranks  were  central  to  the  messaging  of  both  parties.    Each  party  vied  for  the  title  “friend  
of  the  soldier”  and  disputed  the  rival  party’s  claim  to  that  status.  The  voice  of  the  soldier 
became an indispensable weapon in the political combat between Republicans and 
Democrats, and particularly in the contest between Lincoln and McClellan.  
  History has not been kind to George McClellan.  It has defined him mostly in 
juxtaposition to three iconic figures, with comparisons that inevitably doom McClellan to 
a second-class  station  in  the  national  memory.    Robert  E.  Lee,  the  great  “Marble  Man,”  
outfoxed   him  militarily.      Ulysses   Grant,   “Savior   of   the  Union,”   persevered   to   success  
against Lee where the flashier but irresolute McClellan had failed.  And worst of all, 
McClellan collided with Abraham Lincoln, the most beloved American of them all, 
whom the arrogant McClellan spurned as his commander-in-chief and then tried to unseat 
in 1864.   It is small wonder that McClellan emerges today as a plodding, vainglorious, 
mediocre figure.   
His star shone much brighter in 1864.  He had his detractors, to be sure, 
particularly among Republicans.  But he also had fervent admirers, and Democrats had 
good reason to think he would carry them to victory in the 1864 election.  The resume 
was impressive.  McClellan had graduated near the top of his class at West Point and had 
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served with distinction in the Mexican War.  He then entered the private sector, rising to 
become president of a railroad, before returning to military service at the outbreak of the 
Civil  War.    He  rose  quickly  to  command  the  Union’s  principal  field  force,  the  Army  of  
the Potomac.  Applying formidable organizational skills, he built that army into a 
powerful fighting force.  This army – McClellan’s  army  – ultimately beat Lee and won 
the war.   
But the Army of the Potomac would achieve its final success under Grant, not 
McClellan.  McClellan could never quite bring himself to unleash it.  He was more 
comfortable on defense than on offense – not a good quality for a commander charged 
with putting down a rebellion.  His reluctance to send forces into battle, so mystifying 
even today, infuriated his contemporary critics and finally exhausted Lincoln’s  patience.    
Historians   attribute   McClellan’s   reticence   to   a   cautious   temperament,   but   radical  
Republicans attributed it to his politics.  His loyalties, they claimed, were more to the 
Democratic Party than to his commander-in-chief.22   
McClellan suffered some celebrated defeats, most famously in the abortive 
Peninsula Campaign, a painstakingly planned assault on Richmond in the spring of 1862.  
But  he  later  turned  back  Lee’s  invasion  of  Maryland  in  the  battle  of  Antietam.    This  was  
enough of a victory to justify celebration in the North, even though his caution in that 
battle  may  have  cost  McClellan  the  opportunity  to  destroy  Lee’s  army  altogether.      In  any  
event,  he  remained  the  country’s  most  famous  military  figure  through  the  first  half  of  the  
war.  Even after Lincoln cashiered him late in 1862, McClellan was immensely popular 
                                                 
22. The authoritative biography of McClellan is Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young 
Napoleon (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988). 
191  
 
with Democrats.  And Union soldiers, who made up a major voting block in the North, 
remained devoted to him.23 
 
Republican  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “McClellan  is  Disloyal” 
To deflect charges like the ones Andrew Dickson White leveled against the party, 
Democrats hoped that putting McClellan at the head of the ticket would inoculate the 
party against the Republican charge that all Democrats were traitors.  Their antebellum 
association  with  the  Southern  “slave  power,”  which  became  the  Confederacy’s  bulwark,  
made   them   easy   targets   on   the   charge.      So   did   “old”   Democratic   Party   orthodoxy,  
embraced by peace Democrats like George Woodward. It held that while any war 
threatened republicanism by spawning tyrannical central government, civil war in 
particular  was  “the  worst  of  all  society’s  disorders.”24  Keepers of this orthodoxy believed 
that forcible reunion of the North and South contradicted Lockean tenets of consensual 
government.     These  purists   in   the  antiwar  wing  of   the  party,   the  “Peace  Democrats”  or  
“copperheads”   as   they   were   called,   favored   prompt   recognition   of   the   Confederacy.    
James  Bayard  of  Delaware  typified  this  faction.    “Bodies  tied  together  by  so  unnatural  a  
bond  of  union  as  mutual  hatred  are  only  connected  to  their  ruin,”  he  said  in  urging  an  end  
to   the  war.      “[A]nything   is   better   than   a   fruitless,   hopeless,   unnatural   civil   war.”25  In 
some quarters, anti-war Democrats went even further, some urging men not to enlist or 
displaying the Confederate flag as a statement of protest. So, at least as to that extreme 
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element of the party, Republican charges of treason had a ring of truth.26  And beyond 
that fringe, Republicans could and did argue that Democrats were guilty by association.   
To be sure, the Democratic Party also had a pro-war wing.  It included prominent 
political figures like Ohio Governor John Brough, New York Attorney General John 
Dickinson, and a host of Union military leaders including McClellan.  In fact,  the  North’s  
war effort owed these men a great deal.  Many Democratic leaders actively supported 
recruitment for the Union army, and between 40% and 45% of Union soldiers entered the 
war as Democrats.27  Politically, however, this element of the Democratic Party found 
itself drowned out by the shrill voices of the antiwar faction.  In contrast, Republicans 
enjoyed the advantage of far greater unity.  They were virtually unanimous in favoring a 
resolute prosecution of the war, and in the election year of 1864 their polemicists made 
sure   that   war   Democrats   did   not   escape   association   with   the   party’s   putatively  
treacherous antiwar wing.  In his study of Civil War politics, Joel Silbey observed that 
“[t]he   articulation   of   traditional   Democratic   orthodoxy   made it very easy for the 
Republicans,  in  response,  to  draw  the  lines  between  the  parties  sharply  and  distinctly.”28  
Republicans drew the lines largely by the device of charging that Democrats were 
disloyal.  Democrats had reason to hope that the nomination of  McClellan,  the  country’s  
most famous military man through the first half of the war, would undercut that charge, 
though surely not silence it. 
One technique Republicans used to brand McClellan as disloyal was to build a 
mischievously flawed syllogism: 1) in political kinship with northern Democrats, the 
country’s   southern   enemy   hoped   the  Republican   incumbent  would   lose   the   election   to  
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McClellan;;   2)   Democrats’   political   fortunes   brightened  when   the  US   suffered  military  
setbacks; therefore 3) Democrats hoped   for   the   enemy’s   success,   which   made   them  
traitors.      As   an   exercise   in   logic,   this  was   complete   rubbish.  An   incumbent’s   political  
prospects  always  suffer  in  proportion  to  the  country’s  misfortunes.    “The  strength  of  the  
Peace  Democrats,”  writes  historian Jennifer  Weber,  “generally  ran  in  inverse  relation  to  
the  successes  (or  failures)  of  the  armies.”29 And wartime antagonists of course welcome 
the demise – electoral or otherwise – of their  enemy’s  leader.  So  of  course  Confederates 
hoped McClellan would beat Lincoln.30  Those self-evident propositions say nothing 
about  McClellan’s  attitude  toward  the  Confederacy.    Republican  propagandists,  operating  
in the realm of politics – not logic – made repeated use of this wobbly syllogism, which 
amounted to the outright assertion that McClellan was disloyal. 
Pro-Republican organs, building the foundation of the disloyalty syllogism, first 
pointed to an identity of interests between the Confederates and McClellan.  They 
claimed that when Union armies won, as they were doing in the fall of 1864, it was bad 
news for McClellan. 
[T]he success of the Union arms, the triumphs of the United States flag, 
and   of   the   Federal  Government,   are   the   ruin   of   [McClellan’s]   cause...  
[T]he feelings of a genuine Copperhead toward [Sherman and Sheridan] 
at this moment are very much such as Satan is believed in Catholic 
countries to entertain toward holy water.31 
 
In the same vein, the New York Times quoted  Southern  newspapers,  one  saying,  “Every  
defeat  of  Lincoln’s  forces  inures  to  the  advantage  of  McClellan,”  and  another  claiming,  
“The  victory   of   the   rebels   ‘insures   the   success   of  McClellan   – their failure insures his 
                                                 
29. Weber, Copperheads: The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Lincoln’s  Opponents, 9. 
30. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 41, 107. 
31. New York Times, Sept. 25, 1864, 4. 
194  
 
defeat.’” 32   A week before the presidential election, a pro-Lincoln newspaper in 
Pennsylvania exhorted voters to turn against McClellan  using  the  same  theme.  “Jefferson  
Davis,  were  he  permitted  to  participate  in  next  Tuesday’s  election,  would  certainly  vote  
for  McClellan  and  Pendleton….  Every  ballot  for  McClellan  and  Pendleton  is  equivalent  
to a bullet sent through the heart of a brave  Union  soldier.”33  
Political  cartoonists  piled  on  with  their  own  depictions  of  McClellan’s  disloyalty.  
One,  published   in  New  York,   is   entitled,   “UNION  AND  LIBERTY  and  UNION  AND  
SLAVERY.”  On   its   left   panel,   Lincoln   amiably   greets   a  man   depicted   as   “Workman”  
while black and white school children frolic beneath an American flag in the background. 
On the contrasting right panel, McClellan shakes hands with Jefferson Davis while a 
slave auction proceeds in the background and a Confederate flag waves overhead. 
 
Illustration originally published by M.W. Siebert, Union and liberty! And union and slavery!, 1864. Library 
of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction 
Number: LC-USZ62-945. 
 
                                                 
32. Id. Sept. 24, 1864, p. 4.   
33. The Agitator (Wellsborough, PA), November 2, 1864, 5. 
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Another cartoon, this one   published   in   Boston   and   entitled   “Democracy,”   uses  
contrasting left/right panels to argue that the Democratic Party had departed from its 
patriotic heritage (much as we have seen that the fictional soldiers in Andrew Dickson 
White’s  claimed).   
 
Illustration originally published by Louis Prang & Co., Democracy. 1832-1864, 1864. Library of Congress, 
Prints and Photographs Division; Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction Number: LC-
USZ62-13212. 
 
On  the  left  panel,  labeled  “1832,”  an  animated  Andrew Jackson berates John C. Calhoun: 
“By  the  Eternal!”  growls  Jackson,  “this  Union  must  and  shall  be  preserved.  A  Traitor’s  
doom   to   him   who   acts   against   it.”   Calhoun   bows   humbly   before   Jackson,   imploring  
“Pardon!   Pardon!”     On   the   right   panel,   labeled   “1864,”  McClellan   and   Pendleton   bow  
even  more  humbly  before  Jefferson  Davis.  McClellan  addresses  Davis  pathetically:  “We  
should like to have Union and Peace, dear Mr. Davis, but if such is not your pleasure then 
please state your terms for a friendly separation.”  Davis  responds  condescendingly.  First  
he  praises  his  kneeling  supplicants  as  “men  of  sense.”  Then  he  states  his  terms:  “call  back  
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those fellows Sherman, Grant and Sheridan, also that old seadog Farragut – after that we 
will   see   further.”   A   Confederate   soldier   in   the   background   looks   on,   saying   “Those  
Northern  dogs  how  they  whine!”     
This   cartoon   conveys   the   theme  of  McClellan’s   perfidy   as   the   central  message,  
but adds powerful secondary themes as well. One is that McClellan contrasts poorly with 
the northern military leaders Sherman, Grant, Sheridan, and Farragut, all of whom 
outshone him. McClellan, in other words, was not much of a general. The other is that he 
doesn’t   command   the   respect   of   an   ordinary   soldier.   Real   soldiers   don’t   “whine,”   but  
cowards do. The selection of a military man as the Democratic standard-bearer invited 
these two attack  themes,  both  designed  to  undermine  McClellan’s  stature  as  a  soldier.   
An anti-Democrat cartoon published in Philadelphia also drew on the memory of 
the  old  “Party  of  Jackson”  to  portray  the  1864  version  of  the  party  as  treasonous.  Entitled  
“A  THRILLING   INCIDENT  DURING  VOTING,   -- 18th Ward,   Philadelphia,  Oct   11”  
(below), it depicts an old man (wearing a top hat and holding a cane) responding when a 
“Copperhead”  offers him a ballot. The man with the ballot says of the old man, “Here  is  
an   old   Jackson  Democrat  who   always   votes   a   straight   ticket.”      The   old  man   responds  
furiously:  
I  despise  you  more  than  I  hate  the  rebel  who  sent  his  bullet  through  my  dead  son’s  
heart! You   miserable   creature!   Do   you   expect   me   to   dishonor   my   poor   boy’s  
memory, and vote for men who charge American soldiers, fighting for their 
country, with being hirelings and murderers?  
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Illustration by Joseph Harley, A thrilling incident during voting, --18th Ward, Philadelphia, Oct. 11 / 
Harley, del. 1864. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, 
American, Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-89566. 
 
The Republican attack machine – politicians, songsters, pamphleteers, cartoonists, 
and newspaper editors – drew on the credibility of real life soldiers to help them carry the 
attacks on McClellan as a traitor.  Examples abound. The Chicago Tribune quoted a New 
Jersey veteran saying to a friend as they watched a Democratic campaign procession in 
Trenton:  “I  say,  Jim,  this  is  the  first  rebel  raid  we’ve  seen  since  we  left  Virginia.”34   The 
Tribune also   quoted   “another   chronic  McClellan   officer,”  who   said   upon   learning   that  
Atlanta   had   fallen,   “that   knocks   our   stocks   down   10%.”35  And the Chicago Tribune 
reported that a soldier, called on to speak at a mass meeting in Chicago a day or two after 
the  Democrats  had  finished  their  convention,  told  his  audience  that  “he  saw  more  treason  
                                                 
34. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 5, 1864. 
35. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 9, 1864. 
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during the present week in Chicago than he ever saw while marching through the 
South.”36 
Some   soldiers   lent   their   voices   to   assertions   of   McClellan’s   traitorous   kinship  
with rebels in the context of soldier voting.  A pro-Lincoln paper in Ohio printed a 
soldier’s  account  of  his  unit’s  experience  voting  in the field.  He claimed that rebels along 
his  regiment’s  front,  having  learned  when  the  Ohio  troops  would  cast  their  ballots,  timed  
an attack to disrupt the voting.   
           The election judges and clerks moved along our lines in ambulances.  It 
was a day of constant marching and fighting.  At every halt of a few 
minutes’  duration  balloting  progressed  vigorously,  votes  being  more  than  
once sandwiched in between volleys of musketry scarcely fifteen minutes 
apart.  The rebels at every charge advance with vociferous cheers for 
McClellan to which our boys reacted with cheers for Lincoln and solid 
arguments from their Enfields.  It produced a marked effect upon our 
soldiers.  What wonder that they voted almost unanimously for the Union 
ticket?  How could they fight rebels one moment, hazarding life and limb 
for the dear old government, and the next undo all they were doing by 
voting  for  Treason’s  cowardly  allies  at  the  rear?37 
 
 A different Republican paper printed a maudlin poem assailing McClellan and 
other “traitors.”      A   voting   soldier   purportedly   penned   it   under   the   pseudonym   “E.  
Pluribus.”    Written  as  a  letter  to  his  mother,  it  was  entitled,  “The  Wounded  Soldier  on  a  
Furlough:”   
Dear Mother, I remember well, 
The parting kiss you gave to me; 
When merry rang the Union bell, 
You bade me fight for liberty. 
I  did  not  dream  that  ‘Little  Mac’ 
Would thus throw off his loyal coat. 
O,  Mother  dear!  I’m  coming  back, 
Dear Mother – I’ve  come  home  to  vote. 
Chorus:  
                                                 
36. Id. Sept. 2, 1864, 3. 
37. Quoted in Young,  “Soldier  Voting  in  Ohio  During  the  Civil  War,”  70. 
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Call brother comrades to my side, 
While fawning traitors smile and dote, 
Old Abe and Andy [Andrew Johnson] suit me well; 
Dear  Mother!  I’ve  come  home  to  vote. 
Come, brother soldiers, one and all – 
Oh!  I’ll  be  with  you  by  and  by;; 
My country calls me to my home, 
Those coward traitors to defy. 
I’ve  met  the  foe  upon the field,  
Mid  cannon’s  roar  and  bugle  note;; 
Our  loyalty’s  our  only  shield  – 
Dear  Mother!  I’ve  come  home  to  vote. 
Chorus.38 
 
A pro-Lincoln   paper   in   Ohio   quoted   a   soldier   making   the   same   point   that   “E.  
Pluribus”  made,  but  with  more  humor   than   sentimentality. When offered a Democratic 
ballot  at   a  civilian  election   in  Vermont,   the   returned  veteran  purportedly   said,   “What  a  
fool I should be to go down and fight the rebels for three years with my musket, and 
come here to stab myself in the back with a piece of paper   like   this.”39 A Connecticut 
veteran sounded almost exactly the same theme. Asked if he intended to vote the 
Democratic   ticket,   the   veteran   supposedly   answered,   “I   have   been   shooting  Democrats  
for three years, and I am not in the habit of voting for the  game  I  kill.”40 
The theme of soldiers fighting rebels with their bullets and treason with their 
ballots also found expression in a bouncy partisan song composed by a woman and 
entitled  “Uncle  Abe  and  Andy”: 
We’ll  fight  the  traitors  down,  my  boys, 
No foe can stand before us; 
We’ll  vote  the  traitors  down,  my  boys, 
While  Freedom’s  Flag  waves  o’er  us. 
To  fight  and  vote,  we’ll  have  you  note, 
We’ll  do  it  all  so  handy;; 
We’re  heart  with  heart  and  hand  with  hand 
                                                 
38. Chattanooga Daily Gazette, November 8, 1864. 
39. Scioto Gazette (Chillicothe, OH), October 18, 1864. 
40. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 18, 1864. 
200  
 
With Uncle Abe and Andy.41 
 
General Joseph Hooker, appearing at a meeting of the Union Party in Brooklyn, 
assured  the  audience,  “There  are  no  Copperheads  in  the  army.     [The  soldiers]  will  fight  
well,  and  they  will  vote  well.”42 Often rank and file troops participated in the meetings to 
report on the political sentiments of their comrades.  The Chicago Tribune reported that 
at  a  meeting  in  Springfield,  Illinois,  “[t]he  soldiers  took  part  with  a  great  zest,  and  their  
denunciation of the Copperheads were terrible.  They appear to be unanimous for Lincoln 
and Johnson.”43   
The pro-Lincoln   press,   applying   the   disloyalty   syllogism   to   prove  McClellan’s  
treason, always delighted in reports from soldiers in the field about the political 
preferences of enemy soldiers. A soldier speaking at a Union party rally in Bridgeport, 
Connecticut   said   he   “heard   rebel   soldiers   cheer   the   nomination   of   Gen.  McClellan   all  
along  their  lines.”44  A Republican newspaper in Pittsburg reported an episode in Virginia 
about   two   weeks   before   the   1864   presidential   election.      “The   rebels   hung   out   a   huge 
placard at a point in their outer works before Richmond, inscribed  ‘Vote  for  McClellan.’  
The Union   troops   responded   by   opening   fire   on   both   the   placard   and   the   ‘McClellan  
canvassers   in   the   rebel   lines.”45  A Wisconsin paper a week later described the same 
incident,   elaborating   that   the   union   barrage   “knocked   placard,   breastwork,   McClellan  
canvassers and all into tinders. The Chicago platform and candidate will go up in just the 
same way on the blessed 8th [of November] proximo. – Speed  the  day!”46 
                                                 
41.  Anna  Tellez,  “Uncle  Abe  and  Andy,”  The Republican Campaign Songster for 1864 (Cincinnati: J.R. 
Hawley & Co., 1864), 51. (Reprinted by the Cornell University Library Digital Collections.) 
42. New York Times, Sept. 23, 1864, p. 1. 
43. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 9, 1864, p. 1.  
44. Id., Oct. 15, 1864, p.1. 
45. Pittsburg Daily Gazette, October 21, 1864, p.2 
46. Wisconsin State Register, October 29, 1864. 
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In September  1864,  an  Ohio  newspaper  quoted  from  “a  letter  written  [to]  us  from  
the  trenches  near  Petersburg.”  The  letter  reported,  “McClellan  stock  is  not  very  brisk  in  
the army. The rebels like his nomination too well to suit the men. On Monday evening 
the lines  on  the  rebel  side  rang  for  miles,  with  traitor  cheers  for  the  nomination  of  ‘Little  
Mac.’”47 The following month, the same paper printed a letter signed by eleven soldiers 
from the 79th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers.  As if to lend an extra measure of 
credibility  to  their  account,  the  soldiers  started  by  assuring  readers  that  they  “testify  to  the  
following  facts  as  true  to  our  knowledge.”  The  letter  went  on  to  say  that  during  the  battle  
of   Resaca   in   Georgia   “we   distinctly   and   clearly   heard   the   soldiers of the rebel army 
cheering  for  Jeff.  David  and  George  B.  McClellan….  Besides,  all  the  rebel  prisoners  with  
whom we conversed since the Presidential nominations agreed in assuring us that their 
only hope of establishing a Southern Confederacy rested on the election of Geo. B. 
McClellan   for  President   of   the  United  States.”48  The New York Times printed similar 
accounts,   reporting   that   “[t]he   rebels   cheered   for   McClellan   in   the   trenches   before  
Petersburgh   (sic)”   and  quoting  a   soldier   speaking   at   a  Union  party rally in Bridgeport, 
Connecticut, who  said  he  “heard  rebel  soldiers  cheer  the  nomination  of  Gen.  McClellan  
all  along  their  lines.”49 
Republican media sometimes told their audiences that the Confederates went 
beyond merely hoping and cheering for McClellan; they actually worked for his election.  
In  a  story  entitled  “Rebel  Electioneering  for  McClellan,”  The  New York Times related the 
experience of a wounded Union soldier captured by the Confederates.  He was released 
from the Virginia hospital to return home   upon   his   “promise   to   vote   for   George   B.  
                                                 
47. Daily Cleveland Herald, September 15, 1864. 
48. Id., October 28, 1864. 
49. New York Times, October 2, 1864 and October 15, 1864. 
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McClellan at the approaching election.... [But] all the prisoners of said hospital who 
promptly and positively said they would vote for Abraham Lincoln, were not paroled, but 
remained  in  said  hospital.”     The  Times, perhaps grateful to the opportunistic soldier for 
supplying such powerfully anti-Democratic images, was inclined to forgive him, 
observing  sympathetically  that  “it  is  hard  on  our  gallant  boys  to  have  to  choose  between  
such a cruel alternative as McClellan  or  starvation.”50 
Another pro-Lincoln paper described the conversion experience of a soldier who 
at one time had favored McClellan. The Union soldier, a captain named Southerland, was 
captured near Atlanta and later exchanged. After his release, he explained his shift to 
Lincoln.   His   rebel   guards   in   Charleston   “electioneered   with   him   for   McClellan.”   The  
paper  continued,  “Captain  Southerland  declares  that  he  never  could  nor  never  would  vote  
for   any  man  AT  THE  REQUEST  OF  ARMED  TRAITORS.”  The   story   ends  with   this 
sneer  at  Democrats:  “Let  Peace  men  put  that  in  their  pipe  and  smoke  it.”51 
 A story in a different Republican paper described the proud defiance of Union 
prisoners whose rebel captors dangled the promise of release in exchange for assurances 
that they would  vote  for  McClellan  when  they  got  back  to  the  Union  lines.  “It  is  asserted  
that [Confederate General Joseph] Wheeler, the rebel guerilla chief, offered recently to 
release a number of prisoners of the 115th Ohio, in his possession, if they would promise 
to vote for McClellan. Soldier-like,  they  said  they  would  see  him  ‘d--d  first.”52  
For vitriolic excess, no characterization of McClellan and his fellow Democrats as 
traitors  could  match  this  Union  soldier’s  letter  to  the  pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune:  
                                                 
 50. Id. at 4. 
 51. Chattanooga Daily Gazette, October 13, 1864. 
52. Mariettian (Marietta, OH), October 29, 1864. 
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What an awful odor there is to the McClellan, Seymour [Horatio Seymour, 
New  York’s  Governor],   and  Vallandigham  party!      It   is  enough   to  sicken  
the low-lived cannibals.  After all our patriotic efforts, to see men stoop so 
low as to take into their mouths the dirty toes of rebel graybacks and suck 
away for a miserable, low down, degraded peace, peace, and then, to get 
ignorant votes, delude people by proclaiming aloud, war, war.  What an 
open barefaced lie that white-livered  party  clings  to!  … From a McClellan 
administration, my good Lord deliver us!53 
 
The voice of soldiers accusing McClellan of treason also found its way into the 
1864   campaign   debate   less   directly   through   the   device   known   as   the   “straw.”  A   straw  
was a straw poll – a small sampling of voter preference, akin to modern-day pre-election 
opinion polling, without broad or statistically based sampling.  Straws were most 
typically conducted among passengers on railroads or steamships, or among patients at 
hospitals. In his study of political culture in the Civil War, Mark E. Neely, Jr. describes 
straws as an invention of Civil War party enthusiasts, invariably used to prove that their 
candidate enjoyed public support.54  
Both   parties   regularly   published   straws   (sometimes   also   called   “canvasses”)  
showing their candidate doing splendidly with one group of citizens or another, and these 
informal tallies routinely included soldiers.  Partisan operatives often conducted straws 
that combined civilian and soldier preferences on board passenger trains and steamboats.  
Sometimes partisan soldiers would send straws to their home newspapers from camps or 
hospitals at the front, and these had an exclusively military sampling.   
       For example, a pro-Lincoln paper in Cleveland reported, based on a letter from a 
lieutenant of the 60th Ohio  Volunteers,  on  a  straw  conducted  at  breakfast  in  an  officers’  
                                                 
53. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 16, 1864. (Emphasis in the original.)  
54. Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Boundaries of American Political Culture in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 39-40. Neely argues that straws were one of many forms of 
political messaging carried on at grass roots levels of party activism.  
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hospital in Annapolis. Lincoln outpolled McClellan 332-32.   “You   can   judge   for  
yourself,”   wrote   the   lieutenant,   “McClellan   does   not   stand   the   ghost   a   sight   in   the  
army.”55  A pro-Lincoln paper in Philadelphia delighted in reporting, based again on a 
soldier’s  letter,  that  Lincoln  had  outpolled  McClellan  1087-193 in a straw among soldiers 
recuperating  at  “McClellan  Hospital”  in  Philadelphia.56    
An  editor’s   note   accompanying  one straw acknowledged the obvious, that such 
tallies  didn’t  matter  much:  “Of  course,  these  are  of  no  account,  but  ‘straws’  show  which  
way  the  wind  blows.”57  Straws of soldier preferences in the fall of 1864 showed the wind 
blowing in both directions, as Democrats and Republicans alike produced an avalanche 
of these tallies showing their respective man ahead.  On a steamboat from Evansville, 
Indiana on September 16, 1864, McClellan won the straw among the soldiers, 22 votes to 
3.58  The next day, Lincoln won a straw at the Soldiers Hospital in Annapolis, Maryland, 
garnering 237 votes to just 37 for McClellan.59  But the day after that, McClellan won a 
straw among recuperating soldiers in a hospital at City Point, Virginia, 78 to 21.60  A 
straw mixing soldier and civilian tallies on board a train from Milwaukee to Detroit on 
September 20, 1864 favored McClellan over Lincoln, 53 to 39.61  But on a Chicago-
bound train leaving Milwaukee the same day, Lincoln won the straw, 74 to 31. 62  
Newspaper editors on both sides often   punctuated   the   straw’s   tabulation   with   some  
partisan commentary, such as (in the case of a straw showing that soldiers favored 
                                                 
55. Daily Cleveland Herald, September 6, 1864. 
56. North American and United States Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), September 27, 1864. There was in 
fact a hospital in Philadelphia named for McClellan. 
57. Detroit Free Press, October 28, 1864.   
58. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 16, 1864. 
59. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 17, 1864. 
60. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 18, 1864. 
61. Detroit Free Press, September 21, 1864, describing a train that left Milwaukee the day before. 
62. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 24, 1864, describing a train that left Milwaukee on September 20. 
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McClellan),   “You   can   bet   high   that   our   boys,   with   a   few   exceptions,   are   for   ‘Little  
Mac,’”   or   (in   the   case   of   a   straw   showing   they   favored   Lincoln),   “[This]   is   a   fair  
expression  of   the  army….  Little  Mac  and  his   friends  had  better  be  preparing   their  craft  
and  taking  in  rations  for  a  trip  up  Salt  River,  for  they  are  bound  to  go  up,  sure.”63   
 A reader can almost detect the twinkle in the eyes of the newspaper editors who 
sometimes used straws in their negative campaigning.  The pro-McClellan Detroit Free 
Press, for example, showed Lincoln winning in a straw among the inmates at the 
Kalamazoo Insane Asylum.64  Similarly, the pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune published a 
straw   from   Chattanooga,   Tennessee   showing   McClellan   winning   among   “[b]ounty-
jumpers  used  for  policing  hospitals  as  a  penalty  for  their  conduct.”65  
A particularly ubiquitous form of straw in pro-Lincoln papers conveyed the 
message   of  McClellan’s   perfidy   by   reporting  McClellan’s  winning   tallies   among   rebel  
soldiers.  It was another form of the Republican disloyalty syllogism: preference for 
McClellan over Lincoln among rebels proved their common interest and hence 
McClellan’s disloyalty.  A pro-Lincoln Ohio paper set up its report about a straw among 
rebel soldiers by first reporting a win by Lincoln over McClellan in a civilian straw on a 
train to Cincinnati. When the pollster announced the result to passengers, a pro-
McClellan man claimed that on an earlier train he had ridden that day, McClellan had 
won such a straw by 300 votes to 30.  A pro-Lincoln man – described  as  “a  rousing  big  
                                                 
63. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, October 1, 1864; Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 25, 1864. 
 In  the  contemporary  political  idiom,  to  “go  up  Salt  River”  meant  to  lose  an  election.  
64. Detroit Free Press, September 5, 1864. 
65. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 29, 1864. 
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fellow”  – answered  the  McClellan  man  loudly,  “That’s  so!  I  was  on  that  train  myself,  and  
the 300  votes  were  rebel  prisoners,  and  the  30  Lincoln  votes  were  their  guards.’”66  
Another paper quoted a Union soldier guarding rebel prisoners at the prison camp 
in Elmira, New York. The guard described a straw conducted among the prisoners from a 
Confederate  regiment.  “When  I  was  there,”  said  the  guard,  “there  was  a  vote  taken,  and  
every man in the regiment voted for McClellan but one, and he was ridden round the 
camp   till   he   said   he  would   vote   for  Mac.”67 In a slight variation on the straw of rebel 
soldiers, a Harrisburg paper reported that McClellan outpolled Lincoln 21-8   “among  
deserters  and  bounty  jumpers”  held  in  a  guardhouse.68  
 
Republican  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “McClellan  is  Incompetent” 
Republican   claims   of   McClellan’s   disloyalty   were the most ubiquitous and 
conspicuous of the weapons in their arsenal for tearing down his stature as a soldier. 
Another, with the same purpose, was to claim he had been incompetent as a commander. 
Allegations of his incompetence sometimes relied on the same evidence as assertions of 
his disloyalty and of his cowardice. Republican attackers sometimes attributed his 
battlefield  losses  to  his  ineptitude  (he  didn’t  know  how  to  lead  an  army),  sometimes  to  his  
disloyalty   (his   heart   wasn’t   in   the   fight   because   his loyalties lay with the South), and 
sometimes to his cowardice (he chickened out of engaging the enemy).  But all three 
themes aimed to knock McClellan off the pedestal of military greatness that his 
supporters worked hard to construct. 
                                                 
66. Daily Cleveland Herald, October 8, 1864, quoting the Dayton (OH) Journal. 
67. Chattanooga Daily Gazette, October 16, 1864. 
68. Daily Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October 12, 1864. 
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McClellan was an easy target of charges of military incompetence, having led the 
Union armies to many more defeats than victories during his eighteen months of 
command.  Rallies of the Union Party, as Republicans rebranded themselves to facilitate 
alliance with war Democrats, routinely featured speeches elaborately celebrating 
McClellan’s  string  of  military  failures,  preferably  by  a  speaker  who  was  a  military  figure.  
Former  union  general  and  now  congressman  John  F.  Farnsworth’s  appearance  at  a  party  
meeting in Newark was typical.  According to the Newark Daily Advertiser, Farnsworth, 
who had served under McClellan as a cavalry officer, gave an inspired speech detailing 
the  many  times  McClellan  had  “completely  failed,”  including  a  string  of  setbacks  in  the  
Peninsula Campaign.  McClellan had failed, for example, to follow up on good positions 
gained   against   the  Rebels,   always   choosing   to  wait   or   retreat.      “Richmond  might   have  
been   taken   repeatedly   by   other   Generals,”   said   Farnsworth.      A   resolution   at   a   “grand  
Union  meeting”  in  Brooklyn  proclaimed  that  in  candidate  McClellan,  “we  have  a  General  
whose   history   is   an   apology,   and  whose   career   is   a   failure.”      Such  meetings  were   not  
deliberative gatherings, but the newspaper account dutifully reported that the resolution 
was  “adopted  unanimously.”69   
Republicans   delighted   in   reminding   voters   in   clever   ways   about   McClellan’s  
numerous embarrassments as commanding general, most of them familiar to newspaper 
audiences   that   had   followed   the   war’s   progress   in   detail.   They   recalled,   for   example, 
McClellan’s   having   been   duped   at   Yorktown   into   halting   his   already   slow   campaign  
because he believed a large artillery emplacement threatened his position.  In fact, the 
poorly equipped Confederates had merely cut down trees, painted the big logs black to 
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look   like   cannons,   and   pointed   the   harmless   logs   toward   the   Union   lines.      (“Quaker  
Guns,”   McClellan’s   detractors   called   the   phony   artillery.)      And   Republicans   enjoyed  
ridiculing the famous verbal contortions McClellan had devised at the end of the Seven 
Days  battles  to  avoid  describing  his  army’s  movement  away  from  the  victorious  enemy  
as   a   retreat.      (He   had   not   retreated,   but   had   merely   “changed   his   base,”   he   reported  
euphemistically.)   This was all the more mortifying because McClellan had promised at 
the  outset  of  the  conflict  to  “drive  the  rebels  to  the  wall.”    A  Republican  campaign  poem  
wove together all these embarrassments, so familiar to Civil War audiences.  Its refrain 
mocked  McClellan’s  answer  “I  do  not   remember”   to  a  hostile  question  from  Congress’  
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.  The song included these stanzas about his 
performance as a commander: 
Was it your own mighty brain 
Planned that wonderful campaign, 
Where such myriads died in vain? 
 I  don’t  remember! 
 
Did you, after Yorktown’s  fall, 
“Drive  the  rebels  to  the  wall?” 
Or  at  a  snail’s  pace  did  you  crawl? 
 I  don’t  remember! 
 
Did  you  run  a  seven  day’s  race, 
While  old  “Stonewall”  gave  you  chase? 
Or  was  it  a  “change  of  base?’ 
 I  don’t  remember!70 
 
Another device for diminishing his reputation as a good soldier was to draw 
comparisons between McClellan and other Union generals, always to the disadvantage of 
McClellan, of course.  This became easier as summer turned to fall in 1864, but when 
McClellan was nominated in late August, his record did not stand out unfavorably in 
                                                 
70. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 15, 1864. 
209  
 
comparisons with most other Union generals.  At that time, the Union military effort 
indeed appeared to have failed, just as the Democratic platform said.  In the east, Lee had 
locked Grant in a stalemate outside Petersburg,  Virginia,  after  Grant’s  army  had  suffered  
ghastly casualties in the campaign to get there.  Sherman in the west seemed similarly 
stalled in his slow push through northern Georgia toward Atlanta.  The Confederate 
strategy  of  exhausting  the  Union’s  will to fight seemed to be working.  In the context of 
the   Union’s   overall   military   frustration,   Democrats   could   plausibly   blame   anything  
lackluster   in   McClellan’s   record   from   1861-62 on the overarching failings of the 
administration’s  conduct  of  the  war.     
 That all changed abruptly in the late summer and early fall.  Farragut took Mobile 
Bay,  Sherman  took  Atlanta,  and  Sheridan  swept  the  Shenandoah  Valley.    As  the  Union’s  
military fortunes brightened, Republicans could point to an array of successful Union 
generals with whom McClellan suffered in comparison.  And it was particularly easy to 
compare  McClellan  unfavorably  to  Lee.    McClellan’s  1862  campaign  against  Richmond,  
known now as the Peninsula Campaign but often referred to then as the Chickahominy 
Campaign  (for   the  river  on  which  much  of  the  fighting  occurred)  was  McClellan’s  first  
and probably most ignominious setback.  Vastly outnumbered, Lee out-generaled 
McClellan and sent the federals back north in frustration.  Republicans in 1864 happily 
seized on the debacle as campaign ammunition.  One newspaper called McClellan the 
“Chickahominy  grave-digger.”71  Another  quoted  General  Joe  Hooker’s  testimony  before  
the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. Hooker had served under 
McClellan in the Peninsula campaign. In late 1863, he gained celebrity status with his 
victory in the Battle of Lookout Mountain, redeeming the damage his reputation suffered 
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earlier that year at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Speaking with the authority of an 
accomplished soldier, Hooker told the congressmen that the failure of the Peninsula 
campaign   “was   due   to   the   incapacity   of   the   General   commanding.” 72   The general 
commanding, of course, was McClellan. 
Yet  another  Republican  paper,  lumping  McClellan’s  defeat  with  failures by other 
Union generals of Democratic pedigree, compared them all with more successful 
northern commanders: 
McClellan’s  Chickahominy  campaign  was  a  failure.    [Failures  by  Generals  Buell  
and Banks, also well known Democrats, were also cited.]...Almost all [these 
failures], without exception, have come from bad leadership---from the want of 
either the right moral earnestness, or of the right military ability in the men to 
whom the movements were committed...But under the Commanders which have 
been found equal to their responsibilities, Grant and Sherman, and Farragut ... and 
such men as Sheridan ... there has (sic) been no failures of any account – on the 
other hand, a wonderful series of successes.73 
 
 When comparing him to other generals, his critics often played  on  McClellan’s  
famous ostentation, as when he paraded in front of his own troops, basking in their 
adoration (which was genuine), and his caution, as when he drilled his men endlessly but 
committed them to actual battles only grudgingly.  Some of these criticisms, of course, 
were unfair.  McClellan had taken over the Army of the Potomac at a time when 
organization, drilling, and a lift in morale were exactly what the army needed most.  
These he supplied, using his charisma and administrative talents to good effect.  In his 
Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the Civil War, James McPherson said of McClellan, 
“He  instilled  discipline  and  pride  in  his  men,  who  repaid  him  with  an  admiration  they  felt  
toward no other General.  McClellan forged the Army of the Potomac into a fighting 
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machine second to none – this was his important contribution to ultimate Union 
victory....”74 
But that contribution was less important to the electorate, and therefore less 
valuable politically, than battlefield victories, of which McClellan could claim very few.  
A New York Times editorial drew the unfavorable contrast between McClellan and other 
generals effectively.  It argued that early in the conflict, before the country had come to 
understand the character and scale of the war,  
when a man with epaulets who could ride a horse on parade was likely to be 
hailed as great General, it was natural and excusable to mistake Gen. McClellan 
for a new Napoleon.  But that day of early innocence has passed away.  The glitter 
of regimentals has been tarnished.  We have since then too much experience of 
the realities of war to be longer deceived by its shams and shows.  [Now] we have 
had Generals who could fight the enemy as well as parade their own troops; who 
could hurl fifty regiments of valiant men, like so many winged thunderbolts, upon 
the enemy, as well as sit in camp and calculate the chances of defeat or ride to the 
rear to look out a safe resting place for a beaten army.75 
 
 A Wisconsin paper ridiculed the notion that McClellan, who had cultivated the 
nickname Little Napoleon, deserved to be associated with the great Frenchman. 
McClellan,   the   paper   sneered,   is   “this   veteran   of   a   thousand   cheers   and   not   a   single  
charge,   greeted   by   Napoleon’s   huzzahs,   though   innocent   of   Napoleon’s   battles, this 
calico  hero,  this  knight  in  pantalets  …  a  military  nobody.”76  
Given the galvanizing effect of the fall of Atlanta on the public spirit, Republican 
partisans were particularly eager to draw comparisons between McClellan and Sherman.  
They found good material  for   tearing  down  McClellan  not   just  in  Sherman’s  better  war  
record, but also in the contrasting styles of the two men.  For this, Republicans made the 
most   of  McClellan’s   image   as   a   preening   bureaucrat   who   never   won   battles.      In   this  
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telling, when first   taking  on  his   assignment   at   the  head  of   the  Union’s  western   armies,  
Sherman,  “[s]till  diffident  of  himself,”  had  quietly  and  modestly  studied  his  assignment   
instead of setting himself to the task of studying partisan politics and official 
impertinences.... He [Sherman] saw what was the scope of the duty. He got about 
doing it--not as an ape, but as a man; not as a General by prescriptive right, but as 
a plain, practical soldier.... Who shall be the exemplar for the soldiers of the 
Republic hereafter?  This plain, practical man, who... wins?  or this partisan hero 
in epaulets, who struts his brief hour as the martinet-in-chief of the camp, rushes 
to the field with neither counsel nor discretion to guide him, and comes back 
stripped of his feathers – a pretender among honest soldiers?  The Georgia 
campaigner or the juvenile Napoleon – which?77 
 
 Comparisons of the styles of the two men extended to their styles of writing. 
While this subject had no relevance to the relative military skills of the two men, 
Republican  polemicists  found  it  a  useful  way  to  revisit  the  fruitful  subject  of  McClellan’s  
infamous letter accepting the Democratic nomination (about which more is offered in the 
discussion of cowardice, below).  The Chicago Tribune, addressing an audience already 
familiar   with   the   newspaper’s   low   opinion   of  McClellan’s   letter,   described   Sherman’s  
writing style in terms they knew would imply favorable comparisons with McClellan, 
and  make  McClellan  look  less  soldierly  as  well.    Sherman’s   
letters are all to the point; he wastes no words, deals in no sophistry or 
concealments, employs no honeyed phrases, and holds out no false promises to 
friends or foe.... He writes as he would shoot a rifle – straight at the center of the 
mark, and drives the nail every shot.78  
 
When a pro-McClellan   paper   said   of   a   speech   the   general   gave   at  West   Point   that   “it  
placed him in the highest ranks of literature and oratory, the pro-Lincoln Daily Palladium 
in   New   Haven   ridiculed   the   claim.   “We   think   he   ranks   about   as   near   to   Homer and 
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Shakespeare in literature, or Demosthenes and Cicero in oratory, as he does to 
Marlborough  and  Napoleon  in  generalship.”79    
 The   contrasts   between   Sherman’s   correspondence   and   McClellan’s   letter   of  
acceptance  gained  currency  in  Republican’s  political communications, again in terms that 
diminished  McClellan’s  stature  as  a   soldier.     One  advertisement invited Republicans to 
“Compare the Soldier Sherman’s   Letter   and   the   Candidate McClellan’s   Letter,   then 
Attend  the  Union  Mass  Meeting.”80 
 Republican outlets similarly drew comparisons between McClellan and Grant to 
elevate   Grant   and   disparage  McClellan.      “[T]o   compare   the   Chickahominy   Campaign  
with   any   of   [Grant’s]   campaigns   is   at   once   pitiful   and   painful.” 81  Grant, himself a 
Democrat before the war, helped the cause of diminishing McClellan with a letter to his 
friend, Congressman Elihu Washburne of Illinois.  Washburne, who had sponsored 
Grant’s  appointment  to  West  Point,  praised  him  regularly  in  House  speeches,  and  Grant  
must have known Washburne would make his letter public.  In it, Grant described the 
South’s   dwindling   resources   and   asserted   that   Northern   resolve   would   assure   Union  
success.  He then sounded a theme that Republicans would repeat throughout the 
campaign to diminish McClellan.      “I   have   no   doubt but the enemy are exceedingly 
anxious to hold out until after the Presidential election.  They have many hopes from its 
effects....  They  hope  the  election  of  the  peace  candidate.”82   
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The most comprehensive argument that McClellan was incompetent appeared as a 
thirty two-page   pamphlet   entitled   “McClellan’s   Military   Career   Reviewed   and  
Exposed.”83 A correspondent for the pro-Lincoln New York Times, William Swinton, 
wrote it, and the Union Congressional Committee distributed it for the campaign. It is an 
impressive piece of forensic history. Focusing mostly on the abortive Peninsula 
Campaign, and relying heavily on official communiqués McClellan sent and received, 
Swinton assails McClellan as a failed strategist and bungling field commander. He 
regularly exaggerated the strength of the forces he faced, Swinton showed, was easily 
duped   by   the   enemy’s   feints   and   deceptions,   failed   to   oversee   the   actions   of   his  
subordinates during battles, and approached his role with both pomposity (staging 
“reviews,   parades,   and   sham   fights”84) and timidity. Swinton spiced his attacks with 
personal  insults:  McClellan  took  on  more  of  the  nation’s  command  responsibilities  than  
his  “pigmy  shoulders”  could  bear;;  his  offensive  efforts  were  “feeble;;”  he  moved  forward  
only  by  “elevating  his  mettle”  and  overcoming  his  own  “hesitating  and  cautious  spirit;;”  
he  “shirked  his  duty”  to  move  forward  pursuant  to  Lincoln’s  commands;;  and  he  indulged  
a  “wildly  puerile  ambition.”85 
 
Republican  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “McClellan  Is  A  Coward” 
Compounding   the   disqualifying   effects   of   McClellan’s   disloyalty   and  
incompetence,   in   Republicans’   telling,   was   his   cowardice,   both   moral   and   physical.  
Charges that McClellan was a moral coward grew mostly out of the essential 
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schizophrenia of the Democratic   nominating   convention   in   1864.      The   party’s   internal  
divisions made a coherent outcome unlikely from the start, but the convention that 
nominated McClellan elevated incoherence to an art form. It was a gift to Republicans. 
The gathering showcased the   party’s   profound   internal   differences   over   the  war,   once  
again exposing all Democrats to charges of disloyalty even as it opened their standard 
bearer to charges of cowardice. 
By the time the party leaders gathered in Chicago in August, pro-war Democrat 
McClellan  was  the  clear  frontrunner  for  the  nomination.    But  the  party’s  most  prominent  
opponent   of   the  war,  Clement  Vallandigham,   stood   in  McClellan’s  way.   Earlier   in   the  
war,  Vallandigham’s   antiwar   zealotry   had   led   to   his   prosecution   in   a  military   tribunal, 
which convicted him and sentenced him to confinement for the duration of the war.  After 
the Supreme Court declined to set aside the conviction, Lincoln modified the sentence by 
ordering Vallandigham exiled to the South.  He found his way to Canada and campaigned 
from there for Governor of Ohio in 1863.86   His opponent, war Democrat John Brough, 
won that election in a landslide, but Vallandigham had become the darling of peace 
Democrats.  He returned to the United States in 1864 to attend the Democrats’  
nominating convention in Chicago, where he expected (and hoped) to be arrested.  
Lincoln wisely chose to ignore him.  Safely in Chicago, where he was introduced to the 
convention   as   “the   Honorable   Exile   and   Patriot,”   Vallandigham   soon   became   George  
McClellan’s  problem.87 
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The convention received Vallandigham as a celebrity, and his fellow antiwar 
Democrats – about half the total delegates – treated him as a hero.88  He was in a strong 
position to advance his agenda, and he pushed the advantage.  War Democrats faced a 
quandary.  They knew that victory in November required party unity, and they could not 
afford to estrange the antiwar wing.  But accommodating that wing posed dangers, too. 
Vallandigham’s  agenda  jeopardized  the  party’s  chances  by  exposing  Democrats to even 
more Republican charges of treason.  Compromise of some sort seemed essential.   
  The compromises that emerged proved costly for McClellan, ultimately 
exposing him to charges that he lacked the courage of his convictions – in modern 
parlance that  he  was  a  “flip-flopper.”    First,  to  balance  his  spot  at  the  head  of  the  ticket,  
the party nominated George Pendleton as his running mate.  Pendleton was a southern-
sympathizing, Vallandigham-style peace   Democrat   from   Ohio.” 89   For Republican 
propagandists like Andrew Dickinson White, that alone tainted the entire ticket as 
traitorous.     Second,   the   antiwar  wing  put   its  mark  on   the  party  platform  with   a   “peace  
plank”  that  Vallandigham  himself  had  drafted.    It  demanded  an  end  to  the  war: 
...after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of 
war,... justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that 
immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view of 
an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the 
end that, at the earliest practical moment, peace may be restored on the 
basis of the Federal Union of the States.90 
 
These sentiments made Republican charges of Democratic defeatism and 
disloyalty seem credible.  Objective observers could reasonably   interpret   the  call   for  “a  
cessation  of  hostilities,”  without  preconditions,   to  mean  that  Democrats  placed  a  higher  
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priority on peace than on union.91   Unconstrained by objectivity, Republican partisans 
gleefully characterized the platform as a total capitulation to the Confederacy.  In an open 
letter   to   “the  People   of   the  United  States,”   the   pro-Lincoln National Union Committee 
said  of  the  Chicago  convention  that  it  “gives  a  silent  approval  of  the  rebellion  itself....    In  
all essential respects the action that convention took accords with the results the rebels 
seek.    Both  desire  a  cessation  of  hostilities.”92  The Chicago Tribune, always vigorous in 
supporting  Republicans,  called  the  Democratic  convention  “a  Richmond  concern.    It  got  
its shape and animus from the Confederacy.  It was directed beforehand how to proceed, 
and  it  obeyed.”93 
 As  the  convention  closed,  the  party’s  pro-war  leaders  saw  the  platform’s  glaring  
weakness. Anticipating the Republican attack, they set out to persuade McClellan to 
“clarify”   the   platform   in   his   acceptance   message.94  They had about a week to do it.  
Unlike modern conventions, where the nominee attends as the headline attraction, 
nineteenth-century candidates practiced the charade of detaching themselves from the 
hurly-burly of partisan politics.  They left the convention to their surrogates, received 
written notice of the nomination after the convention ended, and accepted in a letter that 
invariably   feigned   modest   reluctance.      McClellan’s   acceptance   letter,   his   pro-war 
advisors   hoped,  would   serve   as   the   vehicle   for   escaping   the   hazards   of   the   platform’s  
antiwar theme.   
McClellan needed little prodding.  He saw the political danger clearly enough, 
and  he  certainly  did  not  share  Vallandigham’s   loathing  of   the  war.     Whatever his other 
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failings, George McClellan was thoroughly devoted to the army and to the cause of 
restoring the Union.  He wanted no association with implications that the war he had 
fought  was  a  failed  “experiment”  or  that  the  soldiers  he  had  commanded  were  “failures,”  
which  was  precisely  the  gist  of  the  platform’s  message,  according  to  Republicans. 
Another problem with the platform became evident to McClellan as he pondered 
the wording of his acceptance letter.  With timing that must have seemed diabolical to all 
Democrats,  the  Union’s  military  fortunes  brightened  dramatically  almost  the  moment  the  
Chicago convention closed on August 29.  Sherman captured Atlanta on September 3, 
tremendously boosting the flagging war spirits of the North.  Following shortly on the 
heels  of  David  Farragut’s  naval  triumph  at  Mobile  Bay,  where  the  old  admiral  famously  
damned  the  torpedoes,  the  fall  of  Atlanta  made  the  platform’s  indictment  of  the  war  as  a  
“failure”  look premature, if not silly.   
 With all this, McClellan readily undertook a repositioning effort in his acceptance 
letter.  Written ten days after the close of the convention, it waffled masterfully.  In 
keeping with the bedrock principles of the faction of his party that supported the war but 
opposed turning it into a fight against slavery, McClellan argued that the war should be 
pursued  only  for  “the  preservation  of  our  Union  [which]  was  the  sole  avowed  purpose  for  
which   the   war   was   commenced.”      Making   no   mention   of   the   war’s   “failure”   or   of   a  
“cessation   of   hostilities,”   he   distanced   himself   from   the   peace   platform   without  
repudiating   it   directly.      Instead,   he   spoke   of   the   need   for   a   “spirit   of   conciliation   and  
compromise...in  the  hearts  of  the  people.”    He  urged  efforts  to   
...exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations, 
and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with honor 
and the interests of the country, to secure [the] peace, reestablish the 
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Union, and guarantee the future of the Constitutional rights of every state.  
The Union is the one condition of peace.  We ask no more.95 
 
It   was   fancy   political   footwork   and   an   artful   “clarification,”   effectively   shifting   the  
party’s   priority   from   peace   to   union.      McClellan   predicted   shortly   before   sending   his  
letter   that   it   “would be acceptable to all true patriots, & will only drive off the real 
adherents  of  Jeff  Davis  this  side  of  the  line.”96  
As to Democrats, he was right.  After some initial grumbling and threats to start a 
third party, even Vallandigham and the peace Democrats ended up supporting 
McClellan.97   Republicans  were  having  none  of  it.    They  saw  in  McClellan’s  acceptance  
letter an opening to attack his fitness for office.  They used it to build the case that 
McClellan was irresolute – essentially a coward.  The first step in constructing that 
argument was to tether McClellan to the peace plank.  He may not have drafted it, and he 
may have wished convention delegates had drafted it differently, but Republicans insisted 
that the Democratic candidate was stuck with both the party and its platform.  The 
Chicago  convention  became  “McClellan’s  convention,”  and   the  platform  – peace plank 
and all – became   “McClellan’s   platform.” 98   At a Massachusetts rally, Republican 
Senator Sumner made the point humorously.  Referring to the spectacle of a candidate 
retreating  from  his  own  party’s  platform,  Sumner  started  with  a  joke  that  became  a  staple  
of the campaign: 
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The cry of the railroad conductor is transferred to politics, -- “It   is  
dangerous  to  stand  on  the  platform.”    Nobody  has  made greater efforts to 
get away from it than the Presidential candidate of the Democracy, who 
forgets, that, as a candidate, he is born with the platform, and united to it, 
as the Siamese twins are united together, so that the two cannot be 
separated.99 
 
After tarring him as disloyal for his ties to the convention, Republicans argued 
that   McClellan’s   acceptance   letter   showed   the   character   failings   of   a   coward.      As  
Republicans constructed the argument, the letter proved that McClellan lacked precisely 
those qualities that nineteenth-century Americans associated with good soldiering: 
“manliness”  and  courage.     Rooted  in  powerful  currents  of  national  culture,  going  to  the  
heart of what it meant to be a man and a soldier, these arguments were forceful tools for 
discrediting McClellan.  Civil War scholarship exploring the motivation of the troops on 
both sides has identified courage as the central value that soldiers were determined to 
express in battle.  It was the most important of the soldierly virtues.   In their 
correspondence   and   memoirs,   soldiers   used   the   terms   “courage”   and   “manhood”  
interchangeably.      They   spoke   of   courage   as   the   “manliest   of   virtues.”      Joshua  
Chamberlain, a hero of Gettysburg and winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 
addressed the question of how men could bring themselves to stand up to enemy fire in 
the  horrifying  way  required  by  Civil  War  battlefield  tactics.    “Simple  manhood”  was  the  
first of the motivations he identified.100   
 To   question   one’s   “manhood,”   then,   was   to   question   his   courage and by 
implication   his   adequacy   as   a   soldier.      Republican   partisans   seized   on   McClellan’s  
waffling letter of acceptance to raise precisely that question.  One pro-Lincoln editorial 
                                                 
99. Charles Sumner and George F. Hoar, Charles Sumner:  His Complete Works (Boston: Lee & 
Shepard, 1900) 11: 421. 
100. Linderman, Embattled Courage, 8; McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 6.   
221  
 
suggested that McClellan, widely known as a war Democrat for whom the   platform’s  
peace plank must have been unpalatable, should have written a letter forthrightly 
rejecting  both  the  peace  platform  and  the  nomination.    “Had  Gen.  McClellan  thus  played  
the  man,”  wrote  the  New York Times, “he  would  have  won  to  himself  every  loyal heart in 
the  land.”101  Another editorial seized on this concept of manhood in chiding McClellan 
for   failing   either   to   agree   or   disagree   with   the   platform’s   two   most   controversial  
statements:      its  characterization  of   the  war  as  a  “failure,”  and   its  call   for an immediate 
“cessation  to  hostilities:”    “A  candidate  of  thorough  manhood  would  have  met  both  with  
downright assent or dissent.... It is humiliating.  What a pitiful exhibition this man, with 
the epaulettes of a Major-General still on his shoulders makes as a party posture-
master.”102 
 An editorial in the pro-Lincoln Milwaukee Daily Sentinel tied   McClellan’s  
acceptance letter directly to his qualifications as a man and soldier:  
Frankness has always been regarded as a prominent trait of the true soldier.  
Frankness, sincerity and courage go naturally together, for the brave man needs 
no disguise and will let all the world know his real sentiments whenever he 
attempts to publish them at all.  Gen. McClellan, in his letter of acceptance, seems 
to have been deficient, temporarily at least, in these soldierly qualities.103 
 
Similarly, the Boston Liberator called  the  acceptance  letter  “indirect  and  unmanly”  and  
an   example   of   McClellan’s   “characteristic   cowardly,   roundabout   way”   of   taking   a  
position.104  Harpers Weekly piled  on,  claiming  that  McClellan’s  letter  was  “confused  and  
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verbose: wanting both the manly directness of the soldier and the earnest conviction of 
the  patriot.”105 
Some   critics   described   the   waffling   character   of   McClellan’s   letter   in   terms  
suggesting that he was thereby taking cover in an un-soldierly way.  The Civil War 
culture of courage and manliness demanded that military officers demonstrate their 
bravery  by  example  to  the  troops  under  them.    They  did  this  by  “conspicuous  exposure  to  
enemy   fire.”106  To demonstrate courage, officers were expected under this model of 
bravery to lead from the front, exposing themselves to the same perils as the men under 
their command.  At Gettysburg, just   before   Pickett’s   charge,   Union General Winfield 
Scott Hancock cemented his place in American military lore by slowly and self-
consciously riding his horse along the entrenched lines on the crest of Cemetery Hill, 
pretending to be indifferent to the explosion of Confederate artillery shells all around 
him.  He believed it would inspire his men to behave courageously if they saw the 
“exemplary  performance”  of  their  General  exposing  himself  so  bravely.107  A captain in 
the  47th  Ohio,  describing  a  lesser  skirmish,  said  his  “boys  besought  me  to  take  cover,  but  
I knew what must be done, ... therefore I set the example by taking the most exposed 
place.”108   
The   unwillingness   “to   expose   himself,”   therefore,   carried   the  meaning   that   the  
actor was a coward – the antithesis of a soldier.  So, when a writer to the New York Times 
described   the  waffling   attendant   to  McClellan’s   letter   of   acceptance   as   the   behavior   of  
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“[t]he  General  who  does  not  like  to  expose  himself  by  a  personal  expression  of  opinions,”  
the suggestion of cowardice was hardly veiled.109  The intent was to diminish the stature 
of McClellan as a soldier by suggesting, with a value-laden phrase carrying strong 
meaning to readers, that he had failed the test of courage by which soldiers and officers 
were measured.   
Pennsylvania congressman Thaddeus Stevens delighted in undercutting 
McClellan’s  manhood  and  didn’t  bother  with  subtlety  to  do  it.    Leaving  to  others  the  task  
of showing unmanliness in the acceptance letter, Stevens showed it by reference to 
McClellan’s   body   parts.   He   effectively   feminized   McClellan   before   a   Union   League 
audience in October 1864 by contrasting the physiques of Lincoln and McClellan. On 
dress parade, Stevens said scornfully, McClellan made  
a great sensation among the ladies. They call him dear little band-box Mac. In 
these qualities, it must be confessed that Lincoln is no match for him. His 
[Lincoln’s]   big   fists   were   not  made   to   wear   kid   gloves….   They   were   made   to  
grasp the oaken helve and swing the tempered steel of the woodman. His arms, 
instead of being artistically rounded and tapered, are sinewy and long as 
Cyclops’s. Nor is he a graceful horseman. His legs, instead of being padded to fit 
a quilted saddle, are long, with joints like Hercules. Put him astride of 
McClellan’s  prancing  parade  horse   and  you  would   think  he  was  walking  with  a  
frisky pony between   his   legs….   If   [McClellan   and   Lincoln]   should   encounter,  
either physically or mentally, the giant grip of the Rail Splitter will tear the 
polished dandy from the ground and hurl him farther than an Indian shoots his 
arrow. Which of these men will you choose to guide the rolling ship in the midst 
of a storm?110 
 
Pro-Lincoln  political  cartoonists  had  fun  with  McClellan’s  predicament  over   the  
platform,   sometimes  making   Stevens’   point   in   picture   form.   The   following   lithograph,  
published in Boston, compares  the  Republicans’  platform  with  the  Democrats’.  In  the  left  
panel, Ulysses Grant, David Farragut, and local favorite Charles Sumner carry Lincoln 
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and Lady Liberty atop the Republican platform. On the right panel, Clement 
Vallandigham shoves a reluctant and dwarfish McClellan up onto the Democratic 
platform,   saying,   “Don’t   be   afraid,   little   Mac.   I’ll   support   you.”   McClellan   responds  
timorously,  “No,  Val;;   it   is   too  much,   such  a   frail,   slippery  box.   I’ll   certainly  break  my  
neck!”   Snakes   support   the   platform,   which is made of cheese. New York Democrats 
Horatio   Seymour   and   Fernando  Wood   look   on,   the   latter   saying,   “All   true   friends   of  
slaves  and  their  masters  should  join  our  company.”  John  Bull,  representing  Great  Britain,  
reads a pro-McClellan issue of the London Times. 
  
Illustration originally published by Louis Prang & Co., Boston, Platforms Illustrated, 1864. Library of 
Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction Number: 
LC-USZ62-7176 . 
 
A cartoon published in   New   York   is   less   playful.      Entitled   “How   Columbia  
receives   McClellan’s   Salutation   from   the   Chicago   Platform,”   it   shows   Pendleton  
preening,  observing  that  if  McClellan  dies,  “I  will  be  President,  and  will  make  everything  
sweet   for   my   Southern   friends.”   A host of peace Democrats, including George 
Woodward and Clement Vallandigham, support the platform with McClellan on it.  
McClellan  stands  on  his  letter  of  acceptance,  “with  which  he  fancies  he  has  concealed  the  
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Platform. He salutes Columbia, courting her smiles,”   but   to   no   avail.   She   spurns   him,  
saying,  “What  a  shame  that  a  man  who  was  educated  at  my  expense  [at  West  Point],  and  
whom I have since honored and petted, should have allowed himself to be allured by 
ambition into such company, and upon such a Platform! His letter cannot conceal his real 
ambition,   nor   hide   those   odious   ‘planks;;’   neither   can   it   reconcile   him   to   his   traitorous  
companions.  I  DISCARD  BOTH  HIM  AND  THEM  FOREVER.”   
 
Illustration originally published in New York, How Columbia receives McLellan's Salutation from the 
Chicago Platform,1864, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, 
American, Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-40791. 
 
It is one thing for a candidate to lack the courage of his convictions, as 
Republicans  asserted  based  on  McClellan’s  acceptance  letter.    It  is  quite  another  to  claim  
that he lacks physical courage.  Republicans leveled that charge, too.  We can think of it, 
almost  literally,  as  McClellan’s  “swift  boat”  problem,  a  nineteenth-century variant of the 
accusations Republicans directed at Democrat John Kerry in the 2004 presidential 
campaign.   
William  Swinton’s  lengthy  attack  on  McClellan  for  his  failures  on  the  Peninsula  
included assertions that McClellan himself was never personally present during the 
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several   engagements   with   Lee’s   forces,   while   his   own   troops   showed   valor   in   his  
absence. 111  The clear implication was that McClellan lacked backbone. The most 
celebrated example of his supposed physical cowardice was an episode variously referred 
in  political  attacks  as  the  “gunboat  episode,”  the  “ride  to  the  rear,”  or  the  “Galena  affair.”    
It   occurred   at   a   place   called   Harrison’s   Landing   toward   the   end   of   the   Peninsula  
Campaign  in  1862,  just  before  the  Union  army’s  ignominious  withdrawal.    Not far from 
Harrison’s  Landing,  the  fierce  battle  of  Malvern  Hill  was  underway,  the  last  big  fight  of  
the   campaign.      In   the  Republicans’   telling,  McClellan   ran   away   to   save   his   own   skin,  
fleeing the battlefield for the safety of the gunboat Galena on the James River.  William 
Swinton  treats  the  episode  as  of  a  piece  with  McClellan’s  penchant  for  absenting  himself  
from the scene of any fighting.112 Other Republican partisans trumpeted the story in their 
pro-Lincoln papers as Election Day approached.  The Chicago Tribune, for example, 
published  an  eyewitness  report  breathlessly  attesting  to  McClellan’s  panicky  escape  from  
the fighting.  The witness described McClellan scurrying to board a departing gunboat 
just as the battle of Malvern Hill began to rage.113  Describing the same incident, the New 
York Times expressed  shock   that  at   the  height  of   the  battle,  McClellan  would  “...cower  
before the foe, and with his army deformed, demoralized and reduced to half its original 
number, fly to the protection of the gunboats   at   Harrison’s   Landing,   strewing   his  
circuitous  route  with  the  dead  and  mutilated  bodies  of  his  devoted  soldiers.”114 
Campaigning   for   Lincoln,   Thaddeus   Stevens   linked   McClellan’s   military  
ineffectiveness to his physical cowardice; McClellan failed to press the enemy because he 
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was frightened. In the Peninsula campaign, Stevens told a raucous pro-Lincoln audience, 
McClellan   “never   ventured   to   attack   the   enemy.   When   they   got   tired   of   waiting   and  
attacked him, he was seven days fighting and running until, far in advance of his army, he 
found   a   safe   place   on   board   a   gunboat.”115  In   an   editorial   entitled   “The   Imbecility   of  
McClellan,”   a   pro-Lincoln paper made the same linkage. Referring to a succession of 
battlefield setbacks during the Peninsula campaign, the paper  said,  “He  was  deficient  at  
Yorktown, absent at Williamsburg, surprised at Fair Oaks, taken in the flank and rear at 
Gaines  Mill,  and  frightened  out  of  his  wits  at  Malvern  Hill.”116  
Currier and Ives published this anti-McClellan political cartoon ridiculing the 
candidate   for   his   gunboat   escapade.   Entitled   “The   Gunboat   Candidate,”   it   depicts  
McClellan on a saddle mounted on the spar of the Galena. Peering through a telescope at 
the  distant   battle   at  Malvern  Hill,  McClellan   intones,   “Fight  on  my  brave  Soldiers and 
push the enemy to the wall, from this spanker boom your beloved General looks down 
upon  you.”   
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Illustration originally published by Currier and Ives, The gunboat candidate at the Battle of Malvern Hill, 
1864. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, 
Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-92038. 
 
A  Massachusetts  paper  joked  that  the  candidate’s  name,  G.B.  McClellan  stood  for  
“Gun   Boat  McClellan,”117 while a Republican paper in Wisconsin deployed humor in 
mocking McClellan with this poem: 
Last, glorious Malvern taught the foe, 
What deeds the Northmen dared; 
Bold Mac, far off in gunboat lay, –  
Of course he was not scared! 
The hero scared? That could not be. 
He heard no bullets whiz. 
He always found in shooting times, 
He  had  some  other  ‘biz.’118 
 
This   tale   of   cowardice   rounded   out   the   Republicans’   portrait   of  McClellan   the  
milksop posing as hero.  Not only was he disloyal and inept, but he also lacked guts.  
Sometimes the message was cloaked in humor.  The New York Times quipped that a 
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portrait of McClellan displayed at a mass meeting of Democrats was probably exposed to 
more  gunpowder  from  the  fireworks  at  the  gathering  than  the  General  himself  had  “ever  
smelt...in   the   whole   course   of   his   military   career.” 119   But fundamentally it was no 
laughing matter to suggest that a commander was unwilling to face enemy fire.  It 
attacked his standing as a leader and soldier, and it was all part of the effort to topple 
McClellan  from  his  perch  as  supposed  heir  to  America’s  tradition of military glory.  And, 
just as with charges that he was disloyal and militarily inept, accusations that McClellan 
was a coward touched on subjects that soldiers could speak about with unique authority. 
So  Republicans  and  Unionists  brought  soldiers’  voices to bear once again. 
General John A Logan was one of those voices. Logan, for whom Logan Circle in 
Washington D.C. is named, had served as an Illinois state senator before the war and 
would serve in the U.S. House of Representatives after the war, was not shy about 
entering   the   political   fray   on   Lincoln’s   behalf   even   while   serving   as   a   commissioned  
officer. At a pro-Lincoln   rally   in   Carbondale,   Illinois,   Logan   seized   on   McClellan’s  
acceptance letter as evidence that McClellan was un-soldierly and a coward. Referring to 
the  “peace  plank”  of  the  Democratic  platform,  Logan  said  that  McClellan,  “or  any  man,  
who  ever  drew  a  sword  in  his  country’s  cause,  who  would  consent  to  take  any  position  on  
a platform of that kind, is unworthy to be called an American soldier.”    When  Democrats  
at the Chicago convention adopted the platform, Logan added in a remark that elicited 
laughter  from  the  audience,  they  knew  “that  McClellan  would  write  a  soft  letter  – sort of 
for war, saying that he knew the convention was for war, but  they  forgot  to  say  so.”120  
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General Samuel Heintzelman was similarly outspoken against McClellan.  A 
West Point graduate, he had served in the Mexican War and commanded a corps under 
McClellan in the Peninsula campaign. Now he lent his name and prestige to the thesis 
that his former commander was a coward.  Newspapers carried an account of 
Heintzelman’s   injecting   himself   in   a   conversation   between   two   men   discussing  
McClellan’s  supposed  lack  of  courage.  “How  do  you  know,  sir,  that  he  hasn’t  courage?”  
the general  asked  one  of  the  men.  “Never  judge  too  hastily,  sir,  of  a  man’s  courage.  Gen.  
McClellan  has  never  been  under   fire,  and   you  can’t   tell  whether   a  man   is  brave  or  not  
until  he  passes  that  ordeal.”121  
The Chicago Tribune published an eyewitness report by an unnamed soldier 
attesting  to  McClellan’s  hurried  and  premature  departure  from  the  fighting  at   the  Battle  
of  Malvern  Hill.    Under  the  Headline,  “He  Takes  A  Little  Nap  While  the  Fight  Is  Going  
On,”  the  soldier described McClellan scurrying to board a gunboat at a landing near the 
battle  and  pushing  off,  just  as  the  battle  began  to  rage.    In  the  witness’s  words,  “A  boat  is  
manned, and, three cheers from officers and crew, off goes the man upon whom hangs 
the  destiny  of  the  American  people.”122 
Republicans used Democratic opposition to soldier-voting laws as part of its case 
that their standard bearer was a coward. One Republican pamphleteer claimed that 
“McClellan  Democrats”   cooked  up   their   supposed  concern  about   fraud  as   a  pretext   for  
opposing soldier voting.  This  was  a  “pretended”   fear,   said   the  Republican  author.  The  
real   reason   for  opposing   the   law  was   that   “McClellan  Democrats”  knew  perfectly  well  
that soldiers would never vote for McClellan or other Democratic traitors. Hiding behind 
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this pretext about fraud,   Democrats   mounted   “cowardly   assaults   in   the   rear   upon   the  
soldier”  by  opposing  laws  that  would  allow  the  troops  to  vote.123  
 
Democratic Messaging in the Politics of Soldiers: Defending McClellan and 
Attacking Lincoln  
For their part, Democrats relied on voting soldiers to rebut the charge that their 
man was disloyal, inept, or a coward and to mount charges of their own against Lincoln.  
“Any  man  who   says  George  B.  McClellan   is   a   traitor,”  wrote   a   soldier   defiantly,   “is   a  
liar.  I shall vote for him, and the soldiers who have served their country, as I have served 
mine,  will  vote  for  him  too.”124  Another soldier, after telling a Democratic gathering in 
Springfield, Illinois, about  losing  one  of  his  brothers  in  combat,  said  melodramatically,  “I  
am for McClellan because I know he would say let me be buried wrapped in the Stars and 
Stripes,   with   not   one   star   wrestled   from   it   by   the   hand   of   treason.”125   A soldier in 
Virginia  wrote  glowingly  of  McClellan  to  a  New  York  newspaper.    “I  fought  under  him  
at Antietam,”  he  said,  “and  I   love  him.     You  need  not  ask  any  soldier  but  what  he  will  
say,  ‘I  go  for  Little  Mac  – you  bet.’”126  Another  wrote,  “If  General  McClellan  was  with  
the army again, you would see one of the happiest armies that ever was.  Our boys will 
vote for him to a man.”127  A soldier writing from Virginia said in heroic sounding tones, 
“if  I  am  spared  to  live  till  the  election  comes  off,  and  I  get  a  chance  to  vote,  I  will  give  
my  voice  for  him  as  far  as  it  will  go.”128  An  Illinois  private  said  colorfully,  “The leaders 
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of the Republican party have stolen the robes of Heaven to serve the Devil in, and if you 
don’t   look  sharp   they  will  succeed,   for   they  are  a  sharp  set  of   thieves.      I   thank  you  for  
your  attention  to  a  McClellan  soldier,  and  bid  you  good  night.”129  
Fighting fire with fire, a Democratic campaign song took Republicans to task as 
the real, albeit disguised, traitors:  
All Hail DEMOCRACY! All ye who would be free! 
Its base is COMPROMISE and PEACE, its hope is LIBERTY! 
But TRAITORS cry for BLOOD, reject all COMPROMISE, 
And  style  themselves  “THE  UNIONISTS,”  tho’  Traitors  in  disguise.130 
 
An outspoken antiwar Democrat from Baltimore, Severn Teakle Wallis, who had been 
arrested early in the war for suspicion of pro-secessionism, made a similar point in a 
public   exchange   of   letters   with   Connecticut   Senator   John   Sherman.   “You   have   …  
borrowed  from  the  vocabulary  of  despotism  the  name  ‘disloyalty,’  he  wrote,  arguing  that  
heavy-handed unionists had abused the label of treason by applying it to those who 
“question  … the  wisdom  …  or,  if  need  be,  resist  the  corruption  and  usurpation  of  those  
who temporarily hold  and  prostitute  power.”131  
Speaking in Nashville, General Thomas F. Meagher, an Irish immigrant who 
commanded   New   York’s   celebrated   “Irish   Brigade,”   stuck   up   for McClellan 
pugnaciously.  “For  my  part,”  said  Meagher,  who  favored  Lincoln  over  McClellan,  “if  any  
man, in my presence, dare call General McClellan a traitor or a coward, I will not stop to 
argue with him. I will at once knock him down. I will answer such assertions only with a 
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blow – and   an   Irishman’s   blow   at   that.”132  One soldier even claimed, in a sentiment 
echoed by Democratic editorial writers, that Lincoln had disloyal, even murderous, 
motives   for   having   fired  McClellan   from   his   army.   “The   removal   of   Gen. McClellan 
from  the  command  of  this  army,”  wrote  the  soldier from his camp near the battleground 
of   Petersburg,   “was   a   masterly   stroke   of   policy   on   the   part   of   the   administration,  
inasmuch  as  it  has  consigned  thousands  of  the  General’s  warmest  friends  and most ardent 
admirers  to  the  tomb.”133    
Democrats used this line of argument not only in defending McClellan against 
charges of incompetence, but also in attacking Lincoln as an incompetent war leader.  His 
having sacked McClellan, they claimed, was just one measure of his ineptitude. Another 
was that he was a bungling micromanager, meddling in the nuts and bolts of military 
affairs about which he knew nothing. At a rally for McClellan in Philadelphia, the 
featured speaker was a local attorney, Hiram Ketcham.  Ketcham had served in the War 
of  1812,  but  as  he  lit  into  Lincoln,  he  modestly  disclaimed  any  great  military  expertise.  “I  
don’t  know  anything  about  military  matters,”  said  the  old  veteran,  “but  I  know  as  much  
as   Abraham   Lincoln.”   The   president   “got   it into his head that because he was 
commander-in-chief  he  should  be  a  general…  He  was  commander-in-chief of the navy; 
but he might as well tell Farragut how to sail his ships as to tell McClellan how to fight 
his  army.”134  
A  variation  on  Ketcham’s  critique  found expression in a political cartoon entitled 
“The  SPORTSMAN  upset   by   the  RECOIL  of   his   own  GUN,”   shown  below.   It  mocks  
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Lincoln as a bumbling warrior, incapable of harming the enemy. Lincoln appears as an 
Irish sportsman, wearing knee breeches and looking feeble. The shot from his 
blunderbuss  misses  its  target,  a  bird  labeled  “CSA,”  and  the  gun’s  recoil  knocks  the  silly-
looking Lincoln off his feet.  The bird flaps its wings and thumbs its nose, and Lincoln is 
reduced to wishing the defiant bird had suffered   the   recoil.   “Begorra,”   he   says   to   the  
unharmed  prey,  “if  ye  war  at  this  end  o’  th’  gun,  ye  wouldn’t  flap  yer  wings  that  way,  ye  
vill’in.”  Edwin  Stanton  appears  in  the  lower  right  as  a  useless  hunting  dog.  The  message  
is  that  Lincoln  didn’t  know  what  he was doing as a wartime commander. 
 
 
Illustration originally published in 1864, The sportsman upset by the recoil of his own gun (Jo. Miller,) 
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction 
Number: LC-USZ62-55785.  The  wording  on  Lincoln’s  gun  reads,  “To  Whom  It  May  Concern,”  a  reference  
to the opening of a celebrated letter Lincoln wrote for Horace Greeley to use in meeting a Confederate 
peace  delegation.  Nothing  came  of  Greely’s  project. 
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Democratic  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “Lincoln  Neglects  Soldiers” 
Micromanaging   and   klutziness   were   only   part   of   Lincoln’s   incompetence   as   a  
commander, Democrats claimed.  He failed more profoundly, they said, when he made 
emancipation a war aim, since that blunder had the effect of hardening the resistance of 
the  Confederacy  and  putting  the  Union’s  soldiers  at  unnecessary  risk.    Robert  Winthrop,  
once a Whig congressman but now a pro-McClellan Democrat, made this point in a 
rousing speech before the party faithful in New York City late in the 1864 election 
season.  By expanding the war effort to include an assault on slavery, Winthrop argued, 
Lincoln had backed Southerners into a corner and forced them to resist reunion more 
ferociously. This put the nation’s  troops  at  heightened  risk.    Lincoln’s  pro-Negro policy, 
said   Winthrop,   “by   inspiring   this   spirit   of   desperation   and   hatred,   has   rendered   the  
victories of our armies a hundred-fold   harder   to   achieve….   For   never,  my   friends,   do  
victories cost so much, and come to so little, as when they are wrung from a foe who has 
been   goaded   and  maddened   to   despair.”      A   wise   commander-in-chief, in the mold of 
Washington and Jackson, would have avoided that blunder, Winthrop claimed.  Lincoln 
did not fit the mold, but  McClellan  did.  “Let  us   rally,   then,   to   the  support  of   that  great  
principle of unconditional Unionism which is common to Washington, Jackson, and 
McClellan.”135 
Soldiers   paid   the   steep   price   of   Lincoln’s  misguided  policy   choices,  Democrats  
insisted. The party  adapted  that  message  to  song.  One  evoked  the  memory  of  Lincoln’s  
martyred victims: 
We are coming Abraham Lincoln, 
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From mountain, wood and glen,  
We are coming Abraham Lincoln, 
With the ghosts of murdered men.136 
Another made the same point as a reason to vote for McClellan: 
The cruel war must have an end; 
I'll tell you what we'll do; 
We'll cast our votes for "Little Mac," 
We're bound to put him through. 
The widow's wails and orphan's tears  
Prevailing o'er the land  
Pray heaven to send a rare relief-- 
McClellan is the man.137 
 
A pro-McClellan   campaign   song   claimed   that   Lincoln’s  war   policy   jeopardized  
not only the Constitution but also the lives of millions of white soldiers. Addressing itself 
to  “Freemen  of  the  Union,”  it  posed  rhetorical  questions: 
 Would you have preserved intact  
The CONSTITUTION and be free? 
And secure in word and fact 
UNION, PEACE, and Liberty? 
Would [you] TWELVE MILLIONS WHITE MEN SLAY 
To  make  FOUR  MILLIONS  NEGROES  FREE?”138 
 
As this song makes clear, when Democrats stuck up for soldiers in attacking 
Lincoln, it was white soldiers they had in mind. Democrats enlisted soldiers to 
communicate this anti-Lincoln message to Northern audiences, making explicit what 
Winthrop  and   these  songsters  had   implied:   that  Lincoln’s  policy  choices  victimized not 
just soldiers generally, but white soldiers in particular.   The Cincinnati Daily Enquirer 
published  a  letter  from  a  Union  private  in  Tennessee  who  complained,  “We  volunteered  
to  put  down  the  rebellion  and  preserve  the  Union  under  the  Constitution….  We did not 
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hire ourselves to the Government to free negroes, and we do not wish to see thousands of 
our  own  race  fall  by  disease  and   in  battle   to  sustain   that   famous  proclamation.”139  The 
Enquirer also printed a letter from a soldier in the Army of the Cumberland to the same 
effect.    “I  could  not  be  contented,”  he  said,  “to  remain  in  this  unholy war. If things were 
as when I enlisted I could be contented, but since the Administration has declared the 
negroes free, and on equality with the white man, I will not support it in Abolition 
principles.” 140   One   resentful   soldier   wrote   to   complain   about   the   administration’s  
pampering  of  African  Americans.    “Around  the  soldier,”  wrote  the  trooper  from  his  post  
in Louisiana in an odd third person style,  
every-where he beheld the negro feasting and banqueting at the expense of our 
Government.  The negro could be paid regularly every week, he could be 
furnished with clothing when needed.  But not so with the soldier; the wife and 
child of his home, who were dependent upon the husband for support, were 
pinched with hunger, penury and want.141 
 
White supremacy was a unifying article of faith among nineteenth-century 
Democrats.    It  became  a  political  rallying  cry  after  Lincoln’s  Emancipation  Proclamation  
made abolition a Northern war aim in 1863.  Prosecuting war on behalf of blacks 
squandered white blood, they insisted, and they argued that Lincoln the abolitionist was 
the enemy of the fighting man.  As the election approached, Democrats developed three 
additional lines of attack based on that message.  The first involved the draft, the second 
prisoner exchanges, and the third – almost surrealistically – a minstrel song.   
The   law   authorizing   a   draft,   enacted   in   1863,   applied   to   “able-bodied male 
citizens of   the   United   States.”      That limited its scope to white men.  Democrats 
complained   that   Lincoln’s   draft   traded   white   lives   for   black   freedom,   a   despicable  
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bargain by Democratic reckoning.  And white men lucky enough to survive their forced 
military ordeal faced destitution on their return home, Democrats predicted, since blacks 
moving in from the South would fill their civilian jobs.  Class injustice compounded the 
racial outrage for Democrats, because the law allowed men to avoid service by paying a 
commutation fee of $300, a price  beyond  a  poor  man’s   reach.     The   issue  stirred  strong  
passions, particularly in urban centers where Democrats usually polled well.  Lower class 
whites protested violently in the notorious New York City draft riots of July 1863, and 
white resentments remained strong enough in 1864 to give Democrats a good campaign 
issue.     They  seized   it,  adopting   the   theme  that  white  soldiers  were  victims  of  Lincoln’s  
pro-black, pro-rich draft.142  Democratic  papers  called  Lincoln  “the  widow-maker”  whose  
“abolition  plan”  would  feed  conscripts  to  enemy  guns  and  leave  them  “scattered  corpses  
over   a   thousand   battlefields.”      A   banner   in   a   pro-McClellan torchlight parade in 
Cincinnati   asked,   “How   are   you,   Conscript?”      Then   it   answered   its   own   question,  
showing the skull and crossbones.  When the administration issued a supplemental draft 
call shortly before the 1864 election, a Democratic newspaper editor confidently 
predicted,  “Lincoln  is  deader  than  dead.”143 
Prisoner exchanges were routine through the first half of the war.  But the 
enlistment of blacks into the Union army, totaling some 180,000 by the end of 1864, 
disrupted that routine.  The Confederacy, refusing to recognize blacks as legitimate 
soldiers, excluded captured black troops from the POW swaps.  The Lincoln 
administration responded by ending prisoner exchanges altogether, a costly decision for 
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the thousands of men confined in ghastly POW camps like the notorious Andersonville in 
Georgia.144  To Democrats, the gesture demeaned whites, and they lashed out at Lincoln 
in a drumbeat  of  campaign  attacks.      “Lincoln  and   [Secretary  of  War]  Stanton   refuse   to  
effect an exchange of prisoners unless the Southerners will act on their notion, that a 
negro   is   just   as   good,”   charged   the   anti-Lincoln Detroit Free Press in a typical 
Democratic attack. “Let   soldiers   everywhere   remember   that   Lincoln   and   Stanton   look  
upon them as no better than negroes, and that they allow white men to rot in prison rather 
than   take   the  risk  of  having  any  disrespect  offered   to  Sambo.”145  Addressing its white, 
Democratic leadership, the Free Press at one point calculated that forty thousand white 
soldiers   languished   in   confederate   prison   camps   solely   because   of   Lincoln’s   policy.  
“Behold   the   costly   sacrifice   at   the   shrine   of   the   negro,”   mocked   the   editors,   “and  
commend  Lincoln  for  them,  and  support  him  if  you  can.”146 
Adding to the  Democrats’   use   of   the   draft   and   the   prisoner   exchange   policy   to  
portray Lincoln as indifferent to white soldiers were the attacks based on the tale of 
Lincoln’s   “Negro   song”   at   the   Antietam battlefield.  That episode arose out of the 
president’s  visit  to  the  Maryland  battle  site  in  October  1862,  just  weeks  after  the  Union  
victory there in what remains the bloodiest single day in American military history.  As 
Democrats related the event, Lincoln demonstrated his heartlessness while touring the 
battlegrounds. They claimed that Lincoln – as was his wont – called on his bodyguard 
and longtime friend, Ward Lamont, to strike up a tune on his banjo, apparently to take the 
president’s  mind  off   the  grisly facts of the battle.  Lamont chose a comical song called 
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“Picayune  Butler,”  named  for  a  black  minstrel  character.    As  Lincoln’s  wagon  carried  the  
president past scenes of the recent carnage, the banjo-playing bodyguard bellowed out 
this jaunty show tune.147 
The   Democrats’   spin   masters   turned   the   story   into   propaganda   for   assaulting  
Lincoln once again as pro-black and anti-soldier.  He had affronted white troops and 
insulted   the  Union  war  dead,   they  claimed,  by  calling   for  “a  negro  song”  at   the  site  of  
(white) soldierly sacrifice.  One speaker at the Democratic convention in Chicago used 
the  episode  as  proof  that  Lincoln  was  a  “cold  blooded  joker”  who,  unlike  McClellan,  did  
not  “entertain  a  proper  appreciation  of  [soldiers’]  suffering.”148 The episode became the 
theme   of   a   poem   entitled   “Lincoln   at  Antietam,”  which   embellished   the   facts   and   ran  
repeatedly in Democratic papers: 
Dead upon dead were huddled thick, 
The very air with death was sick,  
The wounded waited with ebbing life, 
Their turn for the surgeon’s  tired  knife. 
But carelessly rode old Abe along 
And called in that scene for a negro song. 
 
Youth and manhood lay weltering there, 
With the sweat of agony matting their hair. 
And the bravest in battle heard with awe 
The crushing sound of the busy saw. 
But carelessly rode old Abe along 
And called in such scene for a negro song.149 
 
 
A political cartoon captured the anti-Lincoln indignation stirred up by the 
Antietam  battlefield  episode  and  tied  it  to  soldier  voting.    Entitled,  “The  COMMANDER-
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IN-CHIEF conciliating   the   SOLDIER’s   VOTES   on   the   Battle   Field,”   the   lithograph  
(below) shows Lincoln standing on the battlefield surrounded by dead and wounded 
Union soldiers. As a nearby fallen soldier looks on, sadly clutching an American flag, 
Lincoln directs Lamont (standing in the foreground, his back turned to the viewer) to 
“sing   us   ‘Picayune   Butler,’   or   something   else   that’s   funny.” 
 
Illustration originally published in 1864, The Commander-in-Chief conciliating the soldier's votes on the 
battle field, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, 
Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-89731. 
 
The message captured in this picture – that Lincoln was clueless about the sufferings of 
soldiers – became a rejoinder to Republican claims that Democrats in general and 
McClellan  in  particular  were  no  “friends  to  the  soldiers.”    While  Andrew  Dickson  White  
and   William   E.   Chandler   pointed   to   Democrats’   opposition   to   soldier-voting laws as 
proof of their antipathy to soldiers, this lithographer   mocks   the   heartless   Lincoln’s  
pretensions about soldier voting as rank hypocrisy. Both messages highlighted the 
urgency  the  parties  attached  to  seizing  the  mantel  of  “the  soldiers’  friend.”   
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Soldiers were indispensable messengers of the core campaign themes of both 
parties. For Republicans, those themes were that Democrats and McClellan were disloyal, 
that McClellan was inept as a military commander, and that he was a coward, both 
morally and physically. For Democrats, the core themes were that Lincoln bungled his 
role as commander-in-chief and that he mistreated white troops.  Soldiers could speak to 
each of these themes with authority. They were experts on loyalty, courage, military 
effectiveness, and compassion for troops. So both parties enlisted soldiers in the 
messaging, either directly as spokesmen of the themes, or indirectly as the central 
characters of the same themes spoken by politicians, newspaper editors, pamphleteers, 
songsters, and cartoonists. Civil War politics in this sense was a politics of soldiers. 
To prevail in the politics of soldiers, both parties had to position themselves as the 
friend of the soldier.  Deploying the voices of fictional soldiers, Andrew Dickson White 
argued in his 1864 pamphlet that Democrats had forfeited any claim to that status by their 
opposition to soldier-voting laws.  That opposition proved not only that Democrats 
favored   “disfranchising”   soldiers,   as   White   would   have   readers   believe,   but   also   that  
Democrats traitorously aligned themselves with the enemy. It was potent stuff, and it was 
an allegation that put Democrats in a bind.  
As we shall see in the next chapter, soldier-voting laws were a lose-lose 
proposition for Democrats. They lost if they supported the laws, because they were sure 
that the Republican administration would manipulate voting in the field. And they lost if 
they opposed the laws, because then Republicans would paint them as anti-soldier. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE  DEMOCRATS’  PREDICAMENT 
The pattern of Republican support and Democratic opposition to soldier voting 
took shape gradually and did not coalesce before 1863.1 When it did coalesce, Democrats 
found themselves in a box – associated with opposition to soldier-voting laws even in 
states where they had supported the laws, damned as anti-soldier for their opposition in 
states without soldier-voting laws, and damned by the results of soldier voting in states 
wherever such laws passed.  
An election in November 1862 for a congressional seat in Minnesota illustrated 
the emerging problem Democrats faced. Earlier that year, well before the partisan lines 
over soldier voting had taken shape. Minnesota enacted its soldier-voting law. Democrats 
deserved as much credit as Republicans; the bill passed with bipartisan support in the 
state legislature, including unanimous support in the state senate. In the November 
election for a congressional seat Democrat William Cullen lost to Republican Ignatius 
Donnelly. Cullen believed that the soldier votes for Donnelly cost him the election, so he 
took steps to mount a challenge   to   the   law’s   constitutionality.   (Proofs   in   an   election  
contest  would  have  been  difficult,  since  Minnesota’s  mail-in version of absentee voting 
did  not  permit   separate   tallies  of   soldiers’  ballots.)  Almost  before  his  challenge  got  off  
the ground, the Republican press came after him, one mocking Cullen under the headline, 
“Who  Now   Is   the   Friend  of   the  Soldier”?  Fearing   the   loss   of   future   political   viability,  
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Cullen abandoned his challenge, and the law stood.2  While there is no evidence that 
concerns about  the  law’s  unconstitutionality  were  any  more  prevalent  among  Democrats  
than Republicans at that early stage, and neither party had a greater claim than the other 
for   the   law’s   existence,   Cullen’s   experience   was   a   toe   in   the   water   for   Democrats  
everywhere. On the one hand, winning the soldier vote was improbable for Democrats, 
notwithstanding their early support for soldier-voting laws. On the other hand, fighting 
the  laws,  or  the  laws’  electoral  effects,  was  politically  expensive.   
As the war progressed and Republicans increasingly asserted ever more control 
over the military command structure, Democrats grew increasingly pessimistic about 
their chances of winning the soldier vote. They frequently invoked the voice of the 
soldier in trying to cope with the problem, claiming that through its surrogates in the 
military command, the Lincoln administration bullied soldiers by coercing pro-Lincoln 
votes in the field or by interfering with the voting rights of soldiers showing pro-
McClellan proclivities.  But that tactic never gained great traction, and Democrats never 
really escaped the box that the soldier-voting issue put them in. 
The  Democrats’  lose-lose dilemma became particularly evident in the contrasting 
experiences of Pennsylvania and Ohio.  As we have seen, there was no clear partisan 
divide   about   soldier   voting   in   Pennsylvania’s   1861   elections,   in   which   absent   soldiers  
participated  under   the   state’s  prewar   soldier-voting law. In the early stages of the war, 
there was bipartisan ambivalence in Pennsylvania  about  soldiers’  exercising   their   rights  
                                                 
2. The newspaper was the St Paul Daily Union, December  14,  1862,  as  quoted  in.  Downs,  “The  Soldier  
Vote,”  187,  198-199. 
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under that law. In various election contests, candidates of both parties challenged the 
participation of absent soldiers, influenced in doing so only by short-term electoral 
expediency, not by ideological or partisan positions about the legitimacy of absentee 
voting.  When the prewar law came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1862, a 
bipartisan  majority  of  justices  voted  to  strike  it  down,  with  both  of  the  court’s  Republican  
justices joining two of its three Democrats in finding the law unconstitutional. 
Objectively, then, Pennsylvania Democrats were no more hostile to the law when it was 
in  force,  and  no  more  responsible  for  the  law’s  demise,  than  were  the  state’s  Republicans.  
But in the politics of 1863 and 1864 – the politics of the soldier – Democrats took the 
blame for killing the law, and Republicans managed to use the issue to brand their 
candidates  as  “the  soldiers’  friend.”  After  the  court’s  decision,  even  without  a  way  to  vote  
“in   the   field,”   Pennsylvania soldiers made their voices heard loudly for Republican 
gubernatorial candidate Andrew Curtin, either as voters home on furlough or as distant 
spokesmen for Curtin in the political messaging war for civilian votes.  
If 1863 Pennsylvania demonstrated the danger of the soldier-voting issue in a 
state where soldiers could not vote in the field, Ohio demonstrated that danger in a state 
where they could.  Early on, Ohio Democrats supported soldier-voting legislation over 
Republican objections. Not long after their efforts bore legislative fruit in 1863, those 
same Democrats came to regret their supportive role. The reason for Democratic support 
and Republican opposition early in the war was the mirror image of the circumstances 
that explained the reversal of the  parties’  positions  later  in  the  war:  suspicion  of  what  the  
other party might do to cheat. Just as Democrats by late-1863 doubted that their 
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candidates  could  compete  fairly  for  soldier  votes  given  the  administration’s  firm  control  
over the army, so Republicans before 1863 doubted the fairness of soldier voting in an 
army dominated in the early going by Democrats – men like George McClellan, Henry 
Halleck, Don Carlos Buell, and William Rosecrans. In addition to suspecting most 
Democratic generals of harboring Confederate sympathies and plotting to overthrow the 
Republican   administration,   Republicans   believed   that   these   “West   Point   Democrats”  
actively prevented the circulation of Republican newspapers in the military camps. 3  
Those suspicions led the Republican controlled legislature in Ohio to defeat a proposed 
soldier-voting law in 1862.  Democrats seized on that vote to criticize Republicans in the 
1862 elections, paving the way for bi-partisan  passage  of  Ohio’s  soldier-voting law the 
following year.4   
Objectively, then, Democrats deserved more credit than Republicans for the 
Ohio’s   law’s   existence,   but   that   didn’t   protect   them   in   the   politics   of   soldiers   that  
emerged  in  late  1863.  Unlike  Pennsylvania’s  prewar  law,  Ohio’s  statute  survived  its  court  
challenge,   and   Ohio’s   absent   soldiers   used   the   law   to   vote   in   the   state’s   1863  
gubernatorial contest between Union Party candidate John Brough and Democrat 
Clement Vallandigham. Far from rewarding Democrats for their support of the soldier-
voting law, soldiers voted overwhelmingly (and in some cases fraudulently) for the 
Union Party candidate. 
So, from the 1862 election in Minnesota and the 1863 elections in Ohio and 
Pennsylvania, both parties had learned the political danger of opposing, or appearing to 
                                                 
3. Williams, Voters in Blue, 201. 
4.  Young,  “Soldier  Voting  in  Ohio  During  the  Civil  War”,  7. 
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oppose, soldier voting.  But Democrats were also coming to understand that there was no 
political safe harbor for them in supporting the laws, as they became convinced that their 
candidates could not compete on a level playing field for the soldier vote. Democrats saw 
specific evidence that appeared to validate their pessimism.  As the war progressed, 
Democrats became alarmed about what they saw as a clear and growing pattern of 
electoral abuses by military officers for Republican partisan benefit.  It included military 
interference  with  civilian  political  gatherings  and  elections,  denial  of  soldiers’  access   to  
Democratic newspapers, and coercion of soldiers to cast pro-Republican votes.  This 
pattern deeply troubled Democrats and shaped their growing but necessarily muted 
antipathy to soldier voting.     
 Adam I.P Smith documents the ubiquity of intimidation of Democrats by soldiers 
taking it upon themselves to enforce the wartime political culture of no-partyism. In just 
one of many examples Smith cites, a group of soldiers in St. Louis stoned the platform 
where pro-Democratic speakers criticized the Lincoln administration and destroyed anti-
Lincoln campaign paraphernalia.5 Military influence – abuse, in the eyes of Democrats – 
in civilian elections was also common. In the Border States, Union military commanders 
had  issued  orders  barring  “disloyal”  men  from  the  polls  and  requiring  loyalty  oaths  as  a  
condition to voting.  In Kentucky, the commanding general ordered the judges of local 
elections   to  “allow  no  one   to  vote  …unless  he   is  known   to   them   to  be  an  undoubtedly  
loyal  citizen.”    In  Maryland,  the  military  commanders  required  prospective  voters  each  to  
swear  “that   I  will   in  all   things  deport  myself   as   a  good  and   loyal  citizen  of   the  United  
                                                 
5. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 99. 
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States.”6  A letter to the Cincinnati Enquirer, a fervently Democratic newspaper, reported 
that  “inoffensive  citizens”  in  Delaware  appearing  at  the  polls  to  vote  had  been  “stabbed  
with  bayonets”  and  that  “peaceful,  patriotic  men,  whose  fidelity  to  the  Union  no  man  may  
gainsay [were] charged by the military and through fear of bodily injury, deterred from 
voting.”7   
A   contested   election   for   Missouri’s   5th Congressional District in 1862 elicited 
evidence of similar military highhandedness at the expense of Democrats. Republican 
Joseph W. McClurg won the seat over Democrat Thomas L. Price, and Price challenged 
the outcome. At the hearing ordered by the House of Representatives, witnesses for Price 
testified   to   a   long   trail   of   abuses   that   tilted   the   outcome   in  McClurg’s   favor.   Several  
witnesses claimed that soldiers had gathered at polling sites to menace Price voters. One 
witness,  a  man  named  Henry  “Speed”  Guyer,  claimed   that  after  he  voted   for  Price,   the  
provost marshal ordered him into military service. Others claimed that they were arrested 
for voting for Price. H.H. Hudson, another Price voter, testified that soldiers had gathered 
around his voting site in Linn Township with Price ballots speared on their bayonets.  Yet 
another Price man, Henry Bradley, said that the captain of the militia had threatened to 
order  his  militia  unit  to  forage  off  Bradley’s  land  if  he  persisted  in  supporting  Price.    And  
Joseph Eads claimed that soldiers stoned prospective Price voters as they approached the 
polls.8   (Price lost his challenge.) 
                                                 
6. CONG. GLOBE APPENDIX, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 70-71 (1864). 
7. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, April 2, 1863. 
8. THOMAS L. PRICE VS. JOSEPH W. MCCLURG, MEMORIAL CONTESTING THE SEAT OF THE HONORABLE 
JOSEPH W. MCCLURG, H.R MISC, DOC. NO. 16, 38th Congress, 1st Sess. 10, 71, 89, 92, and 151 (1863). 
249  
 
In his account of mid-nineteenth century voting practices, Richard Bensel details 
similar   election   abuses   in   Missouri’s   6th and 7th Congressional Districts. State militia 
forces worked as virtual guarantors of Republican victory. Suspected Democratic voters 
were intimidated and sometimes arrested, their lands used for foraging, and their 
candidates silenced.   Bensel describes one particularly egregious example in which the 
militia commander for Carroll County interrupted a speech by James Birch, the 
Democratic candidate for the seat in the 6th Congressional District. The commander 
proclaimed   that   Birch   was   giving   a   “secession   speech  …   calculated   to   fan   afresh   the  
flames  of  rebellion  and  bushwhacking.”  He  ordered  Birch  to  stop  his  speech  and  never  to  
speak publically again in Carroll County. Recognizing discretion as the better part of 
valor, Birch complied. Unsurprisingly, he lost the election.9 
The clash over loyalty oaths grew out of intractable differences between the 
parties about the meaning of loyalty.  On this question, Republicans and Democrats were 
like ships passing in the night. Democrats who opposed the war sincerely believed they 
were just as loyal as Republicans, and Republicans believed just as sincerely that to 
oppose the Republican administration was proof of disloyalty. Bensel argues persuasively 
that because the Republican Party provided the only organized support for the war in 
many border regions, Republicans there came to see support for the party as tantamount 
to support for the Union.  Bensel calls  it  a  “conflation  of  party  and  national  loyalty.”10   
That conflation was on vivid display in an election contest for the seat 
representing  Missouri’s   third   congressional   district.  The contest hinged in part on the 
                                                 
9. Bensel, The American Ballot Box , 242-243.  
10. Id. at 218. 
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sincerity of voters giving the loyalty oath required as a condition of voting under an 
ordinance  of  Missouri’s  provisional  government.  The  contested  seat  had  become  vacant  
on the death of incumbent John Noell, a former Democrat who won the seat running as 
an   “Unconditional   Unionist.”   Losing   Republican candidate James Lindsay challenged 
many  of  the  votes  cast  for  the  putative  winner,  John  Scott,  a  Democrat.    Some  of  Scott’s  
voters, according to the challenge, had falsely sworn the loyalty oath.  The provost 
marshal of St. Genevieve County was the face of the military in the county. Called to 
testify  in  support  of  Lindsay’s  challenge,  he  claimed  that  he  knew  for  certain  that  some  of  
Scott’s  voters  were  in  fact  disloyal.  Among  them  were  voters  whose  disloyalty,  according  
to the witness, consisted of personally opposing the Emancipation Proclamation.  Cross-
examined  by  Scott’s  attorney,  the  witness  elaborated  on  his  definition  of  loyalty: 
Q: Cannot a person be opposed to the measures of the administration and yet be 
loyal to the government of the United States? 
A: Not at this time, when such measures are the means of enforcing the laws and 
suppressing  rebellion  and  treason… 
Q: Cannot a person differ with the President as to what measures are necessary to 
put down the rebellion, and yet be loyal? 
A: Not if such differing would give any encouragement to rebels and traitors. 
Q: How would it be if such differing did not encourage rebels and traitors? 
A: I consider all such differings as calculated to embarrass the government, and 
will always more or less give encouragement to rebels.11 
 
Another  witness  for  Lindsay,  also  attached  to  the  provost  marshal,  was  asked,  “What   is  
the  reputation  of  the  voters  of  this  county  for  loyalty,  who  voted  for  John  G.  Scott?”  He  
                                                 
11. H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 43, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 120-121 (1864).  (I acknowledge Smith, No Party 
Now: Politics in the Civil War North at 38-39 for highlighting the quoted passage from the record of this 
election  contest.  Smith’s  work  prompted  further  examination  of  the  proceeding  for  this  chapter.) 
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answered,   “The  undoubted   loyal  men  of   the   county look upon all those who voted for 
Scott  as  being,  to  some  extent,  disloyal…”12  
This attitude of course maddened Democrats.  Jean Baker aptly describes 
Democrats’   self   identification   during   the   war   as   the   “loyal   opposition.”13  Joel Silbey 
makes the same point   in   describing   the   essential   continuity   in   parties’   oppositional  
attitudes and habits from 1838 through 1893, with no disruption during the Civil War.14  
Democrats had always seen themselves as loyal Americans, and they still did. So they 
naturally bristled at Republican wartime assertions that they were traitors. Their idea of 
loyalty   was   devotion   to   the   “Union   as   it   was”   before   the   war,   under   an   unchanging  
constitution. To their mind, Lincoln and Republicans, having embraced transformative 
war aims after the Emancipation Proclamation, had no legitimate claim to their support.15  
That made Democrats traitors, as far as Republicans were concerned. Adam I.P. 
Smith argues in his study of Northern politics in the Civil War that the Republican 
organization, having enlisted war Democrats under the Union Party label, believed that 
“antipartyism”  was  the  key  to  national  survival.16  By that logic, opposition to Republican 
candidates was tantamount to opposition to the Union’s  existence.    This  presented  Border  
                                                 
12. Id. at 124. On the recommendation of the investigating committee, the House decided the election 
contest  in  Scott’s  favor.  HOUSE COMM ON ELECTIONS, JAMES LINDSAY VS. JOHN G. SCOTT, H.R. REP.  NO. 
117, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., (1864).  
13. Baker, Affairs of Party, 132-140. 
14. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 139. 
15.  Bensel, The American Ballot Box, 225. 
16. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 160-162.  In his discussion of antipartyism, 
Smith provides a useful historiography on the debate about whether partisan conflict helped or hurt the 
Northern war effort.  Smith himself carves out a hybrid position, embracing some but not all of the 
competing arguments of Eric McKitrick (who argues that two-party conflict helped the war effort) and 
Mark E. Neely, Jr. (who argues that it was a hindrance). Id. at 158-162. 
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State Democrats  with   a  Hobson’s  choice:   fall   in   line  with  Republicanism  or  accept   the  
label  “traitor.”    Naturally  they  resisted. 
The problem extended beyond the Border States.  In Ohio, a Union soldier 
purportedly threatened to hang a Democrat returning from a party rally unless he took a 
loyalty oath and promised not to vote for the Democratic candidate.17  In an election in 
Indianapolis early in 1863, Democrats claimed that soldiers who appeared at the polls 
gave license to Republican thugs intimidating Democratic voters. 
The appearance of the soldiers was the signal for loud talk and bluster on the part 
of   the   bullies   who   always   frequent   such   places….   Men   who   held   Democratic  
tickets…were  compelled  to  leave.    If  they  hesitated,  it  would  be  proclaimed  that  
they had uttered a disloyal sentiment and the mob would run howling after them.  
The soldiers were used by the cowardly political tricksters for this purpose.18  
 
The takeaway for Democrats was that where voters were subject to military 
oversight Democrats faced disfranchisement by virtue of being Democrats. How could 
absentee soldier voting possibly be fair in such an atmosphere, they surely wondered. If 
military authorities abused their power in civilian elections, Democrats reasoned, they 
would surely cheat with soldier voting as well.  Democrats saw evidence of that 
inclination, first, in illegal voting by soldiers stationed or furloughed in Northern states.   
In   a   story   headed   “Election   Carried   by   Palpable   Fraud,”   The   Detroit Free Press, a 
vigorously pro-Democratic paper, described voting irregularities at a local election in 
Detroit’s  10th  Ward  in  November  1863.    Soldiers  from  the  local  provost  guard  had  voted  
in large numbers, and Democrats alleged fraud.  At a hearing called to investigate the 
allegations, a lieutenant testified that he led the troops to the polls and that before leaving 
                                                 
17. Shankman, “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  97.   
18. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, April 9, 1863. 
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the  barracks,  “I  distributed  the  republican  ticket  to  all  that  marched  out  of  the  gate;;  I  did  
so  in  obedience  to  orders.”    The  lieutenant  added,  “My  own  politics  are  democratic and 
always  have  been.”19  A few days later, still covering the story, the Free Press published 
a copy of an order from the captain commanding the provost guard unit to his troops.  It 
said,  in  part,  “While  your  commander  would  not  attempt  to  dictate  the  manner in which 
the members of the Provost Guard shall vote, I may, perhaps, say, that it is very desirable, 
in fact, our duty, to sustain the administration, both by word and deeds.”20  
Democrats made similar complaints about local elections in New Hampshire and 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1863.  The Detroit Free Press and the like minded 
Cincinnati Enquirer both published at various times a copy of a damning 1862 military 
order   stating,   “By   order   of   the   President,   the   following   officers   are   hereby   dismissed 
[from]   the   service   of   the   United   States:   …   Lieut.   A.G.   Edgerly,   4th New Hampshire 
Volunteers,   for   circulating   copperhead   tickets.” 21   Republican troops from New 
Hampshire, they claimed, received preferential furloughs to travel home to vote.  (New 
Hampshire’s  absentee  soldier  voting  law  was  not  yet  in  effect.)    Meanwhile,  Democrats  
asserted, Democratic troops stationed in Harrisburg who enjoyed voting rights as local 
residents, were ordered away from town the night before the election so that they could 
not  vote.    “When  it  suits  their  purposes,”  the  Cincinnati Enquirer complained,  “as  in  the  
case of the late New Hampshire election, an entire regiment are sent home to vote the 
                                                 
19. Detroit Free Press, January 27, 1864. 
20. Detroit Free Press, February 3, 1864, (emphasis in the original). 
21. Detroit Free Press, September 3, 1864; Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, April 15, 1863, November 11, 
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Abolition ticket, and an entire company are sent away from Harrisburg because they 
desire  to  vote  at  her  municipal  election  for  the  Democratic  Union.”22  
Democrats took their outrage over this military heavy handedness to Congress, 
where in 1864 Democratic senators introduced a bill to require federal troops on election 
days to stay at least   a  mile   from   the   polls   and   prohibiting   them   “by   force   or   threat   or  
intimidation”   from   interfering  with   civilian   voting.23  Democratic Senator Saulsbury of 
Delaware, a strong advocate of the legislation, described his own voting experience.  
“And   at   the   previous election in my State, I, sir, had to vote under crossed bayonets; 
soldiers were stationed at the polls, and at some of the voting places peaceable citizens 
were   assaulted   by   your   soldiery.” 24   He added that by interfering with free civilian 
elections,  “Mr.  Lincoln  is  but  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Caesar.”25 Senator Powell, a 
Democrat   from   Kentucky,   added   that   he   had   seen   an   officer   “arrest   two   citizens   for  
exercising   the   right   of   suffrage   and   put   them   in   prison.”   He   added   that   other  military  
officers   “went   and   took   their   pens   and   struck   from   the   poll-book every Democratic 
candidate.”26  Democrats added to the record a litany of specific allegations of this sort 
from a lengthy report a Delaware legislative committee had prepared.  
Unmoved, Republicans defended the need for loyalty oaths in Border State 
elections.  It was a staple of Republican dogma, in the words of historian Mark Neely, 
“that  large  and  dangerous  groups  of  disloyal  citizens  lurked  in  the  North  during  the  war,”  
                                                 
22. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, March 26, 1863. 
23.  Denominated  “S  37”  as  introduced  in  the  Senate,  the  bill  was  entitled,  “A  Bill  to  Prevent  Officers  of  
the Army and Navy, and other persons engaged in the military and naval services of the United States, from 
interfering  in  elections  in  the  States.”    CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1864). 
24. Id. at 102. 
25. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.1282 (1864).   
26. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1864).   
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and Republicans perceived an even stronger peril in the Border States.27  Senator Wilson 
of Massachusetts saw loyalty oaths as a matter of simple necessity for elections in Border 
States, where so many citizens had confederate sympathies. Senator Howard of Michigan 
argued that soldiers had the duty to prevent disloyal people from voting as a safeguard 
against  “the  pollution  of  the  ballot  box.”28  Republican newspapers supported this view.  
The Chicago Tribune argued that loyalty oaths were needed to keep Confederate soldiers 
from entering  the  Border  States  to  vote.    “The  rebels  would  be  glad  to  vote  for  McClellan  
against   Lincoln,   if   they   could   do   so  without   taking   the   oath   of   allegiance.”29  Besides, 
Republicans noted gleefully, McClellan himself, as a general earlier in the war, had 
deployed troops to state election sites in Maryland to prevent, in the words of his order, 
“an  attempt  at   interference  with  …  rights  of  suffrage  by  disunion  citizens.”     McClellan  
had  even  authorized  his  troops  carrying  out  the  order  to  “suspend  the  habeas corpus.”30  
While they had no great appetite for the bill, most Republicans found it hard to 
defend  military  “intimidation”  and  “coercion”  of  civilian  voters,  which  the  bill  proposed  
to forbid.  So they watered the bill down with an exception that permitted the presence of 
troops  “when  necessary  to  keep  the  peace  at  the  polls.”  The  Senate  then  passed  the  bill  on  
June 28, 1864.  House Republicans helpfully avoided voting on the bill before the fall 
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elections, then passed it quietly on February 1865, probably aware and contented that it 
no longer mattered.31   
Increasingly, these experiences with pro-administration bias in the military taught 
Democrats to doubt that their candidates had a fair shot at garnering soldier votes in the 
field.  Their misgivings colored their reaction to proposed soldier-voting laws.  Mindful 
of the need to project an unambiguously pro-soldier sentiment, Democrats had to temper 
their attacks on proposals to let absent soldiers vote.  We can see the absorption of this 
lesson by New York’s   Governor   Horatio   Seymour,   a   Democrat.   In   response   to   the  
soldier-voting bill presented to him for signature in 1863, which he vetoed, Seymour 
argued that soldier voting, apart from its unconstitutionality, was antithetical to 
republicanism and to military effectiveness: 
The great danger is that if the soldier is allowed to vote upon matters of 
governmental policy, he will be rendered corrupt and licentious, and instead of 
lending strength to the Government to suppress the rebellion, he would be the 
means   of   increasing   disorder   and   confusion….   The   moment   that   the   door   is  
thrown open to political influences in the army, that moment there is danger that 
the troops would be rendered worthless as soldiers, and corrupted and depraved 
as citizens.32 
 
 
The 1863 election in Pennsylvania showed how, in the hands of Republican 
propagandists, that argument was risky to articulate in public, too easily characterized as 
denigrating the character of soldiers.  Absorbing that lesson, Seymour signed the soldier-
voting bill passed in the New York legislature in 1864, following a constitutional 
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amendment, even though the policy objections he made in the above-quoted passage in 
1863 should have applied with equal force to the 1864 bill.   
Democrats persisting in their opposition adopted two tactics more nuanced than 
outspoken resistance, both designed to weaken the appeal of the proposed laws. First, 
they publicized the legal battles in other states over the constitutional issues raised by the 
laws’  opponents  and  suggested  whenever they could, without clearly saying, that soldier 
voting was generally illegal.  Second, they published accounts of military electoral 
abuses, hoping their readers would conclude that new soldier voting laws would 
inevitably lead to more abuse. 
In February 1863, with a proposed soldier bill under consideration in Columbus, 
the pro-Democratic Cincinnati Daily Enquirer reported that the supreme courts in 
Pennsylvania and Connecticut had found their respective soldier voting laws 
unconstitutional, adding that  “experience  has  shown  in  Iowa,  Wisconsin  and  Illinois  how  
the   party   in   power   can   commit   gross   frauds   upon   the   soldiers’   elective   franchise   by  
threatening with with (sic) bad treatment if he does not vote the Abolition ticket, and 
promising the officer promotion  if  he  would  exert  his  influence  for  it….33 Later the same 
month, the paper published an account of soldier voting irregularities in a St. Louis 
election,   punctuating   its   report  with   the   reminder   that   “In   Iowa   and  Wisconsin   similar  
frauds were perpetrated,  by  which  Abolitionists  were  elected  to  office.”34  In March, the 
paper reported that a legislative committee in Michigan had tabled a proposed soldier 
voting law there, finding it was unconstitutional.  As if to encourage readers to see that 
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Ohio would be in good company if it too rejected the proposed soldier voting law, the 
paper  added  that  Ohio  law  (without  soldier  voting)  “is  not  materially  different  from  what  
it  is  in  Michigan.”35  In April, two days before Ohio enacted its law, the Daily Enquirer 
reprinted a story from a pro-Democratic paper in Connecticut about bias in granting 
furloughs to troops from that state.  Military authorities in Virginia, the Connecticut 
paper  claimed,  “will  not  permit   [even]  one  of   the  Democratic   soldiers   to  come  back to 
vote; but they send a couple thousand of Republican soldiers back here for that purpose.  
The  War  Department  has  agreed  to  aid  this  scheme.”36   
The next day, the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer reported that an Iowa court had ruled 
that   state’s   soldier   voting law unconstitutional.  In the same edition, the paper bristled 
defensively when a rival, the Sandusky Register, accused it of merely pretending to favor 
soldier voting.  The paper answered its critic by begging the question in a way that failed 
to disguise   its   antipathy   to   soldier   voting   laws.      “The  Enquirer,”   said the paper about 
itself,  “is   in   favor  of   legal  voting  and  opposed   to   illegal  voting.     Where  a  soldier  has  a  
right under the law of the State to vote, we are in favor of his voting; when he has no 
right to vote, we are opposed to it.  Can the Register understand  this  distinction?”37  
The pro-Democratic Detroit Free Press behaved much the same way during the 
special  legislative  session  in  January  and  February  1864,  when  that  state’s  soldier  voting  
law was under consideration in Lansing.  The paper ran a succession of stories detailing 
alleged  election  fraud  in  Detroit’s  10th Ward (discussed above).  On January 16, 1864 the 
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paper responded to criticism from the pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune, which stated,  “The  
democrats take a very queer position in this thing of voting by soldiers.  It does not seem 
to  occur  to  them  that  they  are  belying  the  very  name  by  which  they  seek  to  be  known….  
Could they control the case as they wish, not a soldier would be allowed to cast his vote 
for  any  candidate  to  office,  State  or  national.”    The  Free Press responded defensively in 
an editorial,  
the party in power not only can but has made use of the army for furthering its 
own  partisan  schemes….  [O]nly  such  newspapers  are  allowed to circulate as may 
be  favorable  to  the  Washington  authorities….Could  there  be  an  elimination  of  all  
undue  influences  to  control  the  soldiers’  vote  for  any  particular  party,  there  would  
be no more vigorous supporters of extending the fullest possible voting privileges 
to every soldier in the army than the democracy.38 
 
The paper could barely conceal its antipathy toward soldier voting in an editorial a few 
days  later.  “If  the  right  of  suffrage  can  be  constitutionally extended to our soldiers in the 
field,”  the  editorial  said  defensively,  “we  have  no  objection  to  its  being  done….”39 When 
Democrats’  complaints  about  the  unconstitutionality  of  soldier-voting laws rang hollow, 
as they did in states where Republicans proposed to amend constitutions to accommodate 
absentee voting, Democrats shifted the rationale for their opposition.  In Connecticut, for 
example,  Democrats  who  had  opposed  that  the  state’s  first  soldier-voting law on grounds 
of unconstitutionality persisted in their opposition even after Republicans launched a 
successful drive to amend the constitution. Now the problem was that voting soldiers 
would do the bidding of their despotic commander-in-chief.     They  would  become  “the  
armed   cohort   of   despotism,”   they   claimed,   and   “the   effect   of   their   voting was like the 
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disgraceful sale of the imperial purple by the praetorian guard in the latter days of the 
Roman  Empire.”40  
As 1863 wore on, Democrats saw more and more hard evidence vindicating their 
misgivings about soldier voting. The severity of the problems they faced became 
unmistakably clear in the 1863 election for governor of Ohio, the first election in which 
Ohio’s   soldiers   could   vote   in   the   field.      The   Democratic   candidate   was   Clement  
Vallandigham, from the extreme anti-war wing of the party and an outspoken critic of the 
war. To anti-war Democrats, Vallandigham was a genuine martyr, a victim of a bullying 
central government that the misguided war had so predictably spawned.  But to many 
Ohio  soldiers,  allowed  to  vote  in  the  field  by  Ohio’s  1863  law, he was a detestable traitor.  
He won 42% of the home votes and 39% of the overall votes, but only 5% of the soldier 
votes.41  The victorious candidate, John Brough, had been a pro-war Democrat before the 
Republicans (who renamed themselves the Union Party during the war) nominated him in 
preference to an incumbent who was unpopular with the troops.  Still, Vallandigham 
supporters and conservative Democratic organs blamed the disproportion of the soldier 
votes on actions they claimed federal officials had taken to keep Democratic newspapers 
out  of  the  soldiers’  hands  and  on  coercion  and  intimidation  of  the  troops.    The  Cincinnati 
Enquirer printed   a   soldier’s   letter   claiming   that   officers   had   cancelled   furloughs   of  
soldiers favoring Vallandigham and threatened to charge them with disloyalty.42  In a 
letter to an Akron newspaper, a Union captain admitted that he would have destroyed 
                                                 
40. As quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, 177. 
41.  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  88,  104. 
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Democratic  tickets  if  they  had  been  sent  to  his  camp.    “I  would  have  thrown  them  into  the  
fire;;   …   I   never   would   be   caught   peddling   tickets   for   a   traitor.”43  Indeed, evidence 
suggests that while Unionists had no trouble distributing their campaign materials, 
Democratic tickets and Democratic newspapers often failed to find their way to the 
troops.   “There   are   about   one-half the troops in this department who would vote the 
Democratic   ticket,”   wrote   one   Ohio   soldier,   “if   they   could   only   get   a   Democratic  
newspaper  occasionally.”     A  Cincinnati  newspaper   reported   that  army  officials   stopped  
Democratic operatives trying to supply Democratic tickets to Ohio regiments, viewing 
them  as  “Vallandigham  missionaries.”44  
Democrats could not complain that fraud in the soldier vote tipped the balance in 
the 1863 Ohio elections.  The returns showed that Vallandigham would have lost by six 
percentage points (instead of twenty two) even if all the soldiers who voted had cast their 
ballots for him.45  Nevertheless, there were stunning disparities between civilian support 
for Vallandigham – 42% overall – and his far lower support among absent soldiers.  As 
Arnold Shankman shows in his county-by-county analysis of the returns, Vallandigham 
won, in Williams County, Vallandigham garnered 40% of the civilian vote and less than 
1% of the soldier vote. In Mahoning County, the numbers were even more unlikely: 43% 
of the civilian vote and 0.2% of the soldier vote. In two counties, Lake and Paulding, 
Vallandigham did not garner even a single soldier vote.46  These outcomes heightened 
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Democrats’   growing   fears   that   their   candidates   faced   substantial   and   corrupt  
disadvantages trying to win the soldier vote.  They worried that even with a well-liked 
military figure like McClellan heading the ticket, Democrats might be unable to 
overcome these disadvantages. 
Democrats   increasingly   relied   on   the   military’s   electoral   abuse   as   a   campaign 
theme   in   itself,   hoping   to   rouse   enough   indignation   to   overcome   the   campaign’s  more  
fundamental  difficulties.    A  plank  of  the  party’s  campaign  platform  condemned  military  
interference  with  civilian  elections  as  a  “shameful  violation  of  the  Constitution.”47   And 
party newspapers complained more and more stridently about cheating in the soldier 
vote.  “All  those  who  have  served  in  the  army,”  asserted  the  pro-Democratic Detroit Free 
Press in  an  editorial,  “know  how  easily  men  who  are  independent  in  their views can be 
put  out  of  the  way,  on  detached  service,  on  picket  duty,  as  sentries.”48 They found ample 
evidence to support their complaints, and they enlisted the voice of soldiers to present the 
evidence.  In October 1864, a soldier reported in a letter to the Detroit Free Press about 
abuse  meted  out  to  Democratic  troops.    “Two  soldiers  hurrahed  for  McClellan,”  he  wrote,  
“and  they  put  them  under  arrest,  a  barrel  was  hung  on  their  shoulders  all  day,  and  at  night  
they  were  sent  to  the  front….”49 A colonel in a Michigan unit reportedly told his men,  
If, after [the] election, I discover that a single non-commissioned officer of my 
regiment has voted for McClellan, I will reduce him to the ranks.  Every private in 
this regiment that votes for McClellan shall hereafter in every fight be sent as near 
the front as I can send him, that he may receive the compliments of his friends, 
the rebels.50  
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How routinely Democrats actually suffered these alleged abuses is unclear, but 
modern scholarship backs up the Democrats’   grievances   anecdotally.   Richard   Bensel,  
Joseph Allen Frank, and William Frank Zarnow marshal substantial evidence that 
Democratic   soldiers   indeed   suffered   systemic   discrimination.   “Soldiers   cared  
passionately  about  the  outcome  of  an  election,”  Bensel  observes,  “knew  exactly  how  their  
comrades voted, and carried guns (regularly using them to kill other men). In such a 
situation, it is not at all surprising that few votes cast in the army opposed the Republican 
Party.”51  In his study of the intensity of radical political sentiment within the army, 
Frank  confirms  Bensel’s  assessment,  describing  episode  after  episode   in  which  soldiers  
were prosecuted or punished for speaking disrespectfully about Republican political 
leaders.  Officers often took it as their duty to monitor the political attitudes of their 
subordinates and to induce soldiers to exercise their new absentee voting rights in favor 
of the administration, Frank demonstrates.  Not only did Republican commanders 
routinely block distribution to the troops of Democratic newspapers and Democratic 
ballots, but they also imposed career penalties on Democratic officers who dared speak 
out publicly against the administration, according to Frank.  Enough were arrested and 
dismissed for doing so to chill dissent within the officer ranks generally.52 In his study of 
Lincoln’s  reelection  effort,  Zornow  confirms  Frank’s point, arguing that by 1864, Union 
officers  had  come  to  understand  that  allowing  their  names  to  be  linked  with  McClellan’s  
“was  to  lose  all  chance  of  advancement.”53  
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While Democrats continued publishing stories about these abuses throughout the 
election season, coverage on both sides increasingly took cognizance of actual voting 
results as the November elections approached.  In September and October 1864, with the 
national election just around the corner, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, held elections 
for Congressional seats or state office under new state laws permitting their absent 
soldiers to vote. New York and Vermont soldiers began voting in the field for president 
and vice president over a period of several weeks before the November 8 general 
election. The results trickling in from this early voting provided hard evidence that 
Republicans would handily win the soldier vote in November. 
During the final few weeks of the campaign, papers for both parties gave these 
state elections extensive coverage.  Republican papers covered them with a tone of 
triumph.  Day after day, they reported pro-Republican returns from soldier voting in the 
field.  Reporting that Republican candidates had outpolled Democrats 285 to 9 in one 
Vermont brigade, the Chicago Tribune gloated,  “Our  brave  soldiers  evidently  know  what  
they  are  voting  for.”54 Democrats, in contrast, pointed to the early results to harden their 
theme that Republicans were stealing the soldier vote.  Lincoln operatives in the post 
offices, they claimed, intercepted McClellan ballots sent home from the front under New 
York’s  law  and  replaced  them  with  Lincoln  ballots.    They  reported  that  one  Pennsylvania  
soldier, after casting his McClellan ballot in the field and sending it home to his proxy, as 
Pennsylvania’s  new  law  provided,  returned  home  on  unexpected  furlough  in  time  for  the  
actual election.  Canceling his proxy so he could vote locally, he discovered that someone 
                                                 
54. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 18, 1864. 
265  
 
had switched his ballot to a vote for Lincoln.55  A wounded New York soldier, similarly 
home on furlough after forwarding his McClellan proxy from the field, made the same 
discovery. 56   Speaking of in-the-field voting by Ohio and Pennsylvania troops, a 
Democrat   on   the   scene   complained,   “It   is   a   notorious   fact   that   any   soldier   or   teamster  
could have voted at the polls here yesterday, if he intended to vote the so-called Union 
ticket, without any question being asked with regard to his right to vote  at  all.”57 
        Democrats reported abuses in the navy, as well.  A New York sailor on blockade 
duty claimed that on the day appointed for voting on the ship, naval officers told the 
assembled  sailors,  “That  if  they  wanted  to  vote  for  the  present  administration they might 
vote,  but  if  they  wished  to  vote  to  the  contrary  they  could  not  be  allowed  the  privilege.”58  
Occasionally Democrats couched their objections to these purported abuses in threatening 
language. In a Philadelphia speech in which he lamented   the   fiscal   damage   Lincoln’s  
policies were inflicting on the country, John Van Buren turned his attention ominously to 
the issue of soldier voting: 
The Republicans intend to defeat General McClellan, they say, by the soldiers, 
and they do not conceal the fact that they will do it by fraud. But you cannot cheat 
the  soldiers.  If  they  are  not  heard,  and  if  their  votes  don’t  reach  Washington,  it  is  
probable their muskets will.59 
 
Everywhere Democrats reiterated their complaints that military authorities denied 
Union soldiers access to Democratic newspapers or election tickets.  An Ohio soldier 
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voting   in  Vicksburg  wrote   to  complain,  “Notwithstanding   that  one-half of the voters of 
the   battery  were  Democrats,   ‘Union’   tickets  were   produced   in   abundance,   and   runners 
employed to distribute them, whilst not a single Democratic ticket could be seen 
anywhere.”60 Another   complained,   “We   get   nothing   to   read   here   but   abolition   papers;;  
please  send  me  something  sound   to   read,  and  oblige  a   friend.”61 A Democratic reporter 
from New  York  wrote  with  a  tone  of  authority  from  Washington,  “We  charge,  and  it  can  
be proved, that letters from democrats here to soldiers in the army, containing McClellan 
electoral tickets, have been opened, the McClellan tickets taken out and Lincoln tickets 
put  in.”62  A pro-McClellan soldier from New York echoed this theme with a particular 
note  of  desperation.    “Send  me  more  tickets.    Terrorism  is  attempted  in  my  company  and  
throughout  the  regiment.”63 
Much of the attention of the press in the last month of the 1864 campaign focused 
on celebrated cases in Indiana and New York, in which hard evidence substantiated 
allegations of systematic fraud, though not all of it by Republicans. Indiana had no 
soldier-voting   law.      In   the   governor’s   race,   Republican   incumbent Governor Oliver 
Morton, a pro-Lincoln stalwart, stood for reelection.  The election took place in October, 
and both parties viewed the battle as an early opportunity to influence the outcome of 
November’s  presidential  contest  by  proving  Lincoln’s  strength or weakness.  Morton won 
handily, and Democrats cried foul.  They cited two forms of Republican mischief.  One, 
which Democrats believed their rivals used in all states lacking provision for soldier 
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voting, was to discriminate in the granting of furloughs, arranging for Republican soldiers 
to return home to vote and leaving Democratic soldiers in the field, disfranchised.  The 
other was to use soldiers to stuff ballot boxes.  Secretary of War Stanton issued a 
furlough order neutral on its face, directing   that   “all   sick   and   wounded   soldiers   of  
Indiana”   receive   furloughs   and   transportation   home   “to   enable   them   to   exercise   the  
elective   franchise   at   the   State   election.”      But   Democrats   saw   skullduggery   in   the  
implementation.      “What   a   frightful   wrong   was   done to   the   Democracy,”   howled   the  
Cincinnati Daily Enquirer,  “and   to   fair  play,  and   to   free   institutions,   in  furloughing   the  
sick  and  wounded  Indiana  soldiers!  …  The  complaint  is,  that  it  was  so  carried  out,  that  no 
soldier was allowed to go home to vote who would pledge himself to vote for Morton.”64  
The Detroit Free Press echoed  the  complaint.  “Republican  soldiers  have  been  furloughed  
by thousands and sent home to vote, while democratic soldiers have been kept in the field 
on  duty  and  refused  furloughs.”65  
Arriving at the Indiana polls, Democrats asserted, the soldiers stuffed the ballot 
boxes.  According to the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, 
On election day a train of three cars filled with soldiers – not one of whom 
probably was entitled to vote – passed over the railroad from Toledo to 
Kendallville, and the men voted at four different places.  The three cars would 
contain at least 175 men, each of whom voting four times would make 700 
votes….   It   is   by   such   means   that   the   Democrats   have   been   beat,   not   in   this  
District  alone,  but  throughout  the  state….  Morton  and  his  whole  state  ticket  were  
partakers in the fraud.66  
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The Detroit Free Press joined   in   the   complaint.      “In   one   place   a   whole   regiment   of  
Massachusetts soldiers voted, and in other places soldiers voted several times round, 
without  disguising  it.”67  In his study of soldier voting, Oscar Winther published soldier 
letters corroborating the Democratic charge.  One soldier writing to his brother asked,  
Did you ever attend an election out west?  It is a big thing!  The people are more 
enlightened, of course; it is a natural consequence that there is more liberty and 
freedom than in Massachusetts and benighted lands; so much so that people vote 
as many times as they please, and allow their friends to do the same, provided 
they   are   “sound   on   the   goose.”      It   is   estimated   that   the   Sixtieth  Massachusetts  
Regiment cast about 6,000 votes for Governor Morton last Tuesday.  And I know 
that some boys in Company I voted ten and twelve times each one.68 
 
Another Massachusetts  soldier  claiming  to  have  voted  in  Indiana  bragged,  “Some  of  the  
boys voted twenty-five  times  each….69   
 A pro-McClellan political cartoon (shown below) tapped into racial resentments 
in  depicting  fraud  in  soldier  voting.  Entitled,  “HOW  FREE  BALLOT  IS  PROTECTED,”  
it depicts a clownish African-American soldier, a flask of whiskey on his hip, pointing his 
bayonet in the direction of a crippled veteran who wants to vote for McClellan. The black 
soldier  addresses  the  veteran,  “Hallo,  dar!  you  cant  put  in  dat  you copperhead traitor, nor 
any  oder  ‘cept  Massa  Lincoln.”  The  veteran  retorts,  “I  am  an  American  citizen  and  did  
not   think   I   had   fought   and   bled   for   this.   Alas   my   country!”   In   the   background,   two  
election  workers  look  on.  One  says,  “I’m  afraid  we  shall  have trouble if that soldier is not 
allowed  to  vote.”  The  other  responds,  “Gammon,  Hem  just  turn  around.  You  just  pretend  
you  see  nothing  of  the  kind  going  on,  and  keep  on  counting  your  votes.” 
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Republicans had the upper hand in the blizzard of fraud charges and 
countercharges growing out of the New York soldier vote in the weeks shortly before the 
November  1864  election.        That  state’s  law  provided  for  shipping  sealed  soldier  ballots  
from  the  field  to  the  soldier’s  home  district,  there  to  be  cast  by  a  proxy  designated  by  the  
soldier.  In two separate cases, federal authorities arrested agents stationed (one in 
Baltimore, another in Washington) to receive and forward soldier ballots from the Army 
of   the  Potomac.      In  one  case   the  defendant,  Moses  Ferry,   an  appointee  of  New  York’s  
Democratic Governor Seymour (himself a candidate for reelection), confessed to forging 
the names and ballots of soldiers, some of them dead. He was convicted and served a 
prison term.  The other case resulted in acquittal.  Republicans pounced on both cases as 
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proof of endemic Democratic cheating.  Reminding readers that Seymour had used his 
veto to tailor the New York law to his liking, Republicans charged that he had designed 
the law to facilitate exactly the kind of cheating that occurred.  After summarizing the 
law’s  complicated  procedures and claiming that its  complexity  “opens  the  widest  door  to  
fraud,”  the  pro-Lincoln New York Times, in an editorial just five days before the election, 
pinned   the   responsibility   on   Seymour.      “The  Union  men   in   the  New  York   Legislature  
passed the bill because they could not get a better [one], as it was openly declared that 
Gov. Seymour would veto any bill unless it accorded in all respects with his own 
views.”70  A few days later, directing its scorn at Seymour, the Times asked its readers 
rhetorically,   “What   security  have  honest  men  under   an   administration   [i.e.,  Seymour’s]  
elected by forging the votes of dead soldiers, swindling the living of their suffrage, and 
importing Butternuts from Canada and Missouri to carry the elections by force and 
fraud?”71   
Democratic papers defensively claimed that Republicans had trumped up the 
charges in New York and that administration lackeys had coerced the confessions.  They 
went so far as to assert that federal agents intercepted the shipped ballots in order to 
substitute phony  Lincoln  ballots  for  genuine  McClellan  votes.    “Of  course  they  have  been  
seized   by   Lincoln’s   agents,”  wrote   the  Cincinnati Daily Enquirer in a tone suggesting 
that  only  the  naïve  could  expect  otherwise.     “Lincoln  ballots  will  be  put   in   the  place  of  
McClellan  ballots,  and  the  soldiers  will  be  cheated  of  their  votes.”72  But the Republicans 
                                                 
70. New York Times, November 3, 1864. 
71. New York Times, November 8, 1864. 
72. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, November 3, 1864.  The Detroit Free Press published several stories to 
the same effect. See, for example, November 1, 2,and 6, 1864.  
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had the better of the debate on the New York soldier vote.  To the extent that fraud and 
cheating   by   the   military   had   become   a   centerpiece   of   the   Democrats’   campaign   by  
September and October, the New York case severely weakened their argument as well as 
their prospects in November.73  
When   Republicans   weren’t   bragging   about   winning   the   early   soldier   vote   in  
September and October 1864 or about Democratic fraud in the early New York soldier 
vote, they accused Democrats of standing in the way of soldier voting laws wherever they 
could.  Indeed, of the six Northern states without laws for soldier voting in 1864, four had 
Democratic legislatures.  In particular, Delaware, New Jersey  (McClellan’s  home  state),  
Illinois, and Indiana each had Democratic legislatures and no soldier voting law.74  The 
pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune made much of this fact in its effort to undermine the 
Democrats’   appeal   to   soldiers   and   to   associate   Democrats with the rebellion.  In an 
editorial, the Tribune vilified the legislatures of Illinois and Indiana for not having 
provided for soldier voting.  Referring to the legislators, the paper proclaimed,   “These  
bodies of men set themselves at work to aid their Southern partners in every way their 
                                                 
73.  In  other  states,  too,  Republicans  tried  to  steal  the  Democrats’  thunder  about  fraud  in  soldier  voting.    
The pro-Lincoln Tribune, citing “trustworthy  sources,”  described  an  elaborate  Democratic  cheating  scheme  
in  Ohio.  “Their  plan  is  to  vote  early  in  the  day  in  citizen’s  dress,  and  then  at  a  later  hour  don  a  soldier’s  
uniform, and smuggle into the ballot box another vote, either at the same or some adjoining poll, under the 
control  of  their  friends.”     Tribune (Chicago, IL), November 3, 1864.Republicans also alleged Democratic 
fraud in Indiana.  While they cited no instances of pro-Democratic fraud by soldiers, they did cite enough 
cases of fraud in the civilian vote to feel justified in brushing aside the Democratic allegations about 
fraudulent soldier voting there. After one recital of various frauds committed by Democrats, the pro-
Lincoln Tribune concluded  scornfully,  “In  the  face  of  these  unblushing  frauds,  the  Copperhead  press  have  
the audacity to coin stories of Republican  frauds  in  Indiana.” Tribune (Chicago, IL), November 1, 1864. 
74. As elaborated in Chapter 1 and in the Appendix, Illinois would eventually enact such a law, but not 
until 1865. Oregon had no soldier voting law, but also had almost no soldiers serving. (Winther,   “The  
Soldier  Vote,”  448.)  Massachusetts  was  the  exception  that  proved  the  rule,  having  failed  to  enact  a  soldier-
voting law notwithstanding Republican control of state government. According to Benton, state 
Republicans inexplicably neglected to mobilize efforts to amend the state constitution to authorize absentee 
voting. (Benton, Voting in the Field, 293-294.)   
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ingenuity could invent, and their courage dare undertake.  They spent half of their 
sessions  in  plotting  to  carry  these  States  out  of  the  Union.”75 The paper later published a 
letter from an Illinois soldier stationed in Memphis, who claimed that he and his 
colleagues  “would  like  to  show  our  friends  at  home  that  we  are  for  ‘Uncle  Abe,’  first,  last  
and all the time.  Although we have not the privilege of casting our votes at the 
November election for any candidate.  For which our Legislature will please accept our 
everlasting contempt.”76  The Tribune blasted the Indiana legislature in another editorial 
that chided Democrats for complaining about the votes of furloughed soldiers and 
claimed that Republicans, not Democrats, were cheated in the Indiana vote.   
In order still more effectively to bind the slaves hand and foot at the feet of Jeff 
Davis, [Democrats] disfranchised so far as they could [the] 150,000 soldiers of 
Indiana, by preventing them from voting at the post of duty, and compelling them 
to   turn   their   backs   to   the   rebels   in   order   to   face   the   copperheads….   Many  
thousands of brave Indiana boys were actually disfranchised by these professed 
advocates  of  ‘free  elections’….”77 
 
 
 While no available measure of public opinion reveals how much damage 
Democrats suffered in the debate about soldier voting, the party clearly never found a 
way out of the box the issue put it in.  On the one hand, Democrats lost when soldiers 
voted, because Republicans undoubtedly cheated at least some of the time and because 
most voting soldiers genuinely preferred Republican candidates, who favored fighting the 
                                                 
75. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 16, 1864. 
76. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 2, 1864 (emphasis in the original).  In the same vein, the Tribune 
later  published  a  “resolution”  adopted  by  a  unit  of   Illinois  soldiers  stationed   in  Missouri  who  wanted   the  
Illinois  governor  to  grant  them  furloughs  to  return  home  to  vote.    The  “whereas”  clause  of  their  resolution  
stated,   “WHEREAS,   The   Legislature of the State of Illinois, at its last session, failing to make any 
provision  for  soldiers  in  the  field  to  exercise  their  right  of  suffrage….”  Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 22, 
1864.  
77. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 13, 1864. 
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war until the Confederacy surrendered.  On the other hand, Democrats also lost when 
they opposed soldier voting, however muted their opposition, because Republicans then 
painted them as anti-soldier or even pro-rebel, an image Democrats desperately sought to 
avoid.  So Democrats equivocated about soldier voting laws and hoped their incessant 
charges of Republican cheating would anger voters enough to overcome the Republican 
advantages.  It was a futile hope.  
 Finally,   it   is   worth   reflecting   on   whether   Democrats’   assertions   of  
administration cheating in the soldier voting find anything more than anecdotal support. 
Some interesting evidence deserves more attention than it has received.  In his 
examination of voting data, James McPherson concluded that half the soldiers who 
entered the Civil War as Democrats ended up voting for Lincoln in 1864.78 He reached 
his conclusion by juxtaposing two pieces of fairly hard data.  First, 40% to 45% of Civil 
War soldiers entered the war as Democrats, leaving 55% to 60% who entered as 
Republicans.  Second, Lincoln won 78% of the total soldier votes.  Assuming that 
Lincoln must have won virtually all the 55% to 60% cohort who were Republicans, 
McPherson reasons that Lincoln must have won about half the Democratic soldier votes 
in order to have reached the 78% total.   
This  demonstrates  sound  arithmetic,  but  dubious  logic.    McPherson’s  calculation  
holds water only if we also assume that soldiers of both parties participated in the turnout 
in proportions equal to their representation in the army.  If, in other words, 40% - 45% of 
soldier who voted were Democrats (equal to their percentage of the army population), 
                                                 
78. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 176-7.   
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then indeed Lincoln could not have won 78% of the total soldier vote without winning 
the votes of half the voting Democratic soldiers. What if relatively fewer Democratic 
soldiers voted, either because they had no enthusiasm for either candidate or because, as 
so many alleged, their Republican officers and fellow soldiers interfered with their voting 
rights?  In that case, with Republican soldiers overrepresented in pool of the absentee 
voters,   Lincoln’s   78%   of   the   total   looks   less   impressive.      This   possibility, which 
McPherson left unexplored, finds some support in the fact that turnout among soldiers 
was indeed low.79  In the Army of the Potomac, for example, out of about 120,000 
soldiers, only about 19,000 voted (13,500 of them for Lincoln).80  The exigencies of war 
explain this in part; we know that implementation of absentee for widely dispersed and 
mobile military units faced logistical challenges that voting precincts back home never 
encountered. This undoubtedly held down turnout. Moreover, some of the 120,000 
soldiers were ineligible to vote, including African-Americans, soldiers younger than 
twenty-one, and those from states that lacked soldier-voting laws.  But coercion and 
interference surely played at least some part in the low turnout and therefore at least some 
part  in  Lincoln’s  lopsided  victory  among  voting  soldiers.   
McPherson   is  not  alone   in  slighting  evidence  supporting  Democrats’  complaints  
of injustice in the soldier vote. Oscar Winther, whose article remains an essential 
resource for any examination of soldier voting, similarly gives short shrift to evidence of 
fraud.  While describing the New York cases and episodes of Republican fraud in 
                                                 
79. In a separate examination of the soldier vote, McPherson states, without elaboration, that the soldier 
vote  in  1864  “was  about  as  fair  and  honest  as  19th-century  elections  generally  were,  and  Lincoln’s  majority  
was probably an accurate  reflection  of  soldier  sentiment.”     McPherson,  Battle Cry of Freedom, 805, note 
69.  
80.  Winther,  “Soldier  Voting,”  454. 
275  
 
Indiana, he ignores the countless newspaper accounts of Republican fraud elsewhere, 
stating without explanation  or  citation  that  evidence  of  abuse  “is  very  meager.”81 
In fact, it is far from meager. It abounds. We see it in the countless lamentations 
of frustrated Democratic soldiers describing their personal experiences in letters to 
newspapers back home.  We see it in the boasting of Republican soldiers who saw 
nothing   particularly   wrong   in   cheating   at   the   expense   of   disloyal   “Copperhead”  
candidates. We see it in the unanimous and bipartisan opinion of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court finding rampant fraud in absentee soldier voting in the case of Hulseman 
and Brinkworth v. Rems and Siner. 82  And, where county-by-county voting data are 
available, as in Ohio and Michigan, we see it in the implausibly lopsided disparities 
between the low Democratic share of votes in the field – as low as 0% in some Ohio 
counties – compared to their far higher share of the home vote in those same counties.83  
This not to say that Democrats lost a great many contests they would have won 
but for fraud in the soldier vote.  It is hardly debatable that substantial majorities of 
Union soldiers genuinely preferred Lincoln to McClellan, but Lincoln would have beaten 
McClellan  even  if  “Little  Mac”  had  won  all  the  soldier  votes.  Still,  we  have  seen  that  the  
soldier vote was decisive in some down-ballot elections, as shown in the court decisions 
reviewed in Chapter 2.  Soldier-voting fraud in those and similar cases very likely turned 
some Democratic wins into losses.  And in the larger messaging war, in which 
                                                 
81. Id. 
82. Hulseman, 41 Pa. 396 (1861). The case is discussed more fully in chapter 1. 
83 . Shankman,   “Soldier   Votes   and   Clement   L.   Vallandigham,”   88,   104.   Similarly,   a   Democrat  
newspaper   in  Clearfield,   Pennsylvania   reported   after   the   1864   election   that  McClellan  won   the   county’s  
civilian vote by better than two to one (2762-1371) while losing the soldier vote by more than four to one 
(135-30). Clearfield Democratic Banner, Nov. 30, 1864.  
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propagandists used the ostensible preference of soldiers to influence civilian votes, the 
indirect cost of losing the soldier vote was even bigger. 
More importantly, the reality of corruption in at least some of the soldier vote 
illuminates the dilemma Democrats faced. The issue of soldier voting handicapped 
Democrats   in   the   “politics  of   soldiers”  of  1863-1864, cornering them in a predicament 
they could not escape. They could afford neither to support nor to oppose soldier-voting 
laws. Starting in the 1863 Curtin-Woodward gubernatorial contest in Pennsylvania, 
Democrats learned that Republicans would tar them as anti-soldier when they even 
appeared to oppose soldier-voting laws. That was a heavy burden to bear in the politics of 
soldiers of 1863-1864. On the flip side of the lose-lose coin, Democrats learned that when 
such laws took effect, their candidates would not win among voting soldiers.  They 
believed  that  their  candidates’  poor  showing  in  the  soldier  vote  resulted  from  successful  
and corrupt efforts by the military command structure to tilt the playing field. This was 
undoubtedly less true than Democrats imagined; at least a majority of soldiers truly 
favored republican candidates, as scholars from James McPherson to Joseph Allan Frank 
amply document. But Democrats were not entirely wrong about the fraud committed at 
their expense.   
And right or wrong about the fraud, the loss in the soldier-vote count inflicted a 
double whammy on Democrats.  The direct cost meant, of course, fewer Democratic 
votes in the tally of total votes that determined winners and losers. The indirect cost 
meant that Republicans, pointing to the ostensible preference of soldiers for Republican 
candidates, could present those candidates to civilian voters   as   the   “friend   of   the  
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soldiers.”   In  the  politics  of  soldiers,   this advantage may have had greater importance in 
electoral outcomes than the relatively meager number of direct soldier votes. It weakened 
Democrats’  efforts  to  rebut  Republican  claims  that  McClellan  (and  Democrats  generally)  
were traitors; that McClellan was unsoldierly and inept; and that McClellan was a 
coward. And it weakened their attack themes against Lincoln: that he was an incompetent 
commander-in-chief; that he neglected his troops; and that he subordinated the well being 
of white soldiers to his pro-Negro policies. 
Soldier voting, in short, served as a political trap for Democrats. They found no 
way to escape. 
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CONCLUSION 
War has always been a crucible for suffrage reforms in American history.  The 
Revolutionary War ushered in a liberalization of suffrage rights in favor of otherwise 
unqualified men who provided military service either in the continental army or in state 
militias.1  The War of 1812 sparked a surge in popular demands for suffrage expansion, 
accelerating erosion of the property qualification in many states.2 All three of the U.S. 
Constitution’s   suffrage   amendments  occurred  against   the  backdrop  of   a  major  war:   the  
15th amendment (African-American men) followed the Civil War, the 19th (women) 
followed World War I, and the 26th (eighteen year-olds) was adopted during the Vietnam 
War.  The Soldier Voting Act of 1942 gave absent soldiers limited voting rights during 
World War II.3 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was propelled in part by World War II, 
the Korean War, and the Cold War.4  
In each case, war mattered in catalyzing the suffrage change.  In surveying the 
development of political rights from the colonial period through the Reagan era, Marc 
Kruman   notes   the   importance   of   war.      “War   has   shaped   legislative   decision-making 
regarding political  rights,”  Kruman  writes.    “The  Revolution,  the  Civil  War,  World  War  
I,   and   the   Vietnam   War   all   sparked   dramatic   changes   in   suffrage   qualifications.” 5  
Alexander  Keyssar,   picking   up   on  Kruman’s   observation,  makes  much   the   same   point  
about the striking correlation between war and expanded suffrage in American history.  
                                                 
1. Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 82-83. 
2.  J.R.  Pole,  “Representation  and  Authority  in  Virginia  from  the  Revolution  to  Reform,”  The Journal of 
Southern History 24, no.1 (February 1958): 33; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 35. 
3. Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, 195-222. 
4. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61-120 (1988). 
5.  Kruman,  “Legislatures  and  Political  Rights,”  1235. 
279  
 
Indeed,  in  Keysaar’s  view  war  played  a  greater  role  in  shaping  American  democracy  than  
other, more celebrated factors, such as the dynamics of the frontier.6   
The invention of absentee voting opportunities during the Civil War fits the 
pattern, though uneasily. Keyssar suggests, in agreement with Chilton Williamson, that 
the needs of national security have sometimes motivated suffrage expansions benefiting 
soldiers or veterans, on the theory that rewarding soldiers in this way would facilitate 
military recruiting for the next war.7  That is not a satisfactory explanation of the soldier-
voting phenomenon in the Civil War. If facilitating future recruiting had been a 
significant motivator for these laws, one might expect that at least some of the 
constitutional amendments authorizing absentee voting for soldiers to have extended 
voting rights to some disfranchised soldiers, including non-citizens, men under 21, and 
African-Americans. None did.  And one would expect states to have preserved the 
soldier-voting laws after the Civil War. Most did not.  Moreover, recruiting goals find 
little or no expression in the evidence.8  
An   alternative   to   Williamson’s   and   Keysaar’s   theory   fits   the   soldier-voting 
phenomenon better. It roots the connection between war and suffrage in an enduring 
political culture with ancient antecedents.  That culture treats citizen-soldiers as special, 
holding a uniquely powerful claim on national affection and accommodation. In her study 
of  women’s  efforts  to  gain  access  to  positions  in  the  armed  forces,  Linda  Kerber  quotes  a  
                                                 
6. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, xxi. See also, Krebs, Fighting for Rights. 
7. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 37, 137; Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 
82-83. 
8. Josiah Benton, whose book examined the legislative history of every soldier-voting law in every 
state, cites no mention of it in his study, and no evidence of it surfaced in the contemporary newspaper 
accounts reviewed for this project. 
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toast offered during a celebration of the first anniversary of the Declaration of 
Independence.     “May  only   those  Americans  enjoy   freedom  who  are  ready   to  die for its 
defense.”    In  a  similar  spirit  and  a  similar  setting,  John  Jay’s  wife,  Sarah  Livingston  Jay,  
offered  this  toast  at  a  ball  celebrating  the  conclusion  of  the  Revolutionary  War:  “May  all  
our   Citizens   be   Soldiers,   and   all   our   Soldier   Citizens.” 9    Another scholar aptly 
characterizes  the  battlefield  as  “the  proving  ground  of  national  belonging.”10  Again and 
again  America  has  confirmed  the  priority  of  soldiers’  claims  on  the  rights  of  citizenship  
by elevating its military heroes – from Washington to Eisenhower – to the presidency.  
Democrats in 1864 hoped to tap into that heritage when they nominated George 
McClellan for president. 
The symbiosis between citizenship rights and military service in American 
political culture and political theory may help account   for   the  country’s   strong  appetite  
for permitting absent Civil War soldiers to vote, even when doing so meant abandoning 
or diluting the tradition that had always connected elections physically to a place in a 
community.  Yet in at least three ways the Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon fits at 
best awkwardly within this broader pattern. First, unlike every other example in the 
pattern, this one involved no enlargement of the circle of qualified voters. Without 
exception, soldier-voting laws gave a new right – the right to vote away from home – 
only to men who already qualified as voters under their prewar state constitutions. 
Soldiers constitutionally excluded from suffrage, by race, citizenship, or age, for 
                                                 
9. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be A Lady, 236, 240.  
10. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at 
Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hull and Wang, 2000), 248. 
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example, remained excluded under the new laws. Even the eight states that amended their 
constitutions to eliminate obstacles to absentee voting preserved prewar exclusions that 
left intact the prewar disfranchisement of many soldiers.  
A second area of difference, related to the first, is that unlike propertyless men, 
African-Americans, women, and young people who pushed to break down barriers to 
their voting rights, Civil War soldiers did not provide the main impetus for soldier-voting 
legislation. To be sure, soldiers spoke out harshly against politicians who opposed the 
new laws. But, for understandable reasons, there is a notable dearth of evidence of 
soldiers’  clamoring  for  the  right  to  cast  absentee  ballots.  While  arguably  disfranchised  by  
their (often involuntary) absence from home, these men enjoyed voting rights at home. 
They were not outside the community of full citizenship in the same way as African-
Americans and women were, for example, so they had correspondingly less to fight for in 
the way of suffrage rights. Moreover, the enactment of absentee voting rights was a 
mixed blessing for soldiers. The alternative to absentee voting under a soldier-voting law 
was something even better from their perspective: returning home to vote on furlough.  
Soldiers cherished furloughs, which thousands of them received precisely because their 
states had not enacted soldier-voting laws allowing them to vote in the field.11  The 
enactment of such laws must have disappointed a good number of servicemen who would 
have   preferred   a   furlough’s   respite   from   the   hazards and drudgery of military life. No 
wonder, then, that grass roots support for the laws among absent soldiers was muted.  
                                                 
11 .   McSeveney,   “Re-electing Lincoln: The Union Party Campaign and the Military Vote in 
Connecticut,”  147. 
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A third area of dissonance between the Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon and 
the broader pattern of linkage between war and suffrage was in the duration of the 
change. The 15th, 19th, and 26th Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
brought permanent expansion of voting rights within the federal sphere of law they 
occupied. States found ways to frustrate the spirit of the federal initiative in the case of 
the 15th Amendment, but there were no post-war retreats from the initiatives within 
federal law.12 The change wrought by the soldier-voting laws, in contrast, was more 
fleeting. Only five of the twenty soldier-voting arrangements that came into existence 
during the Civil War survived very long past the war. The relatively short life span of 
most of these laws calls into question whether the soldier-voting phenomenon qualified 
as a reform at all. Why would states endure the legal and constitutional upheavals 
associated with enactment only to erase the laws from the books shortly after the war?   
Putting  aside  for   the  moment   the  parties’  obvious  political  appetite  for   the  votes  
of absent soldiers, and taking contemporary proponents at their word, an important object 
of the laws was simple justice. In state after state, as we have seen, a rallying cry for 
enactment was that justice to soldiers (albeit only soldiers who already qualified for 
suffrage) demanded it. Some advocates cited the requirements of justice directly. Others 
did   so   indirectly   by   decrying   the   “disfranchising”   effect   of   not   passing   such   a   law;;   as  
applied   to  white  males,   the  very  word  “disfranchise”  spoke   for   itself  as   a   synonym  for  
injustice. But if simple justice demanded a loosening of election rules to accommodate 
the  absence  of  the  states’  best  citizens,  why  cancel  the  accommodation  at  this  war’s  end?    
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Future wars with future absent soldiers would demand the same accommodation. While 
the Civil War era laws (including those that expired after the war) set precedents for 
soldier-voting laws enacted during subsequent wars and in that way laid the groundwork 
for future justice, in the short term the innovation did not survive in most states.13 It 
fizzled out with the end of hostilities, calling into question the degree to which the pursuit 
of justice explains the phenomenon. 
The demands of justice were certainly part of the picture, as was the immediate 
political appetite for the votes of absent soldiers. But the picture becomes more complete 
only when it takes account of the role played by the unique circumstances of national 
politics in 1863-1864,   dubbed   here   the   “politics   of   soldiers.”      Quite   apart   from   their  
importance as voters, soldiers enjoyed unequaled credibility in communicating the core 
messages of both parties to civilian voters, which is why both parties enlisted the voice of 
soldiers in their messaging wars.  For Republicans, the core messages were that 
Democrats were disloyal and that McClellan was both incompetent and a coward. For 
Democrats,   the   themes   were   Lincoln’s   ineptitude   as   a   commander-in-chief and his 
neglect of white soldiers.  Servicemen spoke with authority on all these subjects, making 
them  ideal  spokesmen  for  the  parties’  messaging.   
The   parties   learned   in   1863,   particularly   from   Pennsylvania’s   gubernatorial  
contest between George Woodward and Andrew Curtin, that the politics of soldiers 
required   the   parties   to   project   affinity   with   servicemen   and   to   stake   a   claim   as   “the  
soldiers’  friend.”    Support  for  soldier-voting laws served that end, while opposition risked 
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being  labeled  the  soldiers’  enemy.    By  late  1863,  both  parties  recognized  that  reality,  but  
only Republicans could act on it with unalloyed support for the laws. Experience showed 
both   parties   that  Republicans  would   garner   the   lion’s   share   of   soldier   votes,   either   (as  
Republicans would have it) because soldiers genuinely favored Republican candidates or 
(as  Democrats  would  have  it)  because  Republicans  used  the  army’s  command  structure to 
cheat.  Either way, the issue was a winner for Republicans. Democrats lost the soldier 
vote in states that enacted soldier-voting laws, and they appeared hostile to soldiers when 
they opposed enactment, costing them civilian votes. With Republicans wielding greater 
power than Democrats in state governments, and with Democrats boxed in defensively on 
the issue, soldier-voting laws swept the country in 1864. Even more important than the 
votes this yielded for Lincoln and Republicans from soldiers in the field, it helped cement 
Republicans’  status  as  the  soldiers’  friend,  to  the  party’s  great  advantage  among  civilian  
voters in the politics of soldiers.  
The politics of soldiers ended with the war. In most states, the novel legal 
arrangements for absentee voting by soldiers collapsed at about the same time, with no 
allowance for reactivation in future wars, notwithstanding the abstract demands of justice 
for soldiers of those wars.  This underscores not only the power of the politics of soldiers 
briefly to effect radical change, but also the atavistic pull of the prewar communal habit 
of elections. Absent the imperatives of the politics of soldiers, postwar election forms 
moved not in new directions hinted at by the short-lived novelty of absentee voting for 
soldiers – toward portable, individualized voting rights so familiar to modern Americans 
– but back to where they started before the novelty. Communities were back in charge for 
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all voters, with all voters expected in time-honored fashion to appear in person before 
local election supervisors and in the presence of their neighbors.  It would take the better 
part of another century, and more wars, for absentee voting to take hold as a routine part 
of American elections.  
The  modern  perspective  of  “rights consciousness”  may  color  current  perspectives  
on the soldier-voting phenomenon, inviting the conclusion that it was a generally modest 
and conservative shift, or even a missed opportunity for genuine reform. It did not 
enlarge the electoral franchise beyond prewar limits, and it did not effect lasting change 
in the direction of making suffrage a portable and personal right. The late constitutional 
scholar  Ronald  Dworkin  observed  about  modern  political   thought   that   the  “language  of  
rights now dominates political   debate   in   the   United   States.” 14   A student of that 
phenomenon,  Hendrik  Hartog  traces  rights  consciousness  to  “an  American  emancipatory  
tradition   of   constitutional   meaning”   that   began   with   passage   of   the   Civil   War  
constitutional amendments and has become   in   modern   times   “the   most   salient   and  
interesting  feature  of  American  public  culture.”15 Rights consciousness has left its mark 
on the historiography of American election law, as well. The closest thing to a 
comprehensive survey of that subject, Alexander  Keysaar’s  The Right to Vote, brings this 
perspective to the subject, treating the general (though unsteady) shrinking of 
disfranchisement over time as the essential fact of voting rights.  
                                                 
14 .   As   quoted   in   Thomas   L.   Haskell,   “The   Curious   Persistence   of   Rights   Talk   in   the   ‘Age   of  
Interpretation,’”  Journal of American History 74, no. 3 (December 3, 1987): 988. 
15.  Hendrik  Hartog,  “The  Constitution  of  Aspiration  and  ‘The  Rights  That  Belong  to  Us  All,’”  in  The 
Constitution and American Life , ed. David Thelen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 357-359. 
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Measured   by   the   standards   of   rights   consciousness   and  Hartog’s   “emancipatory 
tradition,”  the  Civil  War  soldier-voting phenomenon indeed emerges as a halting, mostly 
conservative step in the evolution of election law. For groups disfranchised before the 
war,   there   was   nothing   “emancipatory”   about   it,   since   all   those   groups remained 
disfranchised   even   with   the   laws’   enactments.   To   the   extent   that   it   enlarged   voting  
opportunities for some (already enfranchised) citizens, that enlargement was short-lived. 
By this reckoning, the soldier-voting phenomenon was small potatoes, a footnote in the 
legal history of voting. 
But that perspective blinds us to the contemporary radicalism of the legal and 
constitutional phenomenon.  Rights consciousness presupposes personal autonomy in 
voting,   so   a   “reform”   that   leaves   intact   prior   exclusions from the franchise and merely 
enlarges the geography within which an enfranchised elector may exercise his electoral 
autonomy  may   seem   to   change   the   “right   to   vote”   hardly   at   all.      Soldier-voting laws, 
however, did not take the personal autonomy of enfranchised voters as a point of 
departure. To the contrary, we may properly view the laws as inventing the notion of 
voters as fully autonomous actors, transforming (albeit only temporarily) an earlier and 
very different idea of the role of the individual voter in the election process.  
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Rufus Ranney captured the before and after contrast 
in his dissenting opinion in Lehman v. McBride.  The picture of voting after the law, to 
Ranney’s  chagrin,  was  as  a  “personal  privilege,  carried  by the elector wherever he may 
go  and  properly  exercised  wherever  he  may  be.”  (Ranney  qualified  “personal  privilege”  
in   this  passage  with   the  adjective  “mere,”  signaling  his  sense   that   this  effect  of   the   law  
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was self-evidently unsatisfactory.) The contrasting pre-legislation picture of voting, 
which   Ranney   saw   as   constitutionally   required,   was   “the   joint performance of a high 
public  duty”  at  a  public  gathering  of  electors  in  their  place  of  residence.  Far  from  being  a  
personal and individual power, Ranney said,  the  constitutional  right  to  vote  is  “a  public 
franchise, belonging to the whole community, conferred upon about one fifth of its 
members, to be exercised for the common benefit of the whole, and under such proper 
safeguards against abuse and perversion, as the fundamental laws of the community have 
provided.”16  
This view of the nature of voting, which Ranney believed the Ohio law 
unconstitutionally altered, is antithetical to a rights conscious claim on the franchise by 
individual, autonomous actors. It is also ubiquitous in the arguments mounted against 
absentee   voting.   The   new   laws’   supporters   did   not   disagree   with   the   opponents’  
characterization of prewar elections; they simply saw nothing constitutionally compelling 
about that prewar reality. If legislators wanted to alter the relationship between 
community and voter, even risking greater fraud by doing so, that was their prerogative 
unless constitutional text expressly and unambiguously tied their hands, which in most 
states they believed it did not. 
One   need   not   agree   with   Ranney’s   conclusion   that   Ohio’s   soldier-voting   law’s  
departure from prewar election legal norms was unconstitutional to agree with him that it 
was radical.  Its radicalism, however, lay not in any change it wrought in who could enjoy 
the   franchise.   Instead   its   radicalism   lay   in   the   law’s   transformation  of  what  an  election  
                                                 
16. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 631, 649 (italics in the original).  
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was. The law upended the prewar notion of the right to vote as a collective possession 
controlled by the community where it took place, replacing it – temporarily and for a 
limited few – with the very different notion that voting rights were personal, to be 
wielded individually and portably. It was a change that the yardstick of rights 
consciousness is ill equipped to measure, making it correspondingly easy for modern 
observers to overlook.  
Even   allowing   for   a   weakening   of   migratory   Americans’   attachment   to  
communities in the first half of the nineteenth century, it took a force of considerable 
power to displace the longstanding identification of an election as a communitarian 
process  with   a   fixed   location   in   the   voter’s   hometown.17  The politics of soldiers from 
1863-1864 carried sufficient power to accomplish the displacement, but not enough to 
accomplish it permanently. When the politics of soldiers ended, the prewar 
communitarian sense of elections reasserted itself, and arguments about the demands of 
justice for future soldiers in future wars were too remote to resist its reassertion. 
Rights consciousness also helps obscure the role local residency requirements 
played   in   the   prewar   way   of   voting.   All   sides   of   the   debate   agreed   that   a   soldier’s  
temporary absence from home did nothing to weaken his status as a resident of his 
hometown for suffrage purposes. Proponents of the laws viewed the residency 
qualification as bearing only on who could vote, such that a soldier meeting the 
qualification could vote anywhere the legislature allowed. That view corresponds to the 
                                                 
17. Joel Silbey, Alexander Keyssar, and Kenneth Winkle all attribute political effects to the ubiquity of 
migration over the course of the nineteenth century. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 148-149; 
Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 300; Winkle, The Politics of Community, 48-70. 
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modern rights conscious way of thinking: the important fact about residency is that it 
reflects the autonomous   elector’s   choice   about   where   to   participate   as   a   citizen;;   once  
earned the qualification travels with him. Opponents viewed it very differently. They 
agreed   that   the   voter’s   choice   of   residency  was   critical   to   identifying   the   place  where  
election judges applied the yardstick of the durational minimum set by law as a 
precondition to voting.  But they also saw the residency qualification as serving a 
communal purpose. As the cases evaluating the constitutionality of soldier-voting laws 
demonstrate, theses men saw residency requirements as having come into existence not to 
provide   individuals  with  a  choice  of  where   they  could  “belong”  as  citizens,  but   to  help  
communities  preserve  electoral  “purity.”  The  residency  qualification  provided  a  policing  
mechanism to assure, in the words of Justice James Campbell of Michigan, that each 
individual  elector  participate  “at  his  own  place  of  abode,  [where]  his  neighbors  will  know  
his   person,   and   will   be   likely   to   know   his   qualifications.”18 Of course, that policing 
mechanism presupposed that the voter would appear personally to cast his ballot at the 
local voting site. Separating the locus of balloting from the place of residence arguably 
disabled the policing mechanism. That either violated the constitution by rendering 
suffrage qualifications unenforceable – “eviscerating”   them,   as   Rufus   Ranney,   Isaac  
Christiancy, and like-minded justices would have it – or  it  was  a  matter  of  mere  “policy  
and  expediency,”   for   legislators   to   adjust   in   light   of   exigencies   that  wise   constitutional 
                                                 
18. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 123, 144. 
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construction   should   accommodate,   as  Michigan’s  Chief   Justice  George  Martin   and   the  
laws’  other  judicial  supporters  would  have  it.19  
Neither view supports a modern interpretation that soldier-voting laws relaxed 
residency qualifications. They did no  such  thing.  The  laws’  legal  significance  was  their  
departure from the communal tradition of voting embedded in prewar law and generally 
restored in post-war law. The brief but irresistible pull of Civil War politics, and 
particularly the politics of soldiers, explains the temporary legal upheaval. 
                                                 
19. Id. at 185. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix describes the Civil War soldier-voting laws, state by state. It 
divides the states that allowed absent soldiers to vote into four groups. Iowa and 
Minnesota constitute the first group. They established the two prevailing models of 
absentee  voting:  opening  election  sites   in   the   field   (Iowa),   and  sending  soldiers’   sealed  
ballots home from the field (Minnesota).  All other states adopted forms of one or the 
other model (except Pennsylvania, which adopted both). The second group consists of the 
nine states that enacted soldier-voting laws and that achieved statehood before 1800.  
They  are   labeled  here   the  “Senior  States.”  The  novelty  of  absentee  voting   faced  higher  
constitutional hurdles in these older, mostly eastern states than it did in the eleven newer, 
generally more westerly states that achieved statehood between 1800 and 1864.  All nine 
had to either amend their constitutions to accommodate absentee voting (in four instances 
after a court  found  the  statute  unconstitutional,  and  once  after  a  governor’s  veto),  or  limit  
absentee voting to elections for federal offices (twice in response to court rulings against 
laws with a broader scope), or both.  Not a single high court in this group sustained a 
soldier-voting law against constitutional challenge. Moreover, three of the eleven 
Northern states organized before 1800 never enacted a soldier-voting law at all 
(Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Delaware).  And only one of the soldier-voting laws 
enacted in these senior states survived long after the war (New Hampshire). 
The post-1800 states that provided for soldier voting (other than Iowa and 
Minnesota) comprise the third group, called here the  “Junior  States.”  Only  two  Northern 
states organized after 1800 never provided for absent-soldier voting at all during the Civil 
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War (Indiana and Oregon). The enacted laws when challenged in these younger states 
were sustained by three of the five high courts that reviewed them.  And four of the 
country’s  five soldier-voting laws that lasted well past the war are from these junior states 
(Kansas, Maine, Michigan, and Nevada). 
The tougher constitutional sledding for soldier-voting laws in the pre-1800 states 
compared to the younger group likely owes to the longer habits in the older states of 
traditional, communal ways of voting. Traditional elections had deeper roots in these 
mostly eastern states, and that older tradition collided more joltingly with the novel 
concept of absentee voting. Judges in the older states were correspondingly more likely 
than their counterparts in the post-1800 states to give constitutional weight to historical 
experience.  They were more likely to search history for definitions of words that framers 
used in state constitutions, words like   “election”   and   “vote.”   History   was   shorter   in  
newcomer states, of course, so the weight of tradition interfered less with legislative 
innovations.  
Grouping the states this way risks overstating the differences between them. The 
line demarking one group from the other is hazier than the categorization may suggest.  
The invention of absentee voting was a legal innovation in the junior states, even if the 
innovation there collided with constitutions less frequently than in the more senior group. 
And a degree of contingency accounts for some of the difference.  For example, we 
cannot  know  whether  the  Wisconsin  Supreme  Court’s  unanimous  decision  upholding  that  
state’s  soldier-voting law resulted from legislative intimidation, as one scholar suggests. 
By amending the law to permit absent soldiers to vote in judicial elections, historian 
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Frank Klement argues, the legislature put a finger on the scale of justice, pressuring the 
jurists into supporting the new law out of political self-interest. And perhaps the 
Minnesota statute would have faced fatal judicial scrutiny if the losing Democratic 
candidate   for   the  state’s  congressional   seat  had  pursued  an  election  contest.   Instead,  he  
backed off when the Republican press threatened to ruin him politically by branding him 
anti-soldier.  That law never faced a test in the high court. Moreover, the California high 
court,  in  striking  down  that  state’s  law,  blurred  the  boundary  between  old  and  young  by  
looking to the history of eastern states in defining words in California’s   1849  
constitution. California settlers imported their legal understandings from the states of 
their origins, ruled Chief Justice Lorenzo Sawyer, and in those eastern states, an elector 
could  “vote”  only  by  being  personally  present  in  his  local  residence.  Sawyer concluded 
that  California’s  framers  had  in  mind  that  definition  of  “vote”  when  they  drafted  the  state  
constitution.   
So, while the senior-junior taxonomy is not problem free, it remains true as a 
general proposition that the novelty of soldier voting survived the gauntlet of 
constitutional challenge more successfully in the junior states than in the senior states to 
east, a distinction that the differing weight of election-law history at least partly explains.    
A subset of the junior group are three  “outlier”  states:  Missouri,  where  the  soldier-
voting provision arguably lacked legitimacy because it came into existence non-
legislatively during an internecine war that destroyed civil government; Nevada, which 
entered the union barely a week before the 1864 elections and did so with a jerry-rigged 
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soldier-voting provision of debatable legitimacy; and Illinois, which enacted a soldier-
voting law only in 1865, when it no longer mattered politically. 
 
THE MODEL STATES 
Iowa and Minnesota 
All soldier-voting laws adopted one of two models, designated here as the Iowa 
and Minnesota models. (Pennsylvania adopted a hybrid of both models). Laws following 
the Iowa model provided for election sites to be set up in military encampments where 
soldiers served. Laws following the Minnesota model allowed absent soldiers to complete 
their ballots and forward them back to their voting precincts to be counted with civilian 
ballots.  
The choice of Iowa as a model for its form of absentee voting is debatable. 
Pennsylvania had enacted a soldier-voting law in 1813 that called for establishing voting 
sites  “in  the  field”  for  absent  Pennsylvania  soldiers.  So,  while  the  state  supreme  court  set  
that law aside early in 1862 before any other state had acted, the 1813 law arguably 
deserves the honor of designation as a model. Missouri provided for absentee voting 
before Iowa did, following a similar model, but Missouri acted non-legislatively and 
arguably illegitimately in doing so.   
As the first state to adopt this model legislatively during the Civil War, Iowa gets 
the nod as the model for purposes of this survey. 
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Iowa 
The Hawkeye State enacted its soldier-voting law on September 11, 1862, the first 
state legislature to do so during the war.1 Voting under the law occurred at election sites 
created   “at   every   place   where   a   Regiment,   Battalion,   Battery   or   Company   of   Iowa  
soldiers  may  be  found  or  stationed.”2 That formulation effectively excluded sailors in the 
navy, since naval organization included none of the listed designations. But all other 
servicemen  were   covered,   including   not   just   volunteers,   but   also   every   “soldier   in   the  
military   service   of   this   state   or   the   United   States.”   That   included   draftees   and   army  
regulars. This coverage provision also specified surgeons and chaplains.3 By an 1864 
amendment, the state added hospitals to the locations where absentee voting locations 
were to be set up.4 
 Setting the template for many military suffrage laws, this one dictated that the 
provisions of the general election law would apply to   voting   in   the   field,   “so   far   as  
applicable,   and   not   qualified   by   the   provisions   of   this   Act.”5  The law specified the 
elections  in  which  Iowa’s  absent  soldiers  were  eligible  to  vote.  With  the  exception  of  a  
few county-level offices (constables, county and township supervisors, and justices of the 
peace),   the   law’s   absentee-voting mechanism applied to elections for all state, federal, 
and local offices.6  This included elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors. 
                                                 
1. An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State 
in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, ch. 29, 1862 Iowa Acts 28. 
2. Id. at § 8. 
3. Id. at § 2. 
4. An Act to Amend Chapter 29 of the Laws of the Extra Session of the Ninth General Assembly, ch. 
28, § 2, 1864 Iowa Acts 26, 27. 
5. Id. at § 6. 
6. Id. at § 5. 
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 Polling sites were to be opened for each Iowa regiment. If that failed to make it 
“practicable   for   all   to   vote   together,”   as   when   part   of   the   regiment   was   on   “detached  
service,”   then   the   detached   unit   could   open   its   own   polling   site. 7 The eligible Iowa 
soldiers at each site elected three election judges, who in turn appointed election clerks. 
The only qualification was that the judges (though not necessarily the clerks) had to be 
eligible Iowa voters.8 That meant they had to be white males, at least 21 years old, U.S. 
citizens, with at least six months of residence in Iowa and 60 days of county residency.9   
As in elections back home, judges and clerks swore oaths, promising among other 
things   to   “studiously   endeavor   to  prevent   fraud,  deceit   and  abuse”   in   the  election.10 To 
assist the election judges and clerks, the law provided for commissioners to travel from 
Iowa with necessary election paraphernalia: copies of the law, forms of poll lists and 
returns, and the text of oaths to administer to judges, clerks, and challenged voters. 
Commissioners also carried the election returns back home to Iowa. 11   The 
commissioners, appointed by the state census board, had to be qualified electors. They 
were assigned one per regiment, although the law authorized the governor to supplement 
that allocation with more commissioners if he thought it necessary. Commissioners had 
to   swear   an   oath   that   included   the   promise   to   perform   their   responsibilities   “without  
                                                 
7. Id.at § 9. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at § 1. 
10. Id. at § 11. 
11. Id. at §§ 25, 26. 
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reference   to   political   preferences,”   and,   like   election   judges   and   clerks,   to   “studiously  
endeavor to  prevent  fraud,  deceit  and  abuse.”12 
 The statute specified the information that each ballot had to include, starting with 
the  voter’s  home  county  and  followed  by  the  preferred  candidate’s  name  for  each  office.  
The ballot had to be on a single piece of paper, though it could cover a long list of 
offices. The offices up for election, and the preferred candidates names, could be printed 
in advance on the ballot (assuming that the party organization found a way to deliver 
such prepared ballots to the military camps) or written by hand by the voter.13  
 Soldiers announced themselves to the judges and clerks, by name, county of 
residence, and military attachment. The clerks entered all this information in the poll 
books.14 If no one challenged the voter, the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box.15 If 
there was a challenge, the judges administered an oath to the soldier testing all elements 
of eligibility – U.S. citizenship, state and county residency, and age. (As to age, the oath 
read,   “Do   you   solemnly   swear  …   that   you   are   twenty   one   years   of   age,   as   you   verily  
believe?”)  If  the  soldier  swore  the  oath,  his  vote  was  accepted.16   
At the close of voting, the judges tallied the votes, the clerks double-checked the 
tally, and the judges entered the final result on the return form. Then the returns, together 
with the poll books and ballots, were given to a commissioner (or if no commissioner was 
                                                 
12. Id. at §§ 29, 30; An Act to Amend Chapter 29 of the Laws of the Extra Session of the Ninth General 
Assembly, ch. 28, § 1, 1864 Iowa Acts 26, 26. 
13. An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this 
State in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, §15. In two states, Minnesota and Connecticut, 
the soldier-voting   laws   expressly   allowed   commissioners   to   carry   ballots   to   the   states’   military  
encampments, but only if the political parties provided the ballots. (See discussion of those states, infra.) 
Iowa’s  statute  did  not  so  state.   
14. Id. at § 16. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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on  hand,  placed  in  the  mail  “or  other  safe  mode”)  for  delivery  to  the  Board  of  Canvassers  
in Iowa. There the results of the soldier voting were added to the civilian results to 
determine election winners. 
In  the  elections  of  October  1862,  shortly  after  enactment  of  Iowa’s  law,  a  losing  
candidate   for   clerk   of   the   district   court   in   Iowa   County   challenged   the   statute’s  
constitutionality.  He  relied  on  the  way  the  state’s  constitution  articulated  the  requirement  
of county residence. Eligibility, the 1857 constitution said, required that the citizen have 
been  for  at  least  60  days  a  resident  “of  the  county  in  which  he  claims  his  vote.”17  This, 
argued  the  challenger’s  counsel,  fixed  the  required  location  of  the  voting.  To  “claim”  his  
vote,   according   to   the   lawyer’s   argument,   a   citizen   had   to   be   physically   present   at   the  
voting site in the county.  
The case went to the Iowa Supreme Court, which ruled in 1863 that the law was 
constitutional. 18   Justice   George   Wright,   a   Republican,   wrote   the   court’s   unanimous  
opinion.19 Justice  Wright  turned  away  the  challenger’s  argument,  ruling  that  the  disputed  
constitutional language defined who could not, but did not fix where he could vote. The 
word  “claim”  meant  that  a  voter  could  not  claim  to  be  an  elector  of  a  county  other  than  
the county where he resided, but it did not mean that he had to be physically present in 
the county when he voted.  The legislature  was  free  to  set  the  “time,  place,  and  manner”  
of voting, including out-of-state locations, Wright concluded.  With some modesty, 
                                                 
17. IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 1. 
18.  Morrison, 15 Iowa  at 304. 
19.  “George  Grover  Wright.”  Biographical  Directory  of the United States Congress. Accessed May 29, 
2013. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000759.   
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Wright   allowed   that   the   issue   was   a   close   call,   but   the   court’s   duty   was   to   call   close  
questions  in  favor  of  a  law’s  constitutionality.20  
Two  other  states’  high  courts,  in  reviewing  the  constitutionality  of  soldier-voting 
laws,   commented   on   the   Iowa   Supreme  Court   decision.   Both   found  Wright’s   decision  
unpersuasive.   Vermont’s   Supreme  Court,   concluding   that   the   constitution of that state 
barred absentee voting laws covering state  (but not federal) elections, expressly declined 
to  adopt  the  Iowa  court’s  reasoning,  declaring  “we  are  not  prepared  to  say  it  is  sound.”21  
California’s   high   court,   in   striking   down   that   state’s   law, said in somewhat harsher 
language  that  adopting  the  reasoning  of  their  Iowa  brethren  would  “throw  the  whole  law  
relating  to  the  construction  of  written  instruments  into  hopeless  confusion.”22  
The Iowa law did not expire by its terms at the end of the war, but soldier-voting 
provisions  were  omitted  from  the  state’s  first  post-war codification of its laws in 1880. In 
fact,   the  general  election   law  of  1880  stated,  “no  person   is  entitled   to  vote  at  any  other  
place than in the township in which he resides at the  time  he  offers  to  vote.”23 
 
Minnesota 
Minnesota enacted its soldier-voting law on September 27, 1862. Unlike Iowa, 
Minnesota  did  not  try  to  open  election  sites  “in  the  field,”  opting  instead  for  a  system  that  
                                                 
20. Morrison  15 Iowa at 348. 
21. Opinion of the Judges of   the   Supreme   Court   on   the   Constitutionality   of   “An   Act   Providing   for  
Soldier  Voting,”  37  Vt.  665,  674(1864). 
22. Bourland, 26 Cal. 161, 206 (1864). 
23. IOWA CODE, Ch. 32, § 492 (1880). 
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allowed soldiers to send completed ballots from their military encampment back home to 
their election districts in Minnesota. It was the first state to do so.24 
Perhaps   to   preempt   anticipated   legal   challenges,   the   act’s   title   indulged   a   legal  
fiction, pronouncing that the law enabled absent servicemen “to   vote   in   the   Election  
District  in  which  they  reside,”  as  if  saying  it  that  way  made  it  so.    This  was  a  clear  effort  
to conform to the language of the state constitution. In its suffrage provision, the 
constitution of 1857 stated the local residence requirement in terms that certainly could 
be  construed  as  requiring  the  voter’s  physical  presence  in  his  Minnesota  election  district.  
It  granted  the  right  to  vote  “in  the  election  district  in  which  he  [the  voter]  shall  at  the  time  
have been for ten days a resident.”25 
In Minnesota and the states following its model of military suffrage legislation, 
soldiers filled out their ballots at the site of their military attachment and forwarded the 
completed ballot back to their voting district in Minnesota. The law covered military 
personnel comprehensively, allowing  absentee  voting  by  “all  persons  …  in  the  military  or  
naval   service,”   provided   they   were   eligible   electors   “when   they   mustered   into   the  
service.”26 This included volunteers, draftees, regulars, and sailors in the navy. The law 
went a step further, authorizing voting by servicemen who turned 21 during their military 
service, provided they qualified as residents before enrolling. The law applied 
                                                 
24. An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the Military or Naval Service 
of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at the General Election to be held 
in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections, during the Continuance of the 
Present War, ch.   1,   1862   (extra   session)  Minn.   Laws   13.   (Hereafter   referred   to   as   “Minnesota   Soldier-
Voting  Law  of  1862.”) 
25. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1. 
26. Minnesota Soldier-Voting Law of 1862, § 1. 
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comprehensively to elections, as well, authorizing absent soldiers to  vote  in  “all”  annual  
elections,  starting  in  1862,  but  only  “during  the  continuance  of  the  present  war.”27  
Commissioners  were  key  to  the  law’s  functioning.  The  governor,  with  the  advice  
and consent of the state senate, appointed the commissioners. They were stretched thin, a 
total of eight commissioners being assigned for all the states where Minnesota 
servicemen were stationed.  By the terms of the law, four commissioners were Democrats 
and four Republicans.28   
The law allowed the two political parties to supply their pre-printed ballots to the 
commissioners,   who   then   provided   the   ballots   to   the   voting   soldiers.   The   soldier’s  
completed ballot would get forwarded home to Minnesota only after he first swore an 
oath, which a commissioner administered in person. The oath touched on the elements of 
voting eligibility other than race and gender.  It covered age (21), residence (four months 
in Minnesota and ten days in the election district), and U.S. citizenship. Minnesota was 
unusually generous in its citizenship qualification for suffrage, enfranchising not only 
then-current  United  States  citizens,  but  also  foreigners  who  had  declared  their  “intention  
to become such citizen, conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of 
naturalization.”29  The oath covered both citizenship categories.30  
                                                 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at § 6. 
29. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1. The constitutions of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Kansas 
similarly allowed prospective citizens to vote. (See discussion of those states, infra.) The Minnesota oath 
did not address the two categories of Native Americans allowed to vote under this section of the 
constitution.  One  was  “Persons  of  mixed  white  and  indian  blood  who  have  adopted  the  customs  and  habits  
of   civilization.”   The   other   was   those   Indians   found   by   a   court   to   be   “capable   of   enjoying   the   rights   of  
citizenship  within  this  State.”   
30. Minnesota Soldier-Voting Law of 1862, § 3. 
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The soldier would complete his ballot, place it in an envelope supplied by the 
commissioner,   “seal   the   same  with   sealing  wax”   (also   provided  by   the   commissioner),  
and swear the above oath. The commissioner then signed a form in the nature of a 
notarization on the back of the sealed envelope. It attested to the name of the soldier, the 
name   of   the   commissioner,   the   soldier’s   military   attachment,   the   fact   that   soldier   had  
taken   the  oath,   and   the   commissioner’s   assurance   that   the   soldier’s  vote  was   “free   and  
voluntary.”31  
The   commissioner   then   mailed   the   envelope   to   the   soldier’s   voting   district   in  
Minnesota. The election judges there, after confirming that the soldier named on the 
envelope   was   on   the   district’s   voting registry, opened the envelope and added the 
enclosed ballot to the civilian votes in the ballot box. This meant that there could be no 
separate tally of the soldier votes.32 
Minnesota’s   statute   never   came   under   review   by   the   state’s   supreme   court.  
According to the leading scholar on this law, a likely court challenge was forestalled 
when   the   losing   candidate   for   Minnesota’s   congressional   seat   backed   away   from   his  
initial intention to contest the election. The candidate, Democrat William Cullen, 
believed he would have won the election if the soldier vote had been excluded. Cullen 
started the process of mounting a challenge, then reconsidered when the Republican press 
had a field day claiming he was anti-soldier.33 Cullen’s  retreat  meant  Minnesota  was  one  
of only five states to have enacted a soldier-voting law without either amending its 
                                                 
31. Id. 
      32. Id. § 4.  
33.  Downs,  “The  Soldier  Vote  and  Minnesota  Politics,”  198-199. Because soldier votes were not tallied 
separately from civilian votes, Cullen would likely have faced a difficult problem of proving his case if he 
had proceeded to contest the election. 
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constitution or experiencing a high court review, or both.  The other three states were 
Kentucky (which forestalled a constitutional challenge by limiting soldier-voting rights to 
federal elections, an approach which high courts in Vermont and New Hampshire had 
sanctioned), Missouri (where the soldier-voting law lacked clear legitimacy and courts 
were unavailable for election contests), Nevada (which became a state only days before 
the election of 1864), and Illinois (which enacted its soldier-voting law in 1865, when it 
no longer mattered politically).  
Minnesota removed its soldier-voting law in the revision of its statutes in 1868.34 
 
 
SENIOR STATES 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Kentucky, Maryland, and New York 
These eight states became part of the United States before 1800, and all remained 
in the Union during the Civil War. Between 1862 and 1864, all enacted provisions 
allowing absent soldiers to vote. All nine had to clear difficult constitutional hurdles to do 
so.  Six of the eight (Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode 
Island) did so only after amending their constitutions.  The other three (Vermont, New 
Hampshire, and Kentucky), following a path suggested by the Vermont Supreme Court, 
avoided constitutional obstacles by limiting absentee voting rights to elections for federal 
offices.  The four state supreme courts in this group that reviewed absentee voting laws 
                                                 
34. MINN. STAT. Ch. 1 (1868). 
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(Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Vermont, and New Hampshire), all struck down the laws, in 
whole  or  in  part.  (Pennsylvania’s  and  Connecticut’s  constitutional  amendments followed 
their courts’   adverse court rulings.)  And in only one state of this senior group did a 
soldier-voting law survive much past the end of the war. (New Hampshire). 
 
Pennsylvania 
The first state to confront the legality of soldier-voting laws was Pennsylvania, 
the only state in the Union with a soldier-voting law on the books at the outset of the war.  
That law was first enacted in 1813 and was retained, in a slightly revised form, as a brief 
section in a comprehensive election law passed   in  1839.      It  allowed  absent  soldiers  “to  
exercise the right of suffrage at such place as may be appointed by the commanding 
officer of the troop, or company, to which they shall respectively belong, as fully as if 
they   were   present   at   the   usual   place   of   election.”35 A precursor to Civil War soldier-
voting laws on the Iowa model, it called for election sites to open at the encampments 
where soldiers served, overseen by officers of each company.36 Before the Civil War, the 
law never received judicial attention, if indeed it was ever used at all.37 But it was used in 
elections in 1861, and in some of those elections it was decisive.  
                                                 
35. An Act Relating to the Elections of this Commonwealth, P. L. No. 192, § 43, 1839 Pa. Laws 519, 
528  (hereafter  cited  as  “Pennsylvania  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1839”). 
36. Id. at § 44. 
37. In attacking Democrats in general, and Democrat George Woodward in particular, for opposing 
soldier voting, Republicans in 1864 charged in an election pamphlet that Pennsylvania soldiers had voted 
under the law during the Mexican War. Chandler, The  Soldiers’  Right  To  Vote, 8.  Neither Josiah Benton 
nor Jonathan White, in writing about the Pennsylvania soldier-voting law of 1864, corroborate that 
assertion.  
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The first challenge to the law that found its way to the state Supreme Court did 
not  call  into  question  the  law’s  constitutionality.  In  the  case  of  Hulseman and Brinkworth 
v. Rems and Siner, two losing candidates for the Common Council of Philadelphia asked 
the high court to enjoin the two winning candidates from taking their seats. Election 
returns  from  a  Pennsylvania  regiment  stationed  in  Virginia  were  decisive  in  the  winners’  
victory, and the challengers claimed that those returns were entirely bogus. No election 
had actually occurred at the regiment, the losing candidates asserted, and the returns 
purporting to show the tally of soldier votes were forgeries.38   
The unanimous Supreme Court agreed that forged returns tarnished the election, 
but it declined to set aside the results. Chief Justice Walter Lowrie, a Democrat, wrote the 
opinion.   He   lamented   the   forgeries   as   a   “gross   fraud”   and   deplored   the   sorry   state   of  
partisan   strife,   in  which   “opposing   parties   treat   each   other   as   enemies”   who   “come   to  
think  that  tricks  and  lies,  fraud,  forgery  and  perjury  are  legitimate  strategies.”  But  it  was  
not  the  Supreme  Court’s  job  to  remedy  election  fraud,  said  Lowrie.  That  job  belonged  in  
this case to the Philadelphia Common Council, and the challengers erred in failing to take 
their challenge to that body before seeking relief from the high court.39  
The Hulseman and Brinkworth decision did not address the constitutionality of 
the 1839 soldier-voting  law.  That  issue  first  came  before  Pennsylvania’s  high court in the 
case of Chase v. Miller, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  In the 1861 race for district 
attorney of Luzerne County, Democrat Ezra Chase outpolled Republican Jerome Miller 
among the voters casting their ballots in the county. But Miller handily beat Chase in the 
                                                 
38. Hulseman, 41 Pa. at 397. 
39. Id. at 400-402. 
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votes of absent soldiers, more than making up his deficit in the home vote. The return 
judges in Luzerne County, however, excluded the soldier votes and declared Chase the 
winner.40   
Miller supporters contested the results, claiming that the return judges should 
have counted soldier votes as provided in the soldier-voting law of 1839.  The lower 
court judge, a Democrat named John Conyngham, agreed.  The exclusion of the pro-
Miller  military  vote,  which  “disfranchised”  soldiers,  in  Conyngham’s  opinion,  also  flew  
in   the  face  of   the   legislature’s  decision.  Upholding   the  exclusion  “would  be  a  denial  of  
sovereignty,”   Conyngham   ruled.41  The decision made Republican Miller the winner. 
Chase appealed to the state Supreme Court. 
Democrat George Woodward  authored  the  high  court’s  4-1 decision in May 1862 
overruling   the   lower  court  and  reinstalling  Chase  as  Luzerne  County’s  district  attorney.  
The court ruled that the 1839 soldier-voting  law  violated  Pennsylvania’s  constitution.  The  
decision hinged on   the   meaning   of   the   suffrage   provision   of   Pennsylvania’s   1838  
constitution.    Article  III,  section  1  of  that  instrument  granted  voting  rights  to  “every  white  
freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year, and in the 
election district where he offers to vote, ten days immediately preceding such 
election….”42 The central question was whether the language italicized here imposed a 
constitutional requirement that voters cast their ballots in person within their 
                                                 
40 . Chase, 41 Pa. at 414. A fair assumption is that the election officials acted based on their 
interpretation of the Pennsylvania constitution, but no record of their reasoning has survived. 
41. Philadelphia Inquirer, January 16, 1862. 
42. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1, italics added.  The same section also conditioned the suffrage on 
the  payment  of  a  tax.  Specifically,  the  prospective  voter  must  have  “within  two  years  paid  a  State  or  county  
tax,  which  shall  have  been  assessed  at  least  ten  days  before  the  election….”       
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Pennsylvania election districts. If so, the legislature acted beyond its authority in 
authorizing absentee voting. If not – if, in other words, the italicized words merely 
established who could vote, leaving the legislature to establish where – then the absentee 
voting law was a legitimate exercise of legislative power. 
Jerome   Miller’s   lawyers,   seeking   to   have   the   law   upheld,   argued   that   the  
constitution   required   only   that   the   ballot   ultimately   be   “polled”   (i.e.,   counted)   in   the  
election district where the voter meets the residency requirement. In this interpretation, 
no  matter  where   a   soldier   physically   cast   his   ballot,   he   “offered”   his   vote   in   his   home  
election district if his vote was polled there. The legislature could fix the time and place 
of   the  soldier’s  voting  as   it  pleased.     Any  other   interpretation,  Miller’s  counsel  argued,  
would  frustrate  “the  great  cardinal  principle”  that  the  constitution  was  meant  to  advance:  
the  right  to  vote,  which  “is  the  corner-stone  of  the  political  edifice.”43 
Chase’s   lawyers,   challenging   the law’s   constitutionality,   argued   for   a   different  
“cardinal   principle”:   the   need   to   prevent   voting   fraud.   They   cited   court   precedents  
defining   the  constitution’s   reference   to  “election  district”   to  mean   the  place   established  
by  law  where  “citizens  assemble  to  vote.”  Each  district  came  into  existence  by  statute  as  
a subdivision of the state, and the legislature could not constitutionally establish a 
“district”   outside   Pennsylvania.   Nor   could   a   voter   qualify   to   vote   in   more   than   one  
district,   Chase’s   lawyers   argued. The soldier-voting law in effect attempted – 
unconstitutionally, counsel insisted – to establish, for each eligible soldier, a second 
location  where  he  could  cast  his  ballot,  namely  the  indeterminate  place  “appointed  by  the  
                                                 
43. Chase, 41 Pa. at 408. 
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commanding  officer,”  in  the words of the old statute. Moreover, they asserted, absentee 
voting would create the very risk of fraud that Pennsylvania election districts existed to 
prevent. Unlike election judges and inspectors in districts within the state, officers 
supervising elections in the field were not subject to sanctions of Pennsylvania law and 
had no way to test the qualifications of voters; they might not themselves even be 
residents   of   Pennsylvania   or   citizens   of   the   United   States.   In   short,   Chase’s   attorneys  
insisted, the   law   invited   fraud,   in   violation   of   the   constitution’s   design   for   assuring  
“purity”  in  elections.44 
Woodward’s  decision  embraced  the  constitutional  interpretation  urged  by  Chase’s  
lawyers.  He approached the matter as a subject of historical inquiry, an effort to answer 
the central question based on the meaning the framers of the constitution attached to the 
text of the instrument. In this he had the advantage of having been one of the framers 
himself, although his authority on questions of original intent was presumably no greater 
than  James  Thompson’s,  a  fellow  Democrat  on  Pennsylvania’s  high  court.  Thompson  too  
was a delegate to the 1838 convention that drafted the constitution.45 He dissented from 
Woodward’s   opinion   for   the   4-1 Chase majority, although, because he did not file an 
explanatory dissenting opinion, we are left to guess at his reasons. 
The framers of the 1838 constitution, Woodward ruled, went beyond deciding 
who could vote (white, 21-year old men meeting residency and taxpaying requirements) 
                                                 
44. Chase, 41 Pa. at 406. 
45. Woodward participated actively at the convention. On the suffrage provision of the new instrument, 
Woodward  supported  the  addition  of  “white”  as  a  qualification  for  voting.  Giving  Negroes  the  vote,  he  was  
reported to have said in a convention   speech,   would   “offend   against   nature.”   Democratic Banner 
(Clearfield,  PA),  August  26,  1863,  p.  2;;  For  Thompson’s  position  as  a  delegate,  see  “James  Thompson,”  
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, accessed November 26, 2013, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000204 . 
309  
 
and purposely made the precise place of elections a constitutional element of suffrage, 
thereby putting the subject beyond the reach of legislation to alter.  The framers did this 
in  Article  III,  §  1  by  linking  voting  to  the  election  “district”  in  which  the voter met the 
10-day residency requirement. It was in that district, and only in that district, that the 
voter  could  “offer”  his  vote  by  appearing  there  in  person  to  cast  his  ballot. 
 The   constitution   did   not   define   the  word   “district,”   but   by   1838   that  word had 
taken  on  a  clear  meaning  from  the  state’s  long  history  of  election  laws.  Year  after  year,  
starting long before the 1838 constitution, legislation had specified the places of voting 
and called those places – always within Pennsylvania, of course – “election  districts.”  By  
law, the word had come to mean the location where voters convened to cast their ballots. 
The  framers  had  that  definition  in  mind  when  they  used  the  word  “district”  in  Article  III,  
§ 1, according to Woodward.46  
Why did the 1838 framers decide to tie voting rights to election districts for the 
first time, according to Woodward?   It was just the most recent step of a consistent trend 
in  the  state’s  constitutional  history,  he wrote. Tracing the evolution of suffrage under the 
state’s   three constitutions – 1776, 1790, and 1838 – Woodward identified a consistent 
policy of tightening voting practices to guard against fraud. The purpose of fixing voting 
in election districts in 1838, he said, was to accomplish statewide what Philadelphia had 
accomplished   by   creating   a   voter   registry   in   1836:   a   way   “to   exclude   disqualified  
pretenders  and  fraudulent  voters  of  all  kinds.”  Tethering  voting  to  local  districts  served  as  
                                                 
46. Chase, 41 Pa. at 421.  The  constitution  did  not  limit  the  legislature’s  authority  to  create  new  districts,  
Woodward wrote, including a district defined as a specific military encampment within the state, if they 
wished. But the 1839 soldier-voting  law  did  no  such  thing.  It  simply  ignored  the  constitution’s  requirement  
of voting in a district, saying instead that absent   soldiers   could   vote   “at   such   place”   as   the   soldier’s  
commanding officer shall appoint. This violated Article III, § 1.  Id. 
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a  mechanism  to  provide  notice  of  where  to  vote  and,  through  the  presence  of  “magistrates 
and  constables,”  provide  a  way   for   the  process  of  voting  “to  be  guarded.”  The  soldier-
voting   law   offered   none   of   these   protections.   It   “opens   a   wide   door   for   most   odious  
frauds,”   Woodward   wrote,   by   allowing   soldiers   to   vote   “where   the   evidence   of their 
qualifications is not at hand and where our civil police cannot attend to protect the legal 
voter,   to   repel   the   rioter,   and   to   guard   the   ballots   after   they   have   been   cast.”   All   this  
collided  with  what  Woodward  called  “the  labour  of  the  constitution,”  which  was  to  assure  
that  suffrage  rights  “be  preserved  from  abuse  and  perversion.”47  
Woodward treated the fraud attendant on soldier voting not as a hypothetical risk, 
but as a documented certainty. With the record of the recently decided Hulseman case 
apparently in mind (though he did not cite that case in his Chase opinion), Woodward 
said,  “the  cases  of  fraud  that  have  been  before  us”  proved  that  soldier  voting  was  subject  
to cheating and manipulation. He was careful to absolve the soldiers themselves from 
culpability for the fraud, noting – again undoubtedly from the Hulseman record – that the 
actual   culprits   “were   political   speculators,   who   prowled   about   the   military   camps  
watching for opportunities to destroy true ballots and substitute false ones, to forge and 
falsify returns, and to cheat citizen and soldier alike out of the fair and equal election 
provided  for  by  law.”48   
The   virtual   certainty   of   fraud   in   soldier   voting,   coupled   with   the   framers’  
overarching goal to guard against fraud through the device of a local residency 
requirement tied to election districts, made it clear to Woodward that any law granting 
                                                 
47. Id. at 425 - 427.  
48. Id.  
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soldiers   absentee   voting   rights   was   decidedly   out   of   step   with   the   constitution.   “We  
cannot be persuaded that the constitution ever contemplated  any  such  mode  of  voting,”  he  
wrote in concluding that the law could not stand.49 
How did Woodward square that statement with the fact that by 1838, when the 
constitution was drafted, a voting law for absent Pennsylvania soldiers had been on the 
books for a quarter of a century? The 1813 soldier-voting law, he explained, had been 
enacted under an earlier constitution. The suffrage provision of the constitution of 1790 
required two years of residence in the state, but it had no local residency requirement and 
made no mention of election districts. 50   It therefore created no bar to legislation 
permitting absent soldiers to vote. But Woodward treated that law as having been a dead 
letter for a long time. Its reenactment, with modest revisions, as one section in the 
comprehensive election law of 1839, lost sight of the newly ratified constitution of 1838 
and was simply the product of sloppiness and haste, according to Woodward. A 
legislative committee in 1834 had recommended slight revisions to the 1813 law, but 
those recommendations had remained dormant until 1839, when the legislature 
mindlessly dropped them into the new comprehensive election law without regard to the 
fact   that  a   revised  constitution  now  controlled;;   it  was  “careless   legislation,”  Woodward  
concluded.51  
As proof that legislators had made a hash of the 1839 law, Woodward pointed to 
other sections of the statute that were at odds with the soldier-voting provision, including 
                                                 
49. Id. at 418-419, 424-425. 
50. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 1. The 1790 suffrage provision also differed from the 1838 version in 
not excluding African-Americans from the suffrage. The qualification of whiteness was added in 1838. 
51. Chase, 41 Pa. at 417.  
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a   section   prohibiting   “any   body   of   troops   …   either   armed   or   unarmed”   from   being 
present  “at  any  place  of  election.”52  That effectively prohibited the very style of election 
that the soldier-voting provision of the same law authorized. To permit soldier voting in 
one section of a statute that elsewhere prohibited it not only collided with the 
constitution, but also bespoke statutory incoherence. Legislation ordinarily enjoyed a 
presumption of constitutionality, as Woodward conceded, but this self-contradictory law 
was such a mess and ran so clearly afoul of constitutional limits that the court could not 
be expected to give it effect, Woodward ruled, in reversing the lower court and 
pronouncing Chase the winner.53  
The Chase decision sparked a successful initiative to amend the constitution so as 
to permit soldier voting.  Acting under its now clear authority, the Pennsylvania 
legislature enacted a soldier-voting law in time for the 1864 elections.54 The law applied 
to all servicemen, including sailors in the navy, with no exclusion for regulars and with 
bounty men expressly included.55 Unique among the twenty states that changed their laws 
to permit absent soldiers to vote, Pennsylvania adopted a hybrid combination of the Iowa 
and Minnesota models, with the Minnesota system of mail-in balloting available for 
soldiers unable to avail themselves of voting at in-the-field election sites set up under the 
Iowa model. Under the law, polls opened at the headquarters of each company 
“composed  in  whole  or  in  part”  of  Pennsylvania  men.  All  qualified  voters  belonging  to  
the company and within one mile of the polling site had to vote there. Others could vote 
                                                 
52. Pennsylvania Soldier-Voting Law of 1839, § 95; Chase, 41 Pa. at 424. 
53. Chase, 41 Pa. at 421. 
54. An Act to Regulate Elections by Soldiers in Actual Military Service, P.L. No. 871, 1864 Pa. Laws 
990.  (hereafter  cited  as  “Pennsylvania  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1864”). 
55. Id. at §§ 1, 2. 
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at   any  “convenient”  polling   site,   including  officers  not   attached   to   a   company,   soldiers  
detached and absent from their companies, men in hospitals, and men on vessels or in 
navy yards. Or, a group of ten or more servicemen gathered anywhere else could open 
their own polling site.56 
Gathered at the polling site, the men chose three election judges, who in turn 
appointed two election clerks. Election judges and clerks had to be qualified 
Pennsylvania voters.57 As in most states, the election judges and clerks had to take an 
oath  swearing  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse”  in  the  voting.58 
In   the  event  of  a  challenge   to  a  voter’s  eligibility,  an  election   judge  could  question   the 
applicant   about   his   qualifications   and   could   accept   his   ballot   only   if   the   judge   “be  
satisfied”  that  the  applicant  was  qualified.59 
Pennsylvania’s   election   judges   and   clerks   faced   logistical   challenges   similar   to  
those their Ohio counterparts faced, as described in Chapter 1. They had to keep separate 
(and duplicate) poll books and voter lists for each Pennsylvania city or county 
represented by a voter at the polling site. 60   The soldier prepared his written ballot 
identifying all the candidates voted for and presented that ballot to an election judge. The 
judge  announced  the  soldier’s  name,  which  the  clerks  entered  in  the  duplicate  poll  books  
for each city and county.61 Critics of the law pointed out how cumbersome this process 
could be. One newspaper, claiming that some regiments had men from every county in 
                                                 
56. Id. at § 2. 
57.  Id. at § 4. 
58.  Id. at § 5. 
59.  Id. at § 6. 
60.  Id. at § 7. 
61.  Id. at § 9. 
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Pennsylvania, complained that elections would require from 150 to 200 different poll 
books,  each  of  which  was  “ponderous.”62 
When the polls closed, the judges and clerks signed the poll books, opened the 
ballot box, and began tallying the results. Ballot by ballot, each of the three judges in turn 
announced the names of the candidates voted for on each ballot while the clerks kept 
count on tally sheets, keeping separate tallies for each city and county. The third judge to 
handle each ballot strung it on a thread, separating the ballots from different cities and 
counties on separate threads.63  
The statute included the form for poll books and tally sheets, which the Secretary 
of the Commonwealth provided for each company and military hospital, delivering them 
through commissioners whom the governor appointed, one per regiment. 64  At the 
conclusion of the voting, the judges packed one of the duplicate poll books and tally 
sheets for each city and county to that jurisdiction’s   court   of   common   pleas.   They  
delivered the duplicate copies to the commissioner, or if the commissioner was 
unavailable, mailed them to the Secretary of the Commonwealth.65 
The fallback process of mail-in balloting was available for men in four 
circumstances that would leave them out of the voting above process, namely men 
gathered away from company headquarters in groups of less than 10, individuals 
separated from their companies, Pennsylvania soldiers attached to units of other states, 
                                                 
62. Daily Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia, Pa.), November 26, 1864. 
63. Pennsylvania Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, §§ 10, 11, 13. 
64.  Id. at §§ 15, 16, 23, 24, 25. 
65.  Id. at § 17. 
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and men on recruiting or provost duty. 66  Each man in these circumstances sent his 
completed ballot to a proxy in his hometown. The proxy had to be a qualified voter. In 
the same envelope containing his ballot, the soldier had to include 1) a statement (signed 
by an officer) identifying the soldier and his military unit, 2) a document authorizing his 
proxy, and 3) an affidavit attesting to his qualifications and promising that he had not and 
would not vote in any other fashion.67 The Secretary of the Commonwealth prepared 
forms  of  these  documents  and,  “furnish  the  same  for  the  use  of”  the  soldiers  who  needed  
them, though the statute did not specify the means of distributing them to soldiers.68 The 
proxy’s   job  was   to   deliver   the   envelope   containing   the   ballot   and   all   these documents, 
unopened, to the hometown election site, where election officials added the ballot to the 
civilian  ballot  box  if  the  soldier’s  name  appeared  on  the  voting  list.69 
The  law  also  addressed  a  loose  end  created  by  the  constitution’s  requirement  that 
voters pay a tax assessed 10 days before the election.70 (In 1864, the tax was ten cents.) 
The soldier-voting law obligated the tax collector to accept payment of the tax from other 
people  acting  on  the  soldiers’  behalf.71  Both political parties exhorted the party faithful 
to  pay  soldiers’  assessments,  and  evidence  is  that  the  faithful  responded.72 
The susceptibility of fraud in soldier voting was predicted, not only by George 
Woodward in his opinion about the 1839 law in the Chase case, but also by people most 
                                                 
66.  Id. at § 32. 
67.  Id. at § 33. 
68. Id. at § 38.  
69. Id. at § 34. 
70. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1. 
71. Pennsylvania Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 40. 
72. Daily Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October 15, 1864; Daily Gazette and Advertiser, (Pittsburgh, 
PA) October 21, 1864. 
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closely associated with the 1864 law, including Governor Andrew Curtin. According to 
Alexander   McClure,   Curtin’s   advisor   and   close   confidant,   the   governor   agreed   with  
McClure’s   assessment   that   the   law   “bristled   with   invitations   to   fraud   and   opened   the 
widest   doors   to   its   perpetration.”  Disapproving   of   the   bill’s  weaknesses   in   this   regard,  
Curtin tried to persuade legislators to revise the bill. After they rebuffed him, he signed 
the bill into law anyway.73  
 
Connecticut 
Connecticut is one of several states  that  found  a  “do-over”  necessary  in  trying  to  
secure voting rights for its absent Civil War soldiers. It enacted one military suffrage law 
in December 1862 and another in July 1864 after the state supreme court found the first 
law constitutionally defective. In the interim, Connecticut amended its state constitution 
to remove the legal obstacle that the first law had encountered.  
The legislature understood that its 1862 effort was constitutionally problematic 
even before the state supreme court said so. It passed a supplemental bill instructing the 
governor to seek to seek an advisory opinion about the law from the state supreme court 
before taking steps to implement it.74   The lawmakers were right to be concerned. The 
court found the 1862 law defective.75  The law followed the Iowa model of calling for 
election sites to open at out-of-state encampments where Connecticut soldiers served.76  
                                                 
73. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2: 129. 
74. An Act in Relation to an Act Herein Named, ch.18, 1862 Conn. Pub. Acts 22.  
75.     Opinion  of   the   Judges  of   the  Supreme  Court,  30  Conn.  591   (1862)   (hereafter  cited  “Connecticut  
Supreme  Court  1863  Advisory  Opinion”).  
76. An act in Addition  to  an  Act  Entitled  “An  act  relating  to  Electors  and  Elections,”  ch.  17,  1862  Conn.  
Pub.  Acts  15.  (hereafter  cited  as  “Connecticut  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1862”).   
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The  problem,  the  court  held,  was  that  the  state’s  constitution  quite  clearly  fixed  the  place  
for holding elections in “electors’   meetings”   held   in   town.      The   court   reached   this  
conclusion   by   an   analysis   of   the   state’s   history.   Dating   from   its   colonial   charter,   and  
continuing   through   its   most   recent   amendment   to   the   state’s   constitution   in   1836,  
“elections”  were   virtually synonymous with town meetings, such that an election held 
elsewhere than in a town meeting, let alone out of state, was a constitutional 
impossibility.77 
To skirt that problem, the 1862 statute attempted a creative legal fiction. It simply 
declared that soldiers’  out-of-state  voting  under  the  law  was  to  “be  considered,  taken  and  
held  to  have  been  given  by  them  in  the  respective  towns  of  which  they  are  residents.”78 
This effort did not persuade the court. Voting under the 1862 act, the court found, clearly 
meant  voting  away  from  Connecticut,  and  the  legislature’s  effort  to  call  it  something  else  
was  the  equivalent  of  “legislative  alchemy.”  In  short,   the  court  concluded  that   the  1862  
law  violated  Connecticut’s  constitution.79 
 This triggered an immediate effort to amend the constitution. Doing so required 
that the state house of representatives propose an amendment in identical form in two 
successive legislative sessions, with two-thirds approval by both houses in the second 
session, whereupon the proposed amendment went to the people for ratification in their 
town meetings.80 The legislature did its part in 1863 and 1864 sessions, and ratification 
followed promptly. The amendment provided that eligible electors serving in the military 
                                                 
77. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion , 30 Conn. at  596-600. 
78. Connecticut Soldier-Voting Law of 1862, § 8. 
79. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn at 602. 
80. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. XI. 
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outside the state (other than regulars) had the same right to vote as he would if he were 
present for the election in the town where he resided. It authorized the legislature to 
prescribe how and when soldier voting would occur.81 
The legislature enacted the new soldier voting law even before the constitutional 
amendment  was   ratified,  stating  at   the  outset  of   the  statute   that   it  would   take  effect  “in  
case of the adoption by the people of the proposed amendment to the Constitution of this 
State.”82 It took effect in time for the 1864 elections. Unlike the failed 1862 law, which 
followed the Iowa model of setting up election sites in the military encampments, the 
new act followed the Minnesota model of providing for the forwarding of soldier ballots 
from the out-of-state encampments back to Connecticut. 
The  act  covered  both  volunteers  and  draftees,  but  not  “persons  in  the  regular  army  
of  the  United  States.”83 Navy personnel seem not to have been included either, as the law 
called   for   balloting   only   where   “Connecticut   regiments,   batteries,   or   battalions are 
stationed….”84 The act applied to both state and federal elections.85 Like the laws in 
Minnesota, Iowa, and Michigan, the Connecticut law provided for commissioners to 
travel to the military encampments to implement the law. Their job was to provide the 
                                                 
81. Proposed Amendment to the Constitution dated November 3, 1863, 1864 Conn. Acts 15 (Spec. 
Sess.); An Act Relating to the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, ch. 11, 1864 Conn. Pub. Acts 
24.Ratification was secured in August 1864. Benton, Voting in the Field, 179. 
82. An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field, ch. 37, § 1, 1864 Conn. Pub. Acts 
51, 51. 
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encampments with copies of the act, envelopes for returning ballots, and, if the political 
parties or someone else furnished them, the ballots themselves.86   
The governor appointed the commissioners, with no requirement that he do so 
with an equal balance of Republicans and Democrats, as the Minnesota governor had to 
do. Also unlike Minnesota, the law capped the number of commissioners who could visit 
“the  same  camp,  post,  or  fortress”  at  two.87 
As with the Minnesota law, the soldier sealed his completed ballot in an envelope 
(there is no mention of sealing wax) and turned it over to the commissioner. On the back 
of   the   envelope,   the   commissioner   wrote   the   soldier’s   name,   military   attachment,   and  
home town, then signed his own name as commissioner.  The commissioners then carried 
all the sealed envelopes back to Connecticut for delivery to the respective towns, with a 
certification  that  the  commissioner  had  not  tried  to  influence  any  soldier’s  vote.  There  the  
soldier named on the back of the envelope was checked against the voter registry and, if 
the  name  appeared   there,   the  soldier’s   ticket  was  placed  added   to  civilian  ballots   in   the  
town’s  ballot  box.88 
 The  Connecticut  law  took  less  care  than  Minnesota’s  in  trying  to  assure  that  only  
eligible Connecticut soldiers voted. There was no requirement in the Connecticut law for 
the soldier to swear an oath that he was indeed a qualified voter, and nowhere did the 
commissioner certify that the soldier named on the envelope was the man who completed 
                                                 
86. Id. at § 3. 
87. Id. at §§ 2, 3. 
88. Id. at §§ 4 - 7. 
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the ballot.  The  commissioners  had  to  receive  sealed  envelopes  from  any  soldier  “claiming  
to  vote,”  with  no  provision  for  confirming  the  voter’s  identity.89  
By   its   terms,   the   Connecticut   law   remained   in   effect   only   “during   the   present  
rebellion.”90 
 
 Vermont 
Vermont’s   experience   with   military   suffrage   legislation   was   similar   to  
Connecticut’s.  The   legislature  wanted   to  give   its   absent   soldiers   a  way   to  vote,  but   the  
state constitution posed apparent obstacles. Lawmakers tried to work around the obstacles 
with a statute they enacted in November 1863, but they hedged their bet by pronouncing 
in the statute itself that its provisions would take effect only after the governor posed a 
specific question to the state supreme court -- “Are   the   provisions   of   this act 
constitutional?”   – and got back an affirmative answer. The statute provided that if the 
court approved some portions of the law but rejected others, then only those portions of 
the law found to be constitutional could go into effect.91 
The governor dutifully asked the required question, and the Supreme Court 
answered  with   an  advisory  opinion   in  April  1864.  The  court   concluded   that  Vermont’s  
constitution barred absentee voting for state officials, but that the bar did not apply to 
voting in federal elections.92 The upshot was absentee voting by Vermont soldiers in 
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1864, but only for their representatives to Congress and for electors for U.S. president 
and vice-president. It was a novel but legally sound way around a thorny issue of state 
constitutional law, and other states took note in fashioning their own military suffrage 
law. 
The  state  constitutional  problem  was  created  by  a  provision  that  the  “freemen”  of  
each  Vermont   town  must   “hold   elections   therein”   for   their   representatives   in   the   state  
House of Representatives.93 That left no room for absentee voting in elections for the 
state house, and the legislature did not even try to get through that tightly shut door. 
Instead, they wrote the 1863 military suffrage law to apply only to elections for 
Vermont’s   executive   branch officials – governor, lieutenant governor, and treasurer – 
plus congressmen and federal electors. 94  As the legislature knew full well, the 
constitutional underpinning for even such a limited law was shaky, but arguably the 
constitution left the door ever so slightly ajar for absentee voting for state executive 
officers and in federal elections.  
For   elected   positions   in   the   state’s   executive   branch,   including   the   governor,  
lieutenant governor, and treasurer, the constitution directed the freemen in each town to 
"bring in their votes ... to the Constable...."95 This happened on the same day as the 
meeting in town at which the freemen elected their state representatives, but the 
constitution did not expressly say that it had to happen at the same meeting. Perhaps, the 
legislators   reasoned,   they   could   “bring   in”   their   votes   to   election  meetings   elsewhere,  
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including  out  of  state,  as  long  as  they  did  so  on  the  same  day  that  civilians  in  Vermont’s  
town meetings were electing their state representatives.  
With evident uncertainty, reflected in the requirement for the Supreme Court to 
weigh in before the law could take effect, the legislature fashioned a military suffrage law 
on the Iowa model, with voting sites set up at the military posts where Vermont soldiers 
were stationed.  To  protect   the  argument   that  soldiers  were  “bringing   in”   their  votes  “to  
the  constable,”  as  the  constitution  demanded,  the  law  designated  the  presiding  officials  at  
the  military  voting  sites  as  “special  constables.”  And  the  voting  had  to  occur  on the same 
day as civilian elections in Vermont.96  
The   Vermont   Supreme   Court   rejected   the   legislature’s   approach.   The   only   fair  
reading  of  the  constitution,  the  court  ruled,  was  that  the  place  for  freemen  to  “bring  in”  
their votes for executive officers was the same town meeting where state legislative 
representatives were elected.  As the Connecticut court had done, the Vermont justices 
looked to history for answers to the constitutional issues. Throughout Vermont history, 
“constables”  presided  at  town  meetings, the court noted, and they had no authority other 
than  as  town  officials.  So,  in  requiring  freemen  to  “bring  in”  their  votes  to  the  constable,  
the constitution meant they had to deliver their votes to the constable presiding at the 
same  freemen’s  meeting where they elected their state legislators. This interpretation also 
made  sense  of  the  constitution’s  otherwise  inexplicable  demand  that  freemen  deliver  their  
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executive office ballots to the constable on the same day as the election meeting for state 
representatives.97 
The Vermont justices made it clear that this requirement of physical presence by 
the voter in his town of residence was different from the residency qualification for 
voting. While soldiers could lawfully cast their votes only in their home towns, the  
absence of such persons from the state, in such service, is not a removal, or 
change of residence, by which the right of voting is lost, but like a absence from 
the state upon a journey, or business, is of a temporary character, and the domicil, 
or residence, continues within the state, while the person is actually without the 
state.98 
 
The court reviewed the opinions of other state supreme courts on the 
constitutionality  of  military  suffrage  laws  in  their  states  and  found  Connecticut’s  (where 
the  state’s  high  court  had  found  that  state’s  law  unconstitutional)  most  helpful.  Vermont’s  
election   traditions,   and   particularly   the   centrality   of   freemen’s   meetings   to   the   voting  
process,  borrowed   from  Connecticut’s  similar   traditions,  and   the   two  state constitutions 
approached suffrage similarly, the Vermont justices said. Both required physical presence 
by the voters at election meetings, which occurred in town.99   
The   Vermont   court   seemed   doubtful   that   any   state’s   constitution   permitted  
absentee voting  for  state  offices.  Its  opinion  took  Iowa’s  court  to  task  for  approving  that  
state’s   soldier-voting law in the face of a constitutional provision requiring 60 days 
residence  in  “the  county  in  which  [the  voter]  claims  his  vote.”  The  Iowa  court  had  opined  
that   “to   claim”   one’s vote did not require physical presence in Iowa. That was 
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unpersuasive   to   the   Vermont   jurists.   The   Iowa   court’s   opinion,   said   the   Vermonters 
dismissively,  was  “exceedingly  subtle  and  ingenious,  and  we  are  not  prepared  to  say  it  is  
sound  …”100   
In answer to the question posed in the Vermont statute – “Are  the  provisions  of  
this  act  constitutional?”  – the  court  concluded  that  no,  Vermont’s  constitution  barred  the  
act’s  provisions  for  absentee  voting  for  state  officials.  But  it  arrived  at  a different answer 
as to absentee voting for members of Congress and electors for U.S. president and vice-
president. The federal constitution governed election procedures for those federal 
positions, the court noted, and that instrument gave state legislatures sufficient authority 
to  opt   for  absentee  voting   if   they  so  wished.  The  “time,  place,  and  manner”  of  electing  
U.S.  senators  and  House  members,  the  federal  constitution  provides,  “shall  be  prescribed  
in  each  State  by  the  Legislature  thereof.”101  Similarly,  each  state  “shall  appoint”  electors  
for the president and vice-president   “in   such   Manner   as   the   Legislature   thereof   may  
direct.”102    
The  state  constitution  was  the  wrong  place  to  look  for  an  answer  to  the  statute’s  
question about constitutionality on these federal election matters, the Vermont jurists 
ruled. The federal constitution controlled entirely, and it assigned the matter entirely to 
the  state  legislature.  Vermont’s  legislature  acted  within  that  broad  constitutional  authority  
when it prescribed absentee  voting  for  federal  elections.    So,  with  the  court’s  blessing,  the  
1863  “Act  providing  for  soldier  voting”  went  into  effect  in  1864,  limited  to  elections  for  
                                                 
100.  Id. at 675. 
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
102. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The constitution’s  verb  here  is  “appoint,”  not  “elect.” 
325  
 
Vermont’s  representatives  to  the  U.S.  congress  and  electors  for  U.S.  president  and  vice-
president. 
The  law  excluded  soldiers  “in  the  regular  or  standing  army  of  the  United  States”  
as  well  as  those  “in  any  regiment,  battery  or  company  organized  and  officered  out  of  this  
State.” 103  By limiting the out-of-state   election   sites   to   “posts”   or   “camps”   where 
Vermonters   served   in   a   “regiment   or   battery   of   artillery,   or   part   of   a   company   under  
separate  command,”  the  act  implicitly  excluded  servicemen  in  the  navy. 104 While nothing 
in the 1863 statute either expressly or implicitly barred draftees, an 1864 amendment 
effectively  excluded  them  by  limiting  absentee  voting  rights  to  “volunteers.”105 
Voting was by company, with the three ranking officers serving as election 
judges,  or  “special  constables,”  as  the  act  put  it.    The  highest  ranking  of  the  three  served  
as   “chairman  of   the  board  of   constables.”106 The special constables appointed clerks to 
assist  with  the  voting  and  to  prepare  “poll  lists”  showing  the  soldiers’  names  and  places  
of residence. Each constable and clerk swore an oath. The oath read the same as those of 
election  laws  in  most  states,  including  the  promise  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  all  
fraud,  deceit  or  abuse  in  conducting”  the  election.107   
Each   soldier’s   ballot   had   to   show   his   county   of   residence   and   the   name   of   the  
preferred candidate for each office. Before the soldier could deposit his ballot in the 
ballot   box,   the   constable  had   to   “be   satisfied   that   the  person  offering   to  vote   is   a   legal  
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voter  of  the  county  shown  at  the  top  of  the  ballot.”  If  there  were  suspicions,  or  if  anyone  
challenged the   soldier’s   eligibility,   the   special   constables   questioned   the   soldier   under  
oath   about   his   qualifications.   Challenges   were   decided   “by   a   majority   of   the  
constables.”108  
The constables tallied the votes and prepared written statements showing the 
results by  county,  “so  far  as  practicable.”  Then  they  “sealed  up”  the  ballots  and  sent  them  
to the Vermont Secretary of State, together with their statements of results and the poll 
lists. The Secretary of State forwarded the returns to the General Assembly, where they 
were added to the results of in-state voting. 
The 1863 law did not provide for commissioners from Vermont to assist in its 
implementation, and it offered sparse guidance for the soldiers at the voting sites. They 
were on their own in preparing poll lists and the statements of voting results, for example. 
And the act made no provision for anyone to send the soldiers the text of the required 
oaths or even copies of the law itself.  
Post-war   changes   in  Vermont’s   general   election   law   eclipsed   the   soldier-voting 
laws of 1863 and 1864. By 1870, the required location for voting for congressional 
representatives   was   “any   town   in   the   congressional   district   in   which   he   [the   voter]  
resides.”  For   electors   for  U.S.  president  and  vice-president,   it  was  “in  any   town   in this 
state.”  There  were  no  exceptions  for  absent  soldiers.109 
 
                                                 
108. Id. at § 8. 
109. VT. COMP LAWS, Title I, §37, (1870). 
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New Hampshire 
 Of all the Northern states that enacted military suffrage laws during the Civil War, 
New Hampshire seems to have worked hardest to get the job done. By the time they 
finished the task in 1864, the legislature had acted on three different bills and the state 
supreme court had issued three different advisory opinions. The final product was a law 
on the Iowa model, but (as in Vermont) limited to federal elections. 
The legislature first drafted a bill in 1863, but before voting on it the state House 
of  Representatives  asked  the  state  supreme  court  for  an  advisory  opinion  about  the  bill’s  
constitutionality.110 That bill was patterned on the Minnesota model, allowing absent 
soldiers to complete   their  ballots  “in   the   field,”   then  send   the  votes  back   to   their  home  
state. The bill would have the soldier execute a power of attorney appointing a qualified 
elector,   in   the   town  of   the   soldier’s   residence,   to   receive   the   soldier’s  completed  ballot  
and   cast   it   for   him.  When   he   delivered   the   soldier’s   ballot,   the   designated   voter   back  
home had to submit his own affidavit attesting that he had received the ballot from the 
soldier named on the envelope and that the soldier was indeed a qualified voter.111 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued the requested advisory opinion in 
June 1863, concluding that the bill would be unconstitutional if enacted. The court began 
with  a  statement  of   the  common  law  principle  that   in  all  elections,  “every  vote  must  be  
personally  given.”112 New  Hampshire’s  constitution  incorporated  that  principle,  the  court  
                                                 
110.  The  bill  was   named,   “An Act to secure the right of suffrage to the qualified voters of this State 
engaged  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  their  country.”  Though it was never enacted, its provisions are 
described in the New Hampshire Supreme Court advisory opinion that found it to be unconstitutional. 
Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. 633 (1863). 
111. Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. 633-634 (1863). 
112. Id. at 634-635.  
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ruled. The opinion cites numerous provisions of the constitution of 1793 to the effect that 
voting   had   to   happen   in   the   town   of   the   voters’   residence.   In   choosing   state  
representatives and senators, for example, the constitution provided that eligible voters 
“shall   be   entitled   to   vote   within   the   district   wherein   they   dwell.”      Elections   for   other  
offices,   including   governor,   were   to   be   “in   the   same   manner”   as   elections   for   state 
representatives.    Overall,  the  court  opined,  the  “provisions  of  our  Constitution  …  require  
that the right of voting shall be exercised by the voter in person at the meetings duly held 
for the purpose in the places of the State pointed out by the Constitution.”113 That left no 
room for the absentee balloting contemplated by the proposed law. 
This took the legislature back to the drawing boards.  In August 1864, they 
produced a new military suffrage law clearly showing the influence of the recent 
experience in neighboring Vermont. That state had struggled to harmonize absentee 
voting   for   soldiers   with   a   state   constitution   that,   like   New   Hampshire’s,   quite   clearly  
allowed for only in-state balloting. The upshot of that struggle, produced with the guiding 
hand of   Vermont’s   Supreme   Court,   was   a   law   allowing   absentee   voting   for   Vermont  
soldiers, but only in elections for representatives to the U.S. congress and for electors for 
U.S. president and vice-president. The state constitution did not govern the manner of 
conducting these federal elections, the Vermont court had concluded. The federal 
constitution controlled, and that instrument gave state legislatures sufficient authority to 
enact absentee voting if they chose to. 
                                                 
113. Id. at 636. 
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The   drafters   of   New   Hampshire’s   1864   military suffrage law clearly had the 
Vermont outcome in mind. In fact, no two military suffrage laws are more alike than 
New   Hampshire’s   and   Vermont’s.   Like   Vermont’s,   the   New   Hampshire   law   granted  
absentee voting rights only in federal elections.114 Like Vermont’s   law  (but  unlike  New  
Hampshire’s  own  1863  bill)  this  law  followed  the  Iowa  model  by  calling  for  election  sites  
to   be   opened   at   the   military   encampments   where   New   Hampshire’s   soldiers   were  
stationed. Also unlike the 1863 version, this law did not include navy personnel, limiting 
its  provisions  to  “regiments,”  “batteries  of  artillery,”  and  “companies,”  just  as  Vermont’s  
law   had   done.   Also   in   common   with   Vermont,   New   Hampshire’s   1864   law   excluded  
soldiers   “in   the   regular,   or   standing   army   of   the  United   States,”   as  well   as   soldiers   in  
military  units  “organized  or  officered  out  of   this  State.”115 The three ranking officers of 
each New Hampshire company presided over the voting, appointed clerks, administered 
oaths   (to   “studiously   endeavor   to   prevent   all   fraud,   deceit   and   abuse”),   resolved  
challenges by a majority vote, and prepared returns, all in language nearly identical to the 
wording  of  Vermont’s  law.116  
To   resolve   doubts   about   the   law’s   constitutionality,   the   New   Hampshire  
legislators did exactly what Vermont lawmakers had done – they added a proviso to their 
                                                 
114.  An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State Engaged in the Military Service of the Country 
to Vote for Electors of President and Vice President of the United States, and for Representatives in 
Congress,   ch.   4030,   1864   N.H.   Laws   3061(hereafter   cited   as   “New   Hampshire   Soldier-Voting Law of 
1864”). 
115.  Id. at § 1. 
116.  Id. at §§ 2, 3, 5, 6. 
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soldier-voting law stipulating that the statute would take effect only if the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court confirmed its constitutionality.117 
On September 9, 1864, the court issued its ruling.118 It concluded that the bill (it 
had not been signed by the governor when their opinion was sought) was constitutional. 
The  justices  based  their  ruling  largely  on  the  logic  of  the  Vermont  court’s  opinion,  from  
which  it  quoted  extensively.  That  state’s  supreme  court  ruled that the constitutionality of 
an election law applying only to federal elections had to be tested by exclusive reference 
to the federal constitution; the state constitution had no bearing on the question. In two 
separate provisions the U.S. Constitution grants broad power to state legislatures to 
decide   the   procedures   for   electing   congressional   representatives   and   “appointing”  
presidential and vice-presidential electors.119  It was within that authority for a legislature 
to permit absentee voting for federal offices, the Vermont court had ruled.  
To this analysis, the New Hampshire justices added consideration of a federal 
constitutional question that the Vermont jurists had not addressed. The New Hampshire 
court had ruled in its 1863 advisory opinion that the state constitution required that 
ballots in elections for state offices   be   cast   in   person   in   the   voter’s   town  of   residence.  
Now the court addressed a different question: did this requirement constitute a 
“qualification”   for   voting?   If   it   did,   then   the   U.S. Constitution posed an obstacle to 
absentee voting for federal congressional representatives. This was so because, to be 
                                                 
117.  Id. at  § 8. 
118.   Opinion   of   the   Justices   of   the   Supreme   Judicial   Court   on   the   Constitutionality   of   the   Soldier’s  
Voting Bill, 45 N.H  595 (1864). The opinion, in the form of a letter from the justices to the state senate, is 
undated. The date of September 9, given above, is based on the estimate given by Josiah Benton in his 
indispensable book, Voting in the Field  at 215. 
119. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4 (for electing congressional representatives) and art. II, § 1 (for appointing 
federal electors). 
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eligible  to  vote  in  elections  for  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  one  had  to  “have  the  
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.”120  If   casting   his   vote   in   the   town   of   his   residence,   as   New  Hampshire’s  
constitution  required,  constituted  a  “qualification”  for  voting,  then  according  to  the  U.S.  
Constitution the absent soldier was ineligible to vote for his congressman.121  
After   an   extended   analysis,   the   court   concluded   that   a   voter’s   “qualifications”  
meant  something  different  from  “the  time  when  or  the  place  where”  he  could  vote.  Rules  
about   the   latter   constitute   “a   mere   regulation   for   the   exercise   of   his   right,”   not   a  
“qualification   of   the   elector   within   the   meaning   of   the   term   as   used   in   the   [U.S.]  
Constitution.”    When  the  U.S.  Constitution  referred  to  an  elector’s  qualification,  it  meant  
such  matters  as  his  “age,   fixed   residence,   [and] property,”  not  where  or  when  he  could  
cast his ballot. 122 The   court   found   support   in   the   history   of  New  Hampshire’s   election  
laws  for  viewing  voters’  qualifications  and  the  place  of  voting  as  two  different  subjects.  
The   court’s   historical   analysis   included an   observation   that   New   Hampshire’s   early  
colonial election laws had permitted voting outside of New Hampshire for absent 
township proprietors, and voting in town by non-resident landowners was legally 
permissible  until  adoption  of  the  state’s  constitution of 1783.123  
Having   concluded   that   soldiers   did   not   lose   their   “qualification”   as   voters   by  
virtue of their absence from New Hampshire election sites, the court wound up exactly 
where the Vermont court had: the U.S. Constitution authorized the state legislature to 
                                                 
120. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 2.  
121. Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 45 New Hampshire Reports at 602.  
122.  Id. at 602, 605. 
123.  Id. at 597-598. 
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permit absentee voting for congressmen and federal electors. That meant the 1864 
legislation   was   constitutional.   This   was   the   court’s   second   advisory   opinion   on   the  
subject of military suffrage legislation, but almost amazingly, there would be a third. 
The court had deliberated the constitutionality of absentee voting after the 
legislation was drafted and voted on, but before it became law. In an almost farcical 
sequence of events after submission of the question to the court, a question arose about 
whether it had become law at all. The bill had passed both houses along party lines, with 
Republicans in favor and Democrats opposed. It was then sent to Governor Joseph 
Gilmore, a Republican. Gilmore had backed the 1863 law, and he favored soldier voting 
as  a  general  proposition.  But  when  the  state’s  high  court  struck  down  the  1863  law,  and  
after  New  York’s  Democratic  governor,  Horatio  Seymour,  had  vetoed  as  unconstitutional  
a   bill   similar   to   New  Hampshire’s   1863   law,   Gilmore   came   to   believe   that   a  military 
suffrage statute would require a constitutional amendment. So, departing from the general 
partisan division on the issue, this Republican governor vetoed the bill. Or at least he 
tried to. It was not clear whether the bill had been properly delivered to him for 
consideration, and through administrative sloppiness, he was slow to draft his veto 
message and send it to the legislature. When he finally did, the Republican leadership, 
obviously reluctant to receive the veto, was slow to acknowledge it.124 
All this to and fro raised a technical dispute, heavily clouded by partisanship, 
about  whether  the  governor’s  message  was  timely  under  the  state  constitution’s  five-day 
                                                 
124. The disputed facts about the attempted   veto   are   set   forth   in   the   state   Supreme  Court’s   advisory  
opinion on the matter, Opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, 45 N. H. at 607. For the legislative history of 
the New Hampshire soldier-voting   law,  and   for   the  political  backdrop,  Benton’s  Voting in the Field is a 
valuable source. 
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deadline for issuing a veto.125  To resolve the dispute, on August 31, both legislative 
branches joined in a concurrent resolution submitting the matter for yet another advisory 
opinion, asking the justices whether the bill had become law.  On September 22, the court 
answered with its third advisory opinion, concluding that the bill had indeed become law. 
The   issue   boiled   down   to   when   the   constitution’s   five-day veto clock started running.  
Was  it  on  the  day  the  bill  was  dropped  off  at  the  governor’s  office,  or  the  next  day  when  
the governor first saw it? The court ruled that delivery to the office started the clock, and 
that the veto message arrived at the legislature one day too late. The bill thereby became 
“a  valid  and  binding  statute,”  the  court  declared.126 
Two acts supplementing the 1864 law are noteworthy. One exempted absent 
soldiers from the state’s  poll  tax.127 The second instructed the governor and secretary of 
state to take additional steps to protect against fraud in the soldier voting. If any vote 
should  “clearly   appear”   to  have  been  cast  by  an  unqualified  voter,   the  governor  was   to  
reject it,   drawing  on   “such   evidence   as   they   [the governor and secretary of state] may 
deem  sufficient.”  Moreover,  the  names  of  voting  soldiers  were  to  be  sent  to  each  of  their  
townships, where the town clerks had to compare their names against voter lists and 
inform   the   secretary   of   state   of   any   discrepancies.   Finally,   because   a   soldier’s   absence  
during  war   “shall   not   affect   his   right   of   suffrage,”   this   act   required   that   the   names   of  
absent  soldiers  be  maintained  on  township  voter  lists.”128 
                                                 
125. N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. 49. 
126. Opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, 45 N.H. at 607, 610. 
127. An Act to Exempt Volunteers and Conscripts from the Poll Tax, ch. 2863, 1864 N.H. Laws 2816.   
128. An Act in Relation to Counting the Votes for Electors of President and Vice President and for 
Representatives in Congress, ch. 4031, §§ 1, 2, 4, 1864 N.H. Laws 3064-3065.   
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A curiosity about New Hampshire’s   soldier-voting experience is that 
commissioners from New Hampshire traveled to the military posts to assist with 
implementation, although the act of 1864 did not provide for such commissioners. It is 
conjectural, but perhaps commissioners were appointed under the 1863 law, which did 
provide for them, before that law was struck down as unconstitutional. The 1864 law did 
not prohibit commissioners, and it is possible that the holdovers from the 1863 were put 
to use in 1864. 
We learn not only that there were commissioners, but a good deal more about 
how  voting  “in  the  field”  may  have  actually  worked,  from  this  New  Hampshire  soldier’s  
positive account: 
The two commissioners, one representing the Republican, and one the 
Democratic, party, came to the 13th New Hampshire bringing with them a list of 
the legal voters in each regiment procured from the different towns, and permitted 
only those to vote whose names were on that list. There were quite a number who 
had come of age during their service whose names had not been added to the list 
of voters, and therefore they were not permitted to vote. On a certain day at dress 
parade the regiment was notified that between certain hours on a fixed day and 
election would be held for President of the United States and Representatives in 
Congress, at which they would be permitted to vote. I was present and voted on 
that day. There was no speechmaking and no gathering of the regiment as a 
whole. Each man came up to the polling place and voted by himself. He was 
given two ballots, one representing the Democratic, and one the Republican, 
candidates, and secretly, without knowledge of any one, he deposited whichever 
vote he saw fit. There had been no campaign literature circulated and no 
speechmaking. There probably never was a purer election held in the world than 
that which was held under the two commissioners from New Hampshire. Both 
expressed their opinion to the effect that no influence was exercised on the part of 
anybody to vote one way or the other.129  
  
                                                 
129. As quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, at 222. 
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 New Hampshire repealed its soldier-voting law in 1897 when the state amended 
various aspects of its election law.130 
 
Rhode Island 
 Rhode Island, like Nevada, Maryland, and Missouri, implemented absentee voting 
for Civil War soldiers without enacting soldier-voting legislation. Instead, the state 
adopted a constitutional amendment that not only enabled the legislature to enact a 
military suffrage law, but also by its own terms provided for absent soldiers to vote even 
if the legislature took no action at all. As it happened, the legislature did not pass a 
military suffrage law during the war, perhaps because none was needed under this 
peculiar constitutional amendment. 
The prewar constitution clearly blocked absentee voting except perhaps for 
federal elections, if Rhode Island had chosen to go the route that Vermont and New 
Hampshire   had   traveled.   Adopted   in   1842,   Rhode   Island’s   suffrage   provisions   were  
conservative and convoluted compared to other northern states, with one set of 
requirements  for  “native  citizens  of  the United  States”  and  a  different  set  for  naturalized  
citizens.  Voting  by  both  groups,  however,  had  to  happen  “in  town  or  ward  meetings.”131  
The discrimination between native-born and naturalized citizens merits some 
elaboration, if only because of the relevance of military service to the suffrage 
qualification of the former group. Naturalized citizens, assuming they were twenty-one 
                                                 
130. An Act in Amendment of the Public Statutes, Relating to the Manner of Conducting Caucuses and 
Elections, ch. 78, § 21, 1897 N.H. Laws 68, 77. 
131. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, §§ 1, 2. 
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year  old  males  who  met  the  constitution’s  residence  requirements,132 had only one avenue 
to the voting franchise. They had to own $134 worth of real property.133 A native-born 
American, in contrast, could qualify with a lower level of property ownership, or no 
property ownership at all. His options were either 1) to pay a one-dollar tax on whatever 
property he owned (or a one-dollar voluntary contribution for the support of public 
schools), or 2) to enroll for duty in the state militia during the year preceding the 
election.134    Military service also relieved voters of liability for a one-dollar   “registry  
tax.”135 The constitution limited its favorable treatment for military service to militiamen 
only; those stationed in Rhode Island in the regular army got no similar break. Moreover, 
as in several states, service in Rhode Island by regulars did not count toward the 
constitution’s  residency qualifications.136 
Rhode Island politicians favoring absentee voting for soldiers saw more than one 
difficulty with the suffrage hodgepodge of the prewar constitution. First and foremost, of 
course,   was   the   requirement   of   voting   “in   town   or   ward   meetings.”   That ruled out 
absentee voting for any soldiers. In addition, even if that hurdle could be cleared, the 
imposition of a property qualification on the cohort of Rhode Island immigrant soldiers 
who had returned home after serving in the war, but not on their native-born neighbors 
who sat out the war without serving at all, created an embarrassing injustice. 
                                                 
132.  One  year  residence  in  the  state  and  six  months  “in  the  town  or  city  in  which  [the  elector]  may  claim  
a right to vote.”    R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 1. 
133. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 1. It was not necessary for the voter to own the property in the town 
or city where he resided. He could vote there as long as he proved he owned property of the requisite value 
somewhere in Rhode Island. Id. 
134. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 2. The state residence requirement for native-born citizens without 
$134 of property was two years, compared to one year for citizens meeting the property qualification. 
135. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 3. 
136. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 4. 
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So, in May 1864, with time running short before the 1864 elections, the 
legislature approved three constitutional amendments and submitted them to Rhode 
Island voters for ratification.137 One, a precursor to the modern Dream Act, would have 
granted suffrage rights to naturalized citizens who had been honorably discharged after 
service in the war, on the same terms that native-born citizens already enjoyed. 
Effectively, this would have eliminated the property qualification for immigrant 
veterans.138 The  second  would  have   thrown  out   the  “registry   tax”  and  substituted  a  poll  
tax that all citizens would pay, native-born and naturalized alike, without exception for 
enrollment in the militia. 139  These two together, had they been ratified, would have 
eliminated suffrage discrimination against those naturalized citizens who had served in 
the war. But both suffered defeat in the ratification voting.140  Nevertheless, Rhode Island 
stands as the only state that even attempted to enlarge the voting franchise in connection 
with its effort to grant absent soldiers the right to vote away from home. 
The only amendment that voters did ratify was one giving absentee voting rights 
to already   qualified   electors   “in   the   actual   military   service   of   the   United   States.” 141 
Standing alone as it did, this amendment left landless immigrant soldiers out of the 
franchise, even if they were naturalized citizens who met the residency requirements. 
While  it  granted  the  legislature  “full  power  to  provide  by  law  for  carrying  this  article  into  
effect,”   the   amendment   eliminated   the   urgency   for   such   legislation   by   describing   how  
                                                 
137. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors a Certain Proposition of Amendment to 
the Constitution of the State, ch. 529, 1864 R.I. Acts & Resolves 3. 
138. Id. at § 1 (proposed Article V). 
139. Id. (proposed Article VI). 
140. Benton, Voting in the Field, 186.  According to Benton, no record remains of the tally of the 
popular votes for and against ratification of any of the three amendments.  
141. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors, § 1. 
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absentee   voting   would   occur   “until   such   provision   shall   be   made   by   law.” 142  This 
description  was  far  less  detailed  than  any  state’s  military  suffrage  law,  but  more  detailed  
than  other  states’  constitutional  provisions  enabling  such  laws.  For  the  elections  in  1864,  
there was no military suffrage legislation in Rhode Island, and this constitutional 
amendment   set   forth   the  only   rules   that  would   govern   that   state’s   soldier  voting   in   the  
war. 
The  constitution  adopted  the  Minnesota  model,  with  absent  soldiers’  ballots  being  
forwarded from their military encampment to the Rhode Island Secretary of State. It 
applied   to   electors   “in   the   actual  military   service   of   the  United   States,”  without   stated  
exceptions. This meant not only that draftees were included, but also that naval personnel 
were.  So  were  regulars.  Given  the  constitution’s  longstanding  bar against letting regulars 
gain their residence qualification on the strength of service in Rhode Island, this created a 
potential anomaly. A Rhode Island elector serving, say, two years in Virginia as a 
member of the regular army could qualify as an absentee voter under the 1864 
amendment, while a different regular having served two years in Rhode Island would 
remain unqualified for want of the required term of residency.  
The soldier completed his ballot, writing his name and place of Rhode Island 
residence   on   the   back,   then   delivered   it   to   the   “officer   commanding   the   regiment   or  
company  to  which  [the  elector]  belongs.”  This  formulation  implies  an  exclusion  of  navy  
personnel, since sailors did not serve in regiments or companies. It might similarly have 
excluded  artillerymen,  who  served  in  battalions.  The  commanding  officer  then  “certified”  
                                                 
142.  Id. 
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that the ballot had indeed been given to him by the man whose name appeared on it. 
Finally, he forwarded the completed ballots to the Rhode Island Secretary of State, who 
compared the names on the ballots with voter lists provided to him by all the clerks of the 
state’s  towns  and  cities. 143 
The potential for fraud abounded in this barebones arrangements. There was no 
requirement that the commanding officer (who need not have been a Rhode Islander 
elector himself) had to give this certification under oath. And the constitutional provision 
said nothing at all about the form the certification should take. The constitutional 
amendment included no requirement for the soldier to swear to his own identity and 
qualifications.  It assigned no commissioners to help explain the law to the soldiers or 
their commanding officers, or carry the ballots back to the state. Presumably, the 
legislature would have fleshed out all these details in a full-fledged soldier-voting law, 
but  without  that  legislation,  these  gaps  riddled  Rhode  Island’s  soldier-voting  “system,”  as  
set forth only in the barebones constitutional amendment. 
The soldier-voting   provision   of   Rhode   Island’s   constitution   survived the Civil 
War, but the state enacted no soldier-voting legislation until the Spanish-American War, 
in 1898. That law lifts the language from the constitution almost verbatim, without 
elaboration and without filling in the gaps left in the constitutional language itself.144  
 
 
 
                                                 
143. Id. 
144. R. I. GEN LAWS, tit. II, ch. 11, § 58 (1909).  
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New York 
New York got a soldier-voting law just in time for the 1864 election after an 
earlier   effort   ran   afoul   of   the   governor’s   veto   pen.   The   governor,   Horatio   Seymour,  
rejected a soldier-voting bill in 1863 notwithstanding the attorney  general’s  opinion  that  
it was constitutional, and he stated his reasons why. This debate, with the governor 
holding the trump card of veto power, provided an executive branch equivalent of a 
judicial  majority  striking  down  a  law  over  a  minority’s  dissent. Clarity about the nature 
of the legal dislocation emerges from the veto message and its counterpoint in the 
attorney  general’s  opinion. 
Governor Seymour, a Democrat, won his office in 1862 as part of the nationwide 
Democratic resurgence.  The following year, he vetoed a bill that would have given 
absent soldiers the right to vote on the Minnesota model. His veto message gave two 
reasons.  First,  Seymour  said,  the  bill  violated  the  constitution’s  suffrage  provision,  which  
entitled each eligible elector to  vote  “in  the  election  district  of  which  he  shall  at  the  time  
[of   the   election]   be   a   resident,   and   not   elsewhere….”145 Seymour’s   view   on   that   score  
contradicted  the  opinion  of  the  state’s  attorney  general,  Daniel  Dickinson,  a  pro-Lincoln 
war Democrat. Dickinson had defended the bill in response to a request from the state 
senate   for  his  view.     Aware  of  Seymour’s  misgivings  about   the   risk  of   fraud   in   soldier  
voting, Dickinson opined that it was constitutionally irrelevant that the proposed law 
“may  be  inconvenient,  cumbrous,  and  liable  to   fraud  and  abuse.”  All   that  mattered  was  
whether the constitution expressly forbad absentee voting, which Dickinson said it did 
                                                 
145.  N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 1. 
341  
 
not.   Just   because   the   constitution   required   the   elector   to   “offer   his   vote”   in   his   home  
district, Dickinson  wrote,  didn’t  mean  that  he  had  to  do  so  in  person.  The  legislature  was  
free  to  “prescribe  the  form  for  depositing  votes”  so  as  to  avoid  allowing  soldiers  to  “be  
disfranchised”  by  their  unavoidable  absence,  according  to  the  Attorney  General.146   
Seymour   completely   ignored   Dickinson’s   argument.   In   fact,   he   very   nearly  
ignored the constitutional issue altogether. The constitutional violation was so clear, 
Seymour  wrote,   that   it   was   “needless   to   dwell   upon   that   objection   to   the   bill.”147  Far 
from dwelling on the constitutional issue, Seymour devoted only one sentence to it, 
quickly  moving  on  to  his  second,  and  apparently  larger,  objection.  The  bill  “is  in  conflict  
with   the   vital   principles   of   electoral   purity   and   independence,”   Seymour   asserted   after  
rattling off all the ways that the absentee balloting called for in the bill was subject to 
fraud   and  military   interference.  He   cited   a   treatise   proclaiming   that   elections   “must   be  
superintended  by  election  judges  and  officers,  independent  of  the  Executive,”  a condition 
obviously missing when absent soldiers vote.148  
The Lincoln administration had already shown its propensity for abusing soldier 
suffrage, as far as Seymour was concerned. As proof, he quoted from a published order 
from the Secretary of War cashiering   a   New   Hampshire   lieutenant   “for   circulating  
                                                 
146. The senate had asked Dickinson whether the constitution meant that the voter must cast his ballot 
“with  his  own  hand.”  In  what  reads today almost as a parody of strict construction, Dickinson answered no, 
and as proof he observed that a qualified voter who had lost both his hands to injury could nevertheless 
vote,  even  though  obviously  not  “by  his  own  hand.”  New York Times, April 17, 1863. 
147.  “Governor  Seymour’s  Veto  of  the  Soldiers’  Voting  Bill,”  New  York  Times, April 26, 1863. 
148. Id. The treatise was Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, ed. Theodore D. 
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Copperhead   tickets”   before   an   election.149 The administration demonstrably sought to 
block  soldiers’  access  to  Democratic  political  views,  Seymour  charged,  and  without  that  
access, the right to vote meant nothing.  “It  would  be  worse  than  a  mockery  to  allow  those  
secluded in camps or upon ships to vote if they are not permitted to receive letters or 
papers from their friends [or if they] have not the same freedom in reading public 
journals”  as  the  voters  back  home, Seymour wrote.150  
Seymour’s  burden   in   justifying  an  executive  veto  was  different   from  the  burden  
judges bore when striking down a law as unconstitutional. The executive need not frame 
his objections in constitutional terms. George Woodward attached constitutional 
significance  to  the  high  risk  of  fraud  in  soldier  voting  under  Pennsylvania’s  prewar  law,  
as  did  Rufus  Ranney  with  respect  to  Ohio’s  1863  law.    Seymour  might  have  done  so  as  
well, but instead he pointed to the fraud risk as a prudential problem. Yes, the bill was 
unconstitutional, he said, irrespective of the fraud risk. And yes, fraud prevention was a 
“vital   principle”   that   the   bill   violated,   a   view   that   inched   Seymour   close   to   the  
Woodward/Ranney position that the high risk of fraud carried constitutional weight. 
Seymour   did   not   quite   get   there,   as   one   can   imagine   that   a   “Justice   Seymour”   would  
have,  because  he  didn’t  need  to.  It  was  enough  for  him  that  the  bill  would  be  bad  law  if  
                                                 
149. New York Times, April 26, 1863. The dismissed soldier was Andrew J. Edgerly of the Fourth New 
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150.  “The  Soldiers  and  the  Right  of  Suffrage  – Message  of  Gov.  Seymour,”  New York Times, April 16, 
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enacted.  It would be bad law, Seymour said, because it would invite fraud and because 
the Lincoln administration could not be trusted to implement it evenhandedly.  
The  legislature  tried  unsuccessfully  to  override  Seymour’s  veto,   then  launched  a  
successful  effort,  with  the  governor’s  support,  to  amend  the  constitution. The amendment 
was ratified in time for passage in 1864 of a new soldier-voting bill, which Seymour 
signed.151 The new law, while constitutional by virtue of the constitutional amendment, 
contained   all   the   other   infirmities   that   prompted   Seymour’s   veto   in   1863. That he 
nevertheless signed it is testament to the greater political potency of the soldier-voting 
issue by 1864.  
Like the vetoed 1863 bill, the 1864 law instituted absentee voting on the 
Minnesota model, though without commissioners to assist implementation. The law 
applied  “in  time  of  war,”  not  expressly  limited  to  the  instant  war.    It  covered  servicemen  
in the army and navy, without exclusion of regulars or draftees, and it applied to all 
general and special elections held in New York.152  
Voting operated through a proxy system. The serviceman first authorized a 
qualified voter in his hometown to cast his ballot for him. The authorization was a written 
document signed by the serviceman and a witness, and sworn to before an officer, all of 
who signed the document.153 The soldier then sealed that document, together with his 
folded ballots, in an envelope. On the outside of the envelope was a printed affidavit by 
which the serviceman swore to his age, citizenship, and residence, and stated that he had 
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not wagered on the election. The affidavit also identified his military unit and its 
approximate location.154  
Next the serviceman put this sealed envelope inside a second envelope, also 
sealed.  He  marked  this  outer  envelope  “soldier’s  vote”  and  mailed  it  to  his proxy.155 The 
proxy, after signing a receipt for the mailing at the post office, opened the outside 
envelope. He delivered the unopened inside envelope to the inspectors of election at the 
polling place on Election Day.  If the envelope was not sealed when delivered to the 
inspectors,  they  had  to  reject  it.  If  it  was  sealed,  they  compared  the  serviceman’s  name  on  
the  outside  of   the  envelope  to  the  voting  list.   If   the  serviceman’s  name  appeared  on  the  
list, they opened the envelope and deposited the still-folded ballots in the ballot boxes at 
the polling place, comingling them with civilian ballots.156 
If   the   serviceman’s  name  did  not   appear  on   the   voter   lists,   the   inspectors   could  
still  accept   the  ballots   if  “a  householder  of   the  district”  submitted  an  affidavit swearing 
that the absent serviceman was a resident of the voting district.157 This provision allowed 
voting by men who turned twenty-one while in the service to cast ballots in their 
hometown districts. 
The law required the Secretary State to provide all the forms and envelopes called 
for  in  this  voting  process,  “in  sufficient  quantity”  to  furnish  one  of  each  to  every  eligible  
New York serviceman.158  Among  the  law’s  penalty  provisions  was  imprisonment  for  up  
to a year, plus a fine of up to $1000, for any officer who influenced or tried to influence 
                                                 
154. Id. at § 3. 
155. Id.at § 4. 
156. Id.at §§ 5, 7. 
157. Id. at § 5. 
158. Id. at § 12. 
345  
 
the  serviceman’s  voting  “by  menace,  bribery,  fear  of  punishment,  hope  of  reward,  or  any  
other  corrupt  or  arbitrary  measure  or  resort  whatever….”159 
The  Civil  War’s  most  celebrated  instances  of  actual  fraud  in  soldier voting arose 
out of voting under the New York Law. In two separate cases, federal authorities arrested 
agents stationed (one in Baltimore, another in Washington) to receive and forward soldier 
ballots from the Army of the Potomac.  In one case the defendant, Moses, an appointee of  
Governor Seymour (himself a candidate for reelection), confessed to forging the names 
and ballots of soldiers, some of them dead. He was convicted and served a prison term.  
The other case resulted in acquittal.  Republicans pounced on both cases as proof of 
endemic Democratic cheating.  Reminding readers that Seymour had used his veto to 
tailor the New York law to his liking, Republicans charged that he had designed the law 
to facilitate exactly the kind of cheating that occurred.      After   summarizing   the   law’s  
complicated   procedures   and   claiming   that   it’s   complexity   “opens   the   widest   door   to  
fraud,”  the  pro-Lincoln New York Times, in an editorial just five days before the election, 
pinned   the   responsibility   on   Seymour.      “The  Union men in the New York Legislature 
passed the bill because they could not get a better [one], as it was openly declared that 
Gov. Seymour would veto any bill unless it accorded in all respects with his own 
views.”160  A few days later, directing its scorn at Seymour, the Times asked its readers 
rhetorically,   “What   security  have  honest  men  under   an   administration   [i.e.,  Seymour’s]  
elected by forging the votes of dead soldiers, swindling the living of their suffrage, and 
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importing Butternuts from Canada and Missouri to carry the elections by force and 
fraud?”161   
Democratic papers defensively claimed that Republicans had trumped up the 
charges in New York and coerced the confession.  They went so far as to assert that 
federal agents intercepted the shipped ballots in order to substitute phony Lincoln ballots 
for   genuine  McClellan   votes.      “Of   course   they   have   been   seized   by  Lincoln’s   agents,”  
wrote the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer in a tone suggesting that only the naïve could expect 
otherwise.    “Lincoln  ballots  will  be put in the place of McClellan ballots, and the soldiers 
will   be   cheated  of   their   votes.”162  But Republicans had the better of the debate on the 
New York soldier vote.  To the extent that fraud and cheating by the military had become 
a centerpiece of the Democrats’  campaign,   the  New  York  case  severely  weakened  their  
argument as well as their prospects in November.  
In late April 1865, well after Appomattox, New York amended it soldier-voting 
law, adopting the Iowa model.163 No soldier voting occurred under this revised law. The 
following year, the state repealed its law permitting absent soldiers to vote.164 
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Kentucky 
Kentucky’s   experience   with   soldier   voting   was   unique   in   two   ways.   First,   to  
conform  to  its  constitution,  it  required  elections  “in  the  field”  to  be held by voice vote of 
the soldiers. (Missouri permitted soldiers to vote either by voice or by ballot.  All other 
states required ballots.) Second, it was the only state that gave a majority of its soldier 
votes to George McClellan in the 1864 presidential election.  
Kentucky’s   1850   constitution   slammed   the   door   tightly   shut   against   absentee  
voting.   It’s   suffrage  provision,  after   stating   that  a  voter  needed  60  days  of   residence   in  
“the  precinct  in  which  he  offers  to  vote,”  added  this  unambiguous  requirement:  “and  he  
shall   vote   in   said   precinct,   and   not   elsewhere.”165 Kentucky therefore fell back to a 
military suffrage law limited to voting for electors of the U.S. president and vice-
president, relying on the independent authority the federal constitution gave states to 
appoint   their   federal   electors   “in   such   manner   as   the   legislature   [of   the   state]   may  
direct.”166  Kentucky enacted its limited military suffrage law in February 1864, making 
it  applicable  only  to  that  year’s  election.167  
Kentucky followed the Iowa model of opening voting sites at the places where 
Kentucky  servicemen  were  stationed.  The  act  covered  “all  qualified  voters  of   this  State  
who  shall  be   in   the  actual  military  service  of   the  United  States.”168 By these terms, the 
law covered both draftees and regulars. While there was no express exclusion of sailors 
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in the navy, the act implied such an exclusion, as a practical matter, by directing the 
opening of election sites where army and artillery servicemen, but not sailors, were 
stationed:  “posts,  camps, or places where the regiment, or battery of artillery, or part of a 
regiment,  not  less  than  one  company,  under  a  separate  command….”169 
Voting   was   by   regiment,   when   “practicable,”   and   otherwise   by   company.  
Regimental and staff officers could vote at any of  the  regiment’s  companies  that  opened  a  
voting site. Whether the voting site was at the regiment or the company, the three ranking 
officers at the site served as election judges, with the highest-ranking officer among them 
designated   as   “chairman   of   the   board   of   judges.” 170  There was no requirement that 
election judges had to be qualified Kentucky voters, but they did have to swear an oath 
that   they   would   “support   the   constitution   of   the   United   States,   and   of   the   State   of  
Kentucky.”   The   oaths   also   included   the promise, common to most such laws, that the 
judges  would  “earnestly  endeavor  to  prevent  all  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse.”171  
Kentucky’s  law  makes  no  mention  of  ballots;;  the  soldier  voting  was  by  viva voce. 
Kentucky’s  constitution  called  for  such  voice  voting  “in  all  elections  by   the  people.”172 
By  requiring  that  soldier  voting  be  conducted,  “as  far  as  practicable”  consistently  with  the  
provisions   of   Kentucky’s   election   laws,   the   military   suffrage   act   incorporated   this  
requirement of voice voting.173  (This requirement also effectively ruled out the option of 
implementing absentee voting using the Minnesota model, in which written ballots were 
forwarded to election precincts back home. With viva voce voting, that mode of voting 
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was by definition impossible.) Election   clerks   recorded   soldiers’   names   and   their  
Kentucky  residences,  as  well  as  their  voting  decisions,  on  poll  lists  as  they  “offered”  their  
votes.174 
Each  election  judge  had  the  “duty,”  and  each  voter  the  “privilege,”  of  challenging  
a vote when he knew or had  “any  reason  to  suspect”  a  soldier  was  unqualified.  When  a  
challenge occurred, the judges interrogated the soldier about the challenged element of 
his  qualification,  using  detailed  inquiries  set  forth  in  Kentucky’s  general  election  law.175 
(The Secretary of State supplied the commanding officer of each company with copies of 
the relevant portions of the general election law for this purpose, as well as blank poll 
lists and copies of the soldier-voting law itself.176) 
When the polls closed, the election judges tallied the results on the poll lists, 
which they and the clerks then signed and forwarded to the governor, secretary of state, 
and attorney general. This was not necessarily the final word on the outcome, however. 
The board of examiners back in Kentucky, upon   receiving   the   returns,   could   “correct”  
them,  or  reject  them  “in  whole  or  in  part,”  as  they  “shall  deem  just.”177 They based this 
assessment   of   justice   on   written   “certificates”   provided   by   the   election   judges.   These  
were written statement in which the judges  had  to  “certify  whether  or  not  the  election  was  
free,  and   the  voters  permitted   to  vote  without   illegal  constraint,  or   force.”   If   the   judges  
                                                 
174. Id. at § 9. 
175. Id. at § 7. 
176. Id. at § 13. 
177. Id. at § 10. 
350  
 
perceived  any  improper  “influence  or  constraint,”  they  had  to  “state  the  facts  fully  in  the  
certificate.”178 
Whether   that  authority  to  “correct”  the  returns  influenced  the  outcome  of  voting  
for   Kentucky’s   electors   is   unclear,   but   Kentucky   is   the   only   state   whose   soldiers   are  
recorded as having preferred McClellan to Lincoln, 2823 to 1194.179   
Kentucky repealed its military suffrage law in 1866, an arguably redundant 
exercise, since by its terms the soldier-voting law applied only to the election of 1864.180 
 
Maryland 
 Like Rhode Island, Kentucky, and nine other states, Maryland faced a time crunch 
for implementing soldier voting. Military suffrage legislation depended on first building a 
constitutional  foundation,  but   there  wasn’t   time  for   that  before  the  1864  elections.     The  
bootstrap solution, as in Rhode Island, was to incorporate soldier-voting mechanisms into 
the proposed constitution itself, such that soldiers could cast absentee ballots in the 1864 
elections at the same time they voted to ratify the constitutional authority for such voting, 
all without the need for any action by the legislature.  
Maryland’s   prewar   constitution clearly barred absentee voting. It said that a 
qualified   elector   “shall   be   entitled   to   vote   in   the  ward   or   election   district   in  which   he  
resides.”181 That unambiguous language meant that military suffrage would depend on 
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changing the constitution. In 1864, a constitutional convention drafted, and submitted for 
public ratification, new suffrage provisions deleting the restrictive wording of the existing 
constitution   and   authorizing   the   legislature   to   “provide   by   law   for   taking   the   votes   of  
soldiers   in   the   army   of   the   United   States   serving   in   the   field.”182 In recognition that 
ratification would not happen in time for the legislature to act on military suffrage before 
November,   the   convention’s   proposal   included   an   ingenious   shortcut.   In   an   article  
entitled   “Schedule,”   it   permitted   absent   soldiers   to   participate   both   in   the   ratification  
process and, while they were at it, in the elections for state and federal offices.183   That 
way, soldier-voting   legislation   was   unnecessary   for   1864’s   elections,   assuming the 
constitutional changes were ratified. Absent soldiers could cast ballots in the annual 
election at the same time they voted on the underlying question of whether the 
constitution should permit absentee voting at all.  
The ratification vote was tight, with the votes of absent soldiers providing the 
very slim margin of victory. 184  The soldier-voting provisions of the proposed 
amendments were not the only source of controversy. Probably the bigger sticking points 
grew   out   of   changes   meant   to   block   “disloyal”   voting.      The   1864   constitutional  
convention addressed the problem with two proposals. The first would disqualify from 
voting  anyone  who  had  given  “aid,  comfort,  countenance  or  support  to  those  engaged  in  
armed  hostility  to  the  United  States,”  or  who  had  declared  his  “desire  for  the  triumph  of  
said  enemies  over  the  arms  of  the  United  states.”185 The second required all voters to give 
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a  lengthy  loyalty  oath,  which  included  the  promise,  “I  have  never  expressed  a  desire  for  
the triumph of said enemies over the  arms  of  the  United  States,”  and  “I  will  in  all  respects  
demean  myself   as   a   loyal   citizen   of   the   United   States.”186 These provisions generated 
more political heat than did the soldier-voting provisions and probably accounted for the 
closeness of the ratification vote. 
The  absentee  balloting  provisions   in   the  “Schedule”  adopted  a  sparse  version  of  
the  Iowa  model.  It  covered  all  qualified  voters  “absent  by  reason  of  being  in  the  military  
service   of   the  United  States.” 187  There was no exclusion for draftees or regulars. The 
description of the polling sites implicitly excluded navy personnel, as so many military 
suffrage  laws  did;;  polls  were  to  open  “in  each  Company  of  every  Maryland  regiment.”188 
Soldiers   stationed   more   than   ten   miles   from   their   own   company’s   headquarters, or 
quartered  in  a  hospital,  could  vote  at  any  company’s  polling  site.189 
Commissioned officers of the company were designated as election judges, with 
no maximum number of judges and a minimum of just one. There was no requirement 
that the election judges be qualified Maryland voters. If there were no officers present, 
the voters at the site would elect two of their own to act as judges. There was no 
provision for election clerks or for commissioners to assist with the voting. The judges 
swore an oath   to   follow   the   law   and   to   “prevent   fraud.”190 The provisions very briefly 
described  the  ballot  to  be  used  in  the  ratification  vote  (stating  either  “for  the  Constitution”  
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or  “against  the  Constitution”),  but  said  nothing  at  all  about  the  ballot  to  be  used  in voting 
for state and federal offices.191  
Election  judges  could,  in  their  discretion,  require  a  prospective  voter  to  swear  “to  
his  being  a  legal  voter  of  this  State,”  but  that  was  the  extent  of  the  guidance  for  judges.  
The Schedule was silent about the handling of voting challenges. The judges recorded the 
names  of  the  voting  soldiers  in  a  “poll  book”  and  watched  over  the  ballot  boxes.  After  the  
polls  closed,  the  ballots  were  counted  and  “strung  on  a  thread.”192 The judges forwarded 
the returns, showing totals for and against the new constitution, to the governor, along 
with the threaded ballots. The Schedule said nothing about the form of the returns of the 
voting for state and federal offices, but these too were to be forwarded to the governor.193  
The governor had  authority   to   “judge  of   the  genuineness   and  correctness  of   the  
returns,   and  may   recount   the   threaded   tickets”  before  aggregating   the  soldier  vote  with  
the civilian results.194 According to Benton, the governor indeed exercised that authority, 
throwing out 290 soldier votes on the constitution, 285 of them favoring ratification. It 
was not enough to change the outcome.195 It is not clear whether he took any similar 
action in reviewing the results from the field in the voting for state and federal offices. 
We know from Benton, however, that such voting did occur. He cites a telegraph 
message Lincoln wrote to an acquaintance in Baltimore claiming, based on what 
Generals Meade and Grant had reported to him, that Maryland soldiers in the Army of the 
Potomac had supported Republicans in the November elections, 1294 to 134. The pro-
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Lincoln  soldier  ballots  contributed  modestly  to  Lincoln’s  victory  margin  of  nearly  7500  
in the overall vote in Maryland. 196 
 On March 23, 1865, the legislature acted on its new constitutional authority by 
enacting a soldier-voting law on the Iowa model. It was the last such law enacted, and it 
was never used.197 The narrowly approved constitution of 1864 had a very short lifespan.  
A new constitution replaced it in 1867.  It deleted the 1864 soldier-voting provisions and 
restored  the  prewar  suffrage  rules,  once  again  entitling  each  elector  “to  vote  in  the  ward  
or  election  district  in  which  he  resides.”198    
 
JUNIOR STATES 
Iowa*, Wisconsin, Minnesota*, Ohio*, West Virginia, Michigan, Kansas, 
Maine, California, Missouri, Nevada, and Illinois 
 
These twelve states were organized after 1800, remained in the Union, and 
enacted soldier-voting laws during the Civil War.  (*Ohio is discussed in Chapter 1. Iowa 
and Minnesota are discussed earlier in this appendix  under  the  heading  “Model  States.”)  
Compared to the experience of their senior, generally more easterly counterparts, the laws 
in these junior states fared better constitutionally.  Three of the five statutes that faced 
high court challenges were upheld as constitutional, compared to zero for four in the 
senior group. Only two out of the Union’s   fourteen   post-1800 states never enacted a 
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soldier-voting law at all (Indiana and Oregon) compared to three out of the Union’s  
eleven pre-1800 states (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Delaware).  And four of the 
country’s   five   soldier-voting laws that endured well past the Civil War are from this 
younger group.  
 
Wisconsin 
The Badger State enacted its version of a military suffrage law two weeks after 
Iowa acted, on September 26, 1862.199  It followed the Iowa model. As with most states 
adopting   that   model,   the   law   stated   that   its   elections   “shall   be   conducted   so   far   as  
practical, and not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, in the manner prescribed by 
the general  election  laws  of  this  state.”200 
The  Wisconsin  law  excluded  “any  person  in  the  regular  or  standing  army  of  the  
United States, nor any person in any regiment, battery, or company organized and 
officered  out  of  this  state.”201 By implication, the law also excluded Wisconsin men in the 
Navy; the only election sites the law authorized were at places where eligible Wisconsin 
soldiers  served  in  a  “regiment  or  battery  of  artillery,”  which  sailors  never  did.202  There 
was no express exclusion of draftees in the text of the statute, although the title of the law 
referred  to  enabling  “militia  and  volunteers”  to  vote  in  the  field,  suggesting  that  draftees  
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were ineligible. Indeed, in describing the law, the state Supreme Court treated it as 
applying only to volunteers.203    
Elections  in  the  field  were  to  be  held  by  company.  The  company’s  three  highest-
ranking officers served as election inspectors, with the highest ranking among the three 
serving  as  “chairman  of  the  board  of  inspectors.”  The  law  did  not  specify  that  clerks or 
inspectors had to be qualified Wisconsin electors, although it did require each to swear to 
“support  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state  of  Wisconsin.”  Regimental  
officers  and  staff  could  vote  at  any  company’s  election  site.204  
Wisconsin’s   law   made   no   provision   for   commissioners   to   assist   with  
implementing the statute. The inspectors ran the election and had several responsibilities: 
They appointed clerks to help receive and tally ballots; they administered oaths to 
themselves and to  the  clerks  (as  in  Iowa,  swearing  “to  studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  all  
fraud,   deceit   or   abuse   in   conducting”   the   election);;   they   examined   (“canvassed”)   the  
ballots,  making  sure  that  the  soldier’s  home  county  was  shown  at  the  top  of  each  ballot;;  
they challenged   any   voter   they   knew   or   had   “any   reason   to   know   or   suspect”   was  
ineligible,  then  they  questioned  the  challenged  voter  under  oath  about  “his  residence  and  
qualifications   as   an   elector,”   asking   the   same   specific   questions   relating   to   age   and  
residence that the general election law specified for civilian elections; they certified the 
accuracy of the poll lists prepared by the clerks showing the names and home towns of 
each voter; they tallied the voting results, county by county; and finally they forwarded 
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the tallies, together with the poll lists, to the Wisconsin Secretary of State for inclusion 
with the in-state voting results.205  
The law purported to impose severe penalties on soldiers caught voting 
fraudulently. Enforceable or not, the penalty language was indeed tough: six months to a 
year   in   prison   for   ineligible   voting,   and   one   to   two   years   in   prison   “at   hard   labor”   for  
voting in more than one election.206  
The contested result of an 1862 election for a county sheriff led in 1863 to a state 
Supreme Court   review   of   the   statute’s   constitutionality.   Justice  Byron   Paine,   a   radical  
Republican, authored the opinion upholding the law.207  The challenger relied on two 
provisions  of  the  state  constitution.  One  (Article  VIII,  section  5)  provided  that  “no  person  
shall  vote  for  county  officers  out  of  the  county  in  which  he  resides.”  This,  according  to  
Paine, meant only that a voter could not vote for officers of a county other than his own 
county of residence.208 Second,   the   challenger   relied   on   the   constitution’s   requirement 
that  criminal  offenses  be  tried  in   the  county  or  district  “in  which  the  offense  shall  have  
been   committed.”   (Article   I,   section   7)      This,   the   challenger   asserted,   rendered  
unconstitutional   the   legislature’s   effort   to   punish   voting   fraud   committed by soldiers 
outside of Wisconsin. Justice Paine turned away that argument, too, ruling that this 
constitutional provision applied only to crimes committed in Wisconsin and that the 
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legislature was free to criminalize acts Wisconsin citizens might commit outside the state. 
He cited treason as an example of such a crime.209  
According to the leading scholar of the Wisconsin law, the state legislature tried 
to  tip  the  scales  of  justice  to  influence  the  court’s  decision.  The  device  for  doing  so  was  
an amendment to the soldier-voting law to permit soldier voting in elections for state 
judges. 210  The intention, according to historian Frank Klement, was to pressure the 
justices to favor soldier voting so as not to antagonize soldiers whose votes they needed 
for their own elections.211  Klement   argues   that   the   legislature’s   gambit   succeeded   in  
influencing the outcome of the court case. 
The  year  after  the  court’s  ruling,  Wisconsin  amended  its  military  suffrage  act   to  
address an issue the legislature could not have anticipated in 1862.  Starting in 1863, to 
meet ever more demanding draft quotas, communities sometimes offered financial 
bounties  to  entice  men  from  other  (usually  poorer)  communities  to  sign  up.  The  “bounty  
men”  who   accepted  were   counted   toward   the  draft  quota  of the community paying the 
bounty and not the community where they lived. For voting purposes, did this affect the 
residence  of  the  soldier  receiving  the  bounty?  No,  the  legislature  decided.  “[E]very  such  
soldier shall be deemed to be a resident of the town, ward or city in which he had a legal 
residence  at  the  time  of  volunteering.”212  
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Wisconsin omitted soldier-voting provisions from its revised election law in 
1871.213 
 
West Virginia 
 West Virginia came into existence during, and because of, the Civil War.  But 
unlike newcomer Nevada, which approached suffrage on a tabula rasa compared to older 
states, West Virginia carried some of the legal and constitutional baggage of its much 
older and estranged parent, Virginia. In setting suffrage qualifications, the new   state’s  
1863  constitution  tracked  Virginia’s  constitution  of  1851.      In  addition  to  being  a  white,  
male, twenty-one year old citizen, a qualified voter needed residence in the state (one 
year for West Virginia, two years for Virginia) plus a briefer period (thirty days for West 
Virginia,   one   year   for  Virginia)   in   the   locality   “in  which”   (West  Virginia)   or   “where”  
(Virginia)  “he  offers  to  vote.”214   
If  absentee  voting  were  foremost  in  the  thinking  of  the  new  state’s  framers,  they  
might have chosen more propitious  wording.  Constitutionally  linking  an  elector’s  “offer”  
to vote with his local residence had proved fatal to the military suffrage law in 
Pennsylvania;;  that  state’s  high  court  had  construed  the  wording  to  mean  that  a  voter  had  
to cast his ballot in person   in   his   place   of   residence.   (Michigan’s   court  would   rule   the  
same  way,  but  not  until  January  1865.)  But  West  Virginia’s  legislators  darted  right  past  
that  constitutional  obstacle  and  enacted  soldier  voting  in  the  state’s  very  first  legislative  
session, almost before the ink on the new constitution was dry. 
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 Uniquely among the states enacting military suffrage laws during the war, West 
Virginia incorporated soldier-voting provisions into its comprehensive election law.215 
Adopting the theory that a soldier “offers”  his  vote  in  the  place  of  his  residence  as  long  as  
his ballot ends up in a ballot box there, no matter where the soldier physically makes out 
his ballot, West Virginia adopted the Minnesota model. The statute applied to any 
qualified  voter  “who  is necessarily absent [from his election district] on the day of any 
election,   in   the   service   of   the   United   States   or   of   this   State….” 216  That covered 
servicemen of all sorts: army, navy, conscripts, enlistees, regulars, surgeons, chaplains, 
and musicians. And it  expressly  applied  to  “any” election, which meant that state, local, 
and federal elections all fell within its scope.  
 The soldier-voting provision was extraordinarily brief. In a single section of a 
long statute (65 sections in all), it required only that the soldier fill out his ballot, seal it in 
an  envelope,  and  sign  the  envelope  “in  his  own  proper  hand,”  adding  a  description  of  his  
military  unit.      If  he   couldn’t   sign,   then  his   commanding  officer   attested   to  his   “mark.”  
The soldier then sent the envelope  (“by  mail  or  otherwise”)  to  the  election  supervisor  and  
two inspectors in his election district back home, or to any one of them. The supervisor 
and  inspectors  accepted  the  ballot  if  they  were  “satisfied  that  the  signature  is  genuine  and  
the person is  entitled  to  vote.”217  
 The law added what was the law in many states – that no soldier could gain a 
residence on the strength of being stationed in the state, and that no qualified elector 
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could lose his residence by his absence during military service.218 Each local assessor had 
to  include  absent  soldiers  on  lists  of  qualified  electors  “so  far  as  he  is  able  to  ascertain  n  
the  same.”219 Election supervisors and inspectors who accepted a soldier ballot knowing 
it was ineligible were subject to a financial penalty (not less than $30 or more than 
$100). 220  But the statute made no provision for notifying absent soldiers about the 
opportunity to vote, or for commissioners to assist soldiers with the voting, or for copies 
of the law to be distributed to military units. 
 West   Virginia’s   military   suffrage   law   did   not   long   outlast   the   war.      It   was  
eliminated   from   the   state’s   election   law   by   the   time   of   the   first   post-war statutory 
codification, in 1870.221 
 
Michigan 
Michigan patterned its military suffrage law, enacted on February 5, 1864, on 
Iowa’s   law.   Voting   under   the   law   occurred   at   election   sites   created   “at   every   place,  
whether within or without the State, where a regiment, battalion, battery or company of 
Michigan   soldiers   may   be   found   or   stationed.”222 Because naval organization did not 
include   these   designations,   this   statutory   formulation,   like   Iowa’s,   effectively   excluded  
sailors in the navy. All other servicemen were covered; there was no exclusion for 
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draftees or soldiers in the regular army. As in Iowa, eligible soldiers specifically included 
surgeons and chaplains.223 
 Michigan’s  law  included  language  that  had  become  boilerplate  in  many  statutes,  
optimistically  providing   that   the  general  election  law  was  to  apply  to  soldier  voting  “so  
far as applicable, and not qualified  by  the  provisions  of  this  act.”224  The law purported to 
allow  soldiers  to  vote  “in  all   the  elections  authorized  by  law.”225  But its administrative 
provisions effectively left out elections for township and ward officials, since nothing in 
the law called for communicating returns to either townships or wards.  As the Michigan 
Supreme  Court  observed  in  reviewing  the  law’s  constitutionality,  this  meant  that  the  law  
could not, and did not, apply to township or ward elections.226  But it did cover elections 
for federal, state, county, and district offices.227  This included elections for presidential 
and vice-presidential electors. 
 Polling sites were to be opened for each company of Michigan troops. If it was 
“not  practicable   for  all   [members  of   the  company]   to  vote   together,”  as  when  part  of  a  
regiment  or   company  was  on  “detached  service,”   then   the  detached  unit  could  open   its  
own polling site.228 The eligible soldiers at each site elected three election inspectors, 
who in turn appointed election clerks. Election inspectors need not be officers; the only 
qualification was that each inspector (though not necessarily the clerks) had to be an 
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eligible Michigan voter.229 That meant, first, that he had to be at least 21 years old, a U.S. 
citizen   (or  a   foreigner  who  “has  declared  his   intention”   to  become  a  U.S.  citizen),  or  a  
“civilized”   Native   Americans   who   did   not   belong   to   a   tribe.   Second,   he   had   to   have  
resided  six  months  in  Michigan  and  20  days  “in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  
to  vote.”230   
Inspectors and clerks swore oaths, as their counterparts did back home. As with 
oaths in most states, the Michigan soldiers serving as inspectors and clerks promised 
among   other   things   to   “studiously   endeavor   to   prevent   fraud,   deceit   and   abuse”   in   the  
election.231 As in Iowa, the law provided for commissioners to travel from Michigan with 
necessary election paraphernalia: copies of the law, forms of poll lists and returns, and 
the text of oaths to administer to judges, clerks, and challenged voters. Commissioners 
also carried the election returns back home to Michigan.232   
The governor appointed the commissioners, assigning one for each division 
containing at least one Michigan regiment. 233   Commissioners had to be eligible 
Michigan voters and had to swear an oath that included the promise to perform their 
responsibilities   “without   reference   to   political   preferences.”   Like   election   judges   and  
clerks,  they  had  to  swear  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit  and  abuse.”234 
 The statute specified that each ballot had to show the  soldier’s  home  county  and  
town or city. The ballot had to be on a single piece of paper, though it could cover a long 
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list of offices. The offices to be chosen, and the preferred candidates names, could be 
printed in advance on the ballot or written by hand by the voter.235  
 Soldiers announced themselves to the inspectors and clerks, by name, county of 
residence, and military attachment. The clerks entered all this information in the poll 
books.236 If no one challenged the voter, the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box.237 
If there was a challenge, the judges administered one or more of five different oaths to 
the soldier testing all elements of eligibility – U.S. citizenship, state and township 
residency, and age. The statute stated the exact wording of each oath.238   
At the close of voting, the inspectors tallied the votes and the clerks double-
checked the tally.239 The final results were entered on the return form, and the returns, 
together with the poll books and ballots, were given to a commissioner (or placed in the 
mail  “or  other  safe  mode”)  for  delivery  to  the  Michigan  Secretary  of  State.240 The results 
of the soldier voting were added to the civilian results to determine election winners. 
 By  its   terms,  Michigan’s  statute  was  to  remain  in  force  only  “during the present 
war,  and  no  longer….”241 As events unfolded, however, the law died slightly earlier than 
that.   In   late   January  1865,   as   the  Confederacy   took   its   last   gasps,   but   before   the  war’s  
conclusion,   Michigan’s   Supreme   Court   struck   down   the   law   as   unconstitutional. 242  
Washtenaw county canvassers had excluded the soldier vote in the 1864 election for 
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county prosecutor, finding that the soldier-voting law was unconstitutional. That decision 
cost candidate Daniel Twitchell the job he would have won if the votes of absent soldiers 
had  counted.  He  appealed.  The  case  ended  up  at  Michigan’s  high  court,  which  ruled  that  
the  canvassers  were  correct  to  exclude  the  soldiers’  ballots.  The  prosecuting  attorney  post  
that Twitchell had sought went instead to Amos Blodgett, who had the higher number of 
votes cast within the county. 
 At  issue  was  the  1850  constitution’s  provision  that  “no  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall  
be an elector, or entitled to vote at any election, unless he has resided in the township or 
ward in which   he   offers   to   vote,   ten   days   next   preceding   the   election.”243 Twitchell’s  
counsel,  state  Attorney  General  Albert  Williams,  contended  that  a  vote  is  “offered”  in  the  
township if the township ultimately receives it. The provision of the constitution, he 
urged, pertained only to the qualifications of the voter – he had to be a resident of the 
township where his vote is received – and not to where the elector cast his ballot.   In 
speaking only of who qualified to vote, not where he had to vote, the constitution left the 
legislature free to establish voting sites for qualified electors outside the Michigan 
township, and outside the state entirely.  
 When the bill had been under consideration in 1863, Williams had opined to the 
state senate that the bill was indeed constitutional. It was inconceivable, Williams had 
written   then   in   response   to   the   senate’s   request   for   his   opinion,   that   the   framers   could  
have   intended   to   force   absent   soldiers   into   the   Hobson’s   choice   of   either   losing   their  
opportunity  to  vote  or,  “at the risk of the national or State existence, [finding a way] to 
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come  home  to  vote.”  If  they  had  had  any  inkling  that  the  constitution  might  be  construed  
to   achieve   such   “palpable   injustice,”   he   argued,   neither   the   convention   nor   the   people  
would have adopted it.  Likening the objectionable interpretation to a snake, he asked 
rhetorically,  “Would  [the  framers]  have  aided  in  warming  such  a  viper  into  life  and  vigor,  
to  turn  and  bite  them?”244 
By a 3-1 vote, the justices disagreed with Williams, concluding that an elector 
met the constitutional requirement only by personally casting his ballot in the township 
where he resides. Each of the three justices reaching this conclusion issued a separate 
opinion. Justice James Valentine Campbell compared the 1851 constitution’s  language  to  
the corresponding provision of the 1835 constitution. The earlier version entitled an 
elector   to   cast   his   ballot   only   in   the   “district,   county,   or   township   in   which   he   shall  
actually  reside….”245 Justice Campbell focused on the conjunction  “or.”  It  gave  the  voter  
the choice of voting anywhere in the county, including polling sites far from his own 
township. This invited voting fraud, since no one at the polling site might be in a position 
to challenge the credentials of the stranger arriving there to vote from some faraway 
corner of the county. The constitution was amended in 1839 to tighten the voting 
requirement,  now  insisting  that   the  voter  cast  his  ballot   in  his  own  “township  or  ward.”  
The 1851 constitution preserved that requirement, Justice Campbell concluded, and did 
indeed prescribe the where of voting, not just the qualifications of who could vote. He 
explained   the   framer’s   intent   in   requiring   that   voters   be   personally   present   in   their  
township or ward when they cast their ballots: 
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If the voter is required to present himself personally at his own place of abode, his 
neighbors will know his person, and will be likely to know his qualifications. If he 
can vote elsewhere, and have his vote transmitted or counted in the township, he 
may or may not be known personally to those who are where he is found, but they 
are by no means likely to know his actual residence, nor, if he violates the law, 
can his crime be as readily identified or proven. That other means of protection 
may be devised is possible; but the test by neighboring eyewitnesses has always 
been the favorite resort of the law, and it is the best.246 
 
Justice Isaac Christiancy, who had helped organize the Republican Party in 1854 
before joining the court, reached the same conclusion, but for somewhat different 
reasons.  Relying  on  history,  he  concluded  that  the  term  “offers  his  vote”  in  a  township  or  
ward,  as  the  1850  framers  must  have  understood  the  term,  meant  “personal  presentation  
of the vote at that place to the inspectors or officers  presiding  at  such  election.”  This  had  
been  the  “uniform  mode  in  all  the  American  states  from  their  first  organization,”  with  the  
single  exception  of  Pennsylvania’s  1813  law,  which  Christiancy  brushed  aside,  observing  
that Michigan had certainly known no other mode in her history.247   
Justice   Thomas  Cooley   issued   the   third   opinion   that  Michigan’s   1864   law  was  
unconstitutional.   He   agreed   with   Campbell’s   reasoning   that,   given   the   historical  
background of the 1851 constitution, there was no ambiguity in the term  “offers  his  vote”  
in   the   township   or   ward   where   the   elector   resided.   It   required   the   voter’s   personal  
presence in the township.  But Cooley added an insight born of a particularly tight 
reading   of   the   statute’s   text.   Twitchell  must   lose,   Cooley  wrote, even if his argument 
were  correct  about  the  meaning  of  the  constitution’s  requirement  that  an  elector  “offer  his  
vote”   in   his   township   or   ward.   According   to   Twitchell’s   counsel,   an   elector   met   this  
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requirement as long as his vote was ultimately received in the township or ward, even if 
he  cast   the  ballot  elsewhere.  But,  as  Cooley  observed,  Michigan’s  military  suffrage  law  
made no provision for returning soldier voting results or ballots to townships or wards, 
only to counties and districts. An absent soldier  could  not  be  said  to  “offer  his  vote”  in  a  
township or ward that, by this law, never received it. Whether through drafting oversight 
or otherwise, the law did not apply to township or ward elections.248   
Campbell, Christiancy, and Cooley, three of the four Michigan Supreme Courts 
justice  who  would  soon  become  known  as  the  “Big  Four”  for  their  national  renown,  all  
agreed on the bottom line – the 1864 law was constitutional – even if they could not 
agree on a single opinion stating why.249  Opposing them in this case was Chief Justice 
George Martin. Like the three justices in the majority, Martin was a Republican. But his 
dissenting opinion, the final opinion in the final case on Civil War soldier-voting laws, 
echoed the first, the trial court opinion in the Pennsylvania case of Chase v. Miller by 
Democrat John Conyngham. Like Conyngham, Martin believed that striking down the 
soldier-voting   law   amounted   to   “disfranchising”   soldiers   and   intruded   on   legislative  
prerogatives.   Absent   “a   direct collision between [a statute]   and   the   constitution,”   the  
court’s   duty   was   to   defer   to   “legislative   discretion,”   wrote   Martin. 250  By   “direct”  
collision, Martin meant an express and unambiguous prohibition in the constitution 
against the legislative action; implied prohibitions did  not  suffice.  “I  cannot  put  my  finger  
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upon any word or clause of the constitution from which I can conclude that they [i.e., the 
people  of  Michigan]  have  surrendered  [their]  will”  on  the  subject  of  setting  the  place  for  
voting.251 To the contrary, he read the constitution as leaving it to the legislature to 
determine where voting could occur.  It mattered not at all to Martin that the framers 
could   not   have   contemplated   absentee   voting.   The   “impressions   and   intention”   of   the  
framers,  considered  apart  from  “the  language  of  the  instrument,”  counted  for  nothing.252  
Courts should not superimpose past understandings of the meanings of words of the 
constitution.   “The   constitution   was   framed   for   the   very   purpose   of   adaptation   to   the  
progress   of   the   times,”  Martin   wrote, sounding very much like modern proponents of 
“living  constitutionalism.”253  
Remarkably, all three justices who voted to strike down the statute were 
Republicans. 254  They certainly understood the party passions surrounding the issue. 
Justice Christiancy lamented  the  law’s  “unfortunate  connection  with  the  party  politics  of  
the   day.”   Indeed,   the   statute  was   bitterly   contested   and   enacted   along   party   line   votes,  
with Republicans favoring passage and Democrats opposed. 255  On the other hand, 
perhaps party loyalties over the issue spilled over to the bench but tugged at the justices 
less forcefully in January 1865, when they ruled, than might have been the case in mid-
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1864. Michigan Republicans had already enjoyed the benefits of the law in the 1864 
elections, and the justices might have supposed that the war would end – and the statute 
with it – long before the next election.  
After the war, in 1866, Michigan amended its constitution to authorize the 
legislature,  during  wartime,  to  “provide  the  manner  in  which,  and the time and place at 
which”   absent   servicemen   could   vote.   That   provision   was   incorporated   in   the   state’s  
revised  constitution  in  1908,  but  was  subsumed  in  the  1963  constitution’s  more  general  
grant of legislative authority for all classes of absent voters, not just soldiers.256    
 
Kansas 
 Kansas was the youngest state in the union at the outbreak of the Civil 
War, having been admitted in January 1861. The new state granted suffrage rights to 21-
year  old  white  men  who  met   the  constitution’s   residency   requirements and were either 
U.S. citizens  or  had  “declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens,  conformably  to  the  laws  
of  the  United  States  on  the  subject  of  naturalization.”257  The state constitution articulated 
residency requirements in words that elsewhere had proved fatal to absentee voting laws 
for soldiers. But those same words proved not to be an insuperable problem in Kansas. 
As   with   both   Pennsylvania   and  Michigan,   Kansas’s   constitution   said   that   men  
wishing to vote had to reside for a specific durational period (for Kansas it was thirty 
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days)  “in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  [the  elector]  offers  to  vote….”258 The high court 
in both the Keystone and Wolverine states struck down absentee voting laws for soldiers, 
concluding that   one   could   “offer   to   vote”   in   a township or ward only by a physical 
presence there when he cast his ballot. Both courts looked to the history of voting 
practices  in  their  respective  states  for  a  sense  of  what  their  constitutions’  framers  meant  
when  they  used  the  verb  “offer”  (as  in  “offer  his  vote”)  in  provisions  governing  suffrage.  
That history showed, in both Pennsylvania and Michigan (at least to the satisfaction of 
their   high   courts)   that   “offering”   a   vote   meant   personally   presenting   a   ballot   in   the  
township, which ruled out absentee voting for soldiers or anyone else. The Kansas 
constitution used the same verb, and a handful of opponents to military suffrage in the 
Kansas legislature argued that it stood in the way of absentee voting as much in Kansas 
as it had in her sister states. But the state attorney general disagreed, as did the vast 
majority of Kansas legislators.259 And  after  enactment,  the  state’s  absentee  voting  law  for  
soldiers prompted no judicial intervention. Perhaps Kansas, unlike Pennsylvania and 
Michigan, was too young to have developed long, pre-constitution election traditions that 
imparted  fixed  meanings  to  undefined  words  like  “offer”  in  its  constitution.260  
A   constitutional   hurdle   that   loomed   higher   than   the   requirement   to   “offer   his  
vote”  in  a  township  or  ward  was  a provision barring soldiers, seamen, and marines from 
gaining residence by being stationed in Kansas. The provision added this prohibition in a 
separate  clause:  “nor  shall  any  soldier,  seaman,  or  marine  have   the   right   to  vote.”     The  
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entire text of this provision  merits  a  close   look.     Here   is   the  full  sentence:  “No  soldier,  
seaman, or marine, in the army or navy of the United States, or their allies, shall be 
deemed to have acquired a residence in the State in consequence of being stationed 
within the same; nor  shall  any  soldier,  seaman  or  marine  have  the  right  to  vote.” 261 
A reader encountering this 1859 text and looking for harmony with the text of a 
1864 law allowing absent soldiers to vote, could conclude that the prohibition in the final 
clause applied only to the those servicemen identified in the preceding clause: soldiers 
and sailors in the regular army or navy of the United States and stationed in Kansas. Read 
that way, which is how the state attorney general read it, the final clause stood not as a 
flat prohibition of a military suffrage statute, but as a bar to voting by career servicemen 
stationed in Kansas.262 Harmony could exist between that bar and a soldier-voting law 
conferring  suffrage  rights  only  on  Kansas’s  militia  and  volunteers.  Kansas  passed exactly 
such a soldier-voting law.  Just to make sure, however, the legislature submitted a 
constitutional amendment, which was ratified at the 1864 election, stating “the  legislature  
may make provision for taking the votes of electors who may be absent from their 
townships or wards, in the volunteer military service of the United States, or the militia 
service  of  this  state.”263  
Kansas enacted its soldier-voting act in March 1864, after the legislature 
recommended the constitutional amendment, but before it was ratified. Its constitutional 
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foundation, then, was the existing constitution, interpreted as presenting no obstacle. The 
law followed the Iowa model, calling for opening election sites at the posts where 
Kansas’s   soldiers   served.   It   covered   only   qualified   electors   “in   the  militia   or   volunteer  
military   service.” 264  This effectively excluded draftees and regulars. In calling for 
election   sites  where   “regiments,   battalions,   companies  or   squads”  were   located,   the   act  
also left out any Kansans servicing in the navy.265 The act applied to all county, district, 
state, and federal elections, but not to elections for township offices.266 
Voting was by regiment, but the law allowed two regiments stationed together to 
vote at a single site, as long as the combined regiments totaled no more than 12 
companies. To assist the voting process, the state sent pre-printed poll books and tally 
sheets,   delivered   by   “a   suitable   person”   whom   the   governor   appointed.   Unlike   the  
“commissioners”  sent  to  help  implement  absentee  voting  under several of the state laws, 
this   “suitable   person”   apparently   had   no   duties   beyond   delivery   of   the   election  
paraphernalia.267 
Kansas soldiers selected (by viva voce election) three judges and two clerks to 
administer the voting process. The Kansas statute omitted any requirement that judges 
and clerks be qualified Kansas voters. That created the possibility that non-Kansans, non-
whites, or soldiers younger than 21 could serve as election judges or clerks. Judges and 
clerks swore an oath promising among other  things  not  to  accept  anyone’s  vote  without  
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first  being  “satisfied”  that   the  soldier  was  a  qualified  voter  “of  the  township  or  ward  of 
which he   offers   his   vote.” 268  This   somewhat   clumsily   reframed   the   constitution’s  
requirement that an elector be a resident  of  the  township  or  ward  “in  which”  he  offers  his  
vote. 
In assessing the qualifications of electors, the judges applied the standards of the 
general election law, many of the provisions of which this soldier-voting law 
incorporated by reference. The rule  for  testing  a  voter’s  residence,  for  example,  was  that  
“the   place   shall   be   considered   and   held   to   be   the   residence   of   a   person   in   which   his  
habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of 
returning.” 269  When someone challenged a soldier offering his vote, the judges 
administered any of several oaths spelled out verbatim in the general election law. 
Sometimes the statutory oath made no literal sense when applied outside of Kansas. Such 
was the case in a challenge for lack of township or ward residency, for example. The 
judges  asked  the  soldier,  “When  did  you  come  into  this  township  (or  ward)?”  Or,  “When  
you came into this township (or ward), did you come for a temporary purpose merely, or 
for the purpose of making it your home?”270 An  oath’s   reference   to   “this   township”  or  
“this  ward”  hardly  fit  the  circumstances  of  soldiers  altogether  absent  from  Kansas.  This  
problem typified a breakdown in anti-fraud protections in soldier-voting laws generally. 
Many, like the Kansas law, imported anti-fraud protections that may have worked well in 
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civilian   elections   back   home   but   that   offered   much   shakier   protections   “in   the   field,”  
where they barely made sense. 
Even if a challenged voter swore to the required oaths, the judges could still reject 
his   ballot   “if   they   shall   be   satisfied,   from   record,   evidence,   or   other   legal   testimony  
adduced  before  them,  that  he  is  not  a  legal  voter.”271 Unchallenged ballots, and those that 
survived the gauntlet of oaths and investigation, were placed in a ballot box. Each was 
marked   with   the   soldier’s   county,   township   (or   ward),   and   district.   The   name   of   the  
soldier  offering  the  vote,  each  of  whom  was  announced  “in  an  audible  voice”  by  a  judge  
before accepting the ballot, was entered in the poll books along with the identity of his 
military attachment and his residence information.272 
At the close of the voting, judges opened the ballot boxes and went through the 
ballots, one by one, and reading out loud the choices appearing on each ticket. The clerks 
recorded the results   on   the   tally   sheets   provided   by   the   governor’s   representative.   Poll  
books, tally sheets, and ballots were then bundled up and forwarded to the Kansas 
Secretary of State in Topeka. The soldier vote was then made part of the overall voting 
results.273 
The Kansas soldier-voting law survived the Civil War and remained in effect until 
at least 1947.274 
 
 
                                                 
271. Id. at § 13. 
272. Kansas Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 7.  
273. Id.at §§ 7-12. 
274. Elections, KAN. STAT. ANN. Ch. 25, art. XII, §§ 25-1201 et. seq. (1947). 
376  
 
Maine 
Maine’s  prewar  constitution  posed  clear  obstacles   to  absentee  voting.   It   granted  
every twenty-one year old male, having three months residence in the state, voting rights 
“in   the   town  or  plantation  where  his   residence   is   so  established.”275  Elections for both 
legislative  branches  and  for   the  governorship  were  to  be  held  in  each  town  in  an  “open  
town  meeting”  where  local  leaders  (town  “selectmen”)  presided.276 Politicians favoring a 
military suffrage law, mostly Republicans, saw the futility of pushing for a soldier-voting 
bill  in  the  face  of  the  constitution’s  clear  insistence  on  the  voter’s  physical  presence  in  his  
town of residence on Election Day. They needed to amend the constitution. 
  Republican governor Abner Coburn urged the legislature to propose an 
amendment   for   popular   ratification   in   1863,   but   that   effort   fizzled.  Coburn’s   successor  
Samuel Cony, also a Republican, was more persuasive the next year. In March 1864, at 
Governor   Cony’s   urging,   the   legislature   passed   a   joint   resolution   recommending   a  
constitutional amendment allowing absent soldiers to vote.277  This came quite late in the 
election year, and timing became a problem. Republicans wanted to implement soldier 
voting in time for the general election in November, but the constitutional amendment 
authorizing the needed legislation would not happen until very shortly before that, in 
September.  Lawmakers could not wait for the people’s   verdict   on   the proposed 
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amendment if they wanted to have a soldier-voting system up and running for the 
November elections. 
The solution was a soldier-voting law that tackled the subject with a two-pronged 
approach.278 First, the law authorized soldier voting in purely federal elections – for 
representatives to Congress and for electors of president and vice-president.279 For this, 
Maine’s   lawmakers   had   the   benefit   of   the   pioneering   efforts   of   their   counterparts   in  
Vermont, guided by its Supreme Court. The Vermont justices had ruled that the state 
legislature had plenary authority under the U.S. Constitution to regulate the time, place, 
and manner of voting for these federal offices, regardless of what the state constitution 
said about elections for state and local offices.    New  Hampshire’s  high  court  had  agreed.  
Both states implemented soldier voting only for federal elections. Maine lawmakers 
could be reasonably confident that by copying this approach, the first prong of their 
statute would similarly survive any constitutional scrutiny it might receive.  
The   statute’s   second   prong  was   to   permit   the   same   absent   soldiers   at   the   same  
time   to   vote   in   the   election   for  Maine’s   governor   and   state   legislature,   contingent   on  
ratification of the state constitution in September.280 As it happened, the contingent event 
occurred with ratification of the amendment in September. It was a characteristically 
partisan affair, with yes votes predominating in Republican towns and no votes in 
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Democratic towns.281 Notwithstanding partisan divisions, however, the amendment was 
ratified,  so  Maine’s  absent  soldiers  were  able  to  vote  in  1864’s  November  elections  for  
federal,   state,   and   local   offices.   The   law   provided   that   each   voting   soldier   “shall   be  
considered as voting in the city, town, plantation and representative district where he 
resided  when  he  entered”  his  military  service.282 
Maine’s   law   followed   the   Iowa   model   of   setting   up   election   sites   at   locations  
where Maine servicemen served in the war. The constitutional amendment excluded 
soldiers  “in  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States,”  and  so  did  the  statute.283 There was no 
exclusion  for  draftees.  As  with  so  many  other  such  laws,  Maine’s  described  the  locations  
for erecting voting sites in terms that effectively excluded sailors in the navy. Elections 
sites  were  to  be  opened  where  Maine  “soldiers”  served  in  a  “regiment,  battalion,  battery,  
company,   or   detachment   of   not   less   than   twenty”   men.284 No provision was made to 
accommodate detached units smaller than twenty men, but general and staff officers were 
allowed to vote at any of the election sites, as were surgeons and chaplains.285 
  The three ranking officers of the military unit where an election site was opened 
served   as   election   “supervisors,”  who   presided   over   the   voting.   Like  Wisconsin’s   law,  
Maine’s  law  had  no  requirement  that  the  supervisor  himself  be  a  qualified  Maine  elector.  
Theoretically, non-Maine officers could preside as supervisors of voting by Maine 
soldiers, although lawmakers may have believed that they had protected against this risk 
with  the  law’s  requirement  that  election  supervisors  swear  “to  support  the  constitution  of  
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the  United  states  and  of  this  state.”286 The law was also unusual in making no allowance 
for clerks to assist the supervisors. Supervisors had to keep the poll lists of soldiers who 
voted and prepare the returns, without clerical assistance. Less uniquely, Maine appointed 
no commissioners to help implement the law. Supervisors, in other words, were on their 
own in managing the election sites, although the law called for Maine’s  secretary  of  State  
to supply them with blank poll lists and forms for preparing returns.287 
The  soldier’s  county  and  town  of  residence  had  to  appear  on  his  ballot,  as  was  the  
case in all such laws.288 Before  accepting   the  ballot,   the  supervisors  “must  be  satisfied”  
that  the  soldier’s  age  and  citizenship  qualified  him  to  vote  and  that  his  residence  was  in  
the location identified on his ballot. 289  If a supervisor or anyone else challenged a 
soldier’s  eligibility,  it  was  the  job  of  the  supervisor  to  interrogate the soldier, under oath, 
and take evidence from the challenger. The law did not include the text of oaths or 
interrogatories the supervisor should administer to test the various categories of 
eligibility.290 Final  say  on  the  voter’s  eligibility  rested  with the supervisors. 
The supervisors forwarded the poll lists and returns (but, unlike most other states, 
not the ballots) to the Secretary of State in Maine, where the results from the field were 
incorporated with the civilian vote in final election outcomes.291 
                                                 
286. Id. at § 2. 
287. Id. at § 17. 
288. Id. at § 4. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at § 5. 
291. Id. at § 6. 
380  
 
Maine election law preserved the right of absent soldiers to vote through World 
War II. In 1944, the state extended absentee voting rights more generally to citizens away 
from their homes on Election Day.292 
 
California 
 California enacted three soldier-voting laws, the first in 1863 then two more in 
1864. All three were virtually identical in their basic structure – applying the Iowa model 
of opening election sites in locations where California soldiers served – and in most of 
their wording. The first applied by its terms only to elections held in a single year, 
1863.293 The following year, that statute having lapsed by its terms, the state filled the 
void with two new laws. One applied to elections of members of the state legislature, 
representatives to Congress, and electors for President and Vice President, beginning 
with the elections in 1864 and then continuing with elections for those offices "every year 
thereafter during the continuance of our National War."294 The other, enacted three days 
later, applied to elections for statewide executive officers, judges, and county officers 
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beginning in 1865 and then "every year thereafter."295 All three military suffrage laws 
were repealed in 1866, before the elections of that year.296 
The laws covered all categories of qualified electors "in the military service of the 
United States," with no exclusions of regulars or draftees. By requiring election sites to 
open not only for service units of the army and artillery ("regiments," "batteries," and 
"battalions"), but also for "squadrons," the laws extended absentee voting opportunities to 
naval and cavalry personnel as well. Coverage extended even to musicians.297 
To limit voting to qualified electors (21-year old white men meeting state and 
local residency requirements), the laws relied heavily on an elaborate process of list 
making. First, California's Adjutant General compiled a single list of all qualified electors 
"in the military service," identifying for each the county of residence and the military unit 
to which he was assigned. The Secretary of State then used this list to compile separate 
lists for each regiment, battalion, squadron, and battery, adding for each serviceman on 
the list his congressional, senatorial, and assembly district. These separate lists were then 
sent to the commanding officers of each unit.   Working from these lists, the officers in 
turn created separate lists for each "detached unit" under his command and sent those 
shorter lists to the appropriate commanders.298 
                                                 
295. An Act Amendatory of and Supplemental to an Act Entitled an Act to Regulate Elections, 
approved March Twenty-Third, Eighteen Hundred and Fifty, and all Acts Amendatory thereof and 
Supplemental thereto, Approved April Twenty-fifth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty Three, ch. CCCLXXXIII, 
§§ 1, 2, 1864 Cal Stat. 431, 432. 
296. A Bill for an Act to Repeal Certain Acts Providing for Soldiers to Vote out of their Election 
Districts during the Rebellion, ch. CCLI, § 1, 1866 Cal. Stat. 277, 277. 
297. California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 1. Section 1 of all three laws stated the coverage in the 
same inclusive terms. 
298. California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, §§ 1, 2, 3. (Each of the three laws describes this list-
making process, in identical language, in sections 1, 2, and 3.) 
382  
 
 The three most senior officers present oversaw the actual balloting process.  The 
laws did not require that they be eligible California electors. They opened the polling 
place (at 9:00 AM, "if practicable"), watched over the ballot boxes, and "received" the 
ballots, checking the names of the soldiers casting ballots against the names on the list. 
The laws made no provision for clerks or commissioners to help them or for copies of the 
law to be forwarded to them. The laws were similarly silent about how they were to 
handle challenges of a soldier's eligibility, or even about whether challenges could be 
made at all. The laws enjoined the responsible officers to "exercise due care and diligence 
to prevent any soldier voting by mistake for any officer except such as he is eligible to 
vote for," and they had to swear to "discharge the duties of _______ of this election to the 
best of your ability, so help you God." The blank line appears in the statutes' provision 
about the oath, but the laws give no idea what the speaker was to say at that point in the 
oath. They assign no title to the officers' election role (Election judge? Supervisor?), 
leaving the officer to figure out for himself what word to utter in filling in the blank 
space.299 
The laws provided no penalty for soldiers who cheated in the voting process, but 
did penalize misconduct by the supervising officers. If they neglected their duties, or tried 
to influence a vote "by command, threats, or promises of any advantage or preferment," 
they faced forfeiture of two hundred dollars in a civil action (with half the proceeds going 
to the state treasury) and criminal prosecution "for such offense."300 What if the offense 
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occurred outside of California? The laws tried to overcome that hurdle with a "deeming" 
provision: the misconduct "shall be considered, taken, and held to have been committed 
by such officer within the jurisdiction of this State...." As if conceding the difficulty of 
making the deeming provision stick in court, the laws also called on the Governor to 
forward evidence of the misconduct to the President, "with the most urgent solicitations 
that the commission of such officer be revoked and his name stricken from the army 
roll."301 
This was not the only deeming provision in the California laws. Another applied 
to the voting itself. The laws provided that the absent soldiers' votes "shall be considered, 
taken, and held to have been given by them in the respective counties of which they are 
residents.”302  By the legal fiction created by this deeming provision, the legislature 
undoubtedly hoped to finesse a potential constitutional impediment to absentee voting. 
As   in   so   many   other   states,   the   problem   arose   from   the   wording   of   the   constitution’s  
residency   qualification   for   voting.   The   suffrage   provision   of   California’s   1849  
constitution conditioned suffrage on two residency requirements: six months in the state 
and,   more   problematically,   thirty   days   in   the   “county   or   district   in   which   [the   voter]  
claims   his   vote….” 303  As elsewhere, the question boiled down to this: did the 
constitution’s  articulation of the local residency requirement establish not only who could 
vote, but also where the eligible voter must cast his ballot? In other words, in restricting 
the franchise to  men  having  thirty  days  of  residence  in  a  given  “county  or  district,”  did  
                                                 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at § 4. 
303. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 1. 
384  
 
the constitution also require that those men cast their votes only in person within that 
county or district?  If so, then absentee balloting was barred. If not, then the legislature 
was free to permit voting elsewhere, including military encampments where California 
servicemen were stationed. 
If  California’s  legislators  calculated  that  they  could  overcome  a  constitutional  bar  
by statutorily deeming each absentee ballot, no matter where actually cast, to have been 
cast   in   the   soldier’s   home   county   or   district, they calculated wrong. The legal fiction 
worked  no  better  in  salvaging  California’s  law  than  a  similar  fiction  had  worked  to  save  
Connecticut’s.  In  October  1864,  the  California  Supreme  Court  struck  down  the  1863  law  
as unconstitutional, concluding that the   constitution’s   local   residency   requirement   did  
indeed fix the place where voting must occur, the deeming provision notwithstanding. 
The court reached this conclusion based on reasoning that applied equally to the two laws 
passed in 1864, so the ruling effectively   nullified   all   three   of   the   state’s   soldier-voting 
laws.  
The case was Bourland v. Hildreth. 304 It arose out of eight contested elections for 
various county offices in Tuolumne County. The county board of supervisors counted the 
absent-soldier votes cast under the 1863 soldier-voting law, giving election wins to the 
eight defendants. On challenge by the eight plaintiffs, who would have won their 
elections if soldier votes had been excluded, the lower court overturned that result, 
agreeing with the plaintiffs that the constitution barred absentee voting.  The cases were 
consolidated on appeal to the state Supreme Court, which in a 3-2 vote affirmed the lower 
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court’s  exclusion  of  the  soldier  votes.    Four  of  the  five  justices  wrote  opinions,  covering  
84 pages in the California reports.  
Perhaps   the   easiest   question   the   court   faced  was  whether   the   statute’s   deeming  
provision transformed absentee voting into local voting by declaring as a legal fiction that 
votes   cast   outside   the   soldier’s   home   county  would   nevertheless   “be   considered,   taken  
and held to have been given by them [i.e., the soldiers] in the respective counties of 
which   they   are   residents.”305 The   court’s  majority   opinion   ridiculed   this   attempted   end  
run. If the legislature can deem an absentee vote to have been cast locally, it could just as 
easily  deem  a  minor’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  an  adult,  or  an  alien’s  vote  to  have  been  
cast  by  a  citizen,  or  a  colored  man’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  a  white  man.  Not  only  did  
this   provision   “efface”   the   constitution, it actually backfired, serving as a legislative 
admission that the constitution created the very limitation that the act attempted, by 
creating a fiction, to circumvent.306 
Justice Oscar Shafter, whose pre-court ties were to the abolitionist Liberty Party, 
wrote   the   court’s   majority   opinion.   Shafter   indulged   a   lengthy   examination   of   the  
sentence  structure  and  syntax  of  the  constitution’s  Article  II,  section  1.  He  concluded  that  
the  phrase  “in  which  he  claims  his  vote,”  as  used  in  the  constitution’s  statement  of  a  30-
day county residency qualification, made no sense other than as an expression of the 
framers’  intent  to  fix  the  location  of  voting  in  the  elector’s  home  county.  To  this  syntactic  
analysis, Justice Shafter added what he saw as the instruction   of   history.   Plaintiffs’  
counsel  had  argued  that  one  could  “claim”  his  vote in his home county if that was where 
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his vote ended up being counted, even if he physically cast his ballot elsewhere. Shafter 
disagreed. To the framers of the 1849 constitution,  the  meaning  of  the  word  “vote”  was  
“imparted   by   traditions   that   became   historical”   and   by   “habits   of   thought   that   became  
chronic, and habits of action that became muscular almost, both in England and this 
country,  ages  before  1849.”  Under  those  traditions and habits, a vote was the physical act 
of casting a ballot (or giving a voice vote) in person, not just the result of that physical act 
in  the  subsequent  tally.  When  they  used  the  phrase  “claim  his  vote”  in  the  county  in  the  
county  of  the  voter’s  residence,  the  constitution’s  framers  could  only  have  meant  that  the  
voter must physically cast his ballot in that county.307 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Lorenzo Sawyer leaned even harder on the 
lessons  of  history  in  lending  meaning  to  the  constitution’s  wording. Settlers from all over 
the country had populated California by the time of statehood, and they brought with 
them a universal understanding of what an election was, Sawyer reasoned. In all states,  
the personal presence of the elector was required at the place established by law 
for  receiving  votes….  The  very  idea  of  an  election  embraced  the  idea  of  a  place  
appointed  within  the  district  for  the  meeting  of  the  voters  …  and  the  presence  of  
the  elector  in  person  to  offer  or  claim  his  vote….  Men  had  no  other conception of 
the process of voting, or of offering to vote, or of claiming their votes. This 
conception and these ideas were necessarily in the minds of the men who framed 
our constitution and the people when they adopted it.308  
 
 The two dissenting justices, Silas Sanderson (a Republican) and John Currey (an 
anti-Lecompton Democrat and member of the Union Party) did not even try to dispute the 
historical novelty of absentee voting, but they attached no dispositive constitutional 
significance to that novelty. Instead, in separate opinions, Sanderson and Currey argued 
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that  the  constitution’s  wording  created  no  indisputable  bar  to  absentee  voting;;  there  was  
at least some ambiguity in the language. For them the controlling principle was that, 
absent a clear constitutional prohibition, the legislature should be free to work its will. 
They  saw  no  clear  prohibition  against  absentee  voting  in  California’s  constitution.   
 Sanderson,  the  court’s  Chief  Justice,  observed  that  if  the  framers  had  intended  to  
fix the location  of  balloting  in  the  elector’s  home  county  or  district,  they  could  have  said  
so in much clearer language than they chose. Other states had done so, the chief noted, 
with wording available to the California framers to borrow if they had wanted the same 
result.   New   York’s   constitution,   for   example,   entitled   each   elector   to   participate   in  
elections   “in   the   election   district   of   which   he   shall   at   the   time   be   a   resident,   and   not  
elsewhere.”  Kentucky’s  similarly  said  that  each  elector  “shall  vote  in  said  precinct, and 
not  elsewhere.”  California’s   framers  could  have  chosen  similarly  direct  wording   if   they  
had  meant  to  fix  the  location  of  voting  in  the  elector’s  home  county  or  district.  Sanderson  
was unwilling to infer a clear intent about the where of voting from the prepositional 
phrase  “in  which  he  claims  his  vote”  appearing  in  Article  II,  section  1.  Currey,  too,  found  
the   constitution’s  meaning   debatable   enough   to   sustain   the   legislation.   Only  when   the  
constitutional  bar  exists  “beyond  a  reasonable  doubt” may the court strike down a statute. 
For Currey, there was too much doubt here.309  
 The majority agreed with the dissenters that legislation is presumptively 
constitutional. Sounding very much like dissenter Currey, Justice Shafter said in his 
majority opinion,   “In   a   doubtful   case   the   benefit   of   the   doubt   is   to   be   given   to   the  
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Legislature.” 310  They disagreed not about the presumption, but about the source of 
evidence that might overcome the presumption. The dissenters in Bourland v. Hildreth, 
like the majority   in   Ohio’s   Lehman v. McBride (upholding   that   state’s   soldier-voting 
law), stood on respectable jurisprudential footing in confining their analysis to the 
constitution’s   text   as   they   found   it   in   1864   and   wherein   they   found   no   indubitable  
prohibition against absentee voting laws. The majority in Bourland v. Hildreth, like the 
dissent in Lehman v. McBride, adopted a different, and also respectable, interpretative 
approach. They looked to history to ascertain the meaning framers probably attached to 
the words they used in drafting constitutional text. Those jurists found, in that historically 
derived meaning, an original intention that left no room for absentee voting legislation, 
and they gave effect to that intention by voting to strike down soldier-voting laws.  
 
Junior State Outliers 
Missouri, Nevada, and Illinois 
The soldier-voting arrangements in these three states stand as a subset of the 
junior states because each comes freighted with problems of legitimacy (Missouri) or 
relevance (Nevada and Illinois). Missouri made provision for voting by absent soldiers 
earlier  than  any  other  state  (Pennsylvania’s  prewar  law  aside),  but  it  did  so  with  dubious  
legitimacy.  Nevada became a state only days before the 1864 election and implemented 
soldier voting through questionable jerry rigging. And Illinois enacted its soldier-voting 
law in 1865, too late to matter politically. 
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Missouri 
 A system allowing absent soldiers to vote took hold in Missouri early in the war, 
having been adopted before any other state had enacted soldier-voting legislation 
(Pennsylvania’s   prewar   statute   excepted).   It   was   installed   neither   legislatively   nor   by  
constitutional amendment, as were the soldier-voting arrangements in all other states. 
Those routes were unavailable in Missouri, where an intrastate civil war, within the 
broader national Civil War, had resulted in 1861 in the collapse of civil government.  So, 
instead of legislation or constitutional amendment, Missouri created its soldier-voting 
system by a so-called   “ordinance”   issued   by an essentially rump legislative body, the 
remnants of a convention originally elected to consider whether the state should secede 
from the union and join the Confederacy. 
Early   in   1861,   even   before   Lincoln’s   inauguration   and   months   before   Sumter,  
Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson had called for a secession convention in hopes that 
Missouri would join the seceding states of the south. Jackson had made a name for 
himself leading the invasion of pro-slavery Missourians into Kansas in hopes of securing 
a pro-slavery constitution for that incoming state.  The Democratic-controlled legislature 
authorized the formation of such a convention by popular vote, without anticipating that 
the populace would choose predominantly pro-union delegates.  The convention spurned 
Jackson and the legislature by rejecting secession.  
That did nothing to dampen   Jackson’s   enthusiasm   for   the   Southern cause.  
Fearing that Jackson would allow a federal arsenal to fall into Confederate hands and take 
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the state out of the Union notwithstanding the unionist sentiments of the convention, 
Federal forces under Nathaniel Lyon moved against Jackson and the legislature in 
Jefferson City. Jackson and the legislature fled, leaving the state without a functioning 
government. The convention, which had adjourned after rejecting secession, reconvened, 
named   a   new   governor,   and   set   itself   up   as   the   state’s   legislative   body.      Dubbed   the  
“Long   Convention,”   it   retained   governing   control   of   the   state   throughout   the   war,   all  
without constitutional authority.311  Its claim to sovereign authority, such as it was, rested 
on a provision of  the  convention’s  enabling  statute,  passed  by  the  legislature  in  January.  
That   law   granted   the   convention   authority   “to   adopt   such  measures   for   vindicating   the  
sovereignty of the State, and the protection of its institutions, as shall appear to them to 
be  demanded.”312 Whether the legislature intended by this language to delegate plenary 
legislative authority to the convention is uncertain, and the constitutionality of such a 
delegation, assuming it was intended, is also uncertain. This casts doubt on the legitimacy 
of the convention to take quasi-legislative action.313 
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In   the   convention’s   fourth   session,   in   June   1862,   it   enacted   an   “ordinance”   to  
allow absentee voting by soldiers.314  By its terms,  the  ordinance  lasted  only  “during  the  
present  war.”315  It covered only militia and volunteers, not regulars. This comported with 
the   state’s   1820   constitution,  which   excluded   from   the   voting   franchise   every   “soldier,  
seaman, or mariner in the regular  army  or  navy  of   the  United  States.”316  As limited to 
volunteers and militia, the ordinance also excluded draftees. 
The ordinance adopted the Iowa model by calling for election sites to open in 
locations where Missouri soldiers served. 317    The process called for voting by 
“company,”   which   effectively   excluded   naval   personnel.   The   ordinance   provided   no  
direct support for creating the voting site, as for example by having officials in Missouri 
send the field commanders necessary election paraphernalia such as poll books and ballot 
boxes. To the contrary, it left the commanding officers entirely on their own, instructing 
them  to  “cause  …  poll  books  to  be  made  out  for  each  company….”318 The process called 
for separate poll books for each Missouri county where voting soldiers resided.319  This 
                                                 
314.  Missouri  Convention.  “An  ordinance  to  enable  citizens  of  this  state,  in  the  military  service  of  the  
United States or the State  of  Missouri,   to  vote,  June  12,  1862.”  Journal and proceedings of the Missouri 
State Convention: Held at Jefferson City, June, 1862. St. Louis: G. Knapp & Co., 1862 (hereafter cited as 
“Missouri  Ordinance.”) 
     315. Id. at § 1.  In April 1865, the state adopted a new constitution. It included absentee voting rights for 
qualified electors absent in the volunteer military service of the United States or the militia service of 
Missouri. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § XXI.  The replacement constitution of 1875 included no such 
provision.  
316. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10. 
317 .   Enactment   of   the   Missouri   ordinance   predated   enactment   of   Iowa’s   law   by   three   months,   so  
absentee-voting   laws   of   this   type,   including   Iowa’s,   arguably   adopted   the   “Missouri   model.”   Iowa, 
however, was the first state to legislate an absentee-voting system in the Civil War through the mechanism 
of an elected legislative body of indubitable legitimacy. 
318. Missouri Ordinance, §§ 1, 2. 
319. Id. at § 5. 
392  
 
could have created daunting logistical challenges for company commanders, depending 
on  how  many  of  the  state’s  113  counties  were  represented  among  his  cohort  of  troops.320 
The   company’s   commanding   officer   appointed   “three   good,   discreet and 
disinterested  persons”  as  election  judges.  Each  had  to  be  a  qualified  Missouri  voter  and  
had   to   swear  an  oath   to   “impartially  discharge   the  duties  of   judge.”  The   judges   in   turn  
appointed two clerks. 321  Uniquely among all absentee voting systems, the Missouri 
ordinance allowed soldier voting by voice or written ballot.  (Kentucky required voice 
vote, pursuant to its constitution.  All other states provided for voting by written ballot. 
See discussion of Kentucky, infra.) 
 The ordinance required all voters to take an oath of loyalty.322 In addition, it 
authorized  the  election  judges  “to  administer  oaths  and  to  test  the  qualifications  of  voters,  
and   to   prevent   frauds.” 323  But   it   provided   no   guidance   on   how   to   test   a   voter’s  
qualifications or what oath to administer.  Unlike   legislation   in  many   states,  Missouri’s  
ordinance made no provision for commissioners to assist with the voting or for copies of 
the law to be provided to the company commanders or the election judges.  The 
ordinance presupposed that the election officials knew the qualifications for suffrage in 
Missouri, which the ordinance did not repeat. 324  The ordinance purported to subject 
soldiers to criminal penalties – up to three months in prison, plus a fine of twenty to fifty 
                                                 
320 Missouri Counties, accessed October 3, 2013 www.mo.gov/government/city-county-
government/counties/counties. 
321. Missouri Ordinance, §§ 3, 4. 
322. Id. at § 13. 
323. Id. at § 8. 
324. The 1820 constitution granted the suffrage  to  “every  free  white  male  citizen  of  the  United  States”  
who was 21-years old, and who had resided one year in Missouri and three months in the county or district 
“in  which  he  offers  to  vote.”  MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10. Similar formulations in Pennsylvania and 
Michigan led the high courts in those states to strike down soldier-voting laws.  In the absence of 
functioning civil government, Missouri lacked an orderly mechanism for a similar test of its ordinance. 
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dollars – for voting fraudulently, although, as in all other states, such extra-territorial 
penalties would have been difficult to enforce.325 At the close of the elections, the 
judges had to forward the election returns, plus a poll book, to each Missouri county 
represented by a voting soldier. The judge could do so either by mail or by assigning one 
of the clerks to carry the materials personally.326 
 In   July   1865,   a   new   constitution   went   into   effect   in  Missouri.      It’s   ratification  
process allowed absent soldiers to participate, and its suffrage provision granted absentee 
voting   rights   to  members   in   “the  volunteer   army  of   the  United  States,   or   in   the  militia  
force   of   this   state….” 327  On revision in 1875, the state constitution omitted this 
provision.328 
 
Nevada 
Nevada is the outlier among the twenty states that allowed absentee soldier voting 
during the Civil War in that the novelty of absentee voting collided with no established 
voting tradition there.  The state was too young to have had any traditions at all. As of 
Election Day in November 1864, Nevada was barely a week into statehood and had no 
peacetime experience as an American polity. The first session of its territorial legislature 
convened in October 1861, nearly six months after Sumter, and the former territory 
became a state five months before Appomattox.329 The backdrop of war shaped all its 
early   political   and   legal   development;;   among   its   nicknames   is   “the  Battle-Born  State.”  
                                                 
325. Missouri Ordinance, § 12. 
326. Id. at § 5. 
327. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § XXI. 
328. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII. 
329. 1861 Terr. of Nev. Laws 1.  
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During  those  formative  wartime  years,  as  the  state’s  leaders  most  surely  knew,  absentee  
soldier voting was becoming a reality all over the Union that Nevada sought to join.  
Unsurprisingly, it joined that Union with absentee soldier voting engrafted into its legal 
foundation. 
 More surprising is the role the federal government played in securing voting 
rights  for  Nevada’s  absent  soldiers.  (In  no  other  state  did  Congress  play  any  formal  role  
at all.) The federal enabling act authorizing Nevada Territory to organize a state 
government required that absent Nevada soldiers be permitted to vote in the elections for 
delegates to the constitutional convention, as long as the absent soldiers were qualified 
electors under territorial laws.330  Unsurprisingly, the convention proposed a constitution 
that  explicitly  gave  absent  soldiers  “the  right  of  suffrage,”  provided  they were qualified 
electors.331  
The   same   federal   enabling   act   called   for   Nevada   to   pass   an   “ordinance”  
submitting the proposed constitution to a ratification vote, this time without a 
requirement that absent soldiers participate. 332  Nevada’s   constitutional   convention 
obliged  with  an  “Election  Ordinance”  that  allowed  absent  soldiers  to  vote  for  or  against  
                                                 
330. Act of Congress to enable the people of Nevada to form a constitution and state government and 
for the admission of such state into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, ch. 36, § 3, 13 
Stat.  30,  35  (1864)  (The  federal  statute  is  set  forth  at  page  35  of  the  “Statutes  of  the  State  of  Nevada  Passed  
at the First Session of the Legislature, 1864-1865.”)   (The   federal   law   is   hereafter   cited   as   the   “Federal  
Enabling  Act”) 
331. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 3. The residence qualification was set at six months in the state and 
thirty days in the district or county. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 1. The proposed constitution also made 
clear   that   a   person’s   presence   or   absence   “while   employed   in   the   service   of   the   United   States”   had   no  
bearing on his qualification as a resident. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 2.  
332. Federal Enabling Act, § 5. 
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the proposed constitution in the ratification election in September 1864.333 Then the 
Election Ordinance went a big step further. It allowed soldiers to vote for the state and 
federal offices at stake in the November elections. The Election Ordinance set both votes 
– the one on ratification and the one for state and federal offices – for the same date in 
September.334  
It was a creative move by the constitutional convention. It purported to regulate 
voting for federal electors before statehood became a reality and therefore before a state 
legislature existed. This was problematic under the U.S. Constitution, which assigned to 
state legislatures the job of deciding the “manner”   of   appointing   electors   for   president  
and vice-president.335  But, given the pace of the statehood timetable, it was the only way 
to achieve military suffrage in time for the November elections. It worked. Absent 
Nevada soldiers not only joined in the vote that ratified the proposed constitution, but 
they also voted in the 1864 elections, doing so before Nevada even existed as a state.  
Nevada’s  military  suffrage  act,  set  forth  in  sections  7  through  14  of  the  Election  
Ordinance, loosely followed the Iowa model. It applied to all soldiers who were qualified 
Nevada electors, with no exception for draftees or regulars. It contemplated voting sites 
not only where ground troops were stationed – regiments, battalions, and batteries – but 
also naval squadrons. It called for the governor to send the commanding officer of each 
unit where a Nevada elector served a list of the Nevada men in his command who was 
                                                 
333. Election Ordinance of 1864, § 2, 1 Nev. Comp. Laws; Embracing Statutes of 1861 to 1873, 
(Bonnifield   &   Healy)   cxxxvii   (1873)   (Hereafter   cited   as   Election   Ordinance.”)   The   constitutional  
convention adopted the Election Ordinance and published it with the proposed constitution. The Election 
Ordinance was not an enactment of the regular territorial legislature of 1864. 
334. Id. at § 3. 
335. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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eligible to vote.336  The three highest-ranking officers presided over the voting, checking 
off the name of each soldier on his list as the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box. A 
single  ballot  stated  not  only  the  soldier’s  vote  for  or  against  the  proposed  constitution,  but  
also his preference for each of the state and federal offices up for grabs in November: 
Supreme Court and district court judges, members of the state legislature, congressional 
representative, and electors for president and vice-president.337  
At the conclusion of the balloting, the presiding officers prepared a return of the 
results, both on the question of ratification and for each contested office, using blank 
forms provided by the governor.338 The   commanding   officer   “sealed   up”   the   ballots,  
voting lists, and returns, then mailed the bundle to the governor in Carson City. 339 
Separately, he sent a copy of the returns to the county clerks. 
The arrangement was riddled with gaps that invited fraud. There was no 
requirement that the presiding officers themselves be qualified Nevada electors. The law 
prescribed no oaths for the officers or for the voters. It made no provisions for hearing or 
deciding  challenges  of   a   soldier’s   eligibility.   It   prescribed  no  procedure   for   confirming  
that the soldier casting a ballot was the same man whose name appeared on the list of 
eligible voters. It made no provision for supplying the officers with copies of the 
ordinance. And it did not provide for commissioners to assist with implementing the 
voting process. It was, in short, the barest of a barebones soldier-voting law.  
                                                 
336.  Election  Ordinance,  §§  7,  8.  The  territorial  “Adjunct  General”  compiled  the  list  for  the  governor. 
337. Id. at § 10. 
338. Id. at §§ 12, 13. 
339. Id. at §11. 
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Soldier voting in Nevada survived the Civil War. In 1866, the legislature 
incorporated military suffrage provisions into the general elections law. 340  Such 
provisions remained a part of Nevada law into the twentieth century.341 
 
Illinois 
 Two obstacles stood in the way of a soldier-voting law in Illinois: the state 
constitution  and  Democratic  majorities  in  the  legislature.    Section  1  of  the  constitution’s  
suffrage  provision  stated  that  no  elector  “shall  be  entitled  to  vote,  except  in  the  district  or  
county in which he shall actually reside at the time  of  such  election.”342 A very similar 
provision   in   New   York’s   constitution   had   prompted   that   state’s   Democratic   Governor  
Horatio Seymour to veto a soldier-voting bill passed by the Republican-controlled 
legislature. But political roles in Illinois were New York’s   polar   opposite.      Illinois  
Republican Governor Richard Yates, far from finding the constitution an impediment, 
proposed in 1863 to the Democratically controlled legislature that they pass a soldier-
voting law.  Democrats declined.   
Yates’s  based  his argument on a different provision of the constitution. Section 5 
of  the  suffrage  article  said,  “No  elector  shall  be  deemed  to  have  lost  his  residence  in  this  
                                                 
340. An Act Relating to Elections, NEV. REV. STAT. Ch. CVII, § 23 (1866). 
341. An Act to Provide for Taking the Votes of Electors of the State of Nevada, who may be in the 
Military Service of the United States, NEV. REV. STAT. § 1887, et seq. (1912).  By 1921, the right to vote 
by absentee ballot had been extended to all qualified voters. An Act to Provide a Method for Voting at any 
General,  Special,  or  Primary  Election  by  Qualified  Voters  who  …  are  Unavoidably  Absent  …  on  the  Day  
of Election, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 2553, et seq., (1929). 
342. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 1. Illinois proposed a revised  constitution  in  1862,  but  the  state’s  
voters rejected it. It did not propose to change the language of Article VI, § 1 with respect to the place of 
voting, and therefore would not have permitted absent soldiers to vote. Curiously, absent soldiers were 
allowed to vote in the ratification process. Unsurprisingly, the soldier-vote was lopsidedly against 
ratification. Benton, Voting in the Field, 252-253. 
398  
 
state  by   reason  of  his  absence  on   the  business  of   the  United  States,  or  of   this   state.”343  
Yates reasoned that the framers would not have included this provision if they believed 
that the legislature lacked authority to provide absentee voting opportunities for the 
troops.344  Democrats were unmoved. 
When the legislature reconvened in 1865, Republicans controlled both chambers. 
Yates again urged adoption of a soldier-voting law, and this time the legislature agreed.  
It passed a law adopting the Minnesota model, and very nearly duplicating the law New 
York had enacted after amending its constitution.345 By this time, however, the election 
was past and the war was winding down. Governor and legislators alike may have sensed 
that Illinois troops would derive little benefit from the law.  But it went on the books 
nevertheless. Only Maryland enacted soldier-voting legislation later than this enactment 
in Illinois, and in Maryland soldiers had voted in the 1864 elections under the provisions 
of an 1864 constitutional amendment. (See discussion of Maryland, supra.)  
The law covered military personnel comprehensively,  applying  to  “every  elector  
…  in  the  actual  military  service  of  the  United  States,  in  the  army  or  navy  thereof….”346 
This included regulars, volunteers, and draftees.  The law applied to elections for state 
and county offices, but not to federal elections.347 It called for each qualified soldier to 
forward his sealed ballot or ballots to a qualified voter in his hometown, who then 
                                                 
343. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 5. 
344. Benton, Voting in the Field, 262.    California’s  constitution  of  1849  had  a  similar  provision.  In  the  
California Supreme Court case of Bourland, counsel   for   the  parties  seeking   to  uphold   the  state’s  soldier-
voting law went a step further than Yates. He argued that this language not only authorized a soldier-voting 
law, but actually mandated it. The court disagreed. Bourland,  26 Cal. at 161. 
345. An Act to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State, Absent therefrom in the Military Service of 
the  United   States,   in   the  Army   or  Navy   thereof,   to  Vote,   1865   Ill.   Laws   59   (hereafter   cited   as   “Illinois  
Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1865”). 
346. Illinois Soldier-Voting Law of 1865, § 1. 
347. Id. 
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delivered the ballot(s) at the election site. Two sworn statements accompanied the ballots. 
The first, sealed in the same envelope as the ballot, was a document appointing the 
soldier’s   designee   back   home.   It   had   to   be   signed   by   a   witness   and   an   officer.   The  
second,  printed  on  the  back  of  the  envelope,  was  an  affidavit  attesting  to  the  serviceman’s  
qualifications as a voter (other than his race and gender): that he was over 21, that he was 
a citizen of Illinois and had resided there for at least a year and in his city, ward or 
precinct for at least 60 days. It also identified the military unit in which he served.348   
The soldier then sealed this envelope inside a second envelope, marked the outer 
envelope   “soldier’s   vote,”   and   sent   it   to   his   designee   back   home.   That   man   signed   a  
receipt for it at the post office349 and delivered the interior envelope, unopened, to the 
voting site. If the inner envelope arrived at the election site unsealed, election officials 
had  to  reject   it.     Those  officials  had  to  confirm  that   the  soldier’s  name  appeared  on  the  
voting lists. If it did, they opened the envelope and deposited the ballot in the ballot box. 
If   it   did   not,   the   envelope   remained   sealed   and   the   ballot   uncounted,   unless   “a  
householder  of  the  district”  swore  in  writing  that  the  absent  soldier  was  indeed  a  resident  
of the district.350  
To help absent soldiers cope with all the red tape and legalese, the law called on 
the Secretary of State to prepare blank affidavits and envelopes and to ship them to 
                                                 
348. Id. at §§ 2, 3. 
349. The law, anticipating that multiple soldiers might designate the same elector back home for 
delivery of their ballots, required each designee to state, on the receipt he gave at the post office, how many 
such letters he had received. Id. at § 7. 
350. Id. at §§ 4, 5. 
400  
 
military   locations  where   Illinois  men   served,   providing      “sufficient   quantity”   to   assure  
that there was one of everything – envelopes and affidavits – for every serviceman.351 
The law set harsh penalties for cheating: four months in jail and $250 for election 
judges  and  soldiers’  designees  who  “willfully”  broke  the  law;;  one  to  five  years  in  prison  
for false statements in an affidavit; and one to three years in prison for forging or altering 
ballots.352  
The   Illinois   law   never   came   before   the   state’s   high   court   for   review,   probably  
because the troops all returned home before the next election. In light of the results in the 
nine states where supreme courts did review such laws, this one may have stood little 
chance of surviving. No high court upheld a soldier-voting law in the face of 
constitutional  language  as  restrictive  as  Illinois’s. 
The Illinois law did not long outlast the war.  No soldier-voting provisions appear 
in  the  election  law  section  of  the  state’s  1874  revised  laws.353   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
351. Id. at § 12. 
352. Id. at §§ 8, 9, 10. 
353. Elections, ch. 46, ILL. REV. STAT. (1874). 
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During the Civil War, twenty northern states changed their laws to permit absent 
soldiers to vote. Before enactment of these statutes, state laws had tethered balloting to 
the   voter’s   community   and required in-person participation by voters. Under the new 
laws, eligible voters – as long as they were soldiers – could cast ballots in distant military 
encampments, far from their neighbors and community leaders. This dissertation 
examines the legal conflicts that arose from this phenomenon and the political causes 
underlying it.  
 Legally, the laws represented an abrupt change, contrary to earlier scholarship 
viewing them as culminating a gradual process of relaxing residency rules in the 
antebellum period. In fact, the laws left intact all prewar suffrage qualifications, including 
residency requirements. Their radicalism lay not in changing rules about who could vote, 
but in departing from the prewar legal blueprint of what elections were and how voters 
participated in them.  The changes were constitutionally problematic, generating court 
challenges   in   some   states   and   constitutional   amendments   in   others.   Ohio’s   experience 
432  
 
offers a case study demonstrating the radicalism of the legal change and the constitutional 
tension it created. 
 In political history, prior scholarship has largely overlooked the role the issue of 
soldier voting played in competition for civilian votes.  The politics of 1863-1864 drew 
soldiers into partisan messaging, since servicemen spoke with authority on the themes the 
parties  used   to  attack   their  opponents:   the  candidates’  military   incompetence,  Lincoln’s  
neglect   of   the   troops,   and  McClellan’s   cowardice and disloyalty. Soldiers participated 
politically not only as voters, but also as spokesmen for these messages to civilian voters. 
In this setting, the soldier-voting issue became a battleground in partisan efforts to show 
kinship with soldiers. The issue’s   potency   became   evident   nationally   after   the   1863  
Pennsylvania gubernatorial race, presaging the 1864 presidential contest. The Republican 
incumbent  ran  as  “the  soldiers’  friend”  and  attacked  his  Democratic  rival  as  the  enemy  of  
soldiers for opposing that  state’s  soldier-voting law.  The issue was decisive in securing 
civilian votes for the victorious Republican. That experience launched a nationwide push 
by Republicans to enact soldier-voting laws in time for the 1864 elections. 
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